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R. Malcolm Errington

A History of the Hellenistic World

323–30 BC



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Preface

The ancient Greeks did not know a Hellenistic world. If they had thought about creating periods for their own history, as modern historians do for their own convenience, I suspect they would have chosen the series of Roman defeats of the Macedonian monarchies beginning in 197 as the epochal events that substantially changed their world, not the role of the monarchies themselves. The Macedonians, for all the structural strangeness of their states, were in the last resort Greeks, their states Greek powers, and for many Greeks they were more beneficent leaders than Athens or Sparta had been in their heyday. I have therefore tried in this book to emphasize continuities with the past and to depict the Hellenistic world of the third and second centuries BC as a natural development of the events of the classical period. I have tried to pay particular attention to regional developments, which were conditioned by differing regional histories in the previous period, and to show that the Hellenistic world was a complex and constantly changing network of sociopolitical relationships at differing societal levels – in this respect not fundamentally different from the “classical period” – certainly not a mammoth static colossus that merely required the earthquake of Roman intervention to produce its collapse. I have therefore placed in the foreground the history of public events, of state and communal activities, the affairs of the monarchies, the cities, and the federations of cities, since the interplay of these structural entities provided the fundamental sociopolitical and economic conditions under which the people of the Hellenistic world lived. This book is therefore a history of important public events and developments, not an encyclopedia with a brief run-down on all aspects of cultural life in the 300 years covered by it.

I am grateful to A1 Bertrand for asking me to write a book of this kind and for his tolerance in waiting for its long-delayed completion, as well as to the generous and constructive criticisms of three anonymous readers, whose comments on an earlier version have produced substantial improvements.

R. Malcolm Errington

Berlin, June 2007

Abbreviations

AfP	<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete</i> . Leipzig, 1901–.
Ager	S. L. Ager, <i>Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 BC</i> . Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996.
Allen	R. E. Allen, <i>The Attalid Kingdom: A Constitutional History</i> . Oxford, 1983.
Austin ²	M. M. Austin, <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation</i> . Second edition. Cambridge, 2006.
Bagnall	R. S. Bagnall, <i>The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt</i> . Leiden, 1976.
BCH	<i>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</i> . Paris, 1877–.
BD ²	R. S. Bagnall and P. Derow, <i>Historical Sources in Translation: The Hellenistic Period</i> . Oxford, 2004.
Bikerman	E. Bikerman, <i>Institutions des Séleucides</i> . Paris, 1938.
Bingen, P. Revenue Laws	J. Bingen, <i>Papyrus Revenue Laws. Nouvelle édition du texte</i> . Göttingen, 1952.
Boiy	T. Boiy, <i>Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 136)</i> . Leuven, Paris, and Dudley, MA, 2004.
Bresson-Descat	A. Bresson and R. Descat, <i>Les Cites d'Asie Mineure occidentale au II^e siècle a.C. Ausonius, Études 8</i> . Bordeaux and Paris, 2001.
Bringmann-Von Steuben	K. Bringmann and H. von Steuben, <i>Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer</i> . Vol. 1. Berlin, 1995.
Bruneau	<i>Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique et à l'époque impériale</i> . Paris, 1970.
Bull. Ép.	<i>Bulletin Épigraphique in Revue des Études Grecques</i> .
Burstein	<i>Translated Documents of Greece and Rome</i> . Vol. 3: S. M. Burstein, <i>The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsus to the Death of Kleopatra VII</i> . Cambridge, 1985.
CID	<i>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes</i> . Paris, 1977–.
CIG	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . Berlin, 1828–1877.
C. Ord. Ptol.	M.-Th. Lenger, <i>Corpus des ordonnances des Ptolémées</i> . Second edition. Brussels, 1980.
Dreyer-Engelmann, I. Metropolis	B. Dreyer and H. Engelmann, <i>Die Inschriften von Metropolis I</i> . Bonn, 2003.
Ducrey-van Effenterre, Kretika Chronika	P. Ducrey and H. van Effenterre, "Traité des attalides avec des cités crétoises," <i>Kretika Chronika</i> 21, 1969, 277–300.
Durrbach	F. Durrbach, <i>Choix d'inscriptions de Délos</i> . Paris, 1921–1923.
FgrHist	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Leiden, 1923–.
Habicht, Studien	Ch. Habicht, <i>Studien zur Geschichte Athens in</i>

Harding	<i>hellenischer Zeit</i> . Göttingen, 1982. <i>Translated Documents of Greece and Rome</i> . Vol. 2: P. Harding, <i>From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus</i> . Cambridge, 1985.
Hölbl	G. Hölbl, <i>History of the Ptolemaic Empire</i> . London and New York, 2001.
Holleaux, <i>Études</i>	M. Holleaux, <i>Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques</i> . Paris, 1938–1968.
<i>I.Cret.</i>	M. Guarducci, <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> . Rome, 1935–1950.
<i>I.Délos</i>	<i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> . Paris, 1926–1972.
<i>I.Didyma</i>	A. Rehm, <i>Didyma II. Die Inschriften</i> . Berlin, 1958.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . Berlin, 1903–.
<i>I.Iasos</i>	W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften von Iasos</i> . Bonn, 1987–1988.
<i>I.Ilion</i>	P. Frisch (ed.), <i>Die Inschriften von Ilion</i> . Bonn, 1975.
<i>I.Milet</i>	<i>Milet I and II</i> . Berlin, 1906–1935.
<i>IOSPE</i>	B. Latyšev, <i>Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae</i> . St. Petersburg, 1885–1901.
<i>I.Peraia</i>	W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften der rhodischen Peraia</i> . Bonn, 1991.
<i>I.Priene</i>	F. Hiller von Gaertringen, <i>Inschriften von Priene</i> . Berlin, 1906.
<i>ISE</i>	L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i> . Florence, 1967–1976.
Jones, <i>Cities</i>	A. H. M. Jones, <i>Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces</i> . Second edition. Oxford, 1971.
Keil and Premerstein	J. Keil and A. v. Premerstein, <i>Bericht über eine zweite Reise in Lydien</i> . <i>Denkschr. Akad. Wien, Phil-Hist. Kl.</i> 54, 1911.
Le Guen	B. Le Guen, <i>Les Associations de technites dionysiaques à l'époque hellénistique</i> . Nancy and Paris, 2001.
<i>LSAM</i>	F. Sokolowski, <i>Lois sacrées d'Asie Mineure</i> . Paris, 1955.
Ma	J. Ma, <i>Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor</i> . Oxford, 1999.
Maier, <i>Mauerbauinschriften</i>	F. G. Maier, <i>Griechische Mauerbauinschriften</i> . Vol. 1. (<i>Vestigia</i> 1). Munich, 1959.
Michel	Ch. Michel, <i>Recueil d'inscriptions grecques</i> . Brussels, 1900.
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Moretti, <i>Inscr.ag.gr.</i>	L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni agonistiche greche</i> . Rome, 1953.
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Ogden, <i>Hellenistic World</i>	D. Ogden (ed.), <i>The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives</i> . London, 2002.
<i>OGIS</i>	W. Dittenberger, <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> . Leipzig, 1903–1905.
<i>P.Cair.Zen.</i>	<i>Catalogue général des antiquités du musée du Caire: Zenon Papyri</i> , ed. C. C. Edgar. Cairo,

<i>P. Enteuxis</i>	1925ff.
<i>P. Hal.</i>	O. Guéraud, <i>Enteuxeis</i> . Cairo, 1931–1932.
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Petrakos, <i>Rhamnous</i>	<i>Ho demos tou Rhamnuntos</i> . Athens, 1999.
RC	C. B. Welles, <i>Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period</i> . New Haven, 1934.
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Robert, <i>OMS</i>	L. Robert, <i>Opera Minor Selecta</i> . Amsterdam, 1969–1990.
<i>Roman Statutes</i>	M. H. Crawford et al. (eds.), <i>Roman Statutes</i> . London, 1996.
Roussel, <i>DCA</i>	P. Roussel, <i>Délos colonie athenienne</i> ² . Paris, 1987.
Scholten	J. Scholten, <i>The Politics of Plunder: Aitolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279–217 BC</i> . Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999.
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> . Leiden and Amsterdam, 1923–.
Seibert, <i>Dynastischen Verbindungen</i>	J. Seibert, <i>Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit</i> [<i>Historia</i> , Einzelschriften 10], Wiesbaden, 1967.
Sherk, <i>RDGE</i>	R. K. Sherk, <i>Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus</i> . Baltimore, 1969.
Sherk, <i>RGEDA</i>	<i>Translated Documents of Greece and Rome</i> . Vol. 4: R. K. Sherk, <i>Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus</i> . Cambridge, 1984.
SP	A. S. Hunt and G. C. Edgar, <i>Select Papyri</i> . Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1932–1934.
StV	H. H. Schmitt, <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> . Vol. 3. Munich, 1969.
Syll. ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . Third edition. Leipzig, 1914–1924.

Map 1 The Hellenistic World



Map 2 Greece and Asia Minor





Map 3 Central and Southern Greece



Map 4 Asia Minor and Syria



Introduction

At the Olympic Games in August 324 BC an envoy from the Macedonian king made an epochal announcement to the participants and visitors, assembled from throughout the Greek world. On this occasion they included a large number of men exiled from their native cities: “We were not responsible for your exile but – except for those under a curse – we shall be the cause of your restoration, each to your own native city. We have written to Antipater about these things, so that he will exert compelling pressure on those cities unwilling to receive you back.”

The occasion was epochal for a number of reasons. The Macedonian king Alexander, later known as “the Great,” sent his message from distant Iran, echoing the high imperial tone of the recently conquered Persian monarch whom he had deposed, to the most prestigious international religious festival of the independent Greek states. Instead of treating each Greek state as the autonomous independent community which each traditionally claimed to be, and examining each local situation as a separate issue, he globalized the admittedly widespread problem of exiles – though its local causes varied widely from city to city – and treated all in the same way. At the same time he threatened the general use of overwhelming force from his regional representative against those states that dared to disobey. He did not even pretend to use the existing international mechanism, the association of Greek states created by his father after the battle of Chaironeia in 338 and known to us as “the Korinthian League,” nor did he show respect for local traditions and conditions. The Greek states were treated as a block and simply expected to carry out his instructions, which would inevitably cause commotion and distress when political exiles returned with the implicit support of Macedonian arms and reclaimed property of which they had been deprived. This was hardly the best way to win the hearts and minds of the Greek states, many of which had doubtless hoped Alexander would simply never return from his Indian adventure.

Before Alexander’s death at Babylon some ten months later, on June 10, 323, there is, however, no indication that Antipater, his viceroy in Europe, was prepared to reinforce the challenge Alexander had issued and actually intervene anywhere militarily. He obviously knew better than his distant king the dissension and political instability this could cause, though some states complied anyway in

order to avoid the risk. Alexander's authoritarian attitude, with all the disrespect for diplomatic tradition that it implied, was bound to provoke opposition in cities where the exile problem was particularly acute, at the very least in the hope of delaying or ameliorating the implementation of the order. Two politically important states felt especially affected by it, the city-state Athens and the federally organized Aitolian League in mountainous central western Greece, since both had committed serious offenses against Greek tradition and practice and currently still enjoyed their fruits. In the 360s the Athenians had captured the island of Samos from the Persian satrap Mausollos, but instead of simply binding the Samians to them in gratitude for their being freed from the Persians, the Athenians chose to expel the inhabitants ruthlessly and to replace them with their own citizen settlers. The Aitolians had acted similarly more recently – though the precise date and circumstances are not known – with the important Akarnanian harbor town, Oiniadai. Both Athens and the Aitolian League now felt unexpectedly and seriously threatened by Alexander's instruction to restore exiles and began to make preparations for resistance, while the Samians – we know nothing about the exiles from Oiniadai – gratefully began planning their imminent restoration to the island. A certain diplomatic traffic between Athens, the Samian exiles, and Alexander's court took place during the next few months, but the Athenians were dissatisfied with Alexander's response, and as soon as they heard the news of his death they made open moves together with the Aitolians towards resistance to Antipater. Under the circumstances, their claim that the coming war was a war for "Greek freedom" was morally distinctly ambiguous.

The Hellenistic period is thus ushered in with a heightened tension between one of the traditionally leading Greek cities (Athens), one of the late-developing "new states" of western Greece (the Aitolian League), and the Macedonian monarchy. The structuring of these tensions, which had been immanent in Greek politics since the diplomatic and military successes of Philip II earlier in the fourth century, would provide the characteristic framework for the political structure of the Greek world over the next three centuries. On the one hand, traditionally leading city-states with their long history of prominence and ancient traditions found themselves in competition with recently advanced new-style regional Greek states, which bound many smaller city-states together in newly effective federal structures (especially in western Greece and in the Peloponnese) and so competed for influence and prominence. On the other hand, both old and new had to learn to live with the Macedonian claim to rule. At the same time, the all-conquering Macedonians of Alexander's generation needed to relearn the lesson that Philip II's more respectful diplomacy

was in the last resort a more effective long-term principle for ruling the Greeks than Alexander's impatient authoritarianism.

It was a long and painful road for all concerned, further complicated in the second century by the emergence of strong Roman interests in the Greek world; and it would have been difficult enough, even if the scene at Babylon after Alexander's death had not been dominated by the fact that most of the senior Macedonian officers who had conquered the Persian empire with Alexander had no intention of giving up what they had so recently gained. Many of them now saw a golden opportunity for carving out of the territories occupied by Alexander a personal fiefdom with much greater potential for development than if they simply retired to Macedonia to enjoy their new wealth, though some of them indeed wished to do just that. The Persian empire conquered by Alexander stretched from the Aegean to the Punjab, and thus included vast territories, each of which had a rich and old indigenous political and cultural tradition of its own. Some of them, however, also enjoyed a centuries-old contact with the Greek world: Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt were the main areas for this, whereby the coastal zones of Asia Minor had been scattered with self-governing Greek settlements for centuries, and the long Syrian coast, known to the Greeks as "Phoinikia," was settled with a recognizably similar type of city-state structure to that of Greece itself. When the Macedonians began to rule all these areas under Alexander they were thus confronted with a type of political tradition that they were familiar with from Greece; in central Asia Minor, in Mesopotamia – and lands further east – as well as in Egypt, however, the self-governing city-state was not the dominant form of settlement.

There existed, however, a major difference between all these newly conquered lands and the European Greeks. The cities of Asia, whether Greek, Syrian, or other, had over centuries grown used to foreign territorial domination, at the latest since the Persian king Kyros the Great extended his empire to the Aegean shores in the mid-sixth century. Over the years they had had little choice but to adapt mentally to their role as subordinate locally self-governing units within a larger territorially defined state (the Persian empire and its regional "satrapies"). The Persians had in practice rarely interfered with local habits and traditions, as long as the taxes ("tribute") were paid and nothing hostile to the Persian dominance was undertaken. When Alexander's Macedonians conquered these areas they usually simply took over Persian administrative structures, while Alexander officially declared the Greeks to be liberated. Since these "liberated" Greek states were not used to exercising real political choice, they were generally content to recognize the Macedonian's essential

goodwill and therefore largely acquiesced in being ruled by him as successor to the "Great King," quietly continuing to pay what his governors demanded.

There was thus from the beginning of Macedonian rule a great difference in political experience and practice between the Greeks of the Balkans and the islands on the one hand and the Greeks of Asia on the other, who were well enough accustomed to accommodating authoritarian domination. This was even more the case with the traditionally territorially governed Mesopotamians and Egyptians, and their differing experiences serve to explain many of the observable regional differences in the years following Alexander's death while the leading Macedonians struggled with each other over the division of the spoils. It was only in the context of winning over the more independently minded Greeks of the Aegean islands and the Balkans that Alexander's marshals rediscovered the diplomatic methods that Philip II had employed to win over most of the southern Greek states in the 350s and 340s. The European Greeks had not only not been part of the Persian empire but drew a large part of their proud municipal self-confidence from memories of their defeat of Xerxes' attack in 480/79 – at a time when the Macedonians had actually helped the Persian aggressor. Moreover, for centuries these Greek states had respected and treated each other as independent political entities, even while attempting in practice to dominate each other. External conquest could therefore only be effective in the long term if their fundamental aspirations to some kind of independence were respected and the conquering power presented itself as the protector of Greek values.

In the formative years of the Hellenistic period immediately following the death of Alexander the Great at Babylon all the leading men were Macedonians or men integrated into the Macedonian imperial system created by Philip and Alexander. The aggressive dynamism of Alexander's expedition had postponed the creation of new governmental structures in the conquered or associated territories, and there is no good evidence that before his death Alexander paid much attention to the longer-term prospects presented by his whirlwind expedition. On his death the question could no longer be postponed. Existing plans for further conquest were indeed immediately dropped when the officers who happened to be gathered together at Babylon set out to consider the future of the Macedonian empire, but all those present had been socialized in the army of Alexander, and as Macedonians they were used to a monarchic system of government. The personal power of a charismatic king was the decisive single element in the governmental system that they knew and favored, since it was conditioned by but also exercised through

his officers. Their personal relationship of trust with the king was expressed by their title, “companions” (*hetairoi*), the most prominent of them being “bodyguards” (*somatophylakes*). The success of the monarchic system, it could be claimed, was shown indubitably by the achievements of Philip and Alexander, and no one present thought seriously of challenging this generally held conviction, which therefore conditioned the negotiations among the officers at Babylon.

Their first major problem, however, proved in practice to be insoluble, yet attempts at its solution structured the course of events over the next decade. The depressing fact was that the charismatic king was dead and no obvious successor was available to take his place. The royal family that had ruled in Macedonia for as long as a Macedonian state existed – the Argeadai, who assertively claimed descent from none other than Herakles himself – and that after Philip’s and Alexander’s spectacular successes now commanded more than ever the personal loyalties of nobles and commons, had no suitable candidate to present and no political sleight of hand could produce one. The loyalty-system that Philip and Alexander had created threatened to implode, just as the long-term implications of their conquests required urgent attention. It did not bode well for a peaceful future.

The governmental problems of the Hellenistic period show up at various levels of intensity in the quite different geographic areas now dominated by Alexander’s Macedonians, their descendants, and imitators. In the old Greek world, where city-states (*poleis*) had traditionally characterized political life, the Macedonian conquest by no means suppressed traditional intercity political discourse or destroyed the wish of city-state populations for self-determination, “to use their own laws and customs,” as they tended to express it. This deeply felt desire for self-determination had always involved diplomatic contact with other states and the regulation of disputes by negotiation, or by force if necessary. Nevertheless, despite this subjective assertion of independence of action, the traditional city-state political units had in the end no alternative to making and upholding contact with the new dominant Macedonian powers. This requirement, however, led in many individual communities to severe internal tensions, occasionally erupting into civil war (*stasis*) – as it had in the past – the most recent manifestation of these tensions being the presence of the hordes of exiles at the Olympic Games in 324. The main issue over which tensions now arose concerned the attitude to adopt towards the Macedonian warlords. In the first generation after Alexander’s death this became a particularly delicate question, often overlaid by longstanding local differing class and personal interests within the communities, since several Macedonians were now

competing against each other and personal loyalties became stretched to the limit.

These essential contacts with the powerful Macedonians the cities tended to try to structure through the traditional means of diplomatic traffic and discourse, though only rarely was the threat of force now a feasible gambit. Diplomacy with the ruling power could therefore only too easily develop into mere requests for aid or privilege within the overarching Macedonian dominance, and this form of contact, depending on the history of the relationship and the personal attitude of the current ruler, would take place with more or less respect for the postulated formal diplomatic equality of the partner. Personal diplomacy thus became increasingly important for the cities, and men who were able, for whatever reason, to get on well with the locally dominant Macedonian dynast or king could become extremely influential within their own city. Such men were usually financially well situated, often able and willing themselves to bear the costs of a diplomatic mission. One result of this, and other factors, was that over the long term such rich and influential citizens came to dominate the affairs of the Greek cities, even in cities where fully democratic structures were in place, at the cost of the effective participation of the mass of citizens meeting in the *ekklesia* (people's assembly). The latter found they had ever fewer matters of importance on which they could really decide, and in the long term in many places the *ekklesia* ceased to meet with any regularity.

In the non-Greek areas, where the respectful diplomatic tradition favored by the Greek world was less well established, problems of imperial government were less easily structured and resolved, and tensions were more obvious and immediate, since there could be no disguising the fact that the Macedonians and their Greek administrators (or their indigenous collaborators) were foreign occupiers, despite the real efforts they made to accommodate the interests of their subjects. At the highest political level, of course, the Macedonian rulers had to live with each other and accommodate each other's interests. This was achieved wherever possible through dynastically structured marriage alliances, which after a generation had produced a biologically interconnected Macedonian ruling ("royal") class, the leading members of which were closely related to each other. This did not mean that tensions could always be resolved by peaceful means. Indeed, this was the political level at which tensions in the Hellenistic period reached their highest level, at which disputes in the last resort could only be resolved by wars, often settled by gigantic set-piece battles, the results of which might change the whole territorial structure of the participant states.

Structural and historical differences in the different geographic

regions also influence the quality of the source materials which the modern historian of the Hellenistic period can use. By the time of Alexander the Great, the Greek world had developed cultural habits in political life which are unusually favorable for the historian. The habit that particularly developed at Athens during the democracy and was increasingly widely imitated, of publishing documentary texts that were of immediate importance to the community as a whole in the permanent form of inscriptions on stone, offers the historian a large quantity of authentic contemporary documentary material. This ranges from laws and decisions of the *ekklesia* on an ever-widening range of political matters, down to lists of participants in public organizations, such as the city-council or the youth training scheme (*ephebeia*), accounts for public works, or lists of winners in public competitions. The habit of publishing official documents became even more widespread in the Hellenistic period, as Greek habits and Greek cities became the dominant form of social and political life in many of the areas ruled by Macedonian kings, some of whom in certain areas were particularly enthusiastic and founded large numbers of new Greek-style locally self-governing cities in order to accommodate their Greek followers and adherents.

The character of the documentation gradually changed, reflecting the changed priorities of the communities. In the Hellenistic period the most important diplomatic contacts of the Greek states were no longer those with the next neighbors but those with a royal power, and documents emerging from such contacts began to play a major part in the public documentation of the cities, old and new. Particularly important were now official communications from the Macedonian kings, often in the shape of a formal letter, especially if they concerned some privilege or advantage achieved by the city's own diplomats, who themselves might also receive a formal published vote of thanks. Votes of thanks in general were now more frequently published than ever before, since highly placed individuals who had good personal connections with one or other of the kings inevitably increased in importance in a world in which the Macedonian kings monopolized all major political fields. Published documents therefore regularly include a review of the relevant political achievements of the person being honored. As a result, the modern historian of the Hellenistic period possesses a mass of information through such localized inscriptions that simply does not exist for earlier periods of Greek history (outside Athens), when publication on stone was much more restricted: now more cities were each publishing more documents, and many of them have survived.

This type of documentation, with rare exceptions, does not exist for the regions where there was no tradition of Greek city-state culture

or to which it was not transplanted, and for these areas its absence is not adequately compensated by other sources of information. From Egypt from the third century onwards we have increasingly large numbers of documents written on papyrus relating to internal administrative affairs of the Ptolemaic kingdom. They shed a great deal of light on the local level of administrative and economic affairs, but offer almost nothing on the international role of the Ptolemies – that is, on their interactive relations with the other Hellenistic states. The same applies to the Babylonian temple archives for the Seleukid kingdom, though they are far less informative than the Egyptian papyri even about local affairs, recording only activities that interested the priests of the temple.

For the general course of events all this contemporary documentation, despite its quantity, does not provide the basis for a chronological narrative. For that we have to rely in general on the fragmentary remains of a historiographic tradition that for the most part did not meet the educational needs of an increasingly urbanized population in later periods, and was therefore not widely reproduced and so did not survive antiquity. This means that until we reach Polybios in the second century BC all history writing by contemporaries is lost, except where it was used and adapted by much later writers. This is particularly disappointing for the first formative decades after Alexander's death, in which the new political structures developed, since there once existed a major eyewitness account, written by Hieronymos of Kardia, a partisan of the Macedonian warlord Antigonos. Hieronymos wrote in his old age at the Macedonian court of Antigonos' grandson, king Antigonos Gonatas, perhaps in the later 270s, and his was the one account which almost all later writers excerpted for their own works. It counted as being tedious, was doubtless far too long and showed no great literary talent, and was certainly not a work that offered a neutral version of events; but Hieronymos lived through and observed all the formative years that created the Hellenistic world of his own day, and – like Polybios more than a century later – seems to have tried to describe and explain how his changed world came about.

In general, however, the monarchies did not provide a favorable intellectual climate for writing contemporary political history – an observation that does not apply just to Hellenistic Greece – and it is no surprise that the most productive historians of the period, even though mostly lost for us, usually originated from one of the traditional Greek states and were not attached to the patronage of a court – Hieronymos here is the one great exception. Diyllos and Phylarchos of Athens, and Duris of Samos, whose lost works covered various aspects of the century after Alexander's death, Timaios of Tauromenion in Sicily,

who also lived in Athens and wrote there, especially about the western Greeks, or in the second century Polybios of Megalopolis in Arkadia, active local politician and historian of Rome's rise to imperial power, are the characteristic figures. The more distant past also offered a way out to literary talent, and it was only when these delicate and formative events themselves belonged to the remote and politically unproblematic past that authors whose books have survived, such as Diodoros from Agyrion in Sicily, a contemporary of Julius Caesar, or Plutarch, whose *Lives* were written in the later first and early second centuries AD, began to write about our period. From the Roman point of view, the Augustan historian Livy's books 21–45 of his *History of Rome*, for which the author made substantial use of lost portions of Polybios' *Histories*, preserve important information on late third- and early second-century events in a Latin version. The modern historian is therefore faced with the problem of trying to reconstruct contemporary history from these (and some other) later accounts and from the contemporary published documents which, however, almost always exist merely because of some particular local situation, which we cannot always reconstruct. These factors condition what we know and how we know it, and will serve to explain some inevitable unevennesses in the treatment of the period as a whole, even in this book. References to the most important ancient sources are given in the text.

The modern naming of the centuries between Alexander's death and the final Roman conquest of the last Macedonian kingdom, Ptolemaic Egypt, as "Hellenistic" is due to a historical misconception by the nineteenth-century German historian Johann Gustav Droysen. He interpreted the period as the time when above all a Greco-Jewish syncretism took place, which paved the way for the creation of the social ambience in which Christianity could develop. The word "Hellenistic" was adopted from the actually hostile description by Jewish sources of some Jerusalem Jews in the second century as "Going Greek" (*hellenizantes*), from which Droysen created the German word "Hellenismus," in English "Hellenism," from which the adjective "Hellenistic" is derived. Whatever the longer-term importance of Droysen's observation of the later development in Jewish circles, it is a quite inadequate characteristic for defining the three centuries following the death of Alexander, in which Jewish affairs played a purely marginal role until a very late date. A much better and more accurate description of the period would be the "Macedonian Centuries," since all changes and developments in these years were directly conditioned by the Macedonian conquest of the Persian empire and its replacement by regional Macedonian monarchies. The main subject of this book is therefore the story of the post-Alexandrian


Macedonian monarchies, and I unashamedly lay primary emphasis on developments in the fields of politics and government, since these were the areas that affected most of the people most of the time. Without the overarching governmental structures created by the monarchies, the economic, social, cultural, and religious developments that took place could never have happened in the way they did.

This book treats each of the regions of the Greek-speaking world until Roman domination – in the farther east, Parthian domination – became so intense that independent action by the remaining monarchies was no longer possible and the whole area finally entered the history of Parthia or of Rome. This means that although the book covers some events until as late as 30 BC, in the case of Ptolemaic Egypt – the conventional end of the “Hellenistic period” – the account of the history of Macedonia ends already with the creation of the Roman province in 148 BC, that of Seleukid Syria with the creation of the Roman province of Syria in 64 BC. As a result of the Roman takeovers in all these areas, the governmental structure created by the Macedonian monarchs was so fundamentally changed that the history of the region thereafter belongs to Rome.

Part I

***THE MAKING OF THE HELLENISTIC
WORLD***

First Steps



June 323	Death of Alexander the Great; outbreak of Lamian War
322	Battle of Krannon; end of Lamian War
320	Death of Perdikkas in Egypt; settlement of Triparadeisos
319	Death of Antipater
317	Return of Olympias to Macedonia; deaths of Philip Arrhidaios and Eurydike
316/15	Death of Eumenes of Kardia in Iran
314	Antigonos' declaration of Tyre; first coalition war (Kassander, Lysimachos, and Ptolemy against Antigonos)
312	Battle of Gaza; Seleukos retakes Babylon
311	Treaty ends coalition war
310	Deaths of Alexander IV and Roxane

I From Babylon to Triparadeisos

The sudden death of the Macedonian king Alexander, far away from home at Babylon in Mesopotamia on June 10, 323, caught the world he ruled fully unprepared for the ensuing crisis. Only two of the men who founded the dynasties of kings which dominated the history of the Hellenistic world were even present at Babylon when he died, and only one of them was sufficiently prominent among the officers who assembled to debate the future to be given an independent provincial command: Ptolemy, now in his early forties, was appointed to distant Egypt (though with Alexander's established governor, Kleomenes, as his official deputy). Seleukos, also present at Babylon, but some ten years younger, became cavalry commander in the central government, a post which under Alexander had been equivalent to the king's

deputy but now was envisaged as being purely military. The third of the later dynasty-founders, Antigonos, a one-eyed giant of a man in his late fifties, was still in central Asia Minor where he had been posted by Alexander in 334 as governor of Phrygia: the officers at Babylon merely confirmed him in his post, since they had no good reason to annoy him by sending a replacement. The three senior figures whose interests dominated affairs at Babylon were, however, all dead within five years. Of them only Perdikkas, a member of one of the old royal families of Upper Macedonia, to whom the dying Alexander gave his signet ring, was present. Absent were Philip's old officer Antipater, now approaching eighty and governor of the Macedonian homeland since 334, and Krateros whom Alexander had sent home with 10,000 veterans to replace Antipater, but who had shirked the challenge and had merely reached Kilikia when Alexander died. Their activities, though in the last resort largely ephemeral, shaped the first years after Alexander's death, but they played no substantial role in creating the long-term structure of the Hellenistic world.

The surviving ancient narrative sources for the history of the decisive thirty years after Alexander's death (the first two chapters of this book) are fairly extensive, though none is contemporary with the events. The most important is the general history of Diodoros, a Sicilian, whose narrative in Greek in books 18–20 excerpted the very detailed, but now lost, story told by the contemporary writer Hieronymos of Kardia. Hieronymos was an active participant in many of the events, whereas Diodoros wrote in the second half of the first century BC and had no personal experience of them. Diodoros' value is therefore related to how accurately he excerpted Hieronymos. Diodoros can be supplemented for the first three years by some surviving extracts of a narrative by the Alexander historian Arrian, writing in the second century AD, and more generally by the short Latin narrative, perhaps intended as a school text of the third century AD, by one Justin. Justin abbreviated a much longer Latin work (now also lost) by a contemporary of Diodoros, the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus. Trogus' sources are unknown, but may have included Hieronymos. Justin's work is unfortunately not only brief, but also careless and often merely obscure. Plutarch wrote several *Lives* in the first and second centuries AD which shed light on the period, especially his *Phokion*, *Eumenes*, and *Demetrios*. Plutarch read everything he could lay his hands on, but his biographies are typically constructed for moralizing purposes, and therefore tend to be very selective in what they record. Some contemporary documents in the form of inscriptions have survived – decrees of democratic states, letters written by one or other of the warlords, sometimes other types

of document – and these provide invaluable authentic contemporary information, but it is usually limited to specific places and single occasions.

The main problem facing the assembled officers at Babylon was to find a royal successor for the dead Alexander. Alexander had a son, Herakles – he was the child of the Persian Barsine, but was still a small boy and, more importantly, was unrecognized by his father – but Roxane, his official Iranian wife, was heavily pregnant. Also at court in Babylon was the last-surviving son of Philip II, Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaios, who had only survived Alexander's morbid suspicion of potential competitors because he was in some way mentally deficient. Faced with this choice between the devil and the deep blue sea, it was hardly surprising that the bad-tempered compromise reached by the officers, under pressure from mutinying soldiery whose loyalty to the Argead House was unbroken, was a recipe for disaster: Arrhidaios was immediately acclaimed king, whereupon he took his charismatic father's name Philip; but should Roxane's baby be male, he was to be called Alexander and also recognized as king; a few months later this duly happened. This curious decision meant that the real ruler would be the regent, as long as he could maintain sufficient loyalty among the Macedonians towards the two equally inadequate "kings," and the function fell to Perdikkas. Antipater was confirmed in Macedonia, but since Alexander had sent Krateros to replace him, he was to share his office with Krateros. Krateros was also granted the high-sounding title of "Protector of the Kings" (*prostates*), but without specific function. Other officers present or absent were given functions or provinces commensurate with their current standing, but no new structure for the empire was envisaged, and Alexander's army seemed satisfied. What this all might mean in practice nobody could judge, there being far too many variables of interest and temperament (Diodoros 18.3–4; Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1).

Perdikkas faced two immediate problems of principle, neither capable of an easy solution. Alexander, it was well known, wanted to be buried in the Egyptian oasis of Siwah, where he had had a mystical experience at the Amun temple when he visited it in 332. If this wish were fulfilled, then any prestige associated with the possession of the tomb of the charismatic king would be Ptolemy's, though the desert remoteness of Siwah would hinder its practical exploitation as a loyalty-symbol for Macedonians. Argead kings were, however, traditionally buried at Aigai in Macedonia, but in Macedonia Antipater was firmly in the saddle and would doubtless be pleased enough to uphold Macedonian royal tradition. Perdikkas' dilemma concerning the disposal of Alexander's body thus had no easy solution

in respect to his own future role, both possibilities involving increased prestige for a potential competitor, whether Alexander's funeral cortège went to Egypt or to Macedonia. A decision could be postponed while a suitably baroque carriage was constructed, but sooner or later it would have to be taken.

His second problem concerned the structure of the government of the empire as a whole. If the "kings" and their protectors were really to govern it as a unity, where were they going to do it from? The officers and troops at Babylon had granted Perdikkas a formal function, but no geographic area of immediate responsibility. In principle the function of regent encompassed the whole empire, in practice the choice of a future base for the kings was bound to affect the current governor of the place chosen; but as Argead kings the obvious place for them was Macedonia. A clash with Antipater must therefore have seemed almost inevitable, and the need to work out a *modus vivendi* with him was fairly urgent. It might be possible to postpone a decision for a few months until Roxane's baby was born and strong enough to travel, but Perdikkas' two major advantages, his possession of Alexander's body and his regency for the kings, both presented unpleasant, perhaps even insurmountable, problems for his own future position. He could still lose everything. A marriage alliance with Antipater, however, might ease the transition, and while still at Babylon Perdikkas approached the old man for the hand of his daughter Nikaia. If Antipater accepted, it might be possible to outmaneuver Ptolemy.

By the time the messenger arrived in Macedonia, Antipater had more immediate concerns at home. The news of Alexander's death gave Athens and the Aitolian League the impetus they required to enroll a large number of states, mostly from central and northern Greece (including Thessaly) in a revolt against Macedonian domination. By winter 323/2 the allies had shut up Antipater and his army in Lamia in central Greece and held him there under siege. He desperately needed help and appealed to other Macedonians, in particular to Leonnatos in Hellespontine Phrygia, as well as to Krateros, who was in any case supposed to be on his way home with a large contingent of troops. Around this time the Athenian politician Demades, who had always cultivated good relations with the Macedonians, opened negotiations with Perdikkas to try to involve him, unknown to Antipater, in undermining Antipater's position among the Macedonian grandees. The negotiations led to nothing except the death of Demades, when they became known later. But they illustrate the way at least some of the belligerents envisaged a political solution to the war.

In the spring Leonnatos, being closer to the scene of the action

than Krateros, arrived in Thessaly but was killed in his first confrontation with the Greeks, though his very presence made them raise the siege. When Krateros arrived it was already late summer, but the united Macedonian armies were strong enough to defeat the Greeks at Krannon in September 322. The so-called Lamian War (Diodoros' name for it, probably reflecting the Macedonians' perception of the war which he found in Hieronymos, though contemporary Greeks liked to call it the "Hellenic War" – the war for Greece) was thereby ended. The Greeks were about to learn that Macedonian rule could be much more invasive and unpleasant than it had been under Philip and even Alexander. Antipater now insisted that each Greek participant state negotiate its peace terms separately, so that individual local solutions to the general problem of Macedonian control could be found. Only the Aitolians refused, and despite Macedonian efforts they managed to survive undefeated in their mountainous homeland until other more important affairs began to occupy the victors of Krannon. Athens, however, whose pride and joy, the great fleet, had also been devastated by the Macedonian admiral Kleitos in a battle off Amorgos, suffered sorely (Diodoros 18.8–17).

A Macedonian garrison was introduced to the city and it set up its base in the fort of Mounychia in the Peiraieus. One of its functions was to oversee the Athenian government. This seemed necessary, since Antipater introduced a major change in the constitution by redefining qualifications for citizenship. Only those who possessed property worth more than 2,000 drachmas (one-third of a talent: in income and buying power perhaps something like €200,000 today) were allowed to be politically active. As a result, some 12,000 men lost their active citizenship, around 9,000 remaining fully qualified. Antipater offered land in Thrace to those excluded, but he had severed the living nerve of the Athenian democracy. The principle that all adult citizens, regardless of their property census, should be equal in political terms had survived all the vicissitudes the state had suffered since Kleisthenes' reforms nearly two hundred years before. Moreover, a foreign garrison had not been seen on Athenian soil since the Spartans installed one at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404. The Samos question was now also resolved once and for all: Antipater referred it formally to "the kings" for a decision, but Perdikkas simply repeated Alexander's decision in favor of the Samians. Athens also lost three of its most prominent democratic activists as a direct result of the war. The general Leosthenes, who organized the Greek alliance, fell during the first year; the orator Hypereides, who led the war party in the assembly and held the official funeral oration over the dead of the first year of the war (Leosthenes among them), was executed by Antipater's

men; and the most famous of them all, the great orator Demosthenes, who led the first Athenian resistance against Macedonia under Philip II and had encouraged Leosthenes in recent times, now fled Athens, but was hunted out by Antipater's men in his remote Peloponnesian refuge at Kalauria, and saw no way out except suicide (Diodoros 18.18; Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 28–30).

The range of possible relationships between Macedonia and the other Greek states was put to the test in Antipater's treatment of Athens, the largest and most prestigious of the Greek cities. The defeated Athenians lost their rights of self-determination because of their opposition to Macedonia, but the exiled Samians recovered their self-determination because of their opposition to defeated Athens. Any generalization about Macedonian treatment of "the Greek states" at this time thus inevitably produces contradictions. Antipater's chief interest, as it had been all along, was to maintain the stability and security of Macedonian control; and now that the Lamian War had proved that many of the southern Greek states were unwilling to accept Macedonian supremacy as a long-term political fact, Antipater saw no alternative to massive intervention in the internal affairs of the defeated in order to convince them. His measures could hardly have made Macedonia more unpopular than it was already, and they at least offered the chance of being more efficient as a control mechanism. Athens was, of course, not the only place where such changes were made, but our Macedonia-friendly source sums up the settlement as it affected them: "So the Athenians were unexpectedly well treated and gained peace; they could run their affairs from now on without disturbance and harvest their land without fear, so that they rapidly increased their wealth" (Diodoros 18.18.6). Antipater was relying on the comfort-needs of the middle classes. Only time would tell whether his model was a viable long-term proposition.

After the war Antipater returned to Macedonia and consolidated his personal bond with Krateros by marrying his daughter Phila to him; Perdikkas also finally received Nikaia, whom he had asked for nearly two years before. The hope was that this tie would encourage him to find a suitably prominent role for Krateros in Asia, since Europe was too small for both him and Antipater. These marriage alliances show how strongly personalized Macedonian political life at the top remained, how personal relations really mattered over and above all governmental structural considerations. When Nikaia came to Perdikkas in 321, he and the kings had reached Sardeis, the old Persian capital of the satrapy of Lydia, after restoring order in Kappadokia on the way (at Babylon Kappadokia was entrusted to Eumenes of Kardia, an influential Greek who had been Alexander's private secretary, but he had been unable to take up his post until the

royal army cleared the way for him). At Sardeis a series of problems, personal and political, began to come to a head at the time of Perdikkas' marriage to Nikaia, and decisions could not be delayed. Even this theoretically joyous personal event was clouded by the arrival of Alexander's full sister, Kleopatra, before the wedding. Kleopatra had been sent off by her mother Olympias – no friend of Antipater's – and she now offered herself to Perdikkas as an alternative bride. Despite the potential political attraction of this match, Perdikkas stuck to Nikaia because to refuse her now would insult Antipater and bring the coalition of Antipater and Krateros actively against him, while he still had found no permanent home for "the kings." For a return to Pella he needed Antipater's support, and only Nikaia could guarantee this (Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 21).

By early summer 321 he had also decided not to allow Alexander's body to get into Ptolemy's hands. Since Babylon Ptolemy had been very active and efficient in his own interest in Egypt. He removed his experienced deputy Kleomenes by assassination and seized the chance of extending his area of immediate influence to the west by annexing Kyrene. Perdikkas was not even consulted (Diodoros 18.19–21; Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 16–19). He also established friendly relations with some of the rich city-kings in Cyprus and kept up contacts with Antipater. Despite all this activity, Perdikkas underestimated the man. Before Perdikkas had decided what to do with Alexander's body, Ptolemy was in touch with Arrhidaios, the Macedonian officer charged with building the carriage for the cortège; and when Arrhidaios and the embalmed Alexander reached Syria, Ptolemaic troops met him by arrangement to escort the procession to Egypt (though Ptolemy was pragmatic enough not to bury his charismatic asset in a remote oasis: Memphis, the old pharaonic capital of Lower Egypt from where he currently ruled, was Alexander's first resting place). In order to achieve this coup, Ptolemy's forces had to repulse units of Perdikkas' "royal army" that the regent had sent to prevent just this happening. Ptolemy's action was therefore a clear challenge to Perdikkas' authority. If his position as regent were to mean anything at all, Ptolemy needed to be punished; and given the current tense situation, this requirement implied an immediate military expedition (Diodoros 18.26–8; Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 25).

While these tensions were increasing in Syria, two events in Asia Minor and an unsolved personnel problem both threatened Perdikkas' equanimity and undermined his position. The unsolved personnel problem concerned Krateros' future role in Asia, since he and Antipater agreed that they could not share Europe, as foreseen at Babylon. Perdikkas could not decide how to react, but time was pressing. The other events were unrelated, but serious enough. The

first happened at court, where king Philip Arrhidaios took a wife, Adea, of whom Perdikkas disapproved so violently that he arranged the murder of her mother, whose idea the whole thing was. This was no mere domestic tragedy, since the murdered mother of the bride was Kynnane, daughter of Philip II and so half-sister of Alexander and of Kleopatra; Adea herself was therefore a grandchild of the great Philip II. Perdikkas was horrified at this potential challenge to his authority from within the royal house. Arrhidaios might be mentally deficient but Adea certainly was not, and she instigated serious riots among the troops when Kynnane was killed by Perdikkas' brother Alketas. Perdikkas was forced to allow the marriage, whereupon Adea took her famous and revered great-grandmother's mythological name, Eurydike (Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 22–3.)

The second event may not have seemed so threatening at the time. Antigonos, governor of Phrygia, had refused assistance to Perdikkas and Eumenes while they were operating in Kappadokia in 322, and now, when called to explain himself, chose to abandon his satrapy and join Antipater and Krateros, whom he found engaged in the war against the Aitolians. Antigonos' presence alone might not have been particularly significant, but he soon claimed to have received important news from his contacts in Asia: Perdikkas was thinking of giving up Nikaia and marrying Kleopatra after all. This bombshell news may not have been true, but Antipater and Krateros were already suspicious because Perdikkas had still made no offer to Krateros, and the last thing Antipater wanted was the court and the regent, now married to Alexander's sister, escorting Alexander's body into Macedonia in a solemn procession protected by the Macedonian royal army that had conquered Asia. Antigonos' news therefore suited well enough; and since it was in their current interest that Alexander's body stay in Egypt, friendly cooperation with Ptolemy was predestined (Diodoros 18.25.3–5; Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 24).

By the end of the winter 321/20 the alliance stood. The Aitolian war was broken off and preparations made for a joint expedition to Asia Minor and beyond, while Perdikkas himself with the kings, the court, and the royal army set off for Egypt. Several major problems were resolved in this year, so that at the end of it some aspects of the later structure of the Macedonian empire began to emerge. Krateros was killed in the first confrontation with the Perdikkas army, commanded by Eumenes of Kardia, defending Bithynia, and so the awkward requirement of finding him a suitable area of responsibility vanished. Antipater and Antigonos then each led part of the joint army and navy on towards Syria. Meanwhile Perdikkas' invasion of Egypt solved a second personnel problem. It went disastrously wrong from the start, and after a catastrophic attempt to cross the Nile near

Memphis in which some 2,000 men were drowned, a group of officers conspired to assassinate him. They then invited Ptolemy into their camp, where he received an enthusiastic welcome from the demoralized troops, stimulated not least by generous provision of food and other materials. When news arrived that Krateros had been killed in battle by Eumenes, the troops immediately pronounced Eumenes condemned to death. Ptolemy cleverly refused all responsibility for the two embarrassing kings, but negotiated a temporary arrangement with the conspirators, escorting the invaders (apart from those who chose to join him) back to Syria, where they met up with Antipater and Antigonos at Triparadeisos on the northern edge of Mt. Lebanon. Even before the armies met, consensus was reached that Antipater assume Perdikkas' function as regent. The decision implied the return of the kings to Macedonia, since Antipater showed no personal interest in Asian affairs and was too old – he was now in his late seventies – to develop any. Another part of the deal broken at Triparadeisos was also consensus: that Ptolemy, who had defended his Egypt against Perdikkas, should remain there. He was probably also bound into Antipater's dynastic system by receiving the hand of yet another of his many daughters, also named Eurydike (Diodoros 18.29–39; Arrian, *Successors* Frag. 1, 26–38).

Leading Perdikkans were still on the loose in various places, equipped with armies and treasure. Particularly dangerous was Eumenes of Kardia, since with his strategically situated base in Kappadokia he controlled major routes across central Anatolia. Antipater showed no enthusiasm for mopping up Perdikkian resistance, but Antigonos was to hand, both willing and able, and he knew the ground well, because he had controlled the areas in his Phrygian satrapy bordering Kappadokia since 334. He was therefore both confirmed in his old satrapy and given the job of fighting Eumenes, using some of Perdikkas' soldiers for the task. Before Antipater returned to Macedonia with the kings, he promoted Antigonos still further to an unspecific, therefore wide-ranging, command as “General (*strategos*) of Asia,” which was probably the type of command that had been envisaged for Krateros. The promotion was accompanied by the customary personal connection with Antipater: Krateros' wife Phila, Antipater's eldest daughter, was now a widow, and Antigonos' son Demetrios needed a wife. The conjunction of interests was clear, the circumstances favorable, and the marriage was arranged immediately. Some forty years later the first fruit of this marriage, their son Antigonos, would himself become king in Macedonia (Diodoros 18.40–41; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 14).

At Triparadeisos the interests of the officers who had participated in the coup against Perdikkas remained to be satisfied. Those who

already possessed satrapies, such as Peithon in Media, were confirmed in post, but two leading conspirators, Antigenes, commander of the infantry guard unit, the “Silver Shields,” and Seleukos, commander of the royal cavalry, were now rewarded for the first time with rich – but for Antipater conveniently distant – satrapies, Antigenes in Susiana and Seleukos in Babylonia. As far as the Macedonian traditionalist Antipater was concerned, they were unlikely to offend his interests from there, however rich and successful they might become. His estimate proved correct.

II Kassander and Polyperchon

When Antipater returned to Macedonia with the kings and their entourage late in 320 he had less than a year still to live. His negotiations at Triparadeisos created a satisfactory traditionalistic distribution of power, with royal authority finally back where it belonged, in Macedonia. The men who operated in the provinces of the empire all formally acknowledged their dependence and subordination to the Argead monarchy, and as long as they depended on Macedonian soldiers to uphold their positions locally this was on the whole likely to continue. To what extent wealth was transferred from the Asiatic provinces to the center is not known. The Persian system of regional treasuries, taken over by Alexander, persisted in any case, and we hear of no regular transfers of bullion. But this may not have bothered Antipater too much, since he certainly brought the central treasury and archive that Perdikkas had controlled back to Macedonia. Before he separated from Antigonos, he was able to leave him a sufficient amount to pay his soldiers for the war against Eumenes and the remaining Perdikkian loyalists, until Antigonos gained access to the regional treasuries in the provinces which they still controlled.

Had Antipater lived even for a few more years, the imperial structure that he and Krateros had worked out for themselves, a European and an Asian division of responsibilities with nominal precedence of the European – Macedonian – side for traditional historical reasons, might well soon have established itself, with Antigonos taking over the role of the deceased Krateros. Antigonos’ deliberately ill-defined current function of “Royal General in Asia” could have perpetuated itself under these conditions. What Antigonos made of his post after defeating Eumenes, assuming he would do so, would then be largely his own business, as long as he did not offend the European side and challenge its nominal supremacy. In effect, the

structure of the old Persian empire might well be revived, but with a Macedonian ruling it who, because he was a Macedonian, would formally acknowledge the supremacy of the Macedonian king in Europe, however independent he might actually become.

This ideal solution vanished with Antipater's death, for no other living Macedonian enjoyed the prestige and authority of the seventy-nine-year-old Antipater, who had been one of Philip's right-hand men throughout the years of struggle for supremacy in Greece and governed Europe while Alexander was conquering Asia. In Macedonia personal prestige and charisma were at least as important as any formal position. But personal prestige was non-transferable and died with its bearer; it was potentially revivable only as historical memory, but even then only within the family of its creator. Antipater, loyal companion and servant of two great Macedonian kings, had in the end one great weakness: his unbending loyalty to the Argead House, currently represented by the debile Philip Arrhidaios and the child Alexander IV, coupled with his belief that others ought to share it. When he felt death approaching, he chose as successor the man whom he felt would best represent the kings' interests in the European sector of the kingdom – his own personal priority – just as he himself had tried to do. Above all, he wanted to avoid giving the impression of setting up a rival dynasty of hereditary regents, despite his large family and his well-known inclination to cement personal relationships with potential rivals by using his nubile daughters. He therefore chose as his successor as regent not his eldest son Kassander, but Polyperchon, an older man already in his sixties, a representative of one of the old regional royal houses of Upper Macedonia (Tymphaia). Polyperchon had made the whole expedition with Alexander as an infantry officer and had recently returned to Macedonia with Krateros and helped win the Lamian War. When Antipater and Krateros set off to confront Perdikkas in Asia, he was left behind as Antipater's deputy in control of Macedonia. He could reasonably be expected to share Antipater's loyalty to the Argead royal house, and because of his origin and his vast military experience, to be readily accepted by the rank and file of the Macedonian soldiery (Diodoros 18.48–49).

This prognosis could not be made for Antipater's son Kassander, whom he nevertheless appointed Polyperchon's deputy with the title "Chiliarch." Kassander was now about forty, therefore a slightly old contemporary of Alexander, but had not accompanied the king to Asia. As a young man in Macedonia, he observed at close hand his father's continual bitter struggle with Olympias, and then he himself traveled to Babylon in 324 to represent his father, where he enjoyed no great welcome at Alexander's court. He was, however, still at

Babylon when Alexander died, and therefore experienced the tense atmosphere among the officers and observed the self-interested maneuverings from which the unworthy dual kingship of Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV had emerged. For a short time after Triparadeisos he had been Antigonos' deputy, but at the time of Antipater's death he was back in Macedonia, perhaps because of his father's terminal illness.

Events following Antipater's death show clearly that again in this phase of Macedonian history personal ambitions were more important than any formalized governmental structure. Even the loyalties of the Macedonian troops, who were attached to the Argead House by a long tradition that had been massively reinforced during the last generation by the personal brilliance of Philip and Alexander, gradually began to dissolve, as the current figureheads of the royal house remained politically invisible. The troops also became increasingly aware that each group of soldiers was actually being paid by its immediate commander in order to achieve his own interests, not by the king in Pella to represent his. This was particularly the case in Asia, but it began to be true in Europe as well, as a result of the dissatisfaction felt by Kassander and his friends with the role envisaged for him as Polyperchon's subordinate. Polyperchon's own activities did little to stem this concern. The unimaginative infantryman may once have been loved by the troops, but he was not respected by his younger equals among the leaders. Kassander was furious at his father's choice and immediately began sounding out his own chances in Macedonia but also, more ominously, with his father's garrison commanders in the Greek cities. He contacted Ptolemy and his recent commander in chief, Antigonos, whose current operations against the Perdikkans in Asia were progressing satisfactorily, though Eumenes still remained undefeated. Before long Kassander left Macedonia and asked Antigonos for practical help, which he duly received, including some warships. This decision implied the total rejection of Polyperchon both by Kassander and by Antigonos, therefore civil war, if the old warrior chose to resist and could drum up sufficient support among Macedonian traditionalists. At this stage Antigonos fostered the impression that he wanted to uphold the division of the empire that he had agreed with Antipater, merely being dissatisfied with the person chosen to govern Europe. For this reason he supported Kassander against Polyperchon. Like Kassander, he entertained no basic objection to the hereditary principle, and had nothing against creating a dynasty of regents in Macedonia. It was an omen for the thought-patterns of the leading men of the time (Diodoros 18.54).

Polyperchon's position was embarrassingly paradoxical: appointed by Antipater as his successor, he was now openly opposed by

Antipater's eldest son. Loyalties in the land were inevitably divided, and he could not anticipate whom Antipater's garrison commanders in Greece would support. Yet he was dependent on the southern Greek cities for income and manpower, since he could expect nothing more from Asia, now that Antigonos was openly supporting Kassander – in 318 Antigonos stopped four ships at Ephesos that were carrying 600 talents (about 20 metric tons) of silver bound for Pella, thus proving the point (Diodoros 18.52.7). Polyperchon therefore desperately needed to control Greece, but this was a more complicated operation than merely exchanging the garrison commanders loyal to Kassander (assuming they let themselves be replaced). After the Lamian War Antipater altered the constitutions of most of the cities that fought against Macedonia in the war – not just at Athens – everywhere putting men of wealth into control of the local governments. They were, of course, grateful to him for this and would tend to support their benefactor's son, if asked to do so. Who, then, in Greece was likely to support Polyperchon? Also in Macedonia Polyperchon was now isolated from the personal political support network created by Antipater and his family, and had little alternative to merely emphasizing his purely formal role as guardian of the Argead House. To strengthen his position he invited Olympias, Alexander's mother, to join him. During Alexander's absence in Asia Olympias was effectively ousted from influence by Antipater and had retired to her original home in Epeiros, where her nephew Aiakides ruled. As Philip's most favored wife and Alexander's mother, she certainly still had her own following in Macedonia, but should she return Polyperchon could abandon hope of ever reconciling Antipater's friends and family.

Antipater's death and Kassander's ambitious dissatisfaction thus brought about a struggle for control of the old Greek cities in the Balkans, which in due course turned into a competition for their hearts and minds and dragged them into center-stage in the power struggle emerging among the Macedonian warlords. Scarcely a city could escape unwilling participation. In Asia the situation was no different in principle, as Antigonos systematically aimed to gain control of the Greek cities in his area, though his experience as freedom-bringer from the Persians under Alexander seems to have made him more sensitive to each individual city's aspiration to self-determination. This, however, did not mean that these communities were any less involved in the struggle for supremacy among the Macedonians.

Polyperchon and his advisers had no time to lose. Antipater's death and the appointment of the new regime brought a flood of representatives from the Greek states to Pella, each anxious to learn what the future was going to mean for his own state. These men

needed reassuring, if they were going to see advantage in supporting Polyperchon rather than Kassander in the internal Macedonian dispute. In Athens, perhaps elsewhere also, Kassander managed to put his own man in as garrison commander before Polyperchon had a chance to interfere, but in general Polyperchon seems to have reckoned, probably rightly, that he would get little support from Antipater's garrison commanders or from those Greeks who had benefited from Antipater's constitutional changes. They would all tend to favor Kassander. The only conceivable way out for him was to abandon Antipater's system and hope for the support of their opponents – an extremely dangerous option for a Macedonian, who knew well enough how the democracies had opposed Philip II and especially Antipater. Nevertheless, Polyperchon's advisers issued a royal decree in Philip Arrhidaios' name restoring the constitutions valid in the time of Philip and Alexander – i.e., before the Lamian War – and restoring all exiles driven out by “our generals from the time when Alexander crossed to Asia” (i.e., by Antipater, who had been in charge for the whole of that time). Athens received the additional explicit favor of recovering Samos, but since Polyperchon did not hold Samos he could not restore it to Athens, so this point was merely cheap propaganda, pandering to Athenian revisionists, and could have no practical effect. The Greek envoys representing the states enjoying Antipater's revised constitutions, who received this document in Pella, must have been horrified at its local implications (Diodoros 18.55–56).

They had every right to be so. In the spring Polyperchon, accompanied by Philip Arrhidaios, entered central Greece to harvest the political fruits of his propaganda offensive. Our best information comes, as so often, from Athens, where the leaders of the restored democracy, relying on the protection of Polyperchon's nearby army, wreaked bloody vengeance on the most prominent of those whom, they claimed, had supported and benefited from Antipater's regime. This happened despite the continued presence of the Macedonian garrison in the Peiraieus under the command of Kassander's man, Nikanor. Polyperchon insisted the Athenians do their own dirty work, when appeal was made to the king. The most prominent victim of the judicial massacre that followed was Phokion, an old conservative patriot who had been elected no fewer than forty-five times to the leading annual office of *strategos*, and so had served the Athenians loyally through all the troubles of their disputes with Macedonia since the 350s. He also enjoyed the rare reputation of being absolutely incorruptible. His fatal mistake, it now turned out, was to have served his country also under Antipater's oligarchy. His earlier career was suddenly irrelevant, and he and a group of his friends and associates

were hauled before the angry newly restored people's assembly, condemned to death, and immediately executed (Diodoros 18.65–67; Plutarch, *Phokion* 33–37). All was not, however, so negative and violent. Antipater's Athenian friends had also committed bitter offenses against the national democratic tradition, their acts including the petty cancellation of honors voted to friends and servants of the democracy, as well as to external benefactors. One particularly prominent case was that of Euphron of Sikyon, whose earlier honors, cashiered by the oligarchs, were restored in a long decree voted in November 318. It was probably not the only restorative action of its kind, once the democrats got over the riotous violence caused by their initial anger (*Syll.*³ 317 = Austin² 32 = Harding 123).

If Polyperchon had not been challenged in Macedonia itself, his program in southern Greece might conceivably have worked for some time, but it offended so many vested interests that could be exploited by Kassander that in the end it merely made a further contribution to the confusion and instability of the times. In many other cities scenes comparable to those in Athens took place. It was not long before Kassander arrived in the Peiraieus with the fleet he had received from Antigonos, and his solution to the Athenian constitutional problem did not lack a certain flair and awareness of local needs: he imposed one of the Athenian conservatives, Demetrios of Phaleron, ex-student at the elite school of Aristotle, as his trusted governor, to be supported by the loyal Macedonian garrison. Demetrios was an associate of Phokion's but had fled the city in anticipation of the democratic restoration, and it might well have been on his recommendation that Kassander weakened the democratic opposition by halving the property census required for citizenship to a capital of 1,000 drachmas (ca. €100,000), a regulation that immediately significantly broadened the base of the citizenship. The length of service of the garrison in Mounychia was also officially limited to the duration of Kassander's war "against the kings," a phrase which, if authentic, shows that Kassander was not presenting himself merely as another Antipater (Diodoros 18.64). Other cities that joined Polyperchon were also gradually recovered at significant cost in time, money, and manpower, but Kassander was helped not least by the fact that Polyperchon made himself widely unpopular by operating with a large army in central and southern Greece, where the cities which he claimed to be helping had to supply and tolerate it. His most spectacular action was his attempt to force reform on the Arkadian city Megalopolis by laying it under siege. He nevertheless failed to take it. So much for the "hearts and minds" campaign in Greece, which continued ineffectually for several more years (Diodoros 18.57; 69–72; 74–75).

Polyperchon was convinced of the importance of his official

function of ruling the whole of Alexander's legacy for "the kings," and therefore also made efforts to gain a foothold in Asia Minor. Since Antigonos was supporting Kassander, and since Polyperchon had no intention of squandering his own men on a land campaign in Asia – he needed them all in Europe – he fell on the notion of rehabilitating Eumenes of Kardia and replacing Antigonos with him as Royal General in Asia. Eumenes needed a special royal dispensation because, embarrassingly for Polyperchon, in 320 a Macedonian assembly in Egypt had condemned him to death for killing Krateros, so providing the moral basis for Antigonos' campaign against him in the first place. Under the present circumstances, however, Eumenes' appointment had the supreme advantage that, as a non-Macedonian, he could never challenge for power in Macedonia itself, and if he were successful he would keep Antigonos occupied far away from Macedonia. This was important, because since Antipater's death Antigonos had increasingly been operating in western Anatolia, including in strategically important Bithynia, so that he currently controlled the eastern side of both the Dardanelles and the Bosphoros. In 317 Polyperchon even sent a fleet up to the narrows under his experienced admiral Kleitos, who had beaten the Athenians in the Lamian War and now again won a naval battle, only to be trumped in the following night by a commando action in the dark organized by Antigonos and Kassander's man Nikanor; Kleitos himself was killed trying to escape (Diodoros 18.72). It was therefore vital to Polyperchon that Antigonos be occupied elsewhere, and Eumenes gladly accepted his paradoxical rehabilitation, moving quickly from Kappadokia to provoke Antigonos by using his new royal patent to gain access to regional imperial treasuries and other resources, and to begin recruiting troops. Since Antigonos was entirely dependent on the financial resources of Asia, he could not allow Eumenes to cut him off from them, and set off to eliminate him. Eumenes, however, made his way successfully into the rich heartland of the old Persian empire in Iran, and began collecting money and men from the Iranians in order to facilitate his return to the west. Antigonos had no real alternative to following him, if he did not want to leave these immensely rich resources in the hands of his enemy (Diodoros 18.53; 58–63; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 13).

As long as Antigonos and Eumenes campaigned against each other in distant Iran, it must have seemed to Polyperchon that his coup against Antigonos had succeeded, but he desperately needed a similar success in Europe. The prestige of his physically inadequate royal wards was insufficiently impressive to guarantee the wide support among the Macedonians that he required, if he were to prevail over Kassander. Recognizing this, he had formed the idea of trying to increase his popularity by mobilizing old Argead loyalties through

bringing Olympias back to Pella. Olympias at first delayed a decision, but after Kassander's success in Athens she decided to come after all. It was summer 317. Polyperchon marched out to greet her in the western Macedonian mountains with his army, accompanied by her grandchild Alexander and his mother Roxane; she met him there, escorted by an Epirot military unit provided by her nephew Aiakides. On this occasion Polyperchon left Philip Arrhidaios and Eurydike behind in lower Macedonia, but as soon as he set off Eurydike, rightly suspecting that she and her husband would take second, if any, place should Olympias return to Pella, did the unthinkable and appealed to Kassander. She also began raising troops of her own and marched off with them to confront Polyperchon and Aiakides in the mountains. When it came to the confrontation, her men simply refused to fight a civil-war battle against Alexander's mother and his child. Their refusal resolved one of the intractable problems created at Babylon, that of the double kingship – but not as the formidable Eurydike had envisaged. She and Arrhidaios were captured, locked up, and mistreated by a ruthlessly resentful Olympias seeking vengeance, and in October they were murdered (Diodoros 19.11).

If Polyperchon had regarded Olympias as his trump against Kassander – the confrontation in the mountains might have seemed to prove him right – he soon found himself completely overshadowed by the old queen, once she had arrived back in Macedonia. She exercised an apparently uncontrolled brutality against her rivals at court and against Antipater's family which, however, merely played into Kassander's hands. After killing Philip and Eurydike she purged Kassander's family, killing one of his brothers, Nikanor, and even desecrating the grave of another, Iollas. She also eliminated, it was said, some hundred prominent Macedonians who, for her, counted as associates of Kassander. Olympias' reign of terror, unhindered by the nominal regent Polyperchon, soon made Kassander seem to many Macedonians the better alternative, and in 316 he judged the time ripe for returning to Macedonia. On his approach, Olympias took refuge in the coastal city of Pydna, but Kassander forced the passes through the mountains and began a siege. In the end Olympias was forced to capitulate and Kassander staged a "trial" before his victorious troops in which she was condemned to death; the sentence was quickly executed. Together with Olympias Kassander also captured Alexander and Roxane, as well as other members of their entourage. The young Alexander was immediately sent to Amphipolis with his mother, where he was kept out of sight and under guard to prevent his becoming a focus for traditionalist opposition elements. After the horror of Olympias' terror regime, Kassander could reasonably expect significant support for his position as effective ruler

in Macedonia, as long as he did not launch a reign of terror of his own. He obviously realized this, and bolstered his position among the Macedonians by marrying Thessalonike, a daughter of Philip II (but not of Olympias), whom he had captured at Pydna along with Olympias' court. In this way he associated himself conspicuously with Philip II, but demonstratively not with Alexander and Olympias (Diodoros 19.35–36; 49–52).

A further act soon after the capture of Pydna illustrates that Kassander was planning a long-term role at the top. On the site of the old Korinthian colony Potidaia, occupied but not wholly destroyed by Philip in 356, he founded a new city intended to become the main urban center of Chalkidike. Chalkidike was not traditionally an integral part of Macedonia, though after its conquest by Philip land there had been distributed to individual Macedonians (*Syll.*³332). Now it was finally organized and integrated into the kingdom, a new urban center created on an old site for the new Macedonian settlers of the area and for any remaining population from the old cities. The most dramatic aspect of the new urban center, however, was its programmatic name: Kassandreia. Philip had begun the royal habit of naming newly founded cities in newly won territory after himself, and Alexander continued the tradition. To name his new city Kassandreia, therefore, shows that Kassander was presenting himself as their successor and their equal. Some time later – the exact date is not known – he exerted pressure on a group of small communities on the Thermaic Gulf and united in another new city, which he named after his wife, Thessalonike. Regional consolidation through centrally supported urbanization by regional rulers or kings had been begun in Macedonia by Philip and Alexander and soon became characteristic of the Macedonian governments of the Hellenistic period – we shall see many later examples – but its first manifestations after Alexander's death are Kassander's foundations in the Macedonian homeland. The use of personal dynastic names for such permanent pieces of communal infrastructure shows he was intending to stay (Diodoros 19.52.2–3; Strabo 7, Frag. 21; 24).

After Kassander's success at Pydna Polyperchon remained on the loose in the south, accompanied by his son Alexandros, but his responsibility for Olympias' disastrous return to Macedonia had forfeited his claim to rule there. The last nail in the coffin of his political ambitions to lead Macedonia was hammered home in Iran. While these events were taking place in Europe, Antigonos finally overcame and eliminated Eumenes in Iran, so that Polyperchon's Asian scheme also collapsed completely (Diodoros 19.12–34; 37–44; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 13–19). Critical now would be Antigonos' reaction to the new situation in Macedonia, to which his own support for

Kassander had already made a significant contribution at a critical time. If he were prepared to accept Kassander as successor of Antipater in Europe, then the dualistic governmental structure envisaged by Antipater for the empire might still be restored. It was a big “if.”

III Antigonos

After Antigonos defeated and killed Eumenes, he began to reckon up with the Macedonian governors of the Iranian satrapies who had supported Eumenes, or who for other reasons seemed potentially unreliable. He showed no inclination for any personal visitation of points farther east. Indeed, quite the opposite. When spring 315 came, he traveled south into Persis and then, moving westwards, went on to Babylon, collecting on the way huge amounts of precious metals that had accumulated in the regional treasuries. From Ekbatana he took 10,000 talents, from Susa another 15,000 talents, together therefore the almost unbelievable sum of 25,000 talents in bullion or coin (a metal weight of some 900 metric tons with an equivalent value of perhaps €15 billion). He was transporting this with him when he arrived in Babylon. That was enough cash in hand to pay up to 40,000 soldiers for three years or so; moreover, he could anticipate an annual income, as long as the eastern satrapies continued to pay their tribute to him, of some 11,000 talents (Diodoros 19.56.5).

It is hardly surprising that those Macedonians who had secretly hoped Eumenes might win (or even better, that both he and Antigonos might eliminate each other) became increasingly disturbed by Antigonos' overwhelming financial power, which he used to support his claim to represent the central government in Asia, a function from which Polyperchon had actually deposed him. The first men to feel the negative side of this claim were the governors of the eastern satrapies, but the situation first became really serious at Persepolis, where he insisted on deposing and taking along with him the locally popular governor, Peukestas, because he had accepted Eumenes' authority. When he reached Babylon Seleukos, who had actually opposed Eumenes and so far supported Antigonos, disagreed with him violently on the issue of his overall authority – Antigonos demanded Seleukos show him the accounts of his satrapy, and Seleukos denied his right to do so – and this led to an open breach. Faced with Antigonos' currently overwhelming military powers and considering the fate of Peukestas, Seleukos decided to leave while still free to do so. He took his worries with him to Egypt, where he painted

Antigonos' attitudes and aims in the darkest possible colors. According to our source Diodoros (19.56), he alleged that Antigonos was aiming to occupy the whole empire ruled by Macedonians, and he might even have been right. Antigonos tried to counteract Seleukos' complaints by sending his own envoys to Ptolemy, Kassander and Lysimachos, who had governed Thrace since 323, but his colleagues were alarmed at his successes and his sudden massive wealth and were persuaded by Seleukos' allegations. While Antigonos was away fighting against Eumenes, Ptolemy had taken control of parts of southern Syria (known as "Koile Syria," "Hollow Syria"), and Kassander sent some troops to attack Eumenes' base in Kappadokia. Now they claimed that Antigonos formally cede these areas to them: Ptolemy should keep his part of Syria, Kassander gain Kappadokia, to which he also demanded Lykia. Lysimachos, though he cooperated with Antigonos and Kassander against Polyperchon, had already been alarmed by Antigonos' activities in Bithynia, which had made him a direct neighbor, and from where he could control shipping passing through the narrows. Lysimachos therefore demanded Bithynia for himself as his specific part of the coalition's packet of demands. The coalition also insisted that Antigonos share out the treasure he collected after defeating Eumenes, since that had really been a joint war. Refusal would be regarded as a declaration of war. Antigonos refused (Diodoros 19.56–57).

Given the conflicting ambitions and interests of the main protagonists, war may indeed have seemed at some time inevitable. That it broke out during the winter 315/14 was, however, a direct result of the coalition's challenge to Antigonos. Of the three opponents, Lysimachos was the least dangerous and in any case currently fully occupied in setting up his own authority in Thrace. Ptolemy was nearest, and Antigonos quickly drove his occupying forces out of Syria and began a major shipbuilding program in order to increase his offensive capabilities against the westerners. He soon made it clear that he intended to try to undermine Kassander's position among the Greek cities in Europe – he had no serious chance of mounting an attack on Macedonia itself – and so damage his possibilities of raising income and troops from them, as well as weakening Macedonia's southern flank. He therefore took up contact with Polyperchon and his son Alexandros, who still held some cities in the Peloponnese, happily ignoring the fact that the same Polyperchon had deposed him from his royal command against Eumenes. Money talked louder than dubious constitutional law, and Antigonos' envoy, the Milesian Aristodemos, won over the exguardian of the kings by offering him the largely illusory title "General of the Peloponnese" – this time, in effect, Antigonos' general. Alexandros negotiated his

future role within Antigonos' plans with Antigonos himself, who in the meanwhile was besieging Tyre (Diodoros 19.58–64).

Polyperchon and Alexandros may not have been the most promising allies for Antigonos, but he had little choice if he wanted to gain a foothold in Europe. They needed his cash just as much as he needed such regional influence and prestige as they still possessed, and they might usefully keep Kassander occupied. At the same time they presented no realistic longer-term challenge to plans Antigonos might have had for Greece, or even for Macedonia. Additionally they brought along a perhaps decisive propaganda bonus for Antigonos' challenge to Kassander, for in 318 Polyperchon had proclaimed the reintroduction of democracies in those Greek cities where they had been abolished by Antipater. At the time it was a disaster for him, since by it he threw away one of his few advantages, the support of the rich citizens who had been favored by Antipater's constitutional reforms, and Kassander had little difficulty in restoring Antipater's oligarchies and maintaining garrisons to support them. But four years on in 314 Kassander's unpopular garrisons provided Antigonos with a cheap populist club with which to beat him. Antigonos had personally experienced the popularity of Alexander's introduction or restoration of democratic governments in the Greek cities of Asia in and after 334, and noted that they did not necessarily conflict with Macedonian imperial interests. Grateful citizens were much more likely to make themselves useful than resentful ones. His collaboration with Polyperchon now offered him the opportunity of gaining some popularity in mainland Greece and the islands by applying the same political techniques as Alexander had employed in Asia Minor. Since he could expect no support anyway from Kassander's garrison troops nor from the richer citizens whom they kept in power locally, he had absolutely nothing to lose by following up Polyperchon's lead and promoting the interests of the lower classes in the cities. His policy also implied encouraging the self-determination of the Greek cities and so, hopefully, gaining their willing support.

Antigonos did not wait long to formulate his policy. As soon as he won over Alexandros, he called his troops together – both Macedonians and other Greeks – who were currently besieging Tyre and announced his program. In it was something for everybody. For the Macedonians, he demanded that Kassander be punished for murdering Olympias and for keeping the little king Alexander and his mother Roxane imprisoned; for “forcing” Thessalonike into marriage and for aiming at the throne himself; also for reversing deliberate past Macedonian actions by rebuilding Olynthos, destroyed by Philip in 348, as Kassandreia, and now Thebes (in 315, destroyed by Alexander in 335); Antigonos claimed for himself to be successor to Polyperchon

as duly appointed general and guardian of the king, this a direct result of his recent negotiations with Polyperchon and Alexandros. For the Greeks present and absent, Antigonos proclaimed that all cities should be free, ungarrisoned, and autonomous, by which he meant living according to their own public laws and traditions. His Greek soldiers could hardly object, and they loudly acclaimed their approval (Diodoros 19.61).

Antigonos' demands relating to Kassander's position in Macedonia were programmatic but quite impractical: he could do nothing, at least in the short term, to achieve them, nor was he likely to gain many friends in contemporary Macedonia through them. But the Macedonians at home were not his primary audience. The demands were aimed in the first instance at his own Macedonians, the soldiers in his army, who hoped someday to be able to return home with him. The Greek side of the program, however, was both immediately practical and seriously aimed at gaining long-term influence in the Aegean and mainland Greece. He sent his nephew Dioskorides to the Aegean immediately with a large fleet to guarantee the safety of his existing allies and to attract the support of those islands that had not yet joined him (Diodoros 19.62.9). Dioskorides' most spectacular success was the prestigious liberation of Apollo's island Delos in autumn 314 from the longstanding Athenian administration, an independence which the Delians upheld for more than 150 years, until after the battle of Pydna (168), when the Romans restored Athenian administration. Antigonos received appropriate honors in Delos from a grateful population in the form of an annual festival called the *Antigoneia*, recalling the liberation, and soon afterwards his local representatives began to coordinate his allies in the Aegean area by founding a "League of Islanders" (*Nesiotai*) (IG XI 4, 1036). Dioskorides and his men were also active in Asia Minor, where Miletos, the home city of Antigonos' officer Aristodemos, recorded for the official year 313/12 that "the city became free and autonomous through Antigonos, and the democracy was restored" (*Syll.*³ 322). Until then it had been controlled by the Karian satrap, Asander, who had been won over by the anti-Antigonos coalition. Ptolemy seems to have been the only member of the coalition to realize how effective and dangerous Antigonos' courting of the Greeks by offering them self-determination could become. He therefore tried to compete by announcing that his activity in the Aegean was also aimed at liberating the Greeks, but his alliance with Kassander (and in Asia Minor with Asander in Karia) rendered his proclamation unconvincing and so ineffective. Seleukos with an Egyptian fleet had little success in the Aegean, so Ptolemy now concentrated on Cyprus, which was not only rich and a major provider of scarce shipbuilding timber, but was

also strategically vital under ancient sailing conditions for a naval power based on the eastern Mediterranean, in Syria or Egypt, that wished to operate in the Aegean: this meant that both Antigonos and Ptolemy competed for influence in the cities of Cyprus (Diodoros 19.62).

In mainland Greece – a critical area for operations, if Antigonos really intended to hurt Kassander – the situation was much more complex. Too many conflicting aims and ambitions existed to ensure success merely with a slogan, however well thought out and presented. The Aitolian League, still unrepentently hostile to whoever might be ruling in Macedonia, gave Antigonos some tactical support, but his reliance on Polyperchon and Alexandros proved to be a serious weakness. In 313 Kassander split the father-son tandem by winning over Alexandros, and the potential disaster for Antigonos was averted only when Alexandros was assassinated. Small towns that simply wished to be left alone suffered badly from the uncertainties of the times. Good examples are the north Peloponnesian cities Dyme and Aigion in Achaia. In 313 both were garrisoned by Kassander while Antigonos' man Aristodemos of Miletos was leading a mercenary army against Kassander's garrisons, promoting Antigonos' "liberation" program. At Aigion Aristodemos defeated and expelled the garrison, but in the process completely lost control of his own troops, who instead of restoring freedom and autonomy went on the rampage, plundering and robbing, in the course of which many of the newly freed citizens were killed and much of their property destroyed. Dyme was more complicated, but no more heartening. The presence of Aristodemos in the region encouraged the Dymeans to take the initiative themselves against Kassander's garrison, but they chose a bad moment to act, just when Aristodemos was away in Aitolia. Alexandros, now representing Kassander, in one of his last actions before his assassination, arrived first, relieved the garrison, and took control of the city again, punishing the rebels with death, imprisonment, or exile. He then withdrew, whereupon the Dymeans lost little time in calling in Aristodemos' mercenaries from Aigion and repeated their attack on the garrison, this time successfully. But recent violent events had stimulated a climate of mindless brutality, and the "liberation" was accompanied by the massacre of prisoners and of those citizens who were thought to have supported Alexandros and benefited from the garrison (Diodoros 19.66).

Such incidents illustrate graphically the practical problems associated with the "liberation" program in Greece, where the upper classes in many of the cities felt their own sectional interests were best represented by Kassander and his garrisons, which kept them in power locally. The inherent class diversity of interests, which over the

centuries had repeatedly led to outbreaks of civil war (*stasis*) in many Greek cities, was now further intensified by divergent class identification with the interests of competing Macedonian dynasts. Nevertheless, with persistence and the mobility offered by his large fleet, Antigonos' operatives did make some progress by spring 311, and a relief expedition organized by Kassander to attack Antigonos in his own territories in Karia was an embarrassing failure. By then, however, the world picture had again changed and none of the dynasts saw much point in continuing their war, since such successes as they had achieved were not decisive. Moreover, Antigonos had recently suffered a major defeat in Syria and from it emerged a potentially disastrous threat to his infrastructure in the east, on which he relied for income to finance his war in the Mediterranean basin. In 312 while he was himself operating in Asia Minor, his son Demetrios was left behind to defend Syria. This was essential, since shortly before Ptolemy had refused to make peace on terms that Antigonos thought acceptable (Diodoros 19.64.8): we are not told what they were, but he had presumably demanded guarantees for his possessions in Syria and Phoinikia that Ptolemy was not prepared to give. At about the same time, separate negotiations with Kassander on the Dardanelles also produced no satisfactory agreement (Diodoros 19.75.6). So the war went on.

Seleukos was the driving force for change. In 312 he still enjoyed Ptolemy's confidence, and now persuaded his host that in Antigonos' absence the time was ripe for an aggressive blow against Syria, now commanded by the impetuous Demetrios. When the armies met near Gaza, Demetrios suffered a defeat so serious that Ptolemy was able to occupy Gaza and several other cities, and to hold them until Antigonos himself brought in reinforcements later in the year. For Antigonos, the worst was yet to come. Seleukos never forgot that at Triparadeisos in 320 he had been appointed to Babylonia and had abandoned his post only under pressure from Antigonos. He had not lost his ambition to return. After the battle of Gaza Ptolemy gave him a thousand men for an attempt on Babylonia, and so to attack Antigonos where it would really hurt him – in his financial base in the east. Since 315 the region had apparently functioned smoothly for Antigonos, providing the regular funds that his expensive military and naval campaigns in the Levant and the Aegean constantly required. Seleukos increased his small force en route by recruiting some Macedonian veterans and garrison troops left by Antigonos in northern Mesopotamia, and when he reached Babylon he received a warm welcome, so we are told, in the city which he had ruled for four years, so that he could eject Antigonos' men from the city and its two citadels and take control himself. Antigonos' commander in Media,

Nikanor, challenged Seleukos, but when the armies met a mixture of good fortune and good sense brought Seleukos success, and he was even able to recruit what remained of Nikanor's army. The strategically critical western Iranian satrapies of Media and Susiana then joined Seleukos, while Nikanor himself fled westwards and reported his disaster to Antigonos. Unless Seleukos could be stopped, Antigonos would be receiving no further funds from his eastern satrapies. Antigonos' first reaction was to imitate Seleukos and try to recover Babylonia in a blitz campaign, and Demetrios set off from Damaskos with a large army of nearly 20,000 men. Seleukos himself was in western Iran when Demetrios arrived, and his local commander in Babylon, Patrokles, simply evacuated the city, except for the two fortified citadels, one of which Demetrios took by storm. He did nothing for his popularity, however, when he let his troops – largely mercenaries – plunder and rob the local population. At the second citadel he failed. Demetrios had to leave one of his friends to continue the siege, while he himself returned to Syria to report to his father on the seriousness of the situation (Diodoros 19.90–92; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 7).

The success of Seleukos' Babylonian adventure was the master stroke that forced Antigonos into negotiations to end the war in the west. Each side had hurt the other sufficiently to regard peace as desirable, but no basic change to the distribution of influence had occurred during the years of fighting: Cyprus was still divided between Ptolemaic and Antigonid supporters; in Egypt Ptolemy was more firmly in the saddle than ever and, as recent events had shown, posed a permanent threat to Antigonos in Syria and Phoinikia, thanks above all to his fleet. In Greece and the Aegean Antigonos had made some gains, owing to his effective propaganda, which he turned into strategic advantage, but in Macedonia itself Kassander remained firmly in control, and in Thrace Lysimachos was never seriously challenged. On the other hand, the coalition itself had made no progress towards realizing its initial demands. Without Seleukos' current threat to Antigonos' financial infrastructure in the east, the desultory war might well have gone on indefinitely, since earlier separate talks with Kassander and Ptolemy had shown that neither side was hurt enough to offer serious concessions.

The immediate loss of Babylonia and the eastern satrapies, and the prospect that this might be permanent, changed all that. The peace treaty that was agreed in 311 formally cemented the structural division of the Macedonian empire on the lines already sketched out by Antipater and Krateros for themselves in 320. Antigonos was forced to agree to the status quo in the west in order to be free to combat Seleukos in the east. This concession certainly recognized his position

of primacy in Asia, but when he accepted Kassander's rule in "Europe" (not further defined) and Lysimachos' in Thrace he formally abandoned any personal claim in Europe; moreover, his recognition of Ptolemy in Egypt and Libya formally restricted the definition of "Asia," his own area of primacy, and limited his rights there. The coalitionists could now afford to observe his existential struggle with Seleukos from a distance, since they had nothing to lose by it: whether Antigonos won or lost, time would be gained; and should Seleukos win, they would expect no problem in coming to an arrangement with their protégé, when he became Antigonos' successor in Asia.


Two minor points were also raised and formally incorporated into the treaty. For the Macedonians, the child Alexander IV, whom the army had recognized at Babylon in 323 and whose interests had been used for Antigonos' propaganda against Kassander since 314, was still the legitimate king, even if he were shut off from all public life in the fortress Amphipolis. He was now twelve years old, and with each advancing year getting closer to maturity, when at least some Macedonian traditionalists would expect him to begin to rule. Kassander therefore had to accept a formal limitation of his own position in Macedonia: he, the agreement stated, was to be "General in Europe" until Alexander IV came of age (a restriction which did not apply to the other signatories). The clause upheld Macedonian tradition – Kassander's father Antipater had held this title under Alexander the Great – but in practice it amounted to a death sentence for the boy and his mother, which was carried out by Glaukias, the commander of the garrison in Amphipolis, only a few weeks after the treaty was agreed. In due course the child's body received royal burial in the Argead cemetery at Aigai; with him the family that had ruled Macedonia as long as the unified Macedonian state had existed buried its last king.

The second point which Kassander was reluctantly made to accept in order to gain the peace concerned the Greek states. According to the text of the treaty, the Greeks were to be "autonomous." This meant that Antigonos had in effect imposed his own propaganda on his colleagues. Ptolemy and Lysimachos will have shrugged their shoulders at this slogan, since they had few, if any, old Greek cities in their territories. Antigonos' own aggressive liberation campaign, despite local setbacks and contradictions, had not been aimed at them, but at weakening Kassander's position with the Greek city-states in the Aegean islands, in the Peloponnese, and in central Greece, where it achieved some successes. Antigonos cannot seriously have expected that as a result of this clause Kassander would immediately withdraw his remaining garrisons – the most important of them was Athens. It was rather intended as a message to those cities his operatives had

already “freed” (even though some of his own garrisons remained in place, for security reasons) that their interests were not being abandoned by this treaty between the Macedonian dynasts, even though his own agreed area of responsibility, being restricted to Asia, formally excluded them (Diodoros 19.105; 20.19.3).

From one of his own Asian cities, the tiny Skepsis in the Troad, an inscription has preserved a letter in which Antigonos explains why he made peace. Large parts of the document can still be read. In it Antigonos emphasizes that he had not achieved everything for the Greeks that he had hoped to because the negotiations would have taken up too much time, but he had negotiated a clause guaranteeing, as he said, “freedom and autonomy” (the literary text in Diodoros mentions only “autonomy,” internal self-determination – writing to his own subjects Antigonos could afford to strain the truth). The reason why he was in such a hurry to make peace and therefore, as he said, to compromise and sacrifice some of his principal interests, he leaves imprecise. It would not do to say to Greeks that he had more urgent concerns than Greek interests, far away from Greek lands. He also insisted that his Greeks (he naturally said “all Greeks,” which has often confused historians) swear an oath that they would themselves take unified action to defend their “freedom and autonomy.” Given Antigonos’ planned absence in the eastern satrapies, independent action was their only chance. It implied, of course, the guarantee of active support against anyone who might seem to pose a threat to it or to the interests of Antigonos as its protector (*OGIS* 5 = *BD²* 6 = *Austin²* 38 = *Harding* 132; cf. chapter 4 below).

Consolidation



310/9	War between Antigonos and Seleukos in Mesopotamia
309/8	Ptolemy on Kos; operates in Greece
307	Demetrios liberates Athens
306	Battle of Salamis; Antigonos and Demetrios take royal title, followed by Seleukos, Lysimachos, Kassander, and Ptolemy; Antigonos attacks Egypt
305/4	Demetrios besieges Rhodes
301	Battle of Ipsos; death of Antigonos

I Seleukos

The decade between the peace between the dynasts in 311 and the battle of Ipsos in west central Anatolia in 301 was seminal for the emergence of the long-term structure of the Hellenistic world that would last with only minor changes until the Roman conquest and occupation. In 311 the classic tripartite political division between Europe (though at this time divided between Kassander and Lysimachos), Egypt, and “all Asia” – whatever might in practice be understood in detail by the latter term – was cemented and proved astonishingly resistant to all efforts to change, so that it sometimes gives the impression of being a “natural” division. It was not. Philip II and above all Alexander the Great would have seen nothing natural about it, and Antigonos only accepted it in 311 because he had no practical alternative. The long-term structure was a direct result of the coalition war, a classic political compromise, and the events of the next decade served in the last resort merely to consolidate its foundations.

Figure 1 Seleukos I wearing a diadem designating his royal status; Roman bronze replica of a Greek contemporary portrait. Found at Herculaneum. Museo Nazionale, Naples. Alinari Archives-Florence.



The most important long-term beneficiary of the compromise had not even participated in it. Seleukos' return to Babylonia after the battle of Gaza in 312 and his success against Demetrios' lightning attack shortly afterwards made the definition of what was meant by "all Asia" Antigonos' priority after the peace. For him it included the Iranian satrapies. It has occasionally been suggested, against the silence of the sources, that Seleukos "must" have been a participant in the agreement, that the coalitionists could not have "abandoned" him, indeed might even have formally recognized him in Babylon, but as formally subordinate to Antigonos. Such modern speculation is baseless. It was Seleukos' own personal decision to challenge Antigonos in Babylonia and the "Upper Satrapies," and Ptolemy supported him. In the meanwhile, he was making every effort to secure control of the resources of the Iranian satrapies, which both militarily and financially would surpass anything that Europe or Egypt

alone could muster. He no longer needed the concrete, still less the mere formalistic, support of his western allies, but if he managed to mobilize his eastern resources and withstand Antigonos' impending attack, he would doubtless remain a friend of the old coalition, since they had no immediate overlapping interests. They did not therefore abandon him in the negotiations of 311; there was simply nothing they could do to help, and he did not need them anyway. The very last thing Seleukos could have wished for was their explicit recognition that Antigonos had rights over "his" territories. That would indeed have been a diplomatic stab in the back. The lack of precise definition of Antigonos' "all Asia" meant simply that the allies were prepared to try to live with whichever of the dynasts won the forthcoming struggle for mastery in Babylonia and Iran. For them the advantages of a non-defined "all Asia" were obvious: by accepting this, Antigonos committed himself to restricting his own interests to Asia and acknowledging the others' rights to retain their current territories in Europe and Egypt.

Seleukos' threatened domination of the "Upper Satrapies" in Iran presented a major challenge to Antigonos, since if he failed to prevent it he would lose a great part of the income he needed to finance his largely mercenary armies. Nobody can therefore have been surprised when he immediately set off for Babylonia. Historical evidence for the campaign is slight. A fragmentary Babylonian Chronicle tells of fighting in Babylonia in 310 and 309, but it breaks off before the decisive engagement (Boiy 132–134). Hieronymos of Kardia, the main source for the extant Greek literary histories, either did not tell this story that ended with the defeat of his patron Antigonos, or his later excerptor Diodoros felt more interest in Greek affairs and simply omitted these events from his narrative. But the result is not in doubt. By late 309 Antigonos was defeated, and subsequently gave up the fight, withdrawing to northern Syria. Whether he reached any kind of agreement with Seleukos or simply accepted pragmatically his inability to challenge him further is unknown. From this time on Seleukos certainly felt reasonably secure in Babylonia, since he devoted the next years to establishing his rule in Iran and up to the borders of India, and so structured his empire in the same way as the Persian Achaimenids had organized theirs. In India, after crossing the Indus with an army and leaving an impression of his power on the local rulers, he made a famous treaty, perhaps in 305, with the Mauryan dynast Chandragupta, who sealed the compact by supplying Seleukos with several hundred – our source says 500 – elephants, the origins of a herd of war elephants that formed the fearsome backbone of Seleukid armies until the Romans destroyed them in the second century. In return, Seleukos accepted Chandragupta's possession of

some of the Indian territories originally conquered by Alexander, but which were virtually impossible to hold against local opposition (Strabo 15.2.9). In Iran Seleukos aimed to enter on the imperial legacy of the Achaimenids, whereas in Babylonia he encouraged the pre-Persian local tradition of Babylon itself. Nevertheless, he set a firm new personal accent in the area. For his imperial capital and his central administration, he founded a new city near Babylon, on the Tigris, organized on Greek lines with a sizable Greek population, doubtless largely recruited from his Macedonian veterans and Greek mercenaries. For it he followed a Macedonian tradition going back to Philip II, and named his new foundation after himself: Seleukeia (Strabo 16.1.5; 16).

Seleukos had in a few extraordinarily energetic years secured control of the Achaimenid empire in the east shattered by Alexander. While retaining the traditional basic governmental structures, the regional satrapies and the local loyalty-systems associated with them, he set up alongside his own Greek-speaking central administration, thus creating in tandem with the local Aramaic or Persian-speaking traditional aristocracy a new Greek-speaking aristocracy of function, personally attached to him in the Macedonian way as charismatic ruler. The maintenance of this double system required constant attention from Seleukos and his successors, but the ground was laid in these first years. Seleukos' success meant that of the Macedonian dynasts it was he who now monopolized the gigantic financial and manpower resources of Iran and Babylonia, and these remained critical for the Seleukid governmental system. At the same time, Seleukos and his successors never forgot their Macedonian origins, and therefore continued to show more than a passing interest in affairs of the eastern Mediterranean basin. Even after more than a century a Seleukid king – Antiochos III – could still envisage challenging for the throne of Macedonia itself. It is therefore hardly surprising that a late Latin source, looking back at this time, chose the description “Macedonian empire” (*Macedonicum Imperium*) for what modern historians, personalizing, tend to call “the Seleukid empire” (Justin 38.7.1). The Janus-headed nature of this unique Macedonian empire is reflected in its calendar. In order to emphasize the novelty and uniqueness of the government structure he had created, Seleukos introduced a new way of counting time and dating documents (the “Seleukid Era”), but this had two starting points, one for the Greek speakers in the Greek regions, according to the Macedonian calendar, beginning autumn 312 (the Macedonian year in which he conquered Babylon), and one according to the Babylonian calendar, which began in April 311, the first full Babylonian year in which he ruled in Babylon. Even though this “era” was probably introduced some years

after the event, in order to commemorate it as the historical beginning of the new kingdom, once it seemed to be firmly established, it emphasizes in a particularly prominent way the political consciousness that Seleukos liked to promote, that the new epoch also represented traditional values. For his subjects his empire was indeed new, but he had no intention of destroying fundamental organizational aspects of their traditional way of life and their sociopolitical structure. By the time the Macedonian coalition reassembled its armies to meet Antigonos at Ipsos in 301, Seleukos had become a major player, without whose aid the battle might have been lost.

II Lysimachos

The second success story of the decade concerns Lysimachos, whose original claim to straddle and control the narrows of both the Bosporos and Dardanelles (Hellespont) in 315 had not been achieved in the peace of 311. Indeed, quite the opposite. When in 313 one of his west Pontic cities, Kallatis in the Dobrudja, tried to throw off Lysimachos' control, Antigonos sent an army in support and Lysimachos had difficulty in defending it (Diodoros 19.73). In 311 he will therefore have been sufficiently satisfied with the terms of the peace that at least guaranteed him freedom from further interference. He himself showed no respect for the civic autonomy clause, and Kallatis was duly integrated into his kingdom, although 1,000 men who had escaped the city during the siege preferred to remain in exile in the Bosporan kingdom (Diodoros 20.25). Lysimachos' advantage during the decade after the peace lay in the fact that all the other Macedonian dynasts were increasingly engaged – mostly with each other – elsewhere, and Lysimachos was largely left alone to organize his realm unchallenged, perhaps even helped, by his closest Macedonian neighbor Kassander. He reached a *modus vivendi* with the Greek cities in his territories and with certain Thracian chiefs, though we have little information in detail, except for the fact that at least two of them – Seuthes and Spartokos – continued to control certain inland areas of Thrace. Seuthes even imitated the Macedonians in founding a city which he named after himself, Seuthopolis (*SEG* 42, 661). Lysimachos tolerated this intimation of independence, perhaps helped by his taking a Thracian wife; the native dynasts certainly show no sign of having hindered his security in the south, where from 309 onwards he imitated his neighbor Kassander and refounded an old Greek city, Kardias on the Gallipoli peninsula, as his name-city,

Lysimacheia (Appian, *Syriake* 1; Pausanias 1.9.8). From here he expected to be able to control traffic approaching the Dardanelles and in effect restate his old claim to influence on both sides of the classic waterway. As soon as the coalition reformed in 302 to challenge Antigonos in Asia, it was Lysimachos who took the first aggressive steps from his European base and set up the vanguard of the challenge to Antigonos. This time the future would be his.

III Ptolemy

Seleukos' patron Ptolemy joined the peace negotiations in 311 only when it became clear that he would otherwise be left on his own. The agreement guaranteed his position in Egypt and Kyrene, but the lack of definition of Antigonos' "all Asia" made his possession of Cyprus, which he governed through his brother Menelaos, a potential bone of contention, while Syria, which he also coveted, remained occupied by Antigonos' troops. The peace terms were thus unsatisfactory for Ptolemy, and while Antigonos was bogged down in his losing war in southern Mesopotamia against Seleukos, Ptolemy seized his chance to change the situation in southern Asia Minor to his advantage by attacking the coastal cities in Rough Kilikia opposite Cyprus with his fleet – he claimed to be freeing them from Antigonos' "illegal" garrisons. His success was only temporary, since Demetrios quickly recovered the towns, but in 309 Ptolemy continued the provocation further west, in Lykia and Karia, and made a base for the winter on the island of Kos, from where he observed and tried to influence what was going on in the Aegean and the European mainland, while awaiting the birth of a son from his concubine Berenike. From here he invited Antigonos' nephew Polemaios, who had made himself independent in the area and allied with Kassander, to visit him to discuss future cooperation; but during the visit he found reason to suspect Polemaios' intentions, and had him brutally eliminated (Diodoros 20.19.3–5; 27). A second initiative concerned Kleopatra, full sister of Alexander the Great, who had been living at Sardeis under guard since 322, when she had hoped to marry Perdikkas. She realized that the nimbus associating her with Alexander was a wasting asset, as new loyalty networks developed among the Macedonians, and she chose this moment to try to join Ptolemy on Kos. She failed to escape the observant guards, however, and was murdered on Antigonos' instructions shortly afterwards. A third Ptolemaic initiative started from Kos also produced no lasting success. Since the death of Polyperchon's son Alexandros, his widow Kratesipolis had held

Korinth and Sikyon in the northern Peloponnese with garrison troops. Ptolemy took up contact with her and some other Peloponnesian states, and in 308 he crossed the Aegean with his fleet and took over Korinth and Sikyon from Kratesipolis, together with neighboring Megara. But when supplies promised by the other Peloponnesians failed to materialize, he just gave up, leaving small garrisons – doubtless mercenaries – in the three cities and returned to Egypt after obtaining Kassander's agreement to tolerate his position (Diodoros 20.37).

Figure 2 Official coin portrait of Ptolemy I as king, wearing the diadem; the royal title is recorded on the reverse. Issued by the Alexandrian mint ca. 300–283. Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



The precise purpose of Ptolemy's desultory Aegean and Greek activity is something of a puzzle. Since it began while Antigonos was away fighting Seleukos, it might be thought that Ptolemy was merely exploring possibilities for the eventuality that Antigonos, who was

already in his mid-seventies, might not return from the fray. His brief adventure into the Peloponnese certainly cannot be seen as a serious challenge to Kassander, who in the end simply accepted his minimal role there, and the lack of a long-term perspective emerges clearly from his immediate withdrawal, as soon as the going became difficult. As a Macedonian, he doubtless tended to take a Europe-centered view of world affairs, at least in principle, and to regard Greece as traditionally important and consider his new Macedonian Egypt to be an integral part of the Greek political and cultural continuum. His massive investments in Alexandria and the transfer of his central administration from the Pharaonic capital Memphis to the new Greek-style city sometime before 311, the date of our first evidence for it, emphasize this mentality; the many Greek immigrants from "Old Greece," attracted by the possibilities of the new city, will also have bolstered Ptolemaic consciousness of having merely extended the limits of the Greek world by setting up a Macedonian state in Egypt. It was therefore natural for him, as a powerful Macedonian, to wish to be taken seriously by the other powerful Macedonians. This does not, however, mean that he had any serious intention of contending for supremacy over the whole empire that the Macedonian army under Alexander had won.

In Egypt itself Ptolemy set out to point a contrast with the Persian occupiers, making a conscious effort to take up themes associated with the pre-Persian Saite dynasty, which under the famous Pharaoh Amasis in the sixth century had deliberately sought contacts with the Greek world, even encouraging a certain level of Greek immigration by allowing the foundation of Naukratis as a Greek trading post. In a contemporary document dated to 311, the "Stele of the Satrap," Ptolemy is praised by a body of priests from a temple in the Nile delta for restoring objects removed by the Persians and in particular for restoring to the temple the income from an estate that had earlier been confiscated (translation in Bevan, *The House of Ptolemy*, 28ff.). In other parts of Egypt existing administrative structures seem to have been largely maintained unchanged, which was a good way of winning over those influential Egyptians who had traditionally run the regional and local government of the land, especially the taxation and legal systems. Here change came only gradually (see Part II, chapter 7, below). The major immediate structural change concerned the growth of Alexandria as the new center of government and main residence for the large influx of Greeks into Egypt. The spectacular tomb of the founder, Alexander the Great, and the establishment of his official cult were to serve as religious mechanisms for expressing the loyalty of the Greek population to the city and to the Ptolemaic regime. A parallel Greek-style city, Ptolemais, was founded in Upper Egypt in the

Thebaid as center for Greek residents and administrators there, but these two city foundations seem not to have disturbed the restored equilibrium of the Egyptian ruling classes. Among them, the priests in particular enjoyed favor, which they repaid with ever-increasing demonstrations of loyalty to the new regime.

When Ptolemy returned to Egypt in 308 from his abortive expedition into Greece, he will have been aware that Antigonos had failed to remove Seleukos from Babylonia, but was otherwise alive and well. This knowledge might even have been a reason for his precipitate return. Antigonos immediately began to found a name-city on the lower Orontes in northern Syria – Antigoneia – a measure intended to perpetuate his hold on the area, to secure his rule in bricks and mortar and through the creation of vested interests among his followers and supporters, who doubtless received houses and land on particularly favorable conditions (Diodoros 20.47.5). It also implied opposition to Egyptian schemes for gaining control of the Lebanon and the cities of the Phoinikian coast (“Koile Syria”), on which Ptolemy had already made two attempts. Antigonos’ threat to Ptolemy stretched, however, even farther afield. Ptolemy had already challenged Antigonos’ hold on southern Asia Minor, and his accusation of bad faith towards the Greeks with regard to the garrisons had doubtless annoyed him. Now that Antigonos had been forced to give up Mesopotamia and the income from the Upper Satrapies, he was a loose gun in search of a challenge. The peace terms agreed in 311 were now quietly forgotten, only the propaganda of Greek freedom from garrisons being employed as and when it might seem to help. Having failed in Mesopotamia, Antigonos and Demetrios now set out to conquer the rest of the Macedonian empire. Turbulent years lay ahead for all who got in their way.

Ptolemy was the first of the Macedonian dynasts to experience this new aggressive Antigonid dynamism. For any power operating from Syria by sea, Cyprus was critically important strategically, and Ptolemy watched over his possession jealously, having put his brother Menelaos in charge there. In 310 he had forced the death of the city-king of Paphos, Nikokles, on mere suspicion of his having entertained secret contacts with Antigonos (Diodoros 20.21). It can therefore have come as no great surprise when late in 307 Demetrios, coming from Greece with a large fleet and sizable army, landed in the north of the island, defeated Menelaos in a first engagement, and laid siege to his headquarters at Salamis. The situation remained so serious over the winter that Ptolemy himself collected all the ships and men he could raise at short notice and set off in the spring to relieve his brother. The result was disastrous. Demetrios won the ensuing naval battle in the waters before Salamis, and shortly afterwards Ptolemaic forces

abandoned the island altogether (Diodoros 20.47–53).

Demetrios' military success was transient, but one of its effects was epochal, for Antigonos chose the victory to justify his assuming the title and style of king (*basileus*) during the following months, and symbolized the act by beginning to wear a diadem – a linen headband, which Alexander had adopted from the Persians as outward symbol of his ruling power – for the first time. Moreover, he granted the title to Demetrios also. The fact became known in Athens in April 305 (*IG II*² 471). Antigonos' Macedonian competitors, Seleukos, Lysimachos, Kassander, and even the defeated Ptolemy, lost no time in each finding an occasion for following suit and formally assuming the royal title (Diodoros 20.53; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 18). But only Kassander could call himself “King of the Macedonians.” In this way the Hellenistic monarchy was born. Macedonia had always known regional royal families until they were absorbed into the centralized state created by Philip II (Polyperchon, for instance, belonged to one of them). In principle, therefore, the post-Alexandrian regional Macedonian monarchies were nothing absolutely new. What had, of course, happened was that the regions ruled by Macedonians since Alexander's campaigns were enormously larger than the little mountain principalities in Upper Macedonia, where the original regional royal families had lived and ruled. Moreover, all the new Macedonian kings were the first in their families to bear the title, none of them, as far as we know, having a close family relationship with previous Macedonian royalty. They chose to be kings because of their overwhelming power, because their followers and supporters expected it from them, and because each of them dominated his immediate world. For the average Macedonian, a nobleman who led and dominated, who was formally responsible to nobody, but who ruled and cared for those he led and whose personal loyalty he claimed and held, was simply kingly, and in the last resort could only be a king.

The battle of Salamis and the loss of Cyprus were serious blows to Ptolemy, and worse was still to come, since Antigonos, having lost the revenues from Babylonia and Iran, decided to seek a favorable alternative source of income – in Egypt. In late 306, buoyed up by his success in Cyprus, a major expedition with both land and sea forces set off to depose Ptolemy. But despite their having taken Cyprus, Antigonos and Demetrios were not all-powerful, and once again, just as in 320 when Perdikkas had tried to remove Ptolemy, the natural defenses of Egypt – desert and the Nile delta – were cleverly exploited by Ptolemy and his men, so that the aggressors could be ignominiously repulsed. They did not try again (Diodoros 20.73–76).

It is not surprising that Ptolemy, having now defeated two kings, chose this occasion to imitate them and become king himself. Up to

this time his ambiguous status – he was still formally “satrap,” but at the same time effective independent ruler – had been elegantly disguised: during the first years after 323 he depicted himself formally merely as a servant of Philip III and then of Alexander IV, whose nominal rule was upheld as a fiction even for some years after his death, until 305/4 when he became king (*basileus*) for the Macedonians and other Greeks, and Pharaoh for the Egyptians. At this point – like Seleukos in Babylon – Ptolemy began to count his regnal years in Greek from the point of his effective rule, the death of Alexander in 323, but the Egyptians counted it formally correctly from 305/4 when he became their Pharaoh. Ptolemy’s attitude was flexible enough to allow him to live with this basically trivial formal anomaly, and he made no effort to standardize it. His success against Antigonos and Demetrios and the self-assurance that it stimulated meant that Ptolemaic Egypt was there to stay. It was nearly a century and a half before a further attempt to invade Egypt from the north was successful. After 306 Ptolemaic Egypt remained virtually unchallenged as an integral part of the long-term dynastic state structure of the Hellenistic world.

IV Kassander and Europe

In Macedonian Europe, where Kassander had been confirmed in 311, the political situation was much more complex than in Asia. In Macedonia Kassander had literally been left “holding the baby,” for Alexander IV and Roxane were still at Amphipolis, under his control, and formally the agreement of 311 was to last until Alexander IV was old enough to rule. Our source, going back to the contemporary client of Antigonos, Hieronymos of Kardias, reflects also Antigonos’ view when he reports that, when Kassander arranged for Alexander’s and Roxane’s assassination shortly after the peace agreement, “Kassander, Lysimachos, and Ptolemy, but also Antigonos were relieved of any challenge to be anticipated from the king; for there was no longer anyone left to take up the royal office, and from now on each of them who controlled peoples and cities entertained aspirations of royalty for himself and governed the territory allotted to him as if it were a spear-won kingdom” (Diodoros 19.105.3–4).

The elimination of Alexander’s child in 310, the last Argead with a recognized claim to rule in Macedonia, certainly clarified the formal situation among the Macedonian generals. Nevertheless, as we have seen, they all waited several years before adopting the royal title, until Antigonos took the initiative after Demetrios defeated Ptolemy in the

naval battle of Salamis in 306. The intervening period was a constitutional limbo, formally filled at least in Babylonia and in Egypt, from where we have some information, by counting years of rule of the child Alexander, even after his death – in Egypt until 306/5. There is no information from Macedonia itself, where loyalty to the Argead House might have been expected to have deeper roots, despite Olympias' counterproductive brutality after her return in 317. Kassander himself had realized this when he married Thessalonike, though through his choice he cleverly preferred to emphasize his connection with Philip's legacy rather than with Alexander's. Kassander's position in Macedonia was therefore fairly stable, but in southern Greece his control was far from being as solid as he would have wished. He held Athens, certainly, but in the Peloponnese Polyperchon, still formally allied to Antigonos, maintained a gloomily threatening presence; Korinth and Sikyon were held by Kratesipolis, widow of Polyperchon's son Alexandros, as an independent but strategically important small fiefdom; and in western central Greece the Aitolian League, undefeated by Antipater in the Lamian War, still maintained its independence in the mountains, ready at the drop of a hat to offer support to anybody opposing Kassander.

As long as Antigonos was occupied in Mesopotamia, Kassander could cope with this basically unstable situation. Polyperchon was first to challenge him, soon after the deaths of Alexander IV and Roxane. As an old companion of Alexander's, Polyperchon knew that the conqueror had sired a son with the Iranian princess Barsine. This child, named Herakles after the mythical founder of the Argead House, had been living in the fortress of Pergamon in Antigonos' territory since sometime after Alexander's death in 323, and was now about seventeen years old. Polyperchon had the bright idea of trying to regain support in Macedonia for himself – how could he ever forget that Kassander's own father had appointed him guardian of the kings? – by bringing the last surviving male Argead home. Herakles' minders in Pergamon did not object, so in 309 Polyperchon set off through Aitolian territory accompanied by an army escorting the boy, crossed the Pindos from Epeiros and reached Tymphaia in Upper Macedonia, the region where until Philip's time his family had provided the rulers. Here he was met by Kassander and his army. Kassander was not taking any risks after his earlier experience with Eurydike and Olympias: his own position in Macedonia was not compatible with the presence of a forgotten son of the great Alexander claiming the vacant Argead succession. In the event, neither of the protagonists had the stomach for a fight, and talks produced a deal, the most immediately important aspects of which were the elimination of Herakles and Polyperchon's giving up his hopeless challenge to Kassander. As an

additional concession, Kassander restored him his private family estates in Macedonia that he had confiscated during Polyperchon's flirt with Antigonos, and appointed him his own representative in southern Greece, even giving him some troops. For Polyperchon, his adventure this time had paid off, and Kassander will have been satisfied, since he had detached him from Antigonos and so weakened his potential rival's position in southern Greece. Polyperchon himself, already around eighty years old, was in any case a problem which nature, left to itself, would fairly soon resolve (Diodoros 20.28).

After Kassander's assimilation of Polyperchon's remaining Macedonian supporters, he suffered no further serious problem of acceptance in Macedonia itself. His position in southern Greece, however, continued to be weak. In 308 even Ptolemy tried briefly to challenge it by taking over Kratesipolis' cities, though Kassander's man Prepelaos soon won over Korinth, by far the most important of them. The real challenge, however, was yet to come and for Kassander, as for Ptolemy, it was a direct result of Antigonos' failure against Seleukos. Had he been successful in the east, his challenge to Kassander might still have come sometime; but because of his failure it came in 307. That year and the following saw Antigonos at the zenith of his power, as a result of actions which shocked his main competitors, Ptolemy and Kassander. While Antigonos himself remained in Syria, overseeing the building of his name-city, in the early part of 307 Demetrios operated in the Aegean with a large fleet, before attacking Cyprus later in the year. In June he dealt a blow to Kassander, as devastating as it was unexpected: the sudden capture of Athens. This event began a love-hate relationship between Demetrios and the city that dominated the next twenty years and in particular shows up in the ancient literary tradition on the history of the period. The capture itself was a pure accident: the harbor chains were not in position, because the authorities thought the fleet they saw approaching was Ptolemy's! Once it had entered the Peiraieus, it was too late to oppose it, and although Kassander's garrison in the harbor fort Mounychia held out for several weeks, it was soon cut off from the rest of the city – effectively besieged – by Demetrios' troops, who took over and “freed” the city from Kassander. His unpopular autocratic governor, Demetrios of Phaleron, was allowed to withdraw honorably to Thebes, and by August Mounychia had also fallen. The Ptolemaic garrison in neighboring Megara was also expelled, so that within six weeks the central pillar of Kassander's position in southern Greece had fallen (Diodoros 20.45–46; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 8–10).

Athens, the most prestigious of the old Greek cities, was the strategic jewel in Kassander's Greek crown, but his representative there, Demetrios of Phaleron, while superficially giving the impression

of respecting Athenian institutions, ran a politically restrictive regime, and over the years became widely unpopular with the mass of the Athenians, who were in effect disfranchised. When Antigonos' son Demetrios arrived proclaiming freedom and the restoration of the democracy, uncontrolled by a garrison, he was therefore not just promoting his father's propaganda but deliberately making a bid for the support of those democratic elements which Polyperchon mobilized in 318, but since then had been politically suppressed. In effect it comprised, paradoxically, the next generation of those Athenians who had resisted Macedonian aspirations in the south from the beginning, the followers of Demosthenes and Lykourgos. Demetrios therefore experienced almost delirious immediate support, and when the *ekklesia*, the democratic mass assembly of all the citizens, began to meet again in summer 307, it did not hesitate to vote enthusiastically honors for Antigonos and Demetrios such as no man had yet received in the city. The almost hysterical joy was at first certainly genuine. Antigonos and Demetrios were granted cult status as "Savior" or "Savior Gods," on the premise that only a god could bring such benefits as Demetrios, acting for his father, had done. Their names were integrated into the resurrected democratic fabric of the state apparatus through the creation of two new citizenship units (*phylai*), Antigonis and Demetrias, which now took formal precedence over the ten old Kleisthenic *phylai*; many statues were erected, most spectacularly those set up next to the "Tyrant-Slayers," Harmodios and Aristogeiton, whose ambivalent act of violence in the sixth century later became the constitutive myth of the classical democracy. The free democratic tradition of the state was also emphasized in a decree posthumously rehabilitating the great anti-Macedonian democrat Lykourgos, whose son Habron now took on various financial offices in the restored democracy ([Plutarch], *Lives of the Ten Orators* 852). Demochares of Leukonoe, a nephew of Demosthenes, also participated prominently in the initial stages of the restoration, but the most active man of the hour was Stratokles, a member of a rich Athenian family, who had been prominent in the 320s and now emerged as the leading man of the new democracy. Stratokles proposed a large number of decrees favoring and honoring in particular Demetrios personally and members of his entourage, and so caused an unprecedented wave of publications on stone, many of which have survived, at least partially, to confirm his prominence in the literary tradition (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 10–14; *IG II*²455ff.).

Demetrios' treatment of Athens and the Athenian reaction to it in and after 307 is paradigmatic for the relationship between traditionally independent cities and Macedonian rulers. Kassander, following his father's methods, had chosen in effect to suppress the

democracy, which had always opposed Macedon, and rule by force. His method was inevitably unpopular and expensive, since it required the constant use of repressive manpower. It was scarcely viable as a general system for controlling the hundreds of cities in the Greek world. Demetrios' method, following his father's proclamation at Tyre and the terms of the peace of 311, was different and aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the citizens, to encourage them to see their essential interests as coinciding with those of the ruling power. In principle this was a more viable model, and it had the additional advantage of being reasonably cheap, but it required constant detailed attention by both parties; and regular contact was difficult to achieve, when the ruler was also following up other, perhaps for him more important, interests; also, despite common interests, it could easily cause mutual irritation if the contact were too prolonged. Demetrios' popularity in Athens – even though the city was only one of his objectives, and in 307 not even the most important of them – was fostered by Kassander's continual opposition and his various attempts over the next four years to regain possession of the city. These attempts stimulated the Athenian democrats to independent resistance in Demetrios' absence, and they were again helped by their old ally from the Lamian War, the Aitolian League. When Demetrios finally returned to Athens late in 304 and spent the following two winters there, the constant presence of the king and his retinue caused serious tensions, since it gradually dawned on the Athenians that in the last resort their new freedom consisted of being free to do what Demetrios wanted them to do. His increasingly arrogant and authoritarian personal "royal" attitude and behavior, expressed most dramatically by his taking up residence on the acropolis in the rear quarters (*opisthodomos*) of the Parthenon – earlier generations would have bluntly called it "tyrannical behavior" – caused the type of irritated reaction which friendly occupying powers regularly experience the world over: the occupiers were overpaid, oversexed, and over here. The irritation caused by Demetrios' friendly occupation raised tensions also within the democratic group of Athenian politicians and led to major policy splits. Demochares even had to go into exile because of them (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 23–24; 26–27).

The basic problem was in the last resort insoluble, though a less flamboyant personality than Demetrios might have made it easier for his local friends to maintain their enthusiasm. However, for the sporadic ongoing war against Kassander his support and personal presence were necessary again and again; but precisely his personal presence (together with his army and entourage) made many democrats quickly yearn for his departure, though none wanted Kassander's regime back. For Demetrios, as long as Antigonos lived

and set the priorities, “Old Greece” was a secondary sector, although our literary sources, fascinated by the prestige and the history of the unique cultural center Athens, like to give a different impression. At first Antigonos was probably as disturbed by the short-term implications of Demetrios’ dramatic coup in Athens as Kassander was, since Antigonos’ immediate priority was to reestablish his rule in Asia. This included regaining maritime supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, which he had enjoyed before 311 but where he was now challenged by Ptolemy. For him Cyprus was currently far more important than Athens, and Demetrios was recalled to begin operations there, as soon as he was free. It would be two years before he returned to Greece. His naval victory and the capture of Cyprus led not to further activity in the Aegean basin but to the abortive attack on Egypt, thus making Antigonos’ priorities quite clear. Even after this, Ptolemy remained the main enemy and the achievement of naval superiority Antigonos’ chief objective. In 305 this aim led to Demetrios’ attacking the island republic of Rhodes that had dared to use its freedom to refuse to support Antigonos against Ptolemy, while the Athenians were left to defend themselves against Kassander. Demetrios’ spectacular attack on democratic Rhodes occupied him for more than a year, from summer 305 to summer 304, and brought him the ironic name-tag “The Besieger” (*Poliorketes*), for the siege was an extraordinarily extravagant waste of time and resources, and in the last resort a failure: even after it, Demetrios had to agree that the Rhodians need not support him in fighting Ptolemy. At Rhodes there was no question of Demetrios trying to win hearts and minds, and his attack on the island, which had democratically decided not to support his aggression against Ptolemy in Cyprus and Egypt, will have given his democratic friends in Athens much to ponder on (Diodoros 20.81–88; 91–100; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 21–22).

The failure of the attack on Egypt and the irresponsible wastage of men and materials in the siege of Rhodes marked a disastrous turning point in the careers of Antigonos and Demetrios. After their failure in Egypt, the ex-coalition partners Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassander realized that Antigonos could be resisted effectively. They had all participated in different ways in supplying the beleaguered Rhodians – Ptolemy’s efforts in particular made a major contribution to their ability to hold out. Demetrios’ friends in the Greek cities were also perturbed at his – to them – irrational persistence at Rhodes, while they were suffering immediate hostilities from Kassander and Polyperchon. During the winter of the year-long siege Athens and some other Greeks tried to persuade Demetrios to negotiate with Rhodes, and in the end it was representatives of the Aitolian League who brought about the agreement that ended the siege, and as soon as


Demetrios appeared in Greece late in 304 they made a formal alliance with him (Diodoros 20.100.6). Kassander's opponents in Greece, whom he had encouraged in 307 but since then totally neglected, were trying to bind Demetrios to their interests and persuade him to engage in mainland Greece seriously – a direct result of his adopting his father's freedom propaganda and of his own commando-style "liberation" of the Athenians and Megarians. His attack on democratic Rhodes must have seemed a regrettable error of judgment to all those Greeks whose priority was "Old Greece," but for a successful resistance to Kassander and Polyperchon Demetrios remained the only feasible ally. He just needed to commit himself to the job until it was completed.

After the siege of Rhodes he did just that. Antigonos now let him operate in southern Greece, spending the next two winters at Athens and the summers operating against Kassander and Polyperchon. By 302 he had "freed" so many cities that he took the initiative in organizing them into a common League based closely on the League of Korinth which Philip II had formed after the battle of Chaironeia to fight the Persian War (StV III 446 = Harding 172 = Austin² 50 = BD² 8). By then he had brought most of southern and central Greece onto his side and had begun to attack Kassander much nearer home, in Thessaly, even expelling Kassander's garrison from Pherai, when he received an emergency call from Antigonos (Diodoros 20.102–103; 110–111).

The coalition of Lysimachos, Kassander, and Ptolemy that had come together in helping Rhodes during the siege 305-4 finally showed alarm at Demetrios' successes in Greece – where would they end? – and decided to attack Antigonos in his heartland, Asia Minor, well knowing that it was still Antigonos who set the military priorities for the pair. Their greatest diplomatic coup, critical, as it turned out, for ultimate victory, was to interest Seleukos in participating. He set out from Mesopotamia with a largely Iranian army, accompanied by some of his famous Indian war elephants, marching on a northerly route into Kappadokia, where he could not be stopped by Antigonos who controlled the easier passage through northern Syria and Kilikia. Lysimachos and Kassander sent troops across to Asia, and in summer 301 the united armies met Antigonos and Demetrios at Ipsos in Phrygia. The result of this battle of the giants was the total defeat of the Antigonid army, a defeat which became epoch-making through the death of Antigonos on the field (Diodoros 20.111–113; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 28–29). To the victors the spoils. Antigonos' defeat guaranteed that the separate political structures that had grown up within the Macedonian empire over the last twenty years, the leaders of which had combined to win the war, would survive it, strengthened

and extended into the territories of the defeated.

From Ipsos to Koroupedion



300	Putsch of Lachares at Athens
297	Death of Kassander
295	Demetrios recovers Athens
294	Demetrios takes control of Macedonia
288	Demetrios loses Macedonia
287	Demetrios loses Athens
286	Demetrios goes to Asia Minor
285/4	Lysimachos king in Macedonia
282	Death of Demetrios
281	Battle of Koroupedion; death of Lysimachos; death of Seleukos

I After Ipsos

The twenty years from the battle of Ipsos to that of Koroupedion in 281 are not well documented. Diodoros' continuous narrative, based on that of the contemporary Hieronymos of Kardia, ends shortly before Ipsos, and the sourcebase for the following years is extremely fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Justin's narrative is the only continuous account to survive, but remains often garbled and is in any case brief and highly selective. Plutarch's *Demetrios* continues to offer some narrative when Demetrios is involved, and occasional references to events of the period are made by the "Greek Baedeker," Pausanias, the Antonine travel-book writer who is well informed about the places he visited in southern and central Greece. Inscriptions – decrees, letters, and other documents – from a variety of places in the Greek world continue to offer ad hoc information about particular places at specific times. Much, however, particularly the precise date of many events, remains uncertain. Almost nothing is known about Egypt in

these years or about areas outside the Greek-speaking world.

The victors of the battle of Ipsos had no difficulty in dividing the spoils on paper. Lysimachos took Asia Minor north and west of the Tauros mountains, and Seleukos Syria. Kassander's brother Pleistarchos received a smaller territory in Kilikia, and Kassander retained Macedonia and what he could control of the rest of Greek Europe, apart from Lysimachos' Thrace. Ptolemy, who had not sent troops to participate in the battle, nevertheless also benefited by taking advantage of Antigonos' absence from Syria to occupy parts of Phoinikia and Lebanon ("Koile Syria") again. For the moment, immediately after the battle, Seleukos had enough to do without challenging his old patron over this, and simply accepted the status quo.

This neat division of territories was based on the assumption that the battle had destroyed Antigonos and Demetrios as a political force. That was a mistake, for although Antigonos was dead and his land army defeated, Demetrios still lived and his fleet was intact. Antigonos had already prepared for the succession to his charismatic kingship when he appointed Demetrios king in 306 at the same time as he took the title himself, well knowing that he was old and that succession problems when a king died had plagued Macedonia for generations, most intensively, of course, since 323. That kind of chaos he wished to avoid for his own kingdom. After Ipsos Demetrios was therefore a king with a fleet but without a country, yet his huge fleet meant he was by no means a political nobody. His main naval base was currently Ephesos, but also in Syria he retained the major harbor cities of Tyre and Sidon; Cyprus was his, and because of the dominance of his fleet it was inaccessible to the competition. He also hoped that the memory of the benefits he had brought to Athens in 307 would shore up the loyalty of that major Greek harbor city and offer him a mainland base for his continuing the struggle against the coalition, above all against Kassander; Korinth, which he had made the seat of his Greek League in 302, also remained in his hands, now held by a loyal garrison. The Island League, through which he controlled much of the Aegean, also remained loyal.

After the defeat at Ipsos Ephesos no longer offered a secure base, so Demetrios collected the fleet and set sail for Athens, where he had left his most recently acquired wife, Deidameia, a sister of the young Epeiros king Pyrrhos. When the news of Ipsos reached Athens, however, the democratic Athenians used their newly won freedom to abandon the advice of Stratokles, Demetrios' main political friend there, to remain loyal, and an assembly passed a decree that foresaw allowing no king entry to their city – formally a declaration of neutrality, but under the circumstances actually a rejection of

Demetrios. Deidameia was escorted to Megara, and when Demetrios demanded at least the delivery of the ships he had stationed at the Peiraeus, the Athenians gladly let them sail away (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 30). Demetrios then collected his forces, sailed north to the Dardanelles where he tried to attack Lysimachos directly, but was soon attracted to the east by Seleukos, who saw advantage in making use of – or, at least, neutralizing – Demetrios by offering him a marriage alliance: the king himself would marry Demetrios' daughter Stratonike, whom Kassander's sister Phila had borne to him. A marriage of convenience indeed, but if all went well through it the most potent land power would be united with the most powerful navy. That this might prove a dangerous combination for others became clear, even before the two kings met at Rhosos in northern Syria; en route Demetrios made various attacks on Pleistarchos' territory in Kilikia, including the buccaneering emptying of the regional treasury at Kyinda, Pleistarchos' most important financial reserve. It was not long before Pleistarchos had to abandon his territory in Kilikia altogether (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 31–32).

In Greece Athens found neutrality more difficult to practice than to proclaim. The city had been dependent on food imports for centuries, and both main sources of grain surpluses and the transport routes from them – Egypt and the northern Black Sea region (today the Ukraine) – were now controlled by one or other of the Macedonian kings. By late 300 famine broke out in Athens and the professional military man Lachares, with the support of mercenary troops whose commander he was, and with the encouragement of Kassander, took control of the city in a putsch that formally left the organs of the democracy intact but robbed them of any initiating function. Lachares, once in control, also made contact with Lysimachos, who controlled the Dardanelles and the Bosporos and is recorded as making a sizable gift of food-grains in 299; in 298 a further gift to aid the celebration of the *Panathenaia* festival arrived from Lysimachos (*Syll.*³ 374 = BD² 13 = Austin² 54 = Burstein 11).

In 297 an unexpected event shook the post-Ipsos appearance of stability. Kassander, not yet sixty, died suddenly, and his eldest son from Thessalonike, programmatically named Philip after his maternal grandfather, who had been groomed for the succession, also died a mere four months after his father. This double loss left open a power-gap in Macedonia that neither of Kassander's two younger sons, Antipatros and Alexandros, could fill. Their mother Thessalonike tried at first to share power between her sons under her own regency, but because she gave the impression of favoring Alexandros, her younger son, Antipatros murdered her and with his own supporters began a civil war against his brother. Given the inexperience of both youths,

this was a mere invitation to other regional potentates to intervene in Macedonia, and the young men did nothing to hinder this, each seeking help against the other wherever he could find it (Justin 16.1). The precise timescale of these events is unclear, but Demetrios was soon able to exploit the disarray. By 295 he had taken advantage of a major split in Athenian politics – a group of men hostile to Lachares occupied the Peiraieus and held it against the tyrant – to regain control of Athens. This time there was no pretense that his main aim was to “free the Greeks” and restore democracy. Instead he installed trustworthy men in office and garrisoned not only the Mounychia fort in the Peiraieus but also the Hill of the Muses in the heart of Athens, across from the acropolis. Athens was to be the firm European base he needed in order to gain power in Macedonia (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 33–34).

The civil war in Macedonia favored Demetrios. Whereas Antipatros turned for help to Lysimachos, one of whose daughters he had married, Alexandros appealed both to Pyrrhos and to Demetrios. Pyrrhos, son of Aiakides (and so great-nephew of Olympias), had joined Antigonos and Demetrios for the Ipsos campaign after fleeing Epeiros before Kassander, and had recently regained his kingdom with help from Ptolemy. He was nearer than Demetrios and quicker to react, and soon reached an agreement with Alexandros, while Lysimachos did little or nothing to support Antipatros. By the time Demetrios reached Macedonia from Athens and met up with Alexandros at the Macedonian national sanctuary at Dion, Alexandros had therefore already won the struggle with his brother, thanks to Pyrrhos’ aid. He then simply told Demetrios he no longer needed his help, but naively accepted an invitation to meet him a few days later in Thessalian Larissa. There Demetrios arranged for Alexandros’ murder, claiming he was saving himself from an assassination attempt. Under the circumstances, Alexandros’ crown council, now isolated in Demetrios’ camp at Larissa, had no alternative to accepting Demetrios as their new king, and Alexandros’ military escort followed their example. Lysimachos, who was currently involved in a major campaign on the Danube, also recognized Demetrios as the price for current stability. Demetrios, it must have seemed, had finally achieved what his father had striven for (Justin 16.1.8–19; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 36–37).

II Demetrios as King of the Macedonians

Demetrios had been born in Macedonia, but left it as a three-year-old. On his return, he experienced severe difficulties in coming to terms with Macedonian ways and social and political traditions. The Macedonians at home expected their king to be available to them, and Demetrios' domineering personal style, coupled with his love of expensive show and luxury, did not go down well. Nevertheless he might have established himself there satisfactorily, had he not made it too obvious too soon that for him – as for Alexander a generation earlier – Macedonia was not in itself a sufficient objective for his ambition. It was merely a convenient base for undertaking other operations, in his case reconquering the lands he had lost in the battle of Ipsos. He soon provoked Lysimachos by attacking southern Thrace when he thought Lysimachos had been captured during a campaign against Thracians on the lower Danube, but had to withdraw precipitately when Lysimachos unexpectedly confronted him, certainly alive and well and extremely energetic. The incident illustrates nicely the basic instability of the political structure of these years and its total dependence on the persons of prominent individuals. Despite this setback Demetrios carried out massive preparations for a reconquest – he is said to have ordered the construction of a further 500 warships, some of them larger than anything that had been known up to that time. He also founded a name-city, Demetrias, not in Macedonia but in Thessaly on the Gulf of Pagasai, as northern base for his new fleet. Macedonians might well have asked themselves if this development were not merely a preliminary measure for transferring the center of power away from Pella (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 39–43).

Figure 3 Idealized official coin portrait of Demetrios Poliorketes as king, wearing the diadem; issued in Macedonia at the Amphipolis mint ca. 289. © Gabriel Hildebrand, Royal Coin Cabinet, Stockholm.



The preparations for war did not go unnoticed by those who would suffer from their completion, and by 288 the old coalition, this time with Pyrrhos from Epeiros replacing Kassander, reformed. Ptolemy sent a fleet into the Aegean, having taken Tyre and Sidon and recovered Cyprus from Demetrios sometime after 294, thus threatening Demetrios' control of the islands, while Pyrrhos and Lysimachos attacked Macedonia by land from west and east respectively. Confrontations between warring dynasts had shown again and again over the last thirty years that Macedonian levies had no enthusiasm for large-scale fighting on their home ground, and this time was no exception. Confronted by Pyrrhos, who had reached as far as Beroia, only a few miles from the old Macedonian royal seat at Aigai, Demetrios' Macedonian troops began to desert, recommending him to get away and save himself, "because the Macedonians refused to make war just to secure his extravagant lifestyle." Demetrios retreated to Kassandreia, where his first and most respected wife, Antipater's daughter Phila, committed suicide rather than leave her so recently regained homeland and join her erratic husband in further hopeless adventures. Macedonia was then divided up between Pyrrhos and Lysimachos (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 44–45; Justin 16.2.1–4).

Demetrios went south, where he still held Athens and Korinth, but

he had to look on while the Athenians rebelled against his garrisons, supported by an Athenian in Ptolemaic service, Kallias of Sphettos, who was serving with the Ptolemaic fleet based at Andros. In the end he accepted a peace brokered by Ptolemy's admiral Sostratos that guaranteed Athenian freedom, though Demetrios' garrison remained in the Peiraeus, making Athenian use of the harbor problematic. Some years later the freed Athenians passed a long decree honoring Kallias for his excellent services, recalling in detail his decisive contribution to the rebellion (*SEG* 28, 60 = Austin² 55 = Burstein 55). Demetrios, however, remaining restless and anxious for action, collected his troops and navy together and set out for Asia Minor, where he landed near Miletos, leaving his son Antigonos based at Korinth to uphold his position in Old Greece. His adventure in Macedonia was over.

III Asia Minor

Asia Minor had changed a lot since Demetrios left it in 295/4, and if he was expecting an enthusiastic reception, the people welcoming him in exchange for Lysimachos, whose treatment of the Greek cities was alleged to be particularly harsh, he was quickly disillusioned. His own running expenses, also incurred at the cost of the Greek cities that were forced to make contributions to equipping his expedition, were notoriously extravagant and unpopular. He could now no longer subsidize his western activities from the accumulated wealth of the Mesopotamian and Iranian satrapies, as his father had done, using this income as the economic basis for his Greek-friendly western activities. Now Demetrios needed cash, and he had to raise it on the spot, just as his immediate opponent in Asia Minor, Lysimachos, did. In this respect there was no perceptible immediate difference between the two Macedonian kings, and the hoped-for joyous reception of Demetrios as liberator just did not happen.

Since Ipsos, Lysimachos had gradually taken control of the area he had officially won in the war, though he did not have the manpower resources to be immediately present everywhere. In some cities autocrats, like Lachares in Athens, exploited the post-Antigonid disorder and perceived power vacuum to take control locally, in the absence of any really effective central authority. Lysimachos did not particularly favor such "tyrants," but once they were in power and as long as they seemed to guarantee stability he worked along with them quite undogmatically, just as he used the regimes that replaced them after a few years – so in Herakleia Pontike, in Priene, or on the

important offshore island of Samos. In Bithynia he was unable, or unwilling, to suppress the effective local dynast Zipoites, who gained a stable control of his region that formed the basis of what later became the Kingdom of Bithynia. In the south he accommodated Kassander's brother Pleistarchos at Herakleia by Latmos, near Miletos, when Demetrios and Seleukos expelled him from Kilikia – Pleistarchos seized his chance and promptly renamed the town Pleistarcheia. Certain coastal cities and territories in Karia and Lykia were taken over by Ptolemy's fleet sometime after 289: when Demetrios landed near Miletos, Ptolemy's ex-wife Eurydike, sister of his own ex-wife Phila as well as of Kassander and Pleistarchos, resided in the area and even offered Demetrios her daughter Ptolemais in marriage. Both Eurydike and Demetrios were by then desperate, and seem to have hoped that by joining forces they would be able to mobilize more local sympathy and support. They were not very successful (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 46).

In the Troad, where before Ipsos Antigonos had begun building a major name-city, Antigoneia, Lysimachos continued the investment but changed the name to Alexandraia, in order to assemble the population of the tiny surrounding cities in a major walled conurbation (Strabo 13.1.26). Ilion, which Alexander had favored as the site of Homeric Troy, also received additional population and infrastructural investment from Lysimachos. But our best evidence concerns Ephesos. When Demetrios withdrew his fleet after Ipsos, the city maintained a tenuous independence, though some evidence suggests the population suffered severe financial pressure from Demetrios' presence there: an extensive law published on stone shortly after his departure aimed to ease the financial pressure on private debtors, which was so serious that it threatened the financial status of the whole community (*Syll.*³ 364 = BD² 9). By about 294, while Demetrios was occupied in Greece, Ephesos was fully integrated into Lysimachos' kingdom and as a result of his investments acquired a regional prominence which it retained to the end of antiquity. Lysimachos rebuilt the city on a new site nearby, calling it Arsinoe after his young Ptolemaic wife – the new name died with Lysimachos in 281 – and he intended it to be the headquarters of his administration in Asia Minor. The immediate reason for rebuilding was a sudden disastrous flooding of the old city, but the possibility of improving defensive and harbor facilities will presumably have been decisive. A story told by Strabo (14.1.21) and often believed, that the flood was caused deliberately by Lysimachos to make the reluctant inhabitants move to the new, safer – but at first unloved – site with much improved access to the sea, is not confirmed elsewhere and is probably merely part of the later literary tradition that was hostile to

Lysimachos (*Anthologia Palatina* 9.434). The city was not just resited but also massively expanded, and pressure was put on the citizens of nearby Kolophon and Lebedos to join the new well-fortified settlement (Pausanias 1.9.7). The defensive wall can still be seen today. Lysimachos was even well regarded and honored as the new founder of the city at Ephesos in Roman times, as late as the second century AD (OGIS 480). It is likely that he intended his eldest son Agathokles to reside there and prepare for the succession.

Lysimachos' Asian cities were grouped together regionally for administrative and defensive purposes under a multifunctional officer entitled "*strategos*" (General). Inscriptions inform us about several such people. One Sosthenes (or perhaps Sopiter) helped Priene sometime during the 290s on Lysimachos' instructions (OGIS 12); the Milesian Hippostratos, *strategos* of the Ionian cities, was honored by the revived Ionian League in 289 with a mounted statue erected at the central Ionian shrine, the Panionion, and with laudatory inscriptions in the cities of the League (Syll.³ 368); an inscription from the island of Chios, also a member of this League, honors another Milesian *strategos* Hippodamos around the same time (SEG 35, 926). But Lysimachos also made himself available in person, receiving ambassadors from the cities and sending replies, even attending to complex detailed questions. In one well-documented case, a territorial dispute between the island Samos and the mainland city Priene about the possession of the mainland territory called the Batinetis, he ruled against the interests of Priene, which he had otherwise supported (OGIS 12), in favor of the Samians, who proudly published the whole text of his ruling on stone – our source for the question (OGIS 13 = RC 7 = Austin² 53).

When Demetrios landed near Miletos with his fleet and army in 286, he was therefore setting out to attack an area which for fifteen years had experienced a form of pragmatic and basically city-friendly royal imperial administration, not so different in kind from that which he and his father had practiced when they were in control of the area before Ipsos. Lysimachos' men, some of them local citizens, were largely in control, but Lysimachos was not desperately unpopular in the cities – as, for instance, Kassander had been at Athens when Demetrios arrived there in 307 – and there was accordingly no spontaneous rising to welcome Demetrios as freedom-bringer. Plutarch, representing the views of Hieronymos of Kardia, says that "many of the cities came over to Demetrios willingly, many he brought over by force" (*Demetrios* 46), but this seems to be mere rhetoric: the only concrete example Plutarch mentions is Sardeis, and the implication of his story is that force was necessary there. Some of Lysimachos' soldiers went over to Demetrios, being reluctant to

engage the charismatic leader in the field, but as soon as Lysimachos' son and viceroy Agathokles confronted him, he simply abandoned what he had gained and marched off into central Anatolia, hoping to reach Iran through the Armenian mountains and take up contacts that his father had enjoyed there until 312. It was the last major throw of a desperate adventurer, demonstrating in the last resort Demetrios' instability and inadequacy as an empire-builder. In this respect he was a true but less systematic imitator of the great Alexander, whose early death, fortunately for his reputation, prevented his confronting even the mere possibility of longer-term peace. War was what Demetrios, like Alexander, had learned; the tedious governmental practice of every day, on which any lasting administrative system depends, was utterly foreign to him. He failed in Macedonia, and he failed again in Anatolia. He did not break through the mountains into Media, landing instead, after a desperate winter, in the gilded captivity of his son-in-law Seleukos in Syria, who allowed him sufficient freedom and luxury to drink himself to death (282) (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 46–52).

IV Towards War – Again

While Demetrios was adventuring in Asia Minor, his son Antigonos managed to hold a series of positions in southern and central Greece – the Peiraieus, Korinth, Chalkis, and Demetrias above all – whereas Lysimachos, who occupied eastern Macedonia when Pyrrhos gained western Macedonia, had little difficulty in driving Pyrrhos out. This had happened before 284, when he controlled the whole land, including Thessaly (except for Demetrias). He made no attempt to extend his dominion further south in Greece. While Pyrrhos continued to fight unsuccessfully against Demetrios' strongholds in southern Greece, but otherwise had to content himself with his own inherited position in western Greece, where the Aitolian League supported his actions against Macedonia, Lysimachos had now, towards the end of his life – he was already seventy-seven – finally created a gigantic empire. It consisted of Macedonia and Thrace up to the lower Danube, as well as the whole of Asia Minor north and west of the Tauros mountains. The area had a financial and manpower potential capable of equaling that of Seleukos and surpassing Ptolemy. Its long-term stability, however, depended on its being passed on to a successor, who needed to be accepted by the troops and the chief functionaries of the imperial administration, as well as by the local elites, the groups which had created the empire and now held it together.

The succession was a problem that in one way or another

confronted each of the old protagonists in the 280s. Seleukos was most successful in solving it, perhaps not least because he had not been involved in Antipater's dynastic marriage system. His son Antiochos, whom his Iranian wife, Apama, had born to him, was adult by the 290s and openly foreseen for the succession. After Ipsos Seleukos had indeed also married Stratonike, daughter of Demetrios Poliorketes, and a daughter was born to them, but tensions arose at court around 294, when Antiochos developed an undiplomatic passion for his stepmother (they were about the same age). Seleukos, perhaps already tiring of the young woman, reacted with sympathy and had no apparent qualms about handing her over to his son, whom he now also recognized as "king" and joint ruler. He then sent Antiochos and Stratonike off to Babylonia to rule the Upper Satrapies from Seleukeia on the Tigris. The solution was elegant and effective, and Antiochos suffered no mature sibling rivalry (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 38).

Ptolemy in Egypt did not have it so easy, since he was important enough in and after 323 to be caught up in Antipater's matrimonial web. He had felt it advisable to accept Antipater's daughter Eurydike, with whom over the next several years he had at least three sons and two daughters. But among Eurydike's entourage when she went to Egypt in the first place was one Berenike, a well-placed young widow with two small children. It did not take long for Ptolemy to form an intimate relationship with her, which in time brought her recognition as favorite wife: from Berenike four more children were born, a son and probably three daughters. This sizable progeny allowed Ptolemy to continue Antipater's marriage policy in the next generation and use his female children to try to bind his competitors. At the same time, however, as everybody grew older and Ptolemy needed to resolve the question of the succession, the male children inevitably became rivals, for Ptolemy's monarchy was new and there were no established precedents. The uncertain situation caused such great tensions that by 287 Eurydike and her brood, including the first-born son, called Ptolemy "The Thunderbolt" (*Keraunos*), left Egypt and took up residence on an estate near Miletos, close to where her brother Pleistarchos now ruled at Herakleia by Latmos. By then they had lost the struggle in Egypt to Berenike, whose son by Ptolemy, also named Ptolemy, by late 285 shared the royal title with his father in Egypt (for us he is therefore Ptolemy II). Berenike's eldest daughter by Ptolemy, Ptolemy II's full sister Arsinoe, had been given to Lysimachos around the time of the battle of Ipsos, thus binding Lysimachos into the Ptolemaic family. Berenike's two children by her first husband were also usefully employed in the interests of the dynasty. The son, Magas, became Ptolemy's viceroy in Kyrene, and the daughter Antigone married Ptolemy's Epeiroi protégé, Pyrrhos.

Given this old Macedonian tradition of intermarriage among the regional dynasts, it is scarcely surprising that Ptolemy's divorced wife Eurydike also tried to play the dynastic marriage game, as had her namesake a generation before. After her brother Kassander's death, Eurydike's daughter Lysandra married her own cousin, Kassander's son Alexandros (V), in Macedonia; but after Alexandros' murder by Demetrios Lysandra turns up as wife of Lysimachos' son and potential successor, Agathokles, another of her first cousins – Agathokles' mother was Nikaia, a sister of Kassander and Eurydike. The date of this marriage is unknown, but it may well have occurred when she took up residence in Asia Minor, in Lysimachos' kingdom. When Demetrios landed near Miletos in 286, it was somehow natural that Eurydike would try to bind him also into her web, since Demetrios was notoriously uxorious and her younger daughter Ptolemais was available for the job. The scheme was well conceived. It must have seemed that, whatever might happen in the coming struggle between Demetrios and Agathokles, Eurydike would have a daughter on the winning side.

She could not conceivably have suspected that both would be losers. Demetrios' fate we have already seen, and with him Ptolemais disappears from the historical tradition. The loss of Agathokles was, however, bitterly ironic for Eurydike, for it resulted from a continuation of the struggle for influence between herself and Berenike into the next generation, this time not in Alexandria but at Lysimacheia. The critical factor that upset Eurydike's plans was the influence of Berenike's daughter, Arsinoe, on the aging Lysimachos. Like her mother in Alexandria, she wanted her own eldest son to succeed her husband, and since Agathokles was away governing Asia Minor, she was able to throw suspicion on him, suggesting that he was planning a coup against his father. The idea was plainly absurd, since Agathokles had nothing to gain from a coup, but he was not there to defend himself. Another tradition suggests a sexual motive, that Arsinoe herself would ideally have wished to be Agathokles' wife – the model would be that of Stratonike, who passed from father Seleukos to son and heir Antiochos – but this route was barred because Lysandra had already borne Agathokles children (Pausanias 1.10.3–4). Motives may not be clear, but the main facts are. Sometime during 283/2 Agathokles was assassinated on the instructions of his father. Lysandra with her children and her brother Ptolemy ("The Thunderbolt") then decided Asia Minor, where Berenike's daughter Arsinoe ruled, was too dangerous for them and fled to Seleukos in Syria. The private tragedy in the House of Lysimachos opened the way for the destruction of the whole imperial structure that he had created. The charismatic loyalty-system that he and Agathokles had

built up over the long years of constant contact with the local elites and through the creation of vested interests in their rule could not be transferred at the drop of a hat to another person. In any case, no viable alternative was available. Arsinoe's children were too young even to be named in the historical tradition (Justin 17.1.1–8).


Seleukos spent the greater part of the years since Ipsos, so far as we know, in northern Syria, where he built up permanent governmental structures for the organization of his extended empire. While he accepted the immediate need to tolerate Ptolemy's presence in the Lebanon and Palestine, in the north he set out to outdo Antigonos by creating an interlinked city-based infrastructure. In particular the four cities bearing the names of members of his dynasty – Antiocheia (named after his father), replacing Antigonos' Antigoneia, Seleukeia (named after himself), Apameia (named after his first wife Apama), and Laodikeia (named after his mother) – formed the new western base of his dominions, while his son Antiochos was despatched as viceroy to Mesopotamia in order to rule the Upper Satrapies from Seleukeia on the Tigris. This massive investment in governmental infrastructure, which also included setting up a breeding farm near Apameia in the Orontes valley for the Indian war elephants he had received from Chandragupta, seems excessive, if Seleukos was really content with the division of the Macedonian territories agreed with his coalition partners after Ipsos. Antigonos only began to build his capital in northern Syria when he had already lost Mesopotamia and the east to Seleukos. His base there was intended as a central bridging area between his territories in Asia Minor and those in Syria. For Seleukos the situation after Ipsos was quite different, because he controlled neither southern Syria and Palestine nor Asia Minor, and Babylonia provided a much better base for ruling the Iranian satrapies. However, while he was busy building cities in northern Syria, and as long as relations with Lysimachos remained mutually tolerant, he had no real motivation or adequate occasion for questioning the status quo. Both Lysimachos and Seleukos were challenged by Demetrios in 286, and it was in both their interests that Demetrios be removed from the active scene. Ptolemy's contribution to weakening Demetrios was his indispensable naval activity, taking Tyre and Sidon as well as Cyprus in the 290s. More recently his fleet was active in the Aegean, where Ptolemy took over the leadership of the Island League and provided essential support for the Athenian opponents of Demetrios. The general situation appeared stable. But the year 283/2 saw not only the shocking assassination of Agathokles, but also the natural death of Ptolemy; and Seleukos could not know whether his successor in Alexandria, Berenike's son Ptolemy II, later known by the cult-name "Philadelphos" ("Sibling-Lover"),

would be as easy to cooperate with.

Lysimachos showed no major weakness until his disastrous family feud left him without an effective political heir. Eurydike's children – Agathokles' widow Lysandra and her brother Ptolemy Keraunos – now turned up in Antioch seeking asylum, and our very inadequate source depicts them as the prime movers for the invasion of Asia Minor that Seleukos launched in 282 (Justin 17.1.8). It is highly improbable that Seleukos was much moved by their personal resentments, but the information they brought about the chaotic state of affairs in Lysimachos' kingdom after Agathokles' death might well have seemed to present the opportunity he had been hoping for since 301. Seleukos was himself now in his seventies, only a year or two younger than Lysimachos, and if he were ever to realize the hope of occupying Asia Minor, perhaps even of ending his life as king in Macedonia, as his bitter rival Antigonos had once hoped to do, the chance would have to come soon, or never. Almost nothing is known about the campaign of 282/1, but by February 281 Seleukos' army had already crossed Asia Minor and reached the area of Sardeis, where it met Lysimachos' troops at the plain known as Koroupedion (perhaps "Plain of Plenty"). In the battle Lysimachos was killed, and since he had just assassinated his chosen successor, his Asian territories had little reason for showing personal loyalty to his ambitious young widow Arsinoe. They adapted to changed circumstances and tried to make the best of the new situation by greeting the winner with encouraging gestures. Any other attitude would have been counterproductive (Justin 17.1.9–2.2).

Seleukos' plans, however, were by no means accomplished when he left the battlefield near Sardeis. His army had killed not just an old rival, but the king of the Macedonians. Macedonian as he was, he set out to claim the reward of victory, moving slowly northwards towards the Hellespont, making contacts and stabilizing governmental arrangements as he went. Towards the end of the summer he crossed to Europe. It ought to have been a triumphant homecoming for the last surviving companion of Alexander who had made the journey to India with the great conqueror. But shortly after his setting foot in Europe, on the ancient road from Sestos to Lysimacheia, the viper in the nest struck home in the person of the exiled but befriended Ptolemy Keraunos. Keraunos chose this historic moment to assassinate his aging patron with his own hand, then hurried on to Lysimacheia, where he allowed himself to be proclaimed king by those Macedonians – doubtless mostly ex-adherents of Lysimachos – assembled there. It was the end of an era. The last of the "Diadochoi" had been eliminated. It remained to be seen whether the younger generation could do any better (Justin 17.2.3–5).

The Structure of Power



I The New Kings

The forty-two years between the death of Alexander in Babylon in June 323 and the deaths of Lysimachos and Seleukos in 281, in and after the battle of Koroupedion, established the conditions and laid down the broad terms under which Macedonian kings would dominate the world of the eastern Mediterranean until they were replaced one after the other by Roman rule. It is scarcely surprising that the basic attitudes and governmental techniques of the new dynasties were merely adaptations of what the leading men had grown up with in their Macedonian homeland and learned – positively and negatively – from their association with the Great Kings Philip II and Alexander III. The geographic basis of the so-called Hellenistic world was formed by the territories conquered by the Macedonian army, in Europe under Philip and in Asia under Alexander. While none of the “successors” was capable of asserting himself absolutely against the others and dominating “the Whole” – the vague expression used by our main source for the period, Hieronymos of Kardia, for all the lands ruled by Macedonians – each was compelled to adapt to prevailing conditions in the area where he ruled. The differences between the kingdoms can therefore be explained by the different regional traditions and by the different governmental problems they had to solve, the similarities by their common Macedonian origin and socialization. It would therefore be quite irrational, despite the common Macedonian origin of the new kings, to expect identical developments in each of the kingdoms.

The first and most obvious feature of the new monarchies is that all without exception were founded by Macedonians and that these Macedonians also recognized each other as being something special, different from the other Greeks who could (and did) never aspire to regal heights (though in the course of time, as we shall see, in Asia Minor several indigenous, but Greek-speaking, dynasties emerged, modeled on those of the Macedonians). The new post-Alexander Macedonian ruling class gradually turned into an international ruling caste, which despite all challenges and differences in aims and achievements tended to intermarry. Characteristic for them was that of all the fifty Macedonian nobles to whom Alexander gave Iranian noble brides at the mass-marriage ceremony at Susa in 324 after his return from India, only Seleukos – as far as we know – retained his attachment to his Apama, and so makes the exception that proves the rule. All other Iranian brides were quickly abandoned. The difficulties which even Alexander's own son by the Iranian Roxane had to be taken seriously in Macedonia represent just another example of the close-knit nature of the Macedonian aristocracy. It is, however, perhaps worth remarking that the leading families of other Greek states – Athens, but especially Sparta – had not behaved very much differently during the relatively short periods in which they had dominated the Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries, where their leading men who governed their "provinces" were always citizens of the dominant state. Moreover, it would have been inconceivable for example for a non-Spartan woman to become queen and bear an heir to the throne.

Macedonia offered wider perspectives. Philip and Alexander themselves had been flexible and non-traditional, Philip being notoriously uxorious, marrying the Epirot princess Olympias for love, it was said, but also a range of other noble women, all of whom were connected with his political activities, though towards the end of his life his marriage with the Macedonian aristocrat Kleopatra finally brought him into line with Macedonian tradition and the expectations of the Macedonian nobility. Alexander, whose underdeveloped uxoriousness presented a problem to the Macedonian aristocracy that was only veiled over by his whirlwind string of victories, followed his father, though reluctantly, in marrying for politics when he took the Iranian (Baktrian) aristocrat Roxane. But, at least theoretically, he still had plenty of time to produce a proper fully Macedonian successor.

Alexander's Macedonian officers did not approve of this extension of their elite status as conquerors to the peoples they had conquered, and with the single far-sighted exception of Seleukos, who did not belong to the very first rank at Babylon, set about creating a complex network of Macedonian blood-relationships among themselves, which

then became characteristic for the next generations and in due course largely defined the new royal ruling class. In the end, even Seleukos joined in. Exceptions long remained rare events. The traditionalist Macedonian Antipater seems to have been the first to take the initiative in this respect, being blessed by a goodly collection of nubile daughters at the time of Alexander's death, binding to himself in quick succession Krateros, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, Demetrios, and Lysimachos, whose multifarious progeny allowed the perpetuation of the habit into the next generation. Kassander was, of course, excluded from this particular network, but followed the same principle in marrying Philip's daughter Thessalonike, whose two younger sons, Antipatros and Alexandros, were integrated into the new system by marrying their maternal cousins, daughters of Ptolemy and Lysimachos respectively. Seleukos, whose marriage with the Baktrian Apama not only produced his heir to the kingdom, Antiochos I, but doubtless also turned out to be a political bonus in reconciling the Iranian ruling class to his essentially foreign rule, was late in joining the intra-Macedonian marriage circus. Indeed, this happened only after the successful battle of Ipsos, when for the first time it was clear that his kingdom had acquired a longer-term western, Mediterranean element, and that for the future his interests would not be limited to Babylonia and points east, but had become integrated into the Macedonia-dominated Mediterranean continuum. He then took Stratonike, daughter of Demetrios and Phila, grandchild of the old Macedonian traditionalist Antipater, whose other grandchildren by his son Kassander were currently being groomed for the throne of Macedonia itself. Lysimachos was also flexible in this respect in the construction phase of his kingdom, taking a Thracian (Odrysian) princess while consolidating his hold on Thrace, and then the Persian aristocrat Amastris while extending his rule into Asia Minor. But after Ipsos he too paid attention to his Macedonian origins and his aim to participate in the intra-Macedonian competition for domination in the territories made vacant by the death of Antigonos. He then took one of Ptolemy's daughters, Arsinoe, whom Ptolemy had sired with his favorite concubine, the Macedonian aristocrat Berenike, who also bore him his own successor, Ptolemy II Philadelphos. Other potentates also strove for marriage alliances with the powerful Macedonian dynasts: the Indian Chandragupta received a daughter – or perhaps a niece: the tradition is uncertain – of Seleukos, and the Thracian king Seuthes, who maintained a certain localized independence from Lysimachos, also had a Macedonian aristocrat, also a Berenike, as wife. (Details of these marriages in Seibert, *Dynastische Verbindungen*; Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death*; on Seuthes see Elvers in *Chiron* 1999.)

From these and other examples it emerges that the massive

geographic extension of the territories ruled by Macedonian dynasts had done nothing to break the essentially endogamic nature of the Macedonian aristocracy. The basic principle remained fairly constant, that wherever possible Macedonian aristocrats, however far from Macedonia they might be living and ruling, preferred to seek marriage partners from within the Macedonian ruling (by the time of Ipsos, “royal”) class, and in this way they created a network of marital relations that at some point or other linked each dynasty to each other, rather like the situation in early modern Europe before the development of the nation-state. It was a rare event when an outsider managed to break into this extremely close society. On the other hand, each individual marriage was, at the time when it was arranged, a clear sign of the current wish – however shortlived it might prove to be in the event – for good relations between the bridegroom and the father of the bride.

Since the new Macedonian kings kept up the marital cultural tradition of the old Macedonian ruling class in respect to their personal relations, it is not surprising that the political structure of the new kingdoms also owed much to Macedonian origins. Philip II and Alexander III had governed their state basically through a body of men who were personally selected by the king to be his advisers and who enjoyed a close personal relationship with him as his “companions” (*hetairoi* – an old word redolent of Homer and heroic myth). As individuals and as a group they fulfilled all the functions the state required, advising on policy, traveling on diplomatic missions – with or without the king – commanding military units, or organizing finance and logistics. As companions they also consorted with the king privately, joining in discussions, entertainments, and drinking parties. The language of personal relationship was so important for the nature of the state that it was also adopted for elite army units, so that under Alexander we find, for instance, that the “Companion Cavalry,” commanded by one of Alexander’s personal companions, was selected for a particularly prominent elite role in the military structure of the kingdom.

When Alexander died, this was the governmental structure that all major players in the struggles of the successors had grown up with, and there is no sign in the first generation that any of them saw the need for major structural change. There was, however, one problem that Philip had not faced and Alexander only relatively briefly: the shortage of native Macedonians available to the new kings as advisers and administrators, particularly once the Macedonian homeland had been pacified and brought to some kind of order under Kassander. There was only one solution, and that was to broaden the recruitment basis for the new royal advisers, who now as a group became known

as the kings' "friends" (*philoî*), the change of name to the more pedestrian everyday word perhaps reflecting the more open nature of the institution and gradual break with the traditional Macedonian heroic tones that the word *hetairoi* encapsulated. The new royal "friends," insofar as they were no longer Macedonians, came almost exclusively from Greek cities and they are found in the course of time in almost all the functions which the kings had to offer.

The extension of personal service at court to other Greeks was not wholly new: Philip II had favored and been supported especially by the men of Thessaly, who continued to be prominent under Alexander, and he had opened up some of his newly conquered lands to ambitious Greeks, the most prominent perhaps being the Cretan Nearchos, who became resident in Macedonian Amphipolis before accompanying Alexander and rising to be his fleet commander in India. He subsequently wrote a book about his experiences. Another was Eumenes from the Greek city Kardias, who rose to be Alexander's personal secretary and, as a result, even managed to play an influential role in the early years after Alexander's death. There were also many others, less prominent, who had followed and attached themselves to the adventurous Macedonian king, but their number bore no comparison with the early years of the successors. The sources give particular prominence to the diplomatic activities of prominent "friends," such as Adeimantos of Lampsakos, who helped Demetrios organize the Greeks into the revived League of Korinth in 302 (*FgrHist* 75 F1 with Robert, *Hellenica* II. 15f.), Antigonos' own chief diplomat in Greece, the Milesian Aristodemos, or the Greeks Megasthenes, whose precise origin is not known (*FgrHist* 515), and Daimachos of Plataia (*FgrHist* 716), who served Seleukos as diplomats in his contacts with India. It was none other than Aristodemos, according to one account, who was instrumental in making Antigonos "royal" by his being the first to address him as king after the battle of Cyprian Salamis in 306 (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 17). In the course of time such men began to form an aristocracy of service in the new kingdoms, some families maintaining court posts over several generations. One example from this early period is Larichos in the service of Seleukos, whose father Laomedon and uncle Erygyios had belonged to Alexander's *hetairoi*, being members of the local aristocracy of Mytilene on the island of Lesbos (*OGIS* 215 = *I.Priene* 18). Another case is that of Oxythemis of Larissa, son and nephew of prominent friends of Antigonos, who served with Demetrios in Greece in 304 and later, and was honored by the Athenians with a grant of citizenship in 303/2 (*Syll.*³ 343).

Many prominent men who for one reason or another found themselves in difficult situations at home also sought refuge at one or other

of the new “courts” established by the successors, men such as the conservative Athenian comic poet Philippides of Kephale, who spent several years at the court of Lysimachos. Literary and intellectual men also sought more general acceptance and employment at the new courts, in this phase Ptolemy’s Alexandria proving particularly attractive, since Ptolemy deliberately set out to cultivate such people and to employ them in his newly founded intellectual center, the Mouseion.

One significant side-effect of the employment of prominent Greeks at the new Macedonian courts was that as a result these men became particularly important for their home cities (and other places where they were active or which they particularly favored), since because of their personal relationship with the kings they were regarded as being able to use their influence at court to help their home (or favored) city. Perhaps the most dramatic example at this period is offered by the Athenian Kallias of Sphettos, who was serving as officer in the Ptolemaic fleet in the Aegean in 287 when the Athenians decided to try to free themselves from Demetrios’ garrisons. Kallias’ own brother Phaidros was the leading Athenian general at the time, and the active support of the Ptolemaic fleet that this family connection made possible was a central factor in the success of the rebellion (*SEG* 28,60 = Austin² 55 = Burstein 55). But there was also less dramatic help: when Athens was short of food in 299 Philippides prevailed on Lysimachos to help out in the crisis (*Syll.*³374 = Burstein 11). The home cities of such prominent men obviously expected them to use their influence for the good of their home states, and many did so. The cities that benefited from such personal influence at court showed themselves grateful by decreeing to set up public statues with an engraved description of the services rendered by the person concerned, so honoring him with the creation of a permanent memorial for a temporary gesture. This way of memorializing thanks is one of the main reasons why it is still possible to know about these events and the mentality behind them, since many such inscriptions have survived. Not only citizens of the home city received such honors, of course. The friends of kings were locally almost as important as the kings themselves, and when they visited cities as diplomats or military commanders they represented the kings, and it became a general habit to offer them honors as thanks for the good they had done (supposing they had done good!) and with it the expectation of more to come in the future. The diplomatic activity associated with the “freedom” campaign of Antigonos and Demetrios, for instance, before it went sour, has left us with a rich harvest of inscriptions praising all sorts of friends of the kings for the help and goodwill offered locally as a result of their being attached to one or

other of the benefactor kings.

The impression emerges of a kind of international class of royal officers attached to the new courts, serving the new kings and, of course, becoming rich in the process without, however, necessarily becoming deracinated and losing touch with the Greek cities where they originated. Since Alexander's breaking up of traditional structures in the Greek world, it had simply become easier to move around profitably and to achieve wealth and status, rising socially within a societal structure that was no longer limited to the individual city (though the ideals of the face-to-face way of life in the Greek cities by no means disappeared). Ambitious men became geographically and socially mobile in the new world, except in Macedonia itself, where there was not the same need for the recruitment of non-Macedonian courtiers and administrators: here the Greek international flavor at court was much more limited, being kept up by artists and intellectuals who visited or resided at Pella for longer or shorter periods – but this was a Macedonian tradition traceable back at least to Archelaos in the fifth century. Some Macedonians had personally profited immensely from Alexander's expedition, as huge houses and extravagant tombs in Macedonia dating from these years show, but the basic structuring of the kingdom and of social life within it suffered no epochal change, merely a further slow development along lines already laid down by Philip II.

II Land Distributions and City Foundations

The Macedonian dynasts who became kings in these years had an essential interest in binding the men on whom they relied (including of course the soldiers) to themselves. The most obvious way to do this was to pay them well, but this required large amounts of ready cash, and cash is a mobile commodity: cash payments allowed men to take their money, when they had earned enough, and move on or simply go home. The Macedonian rulers needed to devise a system of binding their followers to them for the longer term. Here again, a Macedonian precedent was to hand. When Philip extended directly ruled Macedonian territories eastwards into Chalkidike and Thrace, he made Macedonian occupation permanent by two related methods. The first was to make direct land grants within the newly acquired territories to Macedonians, or those who wished to become Macedonians. This had the effect of making the recipients grateful, since they owed their possessions to the royal decision in their favor; it also made them

long-term settlers, since they could not take their land with them if they moved, so that as well as any economic benefit to individuals or state (from taxation), a loyal and gratefully dependent population could grow up in the occupied territories that provided a basis for future recruitment of soldiers and royal functionaries. The second way was to imitate the southern Greeks and settle men in newly founded self-governing urban settlements (*polis*-communities), each responsible for the local government of its own city territory. Philip began this experiment with Philippoi and later with Philip-popolis (Plovdiv) in Thrace. The foundation of new urban communities was particularly useful when the lands on which their new citizens were to work were particularly distant from the center of the state or particularly exposed to security threats, so that a local urban-based regional administration was judged desirable for its own sake. At the same time, local self-government on the well-established *polis* model pleased those Greeks who liked to run their own local communal affairs on a voluntary basis and to attend to their own city development and religious ceremonial (with or without royal supervision of their finances and security); at the same time this relieved the central government of the kingdom of the expensive need to supervise every little local detail.

Alexander followed his father's example of trying to found cities in areas where no independent local governmental system had previously existed – apart from Alexandria by Egypt, all these new cities were in the eastern parts of his conquered territories. This did not work out as well as Alexander had envisaged and as he knew from Europe: the Greeks who were settled in Iranian foundations as garrison troops felt too far from home and took the opportunity offered by Alexander's unexpected death to abandon their new settlements and set off for home. Their action, understandable enough in itself, was interpreted by the local Macedonian regional commanders as military mutiny and brutally put down. None of the mutineers is known to have reached Europe. This was, however, a lesson which the post-Alexander dynasts seem to have learned; but the pressures to secure their territories by creating vested interests as a personalized basis for dynastic loyalty did not go away with Alexander's death; rather, they tended to increase. As a result, once the first wars of the successors were over and the elements of a future regionalized dynastic structure began to emerge, the urgency to bind soldiers and their commanders on a long-term basis led to an unprecedented series of new city foundations, the like of which the Mediterranean world had not seen since the very much slower expansion of the world of the Greek city-states in the so-called Great Colonization of the eighth to sixth centuries, but also to the creation of personal gift-estates. The new dynasts followed Philip's example

also in respect of the naming of the new cities after themselves or members of the dynasty. Kassander was first to rule a relatively stable territory, and he was also first to found a "name-city," Kassandreia in the Chalkidike (Diodoros 19.52.2–3). Kassandreia in effect resuscitated under a new name the old Greek settlement of Potidaia and also included settlers from other run-down cities in the area, including Olynthos, largely destroyed by Philip II in 348. Kassander followed this up some time later with Thessalonike, which created a major urban center out of a series of much smaller population settlements in the area (Strabo 7 Frag. 21; 24). In neither of these Macedonian cases can the main reason for the new foundation have been to accommodate deracinated soldiery. Kassandreia was certainly primarily intended to provide a functioning urban center for defense and local self-administration; in the case of Thessalonike these same elements were combined with the desire to have a major harbor city reasonably near to Pella, which itself could not easily fulfill this function, being reachable by ship only via a quickly silting river.

Where Kassander led, the other dynasts were not slow to follow. Ptolemy continued to invest in and build up Alexandria, moving there himself (and in due course taking Alexander's corpse along with him) some time before 311; in Upper Egypt he also founded a name-city, Ptolemais, as administrative and settlement center for the Greek immigrants whom he hoped to attract. For him, establishing a new regime in an old, civilized, but non-Greek land with its own centuries-old traditions, a brand new foundation had the immense advantage not only of pleasing the Greek immigrants, who would find institutions and a way of life resembling those which they knew at home, but also of ensuring that the new dominant Greek ruling class was simply not as visible and potentially offensive to local traditionalists as it would have been in (say) Memphis or Thebes. There the old Pharaonic traditions, represented in particular by the multifarious Egyptian priestly classes, could continue almost unaffected, where they still existed, during the politically critical first phase of the establishment of Ptolemaic rule, and could even be resuscitated with Ptolemaic encouragement after the centuries of Persian domination, without a massive everyday confrontation with the physical presence of the Greek conquerors. Alexandria was therefore regarded as being an entity separate from Egypt, being always known as "Alexandria by Egypt," not "Alexandria in Egypt."

We know less about Lysimachos' activities in Thrace, but it is clear enough that his chief new foundation, his name-city Lysimacheia at or near the site of Kardias on the "neck" of the Thracian Chersonesos, was both a dynastic statement (like Kassander's in Kassandreia) and the occupation of a strategic site. Who the first settlers were, apart from

residual inhabitants of Kardia, is unfortunately not known (Appian, *Syriake* 1; Pausanias 1.9.8). The main founders of new cities in this period were, however, those dynasts who occupied Asia Minor and Syria, who were compelled by the existing settlement pattern and the history of their conquered territories, as well as by the interests of the Greeks who were united with them in their endeavors, to create new administrative and political structures. Both the Macedonian tradition since Philip II and the wishes of their Macedonian and other Greek followers (who for political reasons could not easily return to Macedonia and receive adequate rewards there for long service to Antigonos or Seleukos) made these territories the recipients of numerous city foundations. Motives were doubtless usually mixed, varying from place to place according to the preexisting local level of urbanization and the needs of the responsible founders. When Seleukos chose to found a new administrative center in heavily urbanized Babylonia (Seleukeia on the Tigris), shortly after he took over the eastern provinces from Antigonos, his model is likely to have been Ptolemy's Alexandria, which he knew at first hand (Strabo 16.1.5). The aim here also, therefore, was to create a near but separate civic environment and identity for the Greek immigrant governing class that minimized the need for ruler and ruled to make significant changes in their social, political, and cultural-religious habits. The objective was certainly not deliberately to "Hellenize" the indigenous population, but rather to create separate environments in which both governors and governed could each continue to practice their own social, cultural, and religious way of life without confronting each other. The aim was precisely to avoid a clash of cultures with its incalculable political backlash that would almost inevitably have been provoked, had the Greek government taken up residence in an existing indigenous city such as Babylon. On the other hand, if sections of the indigenous population found the Greek language and the Greek way of life in the ruling city attractive and began to imitate or adapt aspects of it, as indeed seems to have happened to some extent in the long run, then so much the better.

In Syria it was Antigonos who took the first steps by founding a name-city, Antigoneia, on the lower Orontes near the later Antiocheia, when he began to consolidate his realm in that region in 306 after losing his eastern territories. It was intended to become a major royal residence and administrative center, where Antigonos himself mostly resided until his fatal campaign of 301. It was strategically situated, as our source explains, to keep an eye on Babylonia and the Upper Satrapies that he had apparently not yet given up for lost (Diodoros 20.47.5). Antigoneia did not, however, survive long, since after Ipsos Seleukos decided to make his own base in the same area, from which

(as Antigonos had known) he could observe and potentially influence events and developments to all points of the compass. His investment there, as victor of Ipsos, was appropriately extravagant: not just one city but four major city-settlements were founded in the area (Antiocheia, Seleukeia, Apameia, and Laodikeia), which quickly became known as the “Seleukis” (Strabo 16.2.4). Most of the people Antigonos had settled in Antigoneia were transferred to Antiocheia, and those who chose to remain there lost the self-governing rights of a Greek-style city-state. A very late Antiochene source, Johannes Malalas (p. 201), preserved an old local tradition, asserting that the first settlers of Antioch were Macedonians and Athenians (perhaps long-serving mercenaries, if he is right) to the number of 5,300. Other foundations, or renaming of existing settlements in the area, show that Seleukos was indeed trying to make his “Seleukis” a home from home for Macedonians: Macedonian place-names were also appropriated for existing Syrian communities, so that we find, for example, Pella, Dion, Beroia, and Europos (all names of old Macedonian places in the homeland) in the Seleukis, and the coastal plain at the mouth of the Orontes became known as Pieria, named after the coastal plain at the mouths of the rivers Haliakmon and Loudias in Macedonia.

In western and southern Asia Minor there already existed a large Greek population along the coastal strip, living in city-states (*poleis*) that each incorporated a centuries-old tradition. The non-Greek population, situated largely in the interior and in the north, under the Persians had lived largely in villages that were directly controlled by the Persian regional officers, the satraps. The Greek cities, as long as they paid their taxes (“tribute”) and otherwise caused no trouble, were largely left to their own devices. Alexander swept through the area rapidly, changing local pro-Persian governments, but otherwise largely leaving the overarching Persian administrative structures intact, with the result that on his death “satrapies” in Asia Minor were available for distribution among the assembled Macedonian prominence in Babylon and at Triparadeisos. Whoever wished to control Asia Minor easily in the following period had to take this historical development, the differing local experiences and wishes of the mixed peoples of the territory, into account. When Antigonos set out to recover Asia Minor after defeating Eumenes, the Greeks inevitably took pride of place, at least in his propaganda: they were to be free and ungarrisoned, a statement formulated principally to embarrass Kassander in Greece, but Asia Minor was particularly affected. Ptolemy also played on this fiddle, but since neither of them could operate militarily without troops, and since troops inevitably had to stay somewhere when they were not actually on campaign (and even then needed logistical bases), the propaganda and the reality

soon began to show their incompatibility, even if troops were officially only to be stationed until the current war was over. A certain tension was thus inevitable between the Macedonian warlords and their “free cities.” A document from the Greek city Iasos in Karia illustrates the longer-term presence of three groups of mercenaries there, all apparently currently in the service of Ptolemy, sometime after 309, and the problems associated with supplying cash for their pay – in this case the local people of Iasos themselves had to cover back-payments (*I.Iasos* 2). On the “king’s land,” that is the non-Greek-city land that before Alexander had been directly administered by the Persians, it was technically easier to place soldiers, or indeed to settle them long term. One group of Macedonians was placed by Antigonos or Lysimachos on the borders of Mysia and Lydia at the strategic place known later as Thyateira. They clearly received cultivable land and at some time – perhaps as early as under Seleukos I – were raised to the status of self-governing Greek city (Strabo 13.4.4). Other communities in the area, where Macedonian origins were claimed, may also go back to settlement at this period. All seem to have been on land that was situated close to the traditional Greek settlement area but did not actually belong to it, therefore as “royal land” could be disposed of without irritating the old Greek possessors, on whom all the Macedonian rulers depended for upholding the government and the economy of the area. What the non-Greek indigenous population thought of all this Greek settlement activity is unknown, but it may well be that enough land was available to accommodate the new settlers without causing too much irritation. Over time, most of these early Macedonian settlements achieved recognition as self-governing city-states, though some retained proud memories of their Macedonian origins over centuries, far into the Roman imperial period (for examples see Jones, *Cities*, 44).

There is also evidence that, beginning with Antigonos, particularly prominent officers were rewarded with personal grants of large estates, including existing villages, from the “royal land.” This was also a Macedonian tradition, traceable in our evidence back to Philip’s expansion of Macedonian territories in the 350s onwards, some of which he clearly distributed to worthy officers, nor did this practice cease under the post-Argead regimes: both Kassander and Lysimachos made individual personal land grants, and it would be surprising if Antigonos had not also done so. The evidence is slight, but sufficient. One such recipient of an estate, a man called Mnesimachos, got into financial difficulties, and sometime later made over his estate to the temple of Artemis at Sardeis that had lent him money that he could not pay back, the estate serving as collateral. The resulting documentation was engraved at Sardeis and provides us with

accidental evidence for the existence of such estates. (Had Mnesimachos been able to repay his loan, no document would have been drawn up and we would never even have known of the existence of his estate.) How many similar cases there were in these early years we have no way of knowing, but it would be unreasonable to assume that Mnesimachos was the only one (text and translation in Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 137f.).

“The freedom of the Greeks” was a splendid propaganda theme for an aggressive war against an enemy who employed garrisons and dictators, but it was an impossible practical aim for a Macedonian general who wanted to build an efficient empire that was to include at its heart precisely those Greeks. Many, indeed most, of the Greek cities in Asia Minor were tiny farming or fishing communities with only a few thousand inhabitants – cities with the dimensions and strategic and economic potential of Miletos, Ephesos, Smyrna, or Kyzikos were rare – and the Persians had found this scattered settlement pattern convenient as an instrument of domination and left it in place. Each little city had its own traditions, laws, gods, and way of life, and was proud of them. This disparate structure did not, however, please Antigonos, who had seen the practical administrative advantages of larger urban settlements in Syria and begun to create them there; he also had the examples of Kassander’s deliberately creating large defensible harbor cities in Kassandreia and Thessalonike, to say nothing of Lysimachos’ building activities just over the water at Lysimacheia. While the war was going on, Antigonos tried, however, to live up to his propagated aims. The history of the little farming town Skepsis in the Troad is doubtless characteristic of many. In 311, when Antigonos made peace with the coalition, Skepsis was a “free” member of his “alliance” and was accordingly treated with full diplomatic procedures, receiving a long letter from Antigonos delivered personally by one of his officers explaining in detail both the course of the negotiations and their outcome. Antigonos requested the Skepsians to swear an oath that they would actively join in upholding the struggle for Greek freedom. How could they refuse? They countered by passing a decree expressed in equally diplomatic language praising Antigonos for all his efforts on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks and decreeing the creation of a sacred place (a “*temenos*”) where an altar and a statue of Antigonos were to be erected and an annual agonistic celebration, together with a special sacrifice, performed. Immediate thanks took the form of expensive gold wreaths for Antigonos and his two sons Philip and Demetrios, as well as other unspecified presents. The texts of both Antigonos’ letter and the city decree were inscribed on stone and set up in the temple of Athena, in the ruins of which the stone was found by a traveler in the nineteenth

century and the preserved text made known (OGIS 5-6 = RC 1 = Harding 132 = BD² 6 = Austin² 38).

We must assume that this kind of diplomatic procedure occurred dozens, if not hundreds, of times in Antigonos' empire on this occasion. It was cumbersome and inefficient, and it is not surprising that Antigonos entertained plans for creating some larger urban units in some Greek areas of his empire, where economic, political, and administrative efficiency could be improved. This type of urbanizing activity, which Greek cities already knew and had a name for – *synoikismos*, “settling together” – had taken place often enough in the past, but until now usually voluntarily! Most of the larger existing *poleis* had been created by the agreed *synoikismos* of preexisting villages, and a very prominent example in historical times was the *synoikismos* of the island of Rhodes, where the three existing *poleis* situated on the island, after a period of closer cooperation, agreed to unite in 412 during the Peloponnesian War to form the highly successful city of Rhodes on a new site, where the best harbor on the island was situated. It is still there today.

In two places Antigonos made such proposals, one of which involved, among other settlements, none other than Skepsis, which had shown itself so fiercely loyal in 311. Its population, together with that of a collection of other small cities in the Skamander plain, was to be moved to a new site on the coast, where the best harbor in the area was situated, opposite the island of Tenedos. Antigonos was prepared to invest a lot of money, and a city wall some five miles long was constructed for what was to be his name-city, Antigoneia in the Troad, an area redolent of Homeric echoes. All participants were not pleased at the prospect of the move, and royal pressure must have been exerted, especially, it emerges, in Skepsis, since once Lysimachos gained control of the area after Antigonos' death and continued supporting the build-up of the new city (though he changed its name to Alexandreia) Skepsis was allowed to secede, and both cities continued as centers of population and local administration throughout the Hellenistic period (Strabo 13.1.33; 47; 52).

The second place where we know a royal initiative tried to create a new city through *synoikismos* was in Ionia, where Antigonos urged the two old neighboring cities Teos and Lebedos to negotiate a *synoikismos*. In this case the origin of the affair may have been an earthquake that destroyed a lot of the building fabric in both places and made it seem the best solution to make one city out of two. Whose idea this was originally is not clear from the documentation that has survived. But from the fact alone that the people of Teos went to the trouble to have Antigonos' detailed decision on problems associated with the *synoikismos* recorded on stone (including financial

questions, the answers to which show that Antigonos was not ready to provide complete financing) indicate that they regarded the dossier of royal decisions and suggestions as a kind of city charter for the future (Syll.³ 344 = RC 3–4 = BD² 7 = Austin² 48). In fact, on the death of Antigonos the takeover of the area by Lysimachos put an end to this well-developed scheme, and the already-engraved stone must have been removed from public view, since Lysimachos had even more ambitious aims for the Lebedians: they were to be resettled in his major new city in the area, the resited Ephesos, now renamed after his young wife Arsinoe. The population of some still smaller places in the area, including Kolophon, was to join them. We have already noted the case of Ephesos: it is perhaps worth mentioning in this context that here too good harborage seems to have been the main attraction of the new site – itself important enough to justify moving a whole traditional city and incurring related antipathy from those reluctant to abandon their old homes, even under pressure.

III Regional Government

One aspect of the post-Alexander administrative structure that seems not to have been inherited from Macedonia is that of the regional division of the administration, under the administrative eye of the central government. In Macedonia at this time we hear nothing of subordinate administrative regions, though it is not unlikely that remnants of the old regional kingdoms in Upper Macedonia still retained certain functions. In the few self-governing cities that existed at the time a royal representative (*epistates*), often a local citizen, was a regular feature, but when Alexander left on his expedition Antipater was simply left behind as his viceroy in Europe. In Asia the situation was different and had been so for two hundred years, because the Persians divided their empire into regions of different sizes and formation (the “satrapies”), at the head of each of which a satrap ruled, being directly and personally responsible to the Great King in Susa. When Alexander arrived to “liberate” the Greeks, he extracted the Greek cities from the existing satrapies, so “liberating” them, as his propaganda demanded, but he soon set up a separate regional organization for them. Otherwise he left the satrapal structure basically unchanged for the non-Greeks, the only noticeable difference being that it was now a Macedonian appointee, usually a Macedonian or other Greek, who exercised responsibility.

When Alexander died, the satrapies were up for grabs – those senior military men at Babylon and Triparadeisos who had no realistic

ambitions to participate in the central government were usually satisfied to receive a regional command, corresponding to a satrapy – and so the Persian system of regional government passed on into the period of Macedonian domination, in a sense as part of the booty of the ruling class. In Europe Thrace was separated off from Macedonia and Greece, but otherwise everything there remained unchanged. In Asia this aspect of the Persian inheritance remained dominant throughout the Macedonian period, though there were many local boundary changes related to the different interests and priorities of the new royal dynasties. In terminology the Persian term “satrap” tended gradually to give way in the Greek language and in the west – the Seleukid “Upper Satrapies” may have been different – to Greek military or administrative terminology. The ubiquitous term *strategos* for instance, which in the literal translation means “Army Leader” or “General,” gradually became a term of the administrative hierarchy (as it had already begun to do in democratic Athens). Although its holders may or may not have been real army commanders, a bearer of this title remained a very important person. It is easy enough to comprehend how, as a result of efforts to stabilize and restructure the emerging royal territories during and after the wars of the successors, military terminology remained dominant, even after the specific military function had declined in importance or even disappeared altogether. Even in Egypt – though here rather later – this terminological development is observable.

The first generation after Alexander’s death was a period of fighting and struggling, but also a period of governmental experiment and adaptation. Many people, including many of the protagonists, suffered and lost in this process, but it was a process which by fits and starts produced at its end a recognizable political and social structure. This was dominated by Macedonian dynastic families who now all called themselves “Kings” (*basileis*), and when they showed themselves in public they wore the diadem, a linen headband that Alexander had adopted in Persia as a new symbol of dominant personal power (without its being the potentially offensive royal Persian headdress, the tiara). Greek had become, or was on the way to becoming, the *lingua franca* of those who aspired to high administrative or political functions at the new courts or even in the Macedonian-dominated armies; and the old Greek cities of Greece and Asia Minor had in this generation learned how effective and profitable cooperation with locally dominant kings could be, how devastatingly unprofitable fundamental opposition. They were also on the way to finding a *modus vivendi* in the new Macedonian world.

Part II

THE HELLENISTIC WORLD IN ACTION

The history of the sixty years following the deaths of the first generation of Macedonian kings is one of the most difficult periods of all ancient Greek history, since contemporary or near contemporary literary sources which might have offered help in structuring events and developments have not survived. We are therefore once more dependent on much later writers, who may have used lost authors, but who certainly had their own concerns and only record what interested them. The one surviving narrative remains the *Epitome Historiae Philippicae* of Justin, no less brief, careless, and occasionally obscure than before. Four “*Lives*” of Plutarch, *Agis*, *Kleomenes*, *Aratos*, and *Pyrrhos*, survive and offer invaluable information on some aspects of particularly Peloponnesian affairs. The two introductory books of Polybios’ histories also include a brief resume of some Greek events leading up to his main theme, the rise of Rome, which he began in 220. Pausanias continues to offer sporadic information on the places he visited in central and southern Greece, and a certain amount of primary documentation survives in the form of inscriptions and (from Egypt) papyri, but they often raise as many questions as they solve, and in any case usually only offer very localized information. As a result, much remains uncertain – even the dates of major events – but enough survives to allow the historian to piece together and reconstruct the broad picture of developments during this important half-century. It will, however, given the localized nature of the sources, be most convenient to adopt a geographic division of the material.

Europe after Koroupedion

325 300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25

280	Pyrrhos goes to Italy
279	Celtic attack on Macedonia and Greece; death of Ptolemy "Keraunos"; defense of Thermopylai and Delphi
277/6	Antigonos "Gonatas" becomes king in Macedonia
274	Return of Pyrrhos from Italy
272	Pyrrhos in the Peloponnese; his death at Argos
267	Outbreak of the Chremonidean War
265	Death of Areus of Sparta
262	End of the Chremonidean War
250s	Consolidation of Aitolian and Achaian Leagues
251	Aratos liberates Sikyon
246/5	Death of Alexandros of Korinth; first celebration of Aitolian <i>Soteria</i> at Delphi
239	Death of Antigonos "Gonatas"; succession of Demetrios II
235	Megalopolis joins the Achaian League; accession of Kleomenes III of Sparta
229	Death of Demetrios II; accession of Antigonos III "Doson"; liberation of Athens; Rome's "First Illyrian War"
227	Doson's Karian expedition; death of Lydiadas of Megalopolis
224	Doson's agreement with Achaia; founding of Doson's Greek Security Pact
222	Battle of Sellasia; flight of Kleomenes III to Alexandria
221	Death of Antigonos Doson; accession of Philip V

I Keraunos and the Celtic Invasion

When Ptolemy Keraunos murdered Seleukos on the outskirts of

Lysimacheia in autumn 281 he expected to be able to inherit at least the European possessions of Lysimachos. As grandson of Antipater, his claim was as good as any, and the army and court officials at Lysimacheia who recognized him must have accepted this. Seleukos' son and successor, Antiochos, would have his hands full, asserting his rights in the huge Asiatic section of his father's empire, and was therefore unlikely to offer more than a token challenge for Europe. There remained as potential Macedonian challengers two cousins, also grandchildren of Antipater, the one Antigonos known as "Gonatas," son of Demetrios and Phila (who had already announced his ambitions by adopting the royal title "*basileus*"), the other Antipatros, son of Kassander's eldest son Philippos; a third claimant was a young son of Lysimachos and Arsinoe II called Ptolemaios.

Of these men, only Antigonos seemed capable of causing real trouble for Keraunos, since he still occupied some important fortresses in Greece – Korinth with its dominating citadel, the Akrokorinth, Chalkis, Demetrias, and above all the Peiraeus – and had managed to retain part of Demetrios' fleet. Moreover his sister Stratonike, having been married to Seleukos, was currently Antiochos' queen. Keraunos was, however, at first able to impose himself, since he had immediate access to the fleet that Seleukos brought with him to the Dardanelles, and managed both to defeat a naval challenge from Antigonos and to come to some sort of agreement with Antiochos. He also defeated a challenge from Lysimachos' son Ptolemaios, who had engaged the help of the Illyrian chieftain Monounios (which will hardly have increased his popularity in Macedonia). More importantly, he came to an agreement with Pyrrhos in Epeiros, offering him troops and some of the elephants he had taken over from Seleukos' army. Pyrrhos was just setting off on an expedition to Italy, invited by Tarentum that felt threatened by the Romans, so he felt gratified by Keraunos' approach. Italy and Sicily would keep him occupied for the next five years, and so remove a further potential threat to Keraunos' position in Macedonia. Lysimachos' wife Arsinoe II (Keraunos' half-sister), who had fled to Kassandreia after Koroupedion, was then enticed into marriage with Keraunos. He promptly killed her two remaining children and will doubtless have shed no tears when Arsinoe then fled to her full brother, Ptolemy II, in Egypt. All these violent events took about a year, after which Keraunos' prospects in Macedonia must have seemed mildly encouraging (Justin 17.2.6–15; 24.1–3).

A few months later he was dead, swept away in a wave of violent invasions by Celtic plunderers moving into the Balkans from central Europe, a movement which soon changed the political structure of the whole area of the Balkans and Asia Minor. The Greeks knew of three groups of Celtic invaders, one of which headed eastwards into Thrace

and two that approached Macedonia and Greece by different routes, seeking an easy road to riches in the accumulated wealth of the Macedonian and southern Greek cities and shrines. Ptolemy Keraunos confronted one of these groups, led by a chieftain known to the Greeks as Bolgios, but despite his riding to battle Indian-style on an elephant, the invaders had little difficulty in defeating his depleted force – he had, perhaps foolishly, just before supplied Pyrrhos with cavalry and some of his elephants. The defeat cost him his head and plunged Macedonia into chaos, which neither his brother Meleagros nor his cousin Antipatros – who received the picturesque nickname “Etesias,” since he was king only for as many days (about forty-five) as the summer winds blow in the Aegean – could relieve by consolidating the defense. By the time an experienced soldier called Sosthenes gathered together a new army and began to offer serious resistance, a new band of Celtic plunderers under Brennos and Akichorios passed through Macedonia in summer 279 and headed for the rich pickings of the cities of central and southern Greece (the main source is Pausanias 10.19.5ff.; cf. Justin 24.4–8).

By the time our sources pick up the story again, a confrontation on historic ground was taking place, at the narrow pass of Thermopylai, where in 480 Spartans and Thespians led by Leonidas had offered the Persian invaders of Greece myth-making heroic opposition. It is therefore not surprising that one of the original sources followed by Pausanias was influenced by Herodotos’ classic version of Leonidas’ heroic death. This time, however, the Greek participants were different. The main opposition to Brennos came not from the Spartans, who stayed immobile in the Peloponnese, but from the immediately affected Greek states in central Greece, the various federations of cities of the region, the Boiotian, Phokian, and Aitolian Leagues, aided by units from Athens, Lokris, and Megara, as well as from two small mercenary contingents paid for by Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochos I respectively. The two titular kings were currently involved in a face-off at the Dardanelles, but seem to have agreed on joining forces to combat the danger to central Greece, where some prestige might be won.

The numbers of the aggressors, following Herodotos’ model for the Persians, were wildly exaggerated by the later traditions of the successful defenders, allegedly reaching some 150,000 men who brought along 2,000 wagons to help bear off the booty. The recorded numbers of the defenders are more likely to be correct, and they came to rather more than 20,000 men in all. Accounts of their actions do not suggest that they were seriously outnumbered, if at all. The attack was, however, frightening enough, the Celts’ reputation as the killers of Macedonian kings enhancing their terrifying appearance, but the

late autumn weather favored the defenders who had the additional advantage of operating on their home ground. The Celts had to camp in the open, and their attacks on the Greeks, assembled in the narrows of the pass, were repulsed. Brennos then adopted a new strategy: to split the interests of the defenders by attacking the Aitolian heartland. A contingent involved in this found the nearby eastern Aitolian town Kallion quite unprepared: large numbers of men were massacred, women raped and killed there. But the Celts again misjudged their opponents. The willful destruction of Kallion provoked anger and raised widespread opposition among the surviving mountain dwellers, and the return of the Celts to their base-camp was harried by continual guerrilla attacks in which Aitolian women notoriously participated. Celtic losses were high.

Brennos in the meanwhile, having failed to trap the Greek defenders at Thermopylai, set off through the mountains directly for Apollo's shrine at Delphi. Here he expected to make rich plunder, and Akichorios accompanied him, following a different route. Both contingents, however, suffered extremely from premature winter weather and from the united desperate opposition of the Phokian and Aitolian mountain dwellers, who lost no opportunity to harry the marching Celts. Mighty winter thunderstorms and a fortuitous early fall of snow on Parnassos encouraged the defenders to believe the god Apollo himself and local heroes were joining in the defense of the sanctuary. The turning point came when Brennos was seriously wounded; the Celts then lost their will to continue the attack and retired, hard pressed by the mountaineers, to their original camp in the plain near Herakleia in Trachis. There Brennos died and the survivors gave up and set out to return to the north. Brennos' defeat at Delphi was certainly the most spectacular single event of the invasion, but it by no means marked the end of the Celtic threat to the Greeks. Some of the invaders indeed went back as far as the Danube and settled down near modern Belgrade, but other groups moved into Thrace, one of them settling down on the northern slopes of the Haimos in modern Bulgaria, calling themselves the "Kingdom of Tylis." They presented threats to the Greek cities on the coast, even including Byzantion, for several generations. Some others were happy to serve as mercenaries for Greek paymasters over the next years, but much more influential in the long term was a group which moved eastwards along the Thracian coast, heading for Asia Minor. On the way they had a brush with Antigonos Gonatas near Lysimacheia, who depicted the occasion as a personal victory, before they passed over into Asia Minor. Here they accepted initial employment as mercenaries in an internal power struggle in Bithynia. We shall meet them again (see chapter 6).

II The Rise of the Aitolian League and Delphi

The successful repulse of the Celtic invasion brought wide-reaching results in Europe. All participants in the defense were rightly proud of their achievement, setting up memorials for the glorious dead and branding the event as a major national occasion. Significant long-term effects emerged in two areas. Antigonos' well-marketed defeat of the Celtic group near Lysimacheia made him now the prime candidate for the vacant Macedonian throne, combining as he did the claims of his noble descent, as grandson of Antipater and son of Demetrios, with the newly won charisma of his victory over the terrible invaders. By now he had also come to terms with his cousin and brother-in-law Antiochos, agreeing to divide Seleukos' claimed empire into a European and an Asiatic section. The agreement was sealed by a typical Macedonian marriage settlement, Antigonos taking as wife his own niece, Phila, daughter of Seleukos and Stratonike, therefore half-sister (and step-daughter) of Antiochos. There could be no doubting the seriousness of the arrangement, and by 276 at the latest Antigonos Gonatas was established as king in Macedonia. As far as we know, he also still retained his father's bases in southern Greece, at Demetrias, Chalkis, Peiraieus, and Korinth, and so possessed the wherewithal for picking up the tradition of effective Macedonian domination in European Greece that went back to Philip II.

Many things had, however, changed in southern Greece since the Athenians, with Ptolemaic help, expelled Demetrios' garrison from the city in 287 and restricted the Macedonian presence to the Peiraieus forts. This event and the subsequent self-absorbed battling of the Macedonian kings for total supremacy in the Macedonian empire had left the southern Greeks some room for maneuver. Traditional power structures immediately began to reemerge, particularly in the Peloponnese, where Sparta under king Areus once more began to assert ascendancy over her neighbors. In the northern Peloponnese four of the small Achaian cities found the time ripe for refounding an old federal state which had long since fallen into abeyance as a result of the Macedonian domination. In central Greece the Boiotians maintained their old federal structure; but the rising star was the federation of Aitolian cities. The Aitolian League was ultimately undefeated in the Lamian War after Alexander's death, and since then had maintained a precarious independence, certainly favored by the difficult mountainous geography of the region, while the Macedonian successors fought for supremacy in Greece. As long as there were several candidates for the Macedonian throne, Aitolia had always

tended to support the challenger rather than the incumbent, and this attitude explains the League's good relations with Demetrios until 294, when he became king in Macedonia. Thereafter tensions arose, and they even prevented Macedonian access to Delphi for the Pythian Games in 290, which Demetrios then in pique simply celebrated at Athens; but sometime afterwards they may have formally made peace with him, if a fragmentary inscription containing a peace treaty is correctly dated to this time (*SEG* 48, 588). They certainly enjoyed good relations with his challenger Lysimachos (for whom they even renamed two of their cities Lysimacheia and Arsinoe), and after his death with Antigonos Gonatas, at least for as long as he was not the established king in Macedonia. Pyrrhos in Epeiros was, on the other hand, too close for comfort, but also too close to risk permanent hostilities, so relations there were tense but flexible.

In recent years the League had begun to expand towards the east by integrating those cities and communities that wished to join, or were pressured to join, into the fairly loose federal structure. This consisted of a common federal citizenship, a common council representing the participating communities, and an executive officer (*strategos*) elected annually at an annual general meeting of citizens. Shortly before the Celtic invasion, the city of Herakleia in Trachis, near Thermopylai, joined the League, and immediately reaped the benefits of membership by being defended by League troops when the Celts arrived. Herakleia did not fall to the Celts. The Aitolians also showed great interest in extending their protection to the international shrine of Apollo at Delphi (without, however, being officially members of the governing council, the "Amphiktyons"). In 281, only shortly before the Celtic invasion, they engaged with Peloponnesian troops under the Spartan king Areus, who crossed the Gulf of Korinth to protect the interests of the Delphic God, as they put it – in fact, to reassert traditional Spartan and other Peloponnesian interests in central Greece, especially at Delphi. The Aitolians successfully drove off the Peloponnesian crusaders, and Areus' experiment was not repeated (Justin 24.1.2–8).

When the Celts invaded central Greece and tried to plunder Delphi it was therefore natural that the army of the Aitolian League should play a major part in the defense of Thermopylai and of Apollo's sanctuary, along with the traditional central Greek states Boiotia and Phokis. The Peloponnesians, apart from the western Achaian city Patrai, remained in the Peloponnese, this time unmoved by the threat to the shrine, so that when the successful defensive operation to save the sanctuary was celebrated, the Peloponnesians had to remain apart, in contrast to their proud leading role against the Persians two hundred years earlier which had been ostentatiously celebrated at

Olympia and Delphi. The main glory fell this time to the Phokians and Aitolians. The Phokians traditionally held two seats on the Amphiktyonic Council, which they had lost in 346 to Philip II at the end of the "Sacred War," because they had impiously plundered the sanctuary treasures to finance a mercenary army. After their heroic defense of the temple against the Celts in 279, however, they were rewarded by receiving these two seats back, and once meetings of the Amphiktyons recommenced after the war their representatives took their traditional place on the Council; moreover, at the spring session of 277 at the latest (the probable date of our first postwar Amphiktyonic document), they were accompanied by two Aitolians. As far as we know, this was the first appearance of Aitolian representatives as members of the Council in an Amphiktyonic document, and they are listed in the prominent second place, which had previously been reserved for the delegates of the Macedonian king (CID 4, 12). This list is headed in the traditional way by two Thessalian delegates, a practice which, however, soon ceased, when Antigonos Gonatas took control in Macedonia and Thessaly and the Thessalians stopped attending meetings of the Amphiktyons. From then onwards Aitolians gradually began to dominate this highly prestigious central controlling council of the Delphic sanctuary, moving into first place in the attendance lists when the Thessalians ceased to attend. After the defeat of the Celts there was no Greek state that was in a position, political or moral, to deny their legitimacy or to offer any serious challenge.

Over the next years the influence of the Aitolian League continued to expand in central Greece, and this expansion is reflected in the increasing number of representatives which it sent to the meetings of the Amphiktyonic Council, which began once more to publish its decisions on stone in the sanctuary. Some time after the Pythian Games of autumn 278, at which thanksgiving sacrifices were made by many of the representatives for the safety (*soteria*) of the sanctuary (e.g., Syll.³ 398 = BD² 17 = Austin² 60), the Amphiktyons began to celebrate a modest artistic festival – probably annually – in commemoration of the defense of the temple. By the mid-sixties this festival had become sufficiently important for it to seem worthwhile engraving lists of the active participants, who by then came from all over the Greek world. Later, in the early 240s, an initiative of the Aitolians led to the festival being thoroughly revamped. The program of competitions was massively extended to include athletic and equestrian events, and it was made four-yearly, like the Pythian Games, with which the new Delphic *Soteria* were in a sense to compete. The prizes for the winners of the additional events, however, were made equivalent to those at the rather less prestigious Nemean

Games, so that the centuries-old Pythians were not completely upstaged (*Syll.*³ 402; see Nachtergaele, *Galates*, 401f. for all texts with French translation).

III Pyrrhos and Antigonos Gonatas

Before that took place, however, trouble and turmoil shook the Greek world in Europe. Once the unifying threat from the Celtic attack had vanished, the old problems returned. Those who sought solutions in violence now had a ready body of easily employable fighters to hand in the remaining Celts, many of whom were only too pleased to earn good pay as mercenaries with one or other of the competing Greek warlords. Pyrrhos left Epeiros to help Tarentum against Roman threats just as the Celts were arriving in the southern Balkans, but after six years in Italy fighting against the Romans and in Sicily against the Carthaginians, none of which had produced more than a disappointing “Pyrrhic victory” at best, he returned to Epeiros at the end of 275, leaving only his younger son Helenos with a small garrison at Tarentum. He promptly challenged Antigonos Gonatas for control of Macedonia, from which Lysimachos had driven him out some ten years earlier. Both combatants now employed the convenient Celtic mercenaries in their armies, and at first Pyrrhos overran Antigonos’ resistance and drove him out of the mountains of Upper Macedonia. Large parts of Thessaly – though not Demetrias – also came over to Pyrrhos: at the Thessalian sanctuary of Athena Itonia he dedicated shields taken from Antigonos’ Celts. But the lack of discipline of his own Celts proved fatal to his plans, since when they began plundering the Macedonian royal cemetery at Aigai – traces of the damage have been found by archeologists in recent years – they caused such revulsion among the Macedonians that Pyrrhos thought it best to return to Epeiros, leaving his elder son Ptolemaios to hold Upper Macedonia for him. This disreputable return home did not prevent his dedicating captured Macedonian shields with a proud text at the Epeirot sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona. He had, however, failed. He had not driven out Antigonos from Macedonia, who thanks to his ships still controlled the coastal cities in Macedonia and through his strategic fortresses and their hinterland important areas of southern Greece (Plutarch, *Pyrrhos* 26; Pausanias 1.13.2–3).

Particularly influential among these was Korinth, where Antigonos’ half-brother Krateros commanded the garrison and extended Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese by supporting or installing the type of autocratic government that the Greeks called “tyrants” in

those cities where Macedonian friends were influential. Such one-man rule was in most Greek cities untraditional, therefore widely unpopular and so hardly a viable long-term technique of ruling them, as Kassander had learned the hard way a generation before. Antigonos' grandfather, Antigonos Monophthalmos, had then known better when he promised the Greeks freedom, but Gonatas had inherited the heavy-handed (and expensive) garrison system set up by his father Demetrios, and Krateros had not had the imagination or courage to risk changing it. The opposition it provoked, however, became a major factor influencing the relationship between the king of the Macedonians and the Greek cities he wished to control.

From Korinth Krateros could control any major movement across the isthmus to or from the Peloponnese, and it gradually dawned on Pyrrhos that as long as Antigonos possessed these southern bases and his fleet he was going to be extremely difficult to defeat or replace in Pella. In the Peloponnese, however, Krateros' system of control provoked opposition and not all states regarded Macedonian power as inevitable and immovable. In particular Sparta, which had always opposed Macedonia – though not always very effectively – was currently extending its influence under the guidance of king Areus. In Achaia the four small westernmost cities that had reunited in a federation around 280 managed to extend their influence as far as Aigion, where the old federal sanctuary, the Amarion, was situated, by expelling the tyrant whom Krateros supported there. In other major Peloponnesian states, such as Argos, influential democratic movements objected increasingly to Antigonos' and Krateros' support of their internal opponents, but nowhere was the opposition sufficiently strong to offer a serious general challenge to the Macedonians. Had Pyrrhos cautiously analyzed the situation and attempted to create a coalition of the willing, offering his experience and support, a serious anti-Macedonian movement might have been feasible. But the swashbuckling way he approached the problem merely made confusion worse and in effect postponed the evacuation of Korinth for another thirty years.

The Spartan Kleonymos, an uncle of the ruling Agiad Areus, had earlier been exiled and attached himself to Pyrrhos, whom he accompanied on the Macedonian expedition, commanding the unit which occupied Aigai (Polyainos 2.29.2). He now convinced Pyrrhos that if only he were king in Sparta instead of Areus, Sparta would be at Pyrrhos' disposal for a rollback of Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese. It was not the first, and certainly not the last time, that an exile with his own personal agenda persuaded a gung-ho gullible military man to intervene in what he claimed was mutual interest. Pyrrhos would have been well advised to find out why Kleonymos was

in exile in the first place, before launching a major military expedition to impose the unpopular exile as ruler on his unwilling home city. But he did not, and the major expedition that began in spring 272 ended in total disaster, since the basic assumption that Kleonymos would be easy to impose on Sparta was simply wrong. It did not help that Pyrrhos assembled all available troops – including the now inevitable Celtic mercenaries – and brought back Helenos from Tarentum, as well as recalling Ptolemaios from Upper Macedonia, though he had inflicted a defeat on Antigonos there.

Pyrrhos' crossing to the Peloponnese, which must have been facilitated by Aitolians and perhaps Achaians, who then took no further part in operations, provoked an unprecedented Peloponnesian solidarity against him, further strengthened by his undisciplined troops ravaging Lakonia as soon as they got there. The old Peloponnesian enemies of Sparta, Messenia and Argos, swallowed their historical pride and sent troops to help Sparta, where immediate resistance was weakened by Areus' temporary absence with 2,000 men in Crete, where he was helping the allied city Gortyn, but he returned before it was too late. Even Antigonos rushed to the Peloponnese to combat the invader and sent some mercenaries to help the Spartans. Far from welcoming Kleonymos, the Spartans, men and women equally, put up such bitter resistance that Pyrrhos, like Demetrios before him, was compelled to give up the struggle. Since by this time winter was threatening, Pyrrhos chose to intervene in an internal party struggle in Argos, where one Aristetas invited him to help and where, if successful, he intended to spend the winter. His retreat from Sparta was harried by Areus' Spartan troops, now reinforced by some Cretan allies, and Pyrrhos' son Ptolemaios was killed. When the invaders finally reached Argos, they found Antigonos' troops from Korinth waiting for them in a strong prepared position; and though Pyrrhos managed to enter the city by night, led on by his Celtic commandos, the whole action turned into a tragic farce when one of his remaining elephants got stuck in a low gateway that had been secretly opened by Aristetas for them, and the resulting noise and confusion raised the alarm. When dawn came, Pyrrhos was trapped and in trying to retire he was struck on the head by a woman throwing down a heavy roof-tile and killed. His son Helenos then surrendered to Antigonos, who simply sent him home to his half-brother Alexandros, Pyrrhos' successor as king in Epeiros, and the remains of Pyrrhos' army were taken over by Antigonos. Epeiros would never again play a major role in Greek affairs (Plutarch, *Pyrrhos* 26–34; Justin 25.4–5).

IV Antigonos Gonatas and the Chremonidean War

Pyrrhos' Peloponnesian adventure ruined for several years any hopes there might have been for weakening the Macedonian hold on southern Greece. The Athenians, who had held talks with Pyrrhos when he arrived in the Peloponnese, now had to abandon any hope of recovering the Peiraieus in the near future. Of the Macedonian garrison towns only Chalkis managed to expel the Macedonians for a few years and send a representative to the Amphiktyonic Council in (probably) autumn 271 (*Syll.*³ 419; Knoepfler *BCH* 1995); for added security it may also have joined the Boiotian League. But this did not help for long: by around 269 Chalkis was again Macedonian, and shortly afterwards neighboring Eretria also. Antigonos Gonatas was consolidating his hold, while at the same time tolerating the expansion of the Aitolian League in central Greece, since he could not stop it without a major effort: strategically situated Doris became Aitolian at about this time, and Antigonos is not known to have reacted in any way.

Antigonos' cultivation of reasonably good relations with the Aitolian League stood him in good stead over the next few years, while the Peloponnesian cities – especially in Achaia – became increasingly restless and irritated at the persistence of their Macedonia-supported tyrants. Sparta, encouraged by the success of the glorious coalition that defeated Pyrrhos, also sought a new field for exerting leadership, and a further complicating element was the resurgence of interest in European affairs shown by Ptolemy II Philadelphos. This was a result of two factors, the most important being the resurgence of Antigonos' naval activities in the Aegean. Helped by his current understanding with Antiochos I, Antigonos, like his father Demetrios before him, now again seemed to present a potential threat to Ptolemaic security in the Aegean area. That was currently watched over by the League of the Islanders (the *Nesiotai*), based on Delos, an institution which, ironically, had been founded by Antigonos' grandfather and father. The second factor is less easy to assess. Since around 277, Ptolemy II was officially married to his full sister Arsinoe, who fled to Egypt after the deaths of her husbands Lysimachos and Ptolemy Keraunos, both of whom had briefly been kings in Macedonia. Her Egyptian liaison did not mean that Arsinoe abandoned her interest or claims to influence in Macedonian affairs devolving from the earlier marriages, and this personal factor may well have provided Ptolemy with a motive for developing an anti-Antigonos policy in Europe. Before Arsinoe's death in 270, he

certainly made some kind of alliance both with Sparta and with the Athenians, who acknowledged Arsinoe's influence when they explicitly described his initiative as being in conformity with her policy (Syll.³ 434, lines 17–18 = BD² 19 = Austin² 61 = Burstein 56).

A group of prominent rich Athenians now took the lead in forming an anti-Macedonian coalition – perhaps it was the same group that had contacted Pyrrhos. If so, they will have been seriously disappointed at his defeat and above all alarmed at Antigonos' renewed aggression, especially in neighboring Euboia, where both Chalkis and Eretria – the latter only after a siege – became Macedonian satellites again after 270. The group included Kallippos, who had commanded the Athenian contingent sent to fight against the Celts at Thermopylai, an ex-Olympic champion in the prestigious four-horse chariot race, as well as Glaukon and his brother Chremonides, who enjoyed good contacts with Ptolemy. In August 268 Chremonides introduced a decree into the Athenian assembly proposing an alliance with Sparta and Sparta's allies – largely Peloponnesian cities in Sparta's ambience, including the Achaian League, but also those Cretans whom Areus had recently helped and who had cooperated against Pyrrhos. In his argumentation Chremonides played patriotically on the cooperation of the two cities Sparta and Athens against the Persians in 480/79 – now more than two hundred years ago! – when they had united in the defense of freedom, and “now that similar dangers had seized the whole of Greece from those men who were trying to subvert the laws and the ancestral constitution in each state,” Chremonides proposed the new alliance, “so that common agreed purpose shall unite the Greeks against those who have now infringed and broken agreements with the Greek cities, and as eager contenders along with king Ptolemy and each other will from this time onwards, thanks to their unified purpose, save the cities” (Syll.³ 434 = BD² 19 = Austin² 61 = Burstein 56).

The opponent is not named explicitly, but only one man could currently be compared with the Persian Xerxes: the Macedonian king Antigonos Gonatas who, like Xerxes had done, ruled Greek cities through tyrants and garrisons. Despite the pathos that Chremonides built into his rhetoric – his name was soon attached to the resulting war, known thereafter as the “Chremonidean War” – and the enthusiasm shown by the Peloponnesians, ultimate success inevitably depended on the willingness and ability of Ptolemy to fight Antigonos for control of Attika. Antigonos had his bases to hand, whereby Korinth proved particularly valuable in hindering Athens' new Peloponnesian allies; a Macedonian garrison still controlled the

Peiraeus, and he had a comfortable land connection from Macedonia, thanks to his tolerance of Aitolian expansion in eastern Greece and his possession of Euboia. Ptolemy's general Patroklos possessed a strong navy, his bases being in the islands which now included Samos, occupied by Ptolemy in the follow-up to Koroupedion, and more recently Methana in the northeastern Peloponnese. But to supply large numbers of troops for a land war in Attika from these places (even supposing he had them available) would be a logistical nightmare, despite the support of the Athenians from the city, given Antigonos' much closer continental bases. Fighting was therefore sporadic, though it began straightaway in 267, at least at the Attika border fort Rhamnous (*SEG* 24, 154 = Austin² 62; better text in Petrakos, *Rhamnous* no. 3). Archeological traces of Patroklos' activities have been found in a series of small islands off the Attika coast; but despite Antigonos' attempt at a blockade, the *Panathenaia* festival was held in Athens in summer 266, so his blockade cannot have been complete. On the other hand, as long as the Peloponnesians failed to help attack the Peiraeus from the land side and Patroklos did not blockade it from the sea – a particularly difficult operation under ancient conditions – the Macedonian garrison there could afford to simply sit out the hostilities and hope Antigonos would capture the forts on the land, like Rhamnous and Eleusis, in order to prevent pressure on them.

Hopes in the coalition must, however, have faded once Areus was killed in 265 trying to force a passage past Korinth, and Antigonos was not so hard pressed by them that he could not leave the war zone in Attika to repel an attack on Upper Macedonia from Pyrrhos' son and successor, Alexander II. Patroklos' logistics proved inadequate to allow him to put enough pressure on the Macedonians in the Peiraeus to make them give up, and though desultory hostilities continued until 262, by then the Athenians had had enough, gave up the struggle, and capitulated. Glaukon and Chremonides were evacuated in time to Alexandria. They had challenged and lost. Once more a Macedonian garrison took up residence on the hill of the Muses near the acropolis in the heart of the city, where it would remain for more than thirty years. The forts securing the land, such as Eleusis and Rhamnous, insofar as they had not already been taken by the Macedonians, now came under Macedonian control. Thanks to the failure of Chremonides and his friends, Macedonian power in the south must have seemed better established in 262 after the war than it had been for a generation.

V Aitolia and Achaia

The decade following the Chremonidean War is one of the most obscure in the whole of Greek history. Only the merest fragments of information survive. We can ascertain that in the Peloponnese the consolidation of the Achaian League continued, despite the Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and that tyrants supported by the Macedonians provoked increasing opposition, especially in Arkadia. Sparta, however, after the deaths of Areus in 265 and of his son and successor Akrotatos a few years later, largely withdrew from the leading position it had claimed under Areus.

In central Greece the Aitolian League continued its more or less peaceful expansion. The growth of the federal state, however, made the traditional piracy and banditry of individual Aitolians ever more difficult to reconcile with the political claims of the League to be a civilized federal state, the worthy protector of the Delphic oracle. Efforts therefore began about this time to formally control the activities of Aitolians abroad by offering federal protection to other states that enjoyed friendly relations with the League. Surviving fragments of a treaty with Athens, dating from sometime before the Chremonidean War, lay particular emphasis on this aspect of the relationship (*SEG* 18, 239 = *StV* 470); and as the private interests of Aitolians expanded along with the expansion of the League, particularly in the Aegean area in the two decades following the Chremonidean War, formal protection treaties of one kind or another are known from as far afield as Smyrna, Miletos, and Chios, but also from the smaller islands Delos and Tenos (Scholten, *Politics of Plunder*, 106–107). Most of the later treaties also include a declaration recognizing the validity of the Aitolian reorganization of the Delphic *Soteria* festival in the early 240s. At some time during these years a second annual general meeting of the League, the *Panaitolika*, was instituted that took place around the time of the spring equinox. This was held at varying locations to take account of the expansion of the League into areas outside of ethnic Aitolia and so to address the political needs of new members. The original single annual meeting, the *Thermika*, continued to meet in the autumn, always at the Aitolian federal shrine at Thermon. This shrine also profited enormously from the increasing prominence and affluence of the League, receiving significant investment in its representative infrastructure that was intended to impress visitors to the shrine, including, of course, those new League members who attended the annual meetings.

Sometime during these years, but after 270, the Aitolians made a treaty with their smaller western neighbor Akarnania, which also enjoyed a federal organization. Constant tensions between the two

states that were only separated by the river Acheloos had existed for as long as we have evidence. Alexander the Great's disapproval of the Aitolians' occupation of Akarnanian Oiniadai and the expulsion of its inhabitants was one of the main reasons for Aitolia's joining the anti-Macedonian coalition after Alexander's death, and the regional tensions had not lessened in the meanwhile. A formal agreement, engraved on two bronze plates set up in the federal sanctuary at Thermon and at the international shrine of Zeus at Olympia, therefore marks a significant new development. The agreement provided for the peaceful regulation of disputes and for cooperation in case of war (StV 480). The resolution of this longstanding problem in the west gave the Aitolians a free hand to concentrate on their eastern acquisitions. By the end of the 260s these allowed Aitolia to occupy seven seats on the Amphiktyonic Council (CID 4.42–44), and by the end of the 250s nine (CID 4.45ff.), a physical expansion of state territory that was also reflected in the expansion of the political institutions of the League, where the ruling council enlarged its membership. At about the same time, Aitolian control of Delphi was intensified by creating the new post of secretary to the Amphiktyonic Council that was always occupied by an Aitolian. Throughout these years the leaders of the League were careful to avoid provoking Macedonia. A document from the time of the Chremonidean War shows them successfully approaching both Antigonos Gonatas and Ptolemy II with a request for guarantees of safety for members of the Amphiktyonic Council attending traditional meetings at Anthela near Thermopylai, which the war had interrupted (CID 4.36). And though Antigonos and Athens were officially at war, Athenian representatives continued to attend meetings at Delphi until the war was over and the Macedonian occupation ended their participation (CID 4.30–34).

Across the Gulf of Korinth in the Peloponnese a potential rival to Aitolia was growing in the Achaian League. The dynamics of Achaian development were quite different from those of Aitolia in this phase, being from the beginning anti-tyrant, therefore for local reasons directly relating to the methods of the Macedonian occupation anti-Macedonian. The Achaians were especially hostile to the great Macedonian fortress of Korinth from which, since the time of Philip II, the Macedonian kings had kept a firm hand on most of the Peloponnesian cities. By the mid-250s all the original Achaian cities that still existed had reunited in a federal organization, driven by the principle that unity would make them stronger; and an annual federal magistrate, the *strategos* ("General"), was elected at an annual mass meeting of the citizens. At this stage of the League's development he was primarily responsible, as his title suggests, for commanding the federal army (Polybios 2.41–43.2). The Achaians were, however, not

the only Peloponnesian cities to object to the way Macedonian control was exerted locally through autocratic rulers, supported if necessary by garrison troops. Elis had also rejected its tyrant in the 260s, and Sikyon – Korinth's western neighbor – experienced constant dissension within its pro-Macedonian ruling clique, though this had not yet led to a fundamental system change (Plutarch, *Aratos* 2–4). Argos, we have seen, was also split internally at the time of Pyrrhos' invasion between democrats and supporters of pro-Macedonian autocrats. At Megalopolis in southern Arkadia the pro-Macedonian tyrant Aristodamos was murdered during these years (Polybios 10.22.2), and a number of smaller Arkadian cities participated in the coalition that fought the Chremonidean War. The general situation was therefore fundamentally unstable, since Antigonos had not sufficient manpower to garrison every little place.

The dam broke first at Sikyon, where longstanding strife among the ruling families had created a large rich émigré community scattered throughout Greece, but many of the exiles had found refuge in Argos. The son of one of the deposed tyrants, Aratos, had grown up there, and in 251 he organized a successful putsch in his home city. Instead of simply setting himself up in place of the deposed tyrant, Nikokles – he would doubtless have had support from the Macedonians at neighboring Korinth if he had done this – he resisted the temptation, introduced some kind of more broadly based political system that could qualify as being democratic, and recalled any exiles who wished to return home. Moreover, he then attached his city to the burgeoning Achaian League, which in this way took its first step in expanding its membership outside the traditional ethnic Achaian limit, since Sikyon was a Dorian city. To satisfy the exiles Aratos, though personally rich, desperately needed cash that the Achaians could hardly be expected to provide, and found support in Ptolemy II Philadelphos, whose nearby base at Methana provided easy initial access. Ptolemaic policy had not fundamentally changed since the Chremonidean War, retaining the aim of irritating Antigonos and keeping him occupied in mainland Greece. The purpose was to prevent any serious Antigonid collaboration with the Seleukids that might allow one or other of them to attack Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, in coastal Asia Minor, in Syria, or in Cyprus. At the same time, however, Ptolemy wished to avoid committing Egypt to any specific long-term major involvement in Greece (Plutarch, *Aratos* 4–12).

Shortly after the revolution at Sikyon, Alexandros, son and successor at Korinth of Antigonos' half-brother Krateros, who died sometime after the Chremonidean War, decided to make a bid for independence. His chances may have seemed reasonable, since he also commanded the Macedonian garrisons in Euboia. At neighboring

Sikyon he cultivated Aratos and the revolutionaries, thus foiling any thoughts they might have entertained of carrying their revolution to Korinth, but he failed to win over either the Peiraieus garrison or Argos, where the current tyrant Aristomachos continued to support Antigonos. Although Alexandros called himself *basileus*, this did not help him win support, and when he died around 245 Antigonos lost no time in coming to Korinth personally, where he installed his son Demetrios as husband of Alexandros' widow Nikaia, thus monopolizing such loyalties to Alexandros as might still have been present in the Korinthian garrison and population. He even made friendly approaches to Aratos, a pragmatic attitude in view of the rapidly increasing anti-Macedonian, anti-tyrant tensions in the Peloponnese at the time (Plutarch, *Aratos* 15).

VI The Leagues Expand

The increasing self-confidence of the two southern Greek Leagues gradually produced in the 240s a new power constellation that dominated Greek affairs in parallel with Macedonia for the next several generations. The Aitolians demonstrated their total control of Delphi by offering one of the original Ionian seats on the Council (traditionally filled by Athens or one of the Euboian cities, now all under Macedonian control) to the distant Ionian island of Chios, which had never been part of the Amphiktyony. At about the same time they raised the status of the Delphic *Soteria* festival to parallel that of the Pythian Games, adding athletic and equestrian events and introducing the classic four-year cycle, traditional for great Games, beginning in 246/5 (Syll.³ 402). Around the same time, their agreement with Akarnania was abandoned, and instead of it the Aitolians made an arrangement with their northern neighbor Alexandros of Epeiros to divide up Akarnanian territory between them. As a result the Aitolians regained control of the important harbor town Oiniadai (Polybios 2.45; Justin 28.1). Their part of Akarnania was integrated into their League. Tension also mounted in eastern central Greece, where Aitolian disagreements with the Boiotians led to local warfare, in which the Achaians under Aratos, now *strategos*, joined in on the side of the Boiotians, ravaging Aitolian Kalydon and parts of western Lokris, but failing to prevent a devastating defeat of the Boiotians at Chaironeia in 245 (Polybios 20.4.4–5.2; Plutarch, *Aratos* 16).

These events show that Antigonos Gonatas was far from being able to control what was going on in central and southern Greece, despite

his garrisons and tyrants in the Peloponnese. The Macedonians also cannot have been pleased at the way Ptolemy II and (from 245 onwards) his son and successor Ptolemy III “Euergetes” was interfering in Europe by financing the Achaians, despite a recent success of his fleet against that of Ptolemy near Andros. Ptolemy III made it clear that he was following his father’s policies when he symbolically reminded the Greeks of his father’s support for them at the time of the Chremonidean War by setting up a statue of the Athenian leader Glaukon (who had perhaps recently died) at Olympia. All visitors to the venerable Greek sanctuary would thus be able to see it there and to read the text commemorating “Glaukon’s positive attitude and goodwill towards Ptolemy’s father and his father’s sister.” At about the same time a body calling itself “The Greeks,” meeting at Plataiai to celebrate the freedom festival of the *Eleutheria* – a festival commemorating the battle of Plataiai against the Persians in 479 – passed a decree, which they monumentalized by engraving it in stone, honoring Glaukon for supporting their festival, even after he had gone to Egypt to join Ptolemy. In it they repeated much of the pathos-packed freedom propaganda that Glaukon’s brother Chremonides had incorporated in his Athenian decree arguing for the Spartan alliance some twenty years earlier (*Syll.*³ 462; *BCH* 99, 1975 = Austin² 63). These documents demonstrate that Ptolemy III intended to keep up the irritating policy of causing trouble for Macedonia in southern Greece in order to prevent any serious Macedonian engagement in the Aegean; his Peloponnesian base at Methana allowed easy access to the Peloponnesian states.

Ptolemaic funding therefore probably stimulated the next expansion phase of the Achaian League. The most dramatic event was the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from the citadel of Korinth, the Akrokorinth, in a commando operation led by Aratos 243/2, and the integration of the city into the Achaian League. But shortly afterwards neighboring cities – Megara, Troizen, and Epidaurous – also joined the League. At this period Achaia enjoyed good relations with a resurgent Sparta, cooperating militarily when around 241 an Aitolian expedition looking for plunder in Arkadia raided the Peloponnese, whether encouraged by the aged Antigonos Gonatas or not (Polybios 2.43; Plutarch, *Aratos* 18–24).

Around 240 the almost contemporary deaths of three major players produced a new orientation. In Macedonia Antigonos Gonatas died in 239, being succeeded by his son Demetrios II; probably somewhat earlier Alexandros II had died in Epeiros, leaving two young sons under the tutelage of his wife Olympias; and in Sparta Agis IV, who had been personally responsible for the recent minor Spartan resurgence, was killed by conservative opponents of his scheme to

reform the Spartan landholding system. The changes in the north produced a new orientation for Macedonian interests, since Olympias mistrusted Aitolian intentions in Akarnania and married her daughter Phthia to Demetrios II. This brought about a coincidence of Macedonian and Epeiroi interests in the west, so that when Demetrios became king in his own right in 239 the simmering conflict between Epeiros and Aitolia became an open war with Macedonian participation, later known as the "Demetrian War."

In the Peloponnese Agis' death meant that Achaia had, at least temporarily, lost a local anti-Macedonian supporter, but Demetrios' activities against Aitolia drove the two leagues together, and a period of formal cooperation ensued, during which both leagues extended their existing Peloponnesian interests – Aitolia had for a long time had friendly relations with Elis and Messenia – into Arkadia, on the way integrating further outposts of Macedonian influence into one or other of the leagues. The most important acquisition for Achaia was Megalopolis, where the pro-Macedonian tyrant Lydiadas saw himself increasingly isolated, and in 235 voluntarily joined his city to the Achaian League, in which he then immediately began to play a leading role, being elected League *strategos* several times over the next few years (Polybios 2.44.5). Megalopolis had been founded with Boiotian help in the fourth century as an Arkadian bulwark against Sparta and a symbol of newly won Arkadian independence. Now, more than a century later, the basically pro-Macedonian orientation of the city resulted from residual fears of the resurgence of the once-powerful Spartan neighbor. When Megalopolis joined Achaia the city's traditional hostility towards Sparta was by no means abandoned. The Megalopolitans merely saw in Achaia a more effective ally and protector. As a result of Megalopolis' accession and Lydiadas' own leading role in League affairs over the next few years, League policy became increasingly conditioned by Megalopolitan interests. At the time when Lydiadas brought his city into the League in 235, Sparta had just received a new king, Kleomenes III, who, like Agis IV before him and Areus a generation ago, saw his primary objective as king in restoring Sparta's leading position in the Peloponnese. Given Achaian expansion into Arkadia and the recent integration of Megalopolis into the League, it was virtually inevitable that the two regional powers would clash, their interests now being incompatible: the Peloponnese was too small to accommodate two leading powers.

In the north the process of gradual disintegration continued. Little is known in detail of Demetrios II's activities, except that he failed to oppose Aitolia effectively, while in Epeiros by the end of the 230s the royal family simply died out. The monarchy was replaced there by an unstable republican federation, and even this was threatened by a new

non-Greek power in the west, the Illyrian tribe of the Ardiaioi. Under their influential and active leader Agron, the Ardiaioi had recently begun making regular raiding sorties both along the Adriatic coast as far south as the western Peloponnese and on land through the mountains into northern Epeiros. When the Epeiroi monarchy disappeared, the Epeiroi division of Akarnania seized the opportunity to become independent again, but it also accepted Illyrian help, negotiated by Demetrios, to counteract inevitable Aitolian aggression based on the Aitolian division of the territory. Illyrian aid to independent Akarnania provided them with a politically correct legitimacy for their presence in the area that their earlier raiding activities could hardly justify, though they did not cease. When Agron died in 231 his energetic wife Teuta continued the aggressive tradition and in 230 sent out a major expedition. Among other actions it captured the new Epeiroi federal capital city at Phoinike with the help of some Celtic mercenaries stationed there, who were actually being paid to protect it. Thereupon the Epeiroi appealed for help, this time not to the ineffective Demetrios in Macedonia but to the new powers in the south, the currently allied Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, both of which responded by sending troops. They were not immediately required, as it turned out, but a year later Kerkyra (Corfu) and the two coastal cities Epidamnus and Apollonia appealed to the leagues for help against Illyrian attacks. The leagues themselves were threatened by the Illyrian raids, so they responded quickly by sending Achaian ships with mixed Aitolian and Achaian crews, but they proved no match and lost five ships in an encounter near the Paxi islands, south of Kerkyra. Kerkyra had to accept an Illyrian garrison (Polybios 2.2–6; 9–10).

The role of the two leagues in these events shows the extent to which they had become recognized as effective regional powers within the Hellenic constellation of states, and events of the next year or so confirm this new role. Early in 229 Demetrios II died, possibly in the context of a war with his northern neighbors, the Dardanians. His son Philip was still a child, too young to take over, and a relative, who was also a grandson of Demetrios Poliorketes, whose father's name Antigonos he bore, married his mother and was appointed regent. It was not a happy situation for Macedonia, and neighboring powers tried hard to take advantage of it, forcing the regent Antigonos into immediate action against Dardanians and Paionians in the north. In the south, where Demetrios II had already lost much ground during his desultory war against the two leagues, the Aitolians now even managed to persuade large parts of Thessaly to abandon Macedonian suzerainty and unite with the League. This was a major blow to Macedonia, since Thessaly had been part of the Macedonian power

base in northern Greece now for more than a century, ever since the time of the great Philip II.

Even Athens, which under Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II had resisted pressure from Achaia, steered by Aratos and paid for by Ptolemy III, to risk a rebellion and eject the Macedonian garrisons, now under the impression of a general collapse of Macedonian power began negotiations with Diogenes, the current commander of the garrisons. Diogenes somewhat surprisingly – but perhaps also under the illusion that Macedonian influence was on the wane – agreed to withdraw, as long as the Athenians raised 150 talents to pay off his troops and cover their evacuation costs. The citizens, led by the negotiators, the brothers Eurykleides and Mikion, clubbed together and, aided by a personal contribution of Aratos, raised the cash. The soldiers were paid off and dismissed from their forts in the Peiraieus, Salamis, and Rhamnous. Diogenes received Athenian citizenship and other special honors appropriate to the importance of his benefaction; they included the naming of a new gymnasium after him, the *Diogeneion*, where Athenian ephebes trained and for more than a century thereafter made an annual sacrifice in his honor. Aratos had hoped his twenty talent contribution would win Athens for the Achaian League, and was bitterly disappointed when the freed Athenians chose instead to pursue a precarious course of cautious neutrality. Their situation was now dangerously exposed, and they did not want to provoke the Macedonian regent any further by seeming to support his enemies, in case Antigonos, contrary to the general expectation, managed to restore Macedonian influence in central Greece. Neighboring Chalkis and the other Euboian cities in any case remained Macedonian. In the Peloponnese, since 243 no longer threatened by the Macedonian garrison at Korinth, Aratos had more success when the originally Macedonia-friendly tyrant Aristomachos in Argos brought his city into the League, and some other remaining tyrants joined him (Plutarch, *Aratos* 34–35; Pausanias 2.8.6; *Syll.*³ 497 with Habicht, *Studien* 79ff. = Burstein 67).

VII Antigonos Doson

In 229 European affairs seemed on the verge of a new era, in which developments of recent years merely required consolidation. The influence of the Macedonian monarchy had, with some exceptions, been thrust back to its homeland; the federal structure of the leagues was proving to be increasingly attractive, since it allowed local autonomy for the member cities within a political framework that

offered each of them the possibility of participating in such federal affairs – security and foreign affairs above all – as they wished. In such a state ambitious and talented men had a much larger stage for their activities than could be afforded by each single tiny *polis*, and could put their talents to work to benefit a much larger population, while at the local level in the cities themselves the strong influence of the socially conservative landowning classes would help ensure that local dissatisfaction remained limited to the local community. City-based social and religious traditions remained unaffected. Fairly frequent meetings of federal councils and less frequent, but regular, mass meetings, where all citizens could participate and vote in elections, created the impression of a wide participation in the political process that could even be described as mildly democratic. For the Achaian Polybios, the Achaian League was truly so (Polybios 2.44.6).

Three series of events shattered this promising perspective. The first was in the Peloponnese, where Spartan aggression, now directed by the ambitious Kleomenes III, soon put the Achaian League on the defensive, just as the last vestiges of Macedonian power in the area were being eradicated. The challenge to Achaian supremacy could not be overlooked. The second development was in the north, where the regent Antigonos was quite unexpectedly successful in asserting Macedonian power against his non-Greek neighbors, the Dardanians and Paionians, and in recovering Thessaly. These successes quickly brought him the charismatic influence he needed to have himself accepted by the Macedonian grandees as king ruling in his own right, though he was always known by the nickname “Doson,” meaning “he who will give up (the kingdom)” (Justin 28.3.9–16). This rapid change in the situation in the north inevitably had repercussions elsewhere. The main development of the time, however, was no more than a cloud on the horizon in 229, but more than any other would shape the future of the Greek world: Roman irritation at Illyrian activities in the Adriatic. We begin with this last aspect.

Because of recent Illyrian plundering expeditions along the Adriatic coasts, Italian cross-Adriatic traders had become increasingly concerned about threats to their safety, and when the Epeiroi city Phoinike was captured and overrun by the Illyrians in 230 a number of Italians had been robbed, some even killed. Italian allied communities had complained to the Roman senate about insecurity in the Adriatic before this, but no action had been taken. The incident at Phoinike, however, was worrying – Pyrrhos’ intervention in Italy had not been forgotten – and two senators were sent off to investigate. Their report about the attitude of the Illyrians was alarming, and so an expeditionary force was prepared for 229, the first time Roman troops

operated east of the Adriatic. The ambitious consuls expected an easy victory, and were not disappointed. Kerkyra was freed, along with Apollonia and Epidamnus – the three cities that had appealed to the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues for help earlier in the year – and contacts were made with some hinterland tribes on the mainland. Demetrios of Pharos, who had commanded Teuta's garrison at Kerkyra but surrendered to the Romans as soon as they appeared, became in effect ruler in Illyria, thanks to Roman support. Queen Teuta, who fled to a remote castle, in due course made a treaty with Rome, the most important clause of which restricted Illyrian coastal raiding activities to the area north of Lissos, thus keeping clear of the narrows of the straits of Otranto, where the main commercial cross-Adriatic traffic traveled. The clause also had the effect of protecting the coasts of Epeiros and points further south controlled by the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues. The Romans therefore diplomatically informed the governments of the two leagues of the terms of the agreement with the Illyrians. Polybios concludes his account of these events with the comforting words: "Through this treaty they freed the Greeks from considerable anxiety, for at that time the Illyrians threatened not just isolated peoples, but were common enemies of all" (2.12.6). Thereafter the Roman troops returned to Italy, a good deed well done (Polybios 2.2–12; Appian, *Illyrike* 7).

Far from being alarming, the Roman intervention in Illyria could be widely regarded in the Greek cities as helpful, as doing what the leagues themselves had been unable to do: to control and tame the Illyrians. Macedonia under Demetrios II had not even tried, but had made a bad scene worse by employing, or at least encouraging, Agron and his raiders to intervene in support of his Macedonian-Epeirot agenda in northern Akarnania. It was therefore not from Rome but from a resurgent Macedonia, and to a lesser extent from a revitalized Sparta, that the two leagues expected trouble, and their fears were realized much quicker than even the most pessimistic of their politicians could have anticipated. The self-confident Aitolians were the first to experience Antigonos Doson's efficiency. Their integration of the Thessalian cities into their League lasted no more than a year. In 228 a Macedonian army restored Macedonian influence in the whole area, even marching into Doris, which had been undisputedly Aitolian since 270, burning and looting the little town of Kytenion (*SEG* 38, 1475), and taking over control of Opous from the Boiotians, who had also dared to adopt an anti-Macedonian stance in recent times. By 227 Antigonos Doson felt so firmly in the saddle that he ventured to challenge Ptolemy in the Aegean, equipping a naval force and sailing to Karia in southwestern Asia Minor. Here he gained some friends and bases, from which he could potentially challenge

Ptolemaic naval domination in the Aegean area (Trogus, *Prologus* 28). Whether he intended to push further south in European Greece to recover the losses suffered by his predecessors in recent years would remain to be seen when he returned from Karia. In the meanwhile, despite their loss of Thessaly, the Aitolians raised their own number of seats on the Amphiktyonic Council to fourteen (*CID* 4.68–76), reflecting the consolidation of their hold on the areas traditionally represented on it. The Athenians, however, despite their newly won freedom from Macedonia, as one aspect of their policy of neutrality did not yet reclaim their traditional seat at Delphi.

In the Peloponnese the influence of both leagues collapsed dramatically at the same period, thanks to the energetic Kleomenes III. Although Argos joined the Achaians – for traditional reasons, no friend of Sparta – Kleomenes had the best of ongoing skirmishes in eastern Arkadia, and by 227 secured the active assistance of Elis, which was Aitolia's chief friend in the Peloponnese. This put the Aitolian–Achaian alliance under severe strain. Moreover, in 227 the influential and competent ex-tyrant of Megalopolis, Lydiadas, was killed in a battle at Ladokeia near Megalopolis. Buoyed by this success, Kleomenes carried out a coup back home, the main element of which was the abolition of the annually elected board of five Ephors, who had been reluctant to support his aggression against Achaia – four of the five incumbents were killed, the fifth fled – and weakening the influence of the Council of Elders (the *Gerousia*). These constitutional measures were flanked by a land reform modeled on that planned by Agis IV in the 240s, the short-term aim of which was to increase Kleomenes' popularity with those benefiting from a redistribution of land, but in the middle and long term to raise the numbers of citizens eligible for the army. He called the measures the restoration of the ancestral constitution, but that was mere propaganda, playing on the notorious Spartan respect for their own distant history to gain support for measures dictated by immediate considerations (Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 6–11; Polybios 2.46–47.3).

The Spartan army that took the field after this revolution was largely composed of new citizen troops, who anticipated the proposed land distributions by serving gladly with their royal benefactor. Since Kleomenes also introduced the Macedonian long spear (*sarissa*), abandoning the traditional short hoplite spear, he expected not only a moral but also a surprise technical advantage over his traditionally armed Achaian opponents. He was not disappointed, going on from one success to another, and by 225 putting the Achaians in the situation where the very existence of their League seemed threatened, and not merely from the Spartan military activities. Kleomenes' social revolution at Sparta raised quite unjustified hopes in the lower classes

of the conservatively governed Arkadian and Achaian cities that he might continue his revolution there also – not realizing that its sole function in Sparta was to increase the number of Spartan citizens who then, serving as landowning soldiers, would enable Kleomenes to execute his plan of reviving the Spartan hegemony over the rest of the Peloponnesian cities. As a Spartan king with traditional hegemonial aspirations, the resolution of Spartan military weakness was his first priority, and he was not interested in social revolution as an exportable event in its own right. But in the short term the dissatisfaction of the lower classes in the cities of the League decreased the efficiency of Achaian federal resistance, and Kleomenes was able to take them over one by one, in 225 even including the old Spartan enemy Argos (Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 12–17). At some point – whether before or after the revolution at Sparta is unclear – Ptolemy III decided he was backing the wrong horse in the Peloponnese by continuing to subsidize Aratos and the Achaians and transferred his support to Kleomenes, as being potentially the more effective anti-Macedonian element. This loss of Ptolemaic subsidies was a further contributory factor to Achaian military weakness, which by 225 had reached a decisive point when both the Aitolians and the Athenians refused Achaian appeals for help.

By the time Kleomenes captured Korinth and then laid siege to Aratos' home city Sikyon, it was clear that something drastic needed to be done, since many Peloponnesian citizens, like Ptolemy Euergetes, currently laid greater hope on Kleomenes than on Achaia as guarantor of effective resistance against Macedonia. Aratos' stolid property-owning democrats were also currently less attractive as leaders than Kleomenes' dynamic pragmatists. Moreover, for at least two years, since the death of the Megalopolitan Lydiadas, tensions had become apparent within the Achaian League between the original old Achaian members and Arkadian newcomers, particularly the Megalopolitans in the south, over their attitude towards Sparta. Megalopolis had for more than a century been pro-Macedonian, simply in order to protect itself against Sparta. When the Achaians failed as new protectors against Sparta, as they were currently doing, local Megalopolitan priorities demanded change. Whereas in 235 when Lydiadas joined Achaia Demetrios II had seemed to offer less security than had Aratos and the League (at a time when Sparta in any case was wallowing in its own troubles), things had in the meanwhile changed both in Sparta and in Macedonia, and Antigonos Doson now looked an altogether better bet than Demetrios had ever done. Already in 227 two Megalopolitans whom Aratos trusted conducted semi-official preliminary discussions with Doson, and since then, as Kleomenes advanced from success to success and Megalopolis became

increasingly isolated, the question of the future orientation of the Achaian League began to take first place on its political agenda. The loss of Korinth to Kleomenes was the last straw. Either the Achaians could now accept Spartan domination – fundamentally opposed by Megalopolis – or they could ask for help from the only remaining effective source, now that the Aitolians and Athens had refused: the Macedonian king.

It will have given Antigonos Doson great satisfaction to learn that the Peloponnesians were incapable of running their own affairs adequately, and that centuries-old rivalries that the federal movements had for a while seemed to assimilate broke out as soon as the common enemy Macedonia disappeared. When the official Achaian embassy (which included Aratos' son) arrived in Pella during winter 225/4 to negotiate terms for Doson's helping them against Sparta, they found a ready listener. For Doson, the Achaian request offered a window of opportunity for reestablishing Macedonian influence in southern Greece, and for this traditional objective he abandoned such plans as he might have had for challenging Ptolemy in the southern Aegean. The Karian expedition, from which he had recently returned, was not followed up by further action (though the contacts made in the area were not neglected) and so had no further immediate consequence for Macedonian policy. In Pella the Achaian delegation had little to offer in return for military aid. Doson's terms were therefore hard, but the Achaians had no alternative to accepting them, when they were presented to the spring meeting of the League. Although Antigonos guaranteed the continued existence of the League, the terms of the written agreement that he insisted on reduced Achaia to satellite status within the Macedonian power system. The Achaians were obliged to recognize Antigonos as military leader "on land and sea" and to guarantee his function through an annual oath of loyalty. It was a role they had once granted Ptolemy as a purely formal honor (Plutarch, *Aratos* 24.4), but Antigonos meant seriously what he demanded. Furthermore, they agreed to contact no other king – in effect, only Ptolemy came into question – without Antigonos' permission. Concrete measures that the Achaians had to accept were Antigonos' reoccupation and garrisoning of Korinth (once it had been recovered from Kleomenes) and other places such as he required from time to time, as well as the provision of pay and food for the Macedonian troops for the war. Hostages were to be sent to Pella to guarantee the League's seriousness of purpose, Aratos the younger being one of those chosen. The Achaians showed their gratitude by instituting sacrifices, processions, and festivals honoring Antigonos – in effect regular celebrations of their own reduction to satellite status, in a way only too familiar from recent times in Eastern Europe

(Polybios 2.48–52.4; Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 16; *Aratos* 45).

Antigonos was not finished with restructuring his power base in the south. During the first campaign in the Peloponnese he recovered Korinth and Argos and penetrated as far as the Lakonian frontier near Megalopolis, where he occupied some forts and turned them over to the Megalopolitans. He then set up a standing Security Pact (sometimes called the “Hellenic League” by modern historians) composed of regional federations that were already his allies – Achaia, Epeiros, Phokis, Boiotia, Akarnania, and Thessaly – and committed them to his leadership, as he had already done specifically with Achaia. He thus formally became *Hegemon* of the new Pact, the immediate objective of which was to wage war against Kleomenes and the Spartans. A Pact Council (*synhedrion*) was created for decisions affecting mutual interest, though it was inevitably dominated in practice by the *Hegemon*, who alone had the right to summon meetings (StV 507). If the distant model for Antigonos’ Pact was the Hellenic League, set up by his ancestors Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes in 302, it differed enormously in its effectiveness; for whereas Antigonos and Demetrios, like Philip II and Alexander’s Korinthian League, operated with a large number of city-states as members and seem to have maintained a permanent bureau at Korinth, Doston’s membership was limited to representatives of much larger regional units. There were, therefore, even when formal meetings took place, far fewer individuals involved in decision-making, and the whole structure was more streamlined and more suitable for immediate military activity. Since the Pact possessed no standing bureaucratic staff, it cemented Macedonian dominance through its centralized decision-making, while giving the outward impression that the allies were consulted. That was what it was all about.

Major warfare wracked the Peloponnese for the next two years until a decisive battle at Sellasia, on Sparta’s northern frontier, in summer 222 brought the universal sufferings to an end. Ptolemy had ceased to support Kleomenes financially in the immediate run-up to the battle, but Kleomenes saw no alternative to going to Alexandria, when he escaped in the aftermath. When the war ended thousands of Macedonian troops and mercenaries had been paid for and supplied by the Achaian League for more than two years; devastation of crops and cities, including the destruction and plundering of the major cities Megalopolis and Mantinea, actions that also involved the sale into slavery of such parts of the population that had not been killed or able to escape, was part of the shocking program. These two atrocities were deliberate retributive actions committed equally by the social revolutionary Kleomenes at Megalopolis as by the Macedonian king at

Mantineia. Mantineia, after being taken by Antigonos, was formally refounded after its population had been largely annihilated, and bitterly received a new dynastic name, Antigoneia, by which it continued to be known for centuries. In the final battle at Sellasia more than 50,000 men participated, around 20,000 of them on the side of Kleomenes, all of whom had to be paid and supplied. The losses in manpower were appalling: it was said that nearly 6,000 Spartan citizens alone were lost. The whole war was a tremendous waste of effort and resources, causing unnecessary destruction and political turmoil in the cities, some of which changed hands several times in the course of the troubles, each time involving deaths, expulsions, or at best the voluntary exile of activists, as well as the destruction of public infrastructure and private wealth (Polybios 2.54–69; Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 23–32).

In the last resort the states organized into the Security Pact possessed more resources and could bring to bear more military power than the Spartans, however well motivated they might be. After the battle nobody can have doubted that the Macedonians were there to stay in the Peloponnese. Macedonian garrisons installed in the Achaian cities – at least in Korinth, Orchomenos, Heraia, and Thelphusa – remained in place long after the war, a financial drain on the resources of the Achaian League, but also a guarantee for the Achaians' political quietude. Sparta now also fell under Macedonian control for the first time. When Kleomenes fled, resistance crumbled, since many of his new citizens fell in the battle and the population of Sellasia, near where the battle took place, was even sold into slavery (Pausanias 2.9.2). This time there was no resistance to the last man and woman. Antigonos Doson entered the city and imposed a military governor (*epistates*), such as had also served until recently in Athens. Some territories that were disputed with their neighbors, Messenia and Megalopolis, were settled in favor of the allies, and some attempt was made to restore the pre-Kleomenic laws and constitution to Sparta itself. What happened to the land redistribution is not known. Perhaps it had not yet taken place on a large scale, but in any case so many of the potential new farmers had been killed in the battle that the problem had easily manageable dimensions.

Of the traditional Macedonian bases there remained the Peiraieus to recover. As it turned out, the Athenians were in luck. They tried to talk to Doson as early as 227, but reached no satisfactory agreement. Since then they had showered Ptolemy III with honors, including a cult and a regular festival called *Ptolemaia*, which suggests he must have supported their efforts to extract themselves from Macedonian domination – doubtless financially – though no details are known. But after Doson's startling recovery of the Peloponnese they will surely

have been asking themselves how long it would be before he approached them with renewed “requests” for active cooperation. His first priority, however, after the battle was back home in Macedonia, where the northern frontier was again penetrated by Dardanian raiders, and the northwestern by some Illyrians, despite his employing Illyrian troops under Demetrios of Pharos in his army at Sellasia. Clearly not all Illyrian tribes were equally friendly to their Macedonian neighbors. This action was in a sense routine. The tribes had taken advantage of Antigonos’ absence in the south with his army; he merely needed to convince them that he still meant business in the north. This he seems to have achieved, but shortly afterwards his chronic tuberculosis became acute and he died suddenly, leaving Demetrios II’s son Philip, now seventeen, to continue his consolidation programme in the south.

VIII Retrospect

The death of Antigonos Doson in 221 provides a convenient point to look back over the sixty years of European history since the epochal year 281 that have been covered by this chapter. Out of the collapse of the Macedonian power structure in Europe on the deaths of Lysimachos and Seleukos, a new dynasty established itself in Macedonia. The undisputed succession of young Philip V in 221 shows just how well integrated the Antigonids now were in Macedonia. Despite the multifarious challenges to Macedonian power in the Balkan area, at the death of Doson only the Peiraeus of the major bases in Greece was no longer under Macedonian control (and that had only recently been lost), whereas in the Peloponnese direct Macedonian influence was as strong, if not stronger, than it had ever been. The challenge of the Ptolemaic kings had, however, not been defeated. Ptolemaic garrisons in Thrace (Ainos, Maroneia, and Samothrake) and in the islands (especially important Samos, Thera, and eastern Crete), as well as at Methana in the Peloponnese (now known as Arsinoe), kept a wary eye on potential Macedonian naval activities in the Aegean area (see chapter 7 below). Under Antigonos Gonatas these tensions led to active warfare during the Chremonidean War; two sea-battles, at Kos and at Andros sometime afterwards, show that the cold war could rapidly warm up; and Doson’s Karian expedition may have aimed at acquiring a base from which to challenge Ptolemaic supremacy in the eastern Aegean.

In Macedonia itself, once the Celtic danger had been beaten off and Antigonos Gonatas established himself as king, the main structural

development of these years was the continuation of the process of urbanization begun under Philip II and further developed under Kassander. Accompanying this process was a widespread grant to the Macedonian cities of some limited form of participatory local self-government that allowed them to take part in the general Greek cultural processes connected with the international shrines, such as at Olympia and elsewhere, as independent participating communities. When in the 220s the authorities at Delphi drew up a current list of those cities which received invitations to participate in the Pythian Games, and which therefore offered hospitality to the ambassadors of the sanctuary (the *theoroi*), more than thirty Macedonian cities, many of them upcountry, took part in this premium pan-Hellenic experience (BCH 45, 1921, 1–85). That means they were recognized by the Delphic authorities under Aitolian influence, despite being part of the Macedonian state, as legitimate separate communities with a public and religious life of their own. In 242, when the island of Kos, host of the famous shrine of Asklepios with its school of healing, launched a major campaign throughout the Greek world asking for recognition of its festival of Asklepios and a declaration of the inviolability of its shrine, at least four major Macedonian cities – Philippi, Amphipolis, Kassandreia, and Pella – and there may well have been more, are known to have held a decision-making assembly of their citizens (*ekklesia*), each of which passed a decree accepting the wishes of the Koans that was then inscribed in full at the shrine on the island for the world to see (Rigsby nos. 23, 25, 26, 27). These invaluable documents not only illustrate the integration of these cities into the Greek cultural continuum of the time, they also show that they possessed the right to local public assembly on a democratic model, even if its competence was limited to merely local or cultural affairs: all these decrees say explicitly that what they are doing conforms with the policies of the king, and there is evidence to suggest that most, if not all, the Macedonian cities enjoyed the presence of a royal representative (*epistates*), who may often have been a local citizen, to see to the interests of the central government, which retained competence in all major financial and security questions. In the cities outside Macedonia where garrison troops were stationed, the royal government of course retained final control, even though, as at Athens, a prominent local citizen might be entrusted with this responsibility. At Korinth, however, as long as it was Macedonian, a Macedonian was always in control, under Antigonos Gonatas at first his own half-brother, Krateros, and then Krateros' son, Alexandros.

Apart from the recovery of Macedonia, the most significant political structural development of these years in Hellenistic Europe was the strengthening of the federal movement throughout Greece,

expressed most dramatically by the fact that Doson's Security Pact of 224 consisted at the time of its foundation solely of such states. Single cities were not members. The most effective of these federal states, the Aitolian League, was, however, not a member. During the years following the Celtic invasion the Aitolian League had extended its influence so widely that it began to occupy a strategically dominating position in central Greece. It did this by integrating neighboring cities and areas into the League through generous grants of citizenship and by allowing elite members of newly integrated communities to occupy federal office, as soon as they were formally eligible. This meant that local elites had no reason to regret their joining the League; and since the annual festival at the Aitolian national shrine at Thermon, the *Thermika*, coincided with a mass political meeting of the citizens of the League at which the annual elections were held, political integration could advance without serious problems, favored as it was by frequent social intercourse. When in the 240s in the Peloponnese the Achaian League also began to expand beyond the original ethnic boundaries of classical Achaia, the same basic principles were applied, so that the early years of the expanded League were politically dominated by "new Achaians," the Sikyonian Aratos, the Megalopolitan Lydiadas, and the Argive Aristomachos.

Federal structures offered many advantages, while by no means replacing the *polis* as the place where the citizens continued to live, to uphold their local traditions, cults, and legal and political procedures, as long as these did not clash with federal regulations. Since federal institutions included the army, local disputes between cities, which had in the past often enough been solved by military means – the characteristic Greek war had always been small scale, concerned, for example, with land boundaries, pasturage, or water rights – now became internal federal problems. Federal authorities could obviously not allow member states to go to war with each other, so that traditional types of dispute (which, of course, did not just go away because of the federal structure) now tended to be solved by negotiation or indeed by compulsory arbitration. At the time of joining the League, such problems could be directly addressed, so that they did not immediately cause a federal problem, as evidenced by an Achaian decree about the accession of Orchomenos around 234, found near Orchomenos (Syll.³ 490 = Austin² 68 = BD² 30); but arbitration was also carried out between member cities within the Achaian League, as when around 240 Megara arbitrated a land dispute between the neighbors Korinth and Epidauros (Syll.³ 47 = Austin² 156). Once an arbitration had taken place, the resulting agreement was written down and usually published on stone or a bronze tablet, often in several copies and perhaps even set up in an international

shrine to achieve maximum publicity and the protection of the gods for the sanctity of the agreement. At the same time federal agreements or treaties with external states imply the ability, or at least the claim, of the federal authorities to control the activities of their own members. The widespread Aitolian grants of protection against arbitrary violence exerted by Aitolian citizens (*asylia*), once the Aitolian League became a major player in the Great Game, were often associated with a grant of the right for individuals to activate an Aitolian citizenship that gave the foreigner the right to approach an Aitolian court, as if he were an Aitolian (*isopoliteia*). These grants imply that the Aitolian authorities were aiming to limit the traditional freedom of individual Aitolians to plunder the world at will, in the interests of establishing a stable system of interstate relations.

The Aitolians were, of course, fortunate to gain almost undisputed control of a major international shrine at Delphi, which they could use for publicizing their power and influence. The long series of inscribed Amphiktyonic documents, always listing in full the names of the members present at the meetings and often decreeing various honors for men who had helped Apollo and his shrine in one way or another, were a welcome means of gaining good publicity, set up to be read by all visitors to the sanctuary and seeming to underline the simple normality of the ever-increasing size of the Aitolian membership of the Amphiktyonic Council (texts collected in *CID* 4). Then there was the new festival of the *Soteria*, the celebration of the successful defense of Delphi against the Celts, run at first at a fairly modest level by the Amphiktyons until in the 240s the Aitolians raised its status in a widespread diplomatic action to try to equal that of the traditional games. By doing so they were imitating their friend Ptolemy Philadelphos, since in the early 270s he had created just such a festival in Alexandria, the *Ptolemaia*, to memorialize the achievements of his father, and at that time he had run a widespread diplomatic campaign to have it recognized through the Greek world.

The Aitolians used their influence at Delphi to set up some new buildings and statues in the shrine, just as they did at Thermon, where a second major shrine for their internal public relations was created. Here massive long porticoes (*stoai*) were built to protect and show off, among other things, weapons taken from defeated enemies, the texts of treaties and agreements, as well as statues and inscriptions set up in large numbers honoring citizens, officials, and foreigners, who had served the purposes of the League well. These monuments were intended to be seen and impress, the texts to be read and admired, not only by external diplomats visiting the League council but also by the throngs of visitors and citizens attending the annual festivals and meetings. Perhaps the most dramatic of these monuments was that set

up, probably in the early 220s but perhaps rather earlier, to celebrate the friendship of the League with Ptolemy III, “because of his enthusiasm for and help towards the Aitolians and the other Greeks” (ISE 86). The monument consisted of statues of the king, his wife Berenike, and six other members of his family, each of whom was described in the inscription explicitly as “Macedonian,” thus underlining the Ptolemies’ European origin and intimating at least a potential right to rule in Macedonia – a fascinating perspective at a time when, after the death of Demetrios II, Aitolia, in absorbing Thessaly, was actively engaged in undermining the Antigonid power base in northern Greece: Ptolemy was clearly helping.

With this Aitolian self-advertisement not even the Macedonian king could compete. At Delphi he did not even try, and none of the traditional members of the Amphiktyonic Council whose states he controlled ever sent a representative to attend a meeting, though individuals coming from such cities were not prevented from participating in the games. Participants even from the main Macedonian cities Pella, Philippi, and Kassandreia are known from the 260s and 250s (references in Nachtergaeel, *Galates*, 509, 512, 516). The list of cities receiving invitations and offering hospitality to the Delphic *theoroi* from the 220s carries the same implication. There was, however, one international shrine where the Antigonids were truly welcome: Delos, which Antigonos Monophthalmos had freed from Athens in 314 and used as an epicenter for his League of Islanders. As an Antigonid institution, this League did not survive Demetrios Poliorketes’ death, but passed then into Ptolemaic hands. But the island remained a place of Antigonid attention and pious self-advertising investment, going back to Demetrios. At least three gold wreaths were listed in the temple inventories as having been presented by Antigonos Gonatas, though he was outdone in this respect by his sister Stratonike, wife of Antiochos I, who made a much larger number of dedications (Bruneau, *Recherches*, 546f., 550). But a large portico on the northern side of the precinct and a very large monument associated with it – 21 meters long and carrying at least nineteen statues of his ancestors, both mythical and real – were his main contribution to the permanent shape of the sanctuary, which thereafter could be ignored by no visitor to the Delian temple. In addition, no fewer than four annual festivals were founded at various times by Antigonos Gonatas, the *Antigoneia*, the *Soteria*, the *Paneia*, and the *Stratonikeia*, at which vases were dedicated at the sanctuary (Bruneau, *Recherches*, 558f.).

At a political level below that of the Great (or would-be Great) Powers, life continued in the cities and sanctuaries of Greece as best it could, given the almost permanent warfare somewhere or other

throughout these two generations. Since most of our evidence for this comes from public inscriptions and most of them originate in Athens, our knowledge is limited to things that were thought worth being inscribed, and it tends to be strongly athenocentric – though in general there was a significant and widespread growth in the number of inscriptions set up in the middle years of the third century. Many of the inscriptions record decrees passed by cities commemorating men who benefited them in some way, whether they were non-citizens who had represented the interests of the honoring community abroad or citizens who had distinguished themselves in some way, perhaps just by being particularly generous. Protogenes of Olbia on the Black Sea was honored in a very long decree in the later third century because over many years he had regularly advanced money to his city for various expenditures, even voluntarily undertaking to rebuild the city walls, largely at his own expense (*Syll.*³ 495 = Austin² 115). Those citizens occupying an official position outside the city were particularly prominent in such documents. An excellent example is the long decree passed honoring Kallias of Sphettos around 270 for his services to Athens while in Ptolemaic service (*SEG* 28, 60 = Austin² 55 = Burstein 55). A less prominent person was the Athenian Herakleitos of Athmonon, who in the later 250s became Gonatas' military commander (*strategos*) of the Peiraiæus and adjoining territories; in this function he received two decrees praising him for his help, one from the city as a whole (*Syll.*³ 401 = Burstein 60) and one from the settlers on Salamis (*Syll.*³ 454).

The Athenians were particularly active in honoring benefactors, reintroducing the tradition after the restoration of the democracy in 307 of regularly honoring even their own officials. These included often enough the whole Council of 600, or at least sections of it (relevant inscriptions in *The Athenian Agora*, vol. XV) at the end of their year of office, but also individuals such as the archon Euthios in 282/1 (*ISE* 14 = Burstein 13) or the festival organizer (*agonothetes*) Agathaios in the late 250s (*Syll.*³ 466). For particularly prominent men this commemoration occasionally happened at the end of a long career in the public service, as with Phaidros of Sphettos, brother of Kallias, in the 250s (*Syll.*³ 409) or with the liberator Eurykleides around 215 (*Syll.*³ 497 = Burstein 67). This practice continued during the Macedonian occupation after the Chremonidean War, though at that time it became regular to add a reference that the king had also been served well by the honoree, as in the decrees for Herakleitos of Athmonon from these years. In times of financial crisis subscriptions were called for among the citizens of many Greek cities, whether to repair public buildings or – as at Athens in 244/3 – just to pay for protection for farmers bringing in the harvest (*IG*. II² 791). In each

case, the list of donors was published on stone, and many of these stones have at least partially survived (texts collected in Migeotte, *Souscriptions*). Publication was a way of exerting social pressure: subscribers were pleased to be named in public, while non-subscribers whose names did not appear might think better of it the next time. This type of thing was not dramatic, world-shaking activity, but such documents illustrate the nuts and bolts of political life in the cities. Since they come from a very wide range of Greek cities, they provide evidence for the fact that, despite the impression gained from the analysis of the political activities of the Great Powers, normal political life at grassroots level in the cities continued, certainly not unaffected by war and changing global circumstances, but equally certainly not coming to an abrupt end. One of these rather pedestrian documents – and there are similar ones from other places – shows Athens and Boiotia reaching an agreement (a *symbolon*) in the 240s on clearing up some private disputes between their citizens: judges were requested from the nearby neutral city Lamia, and they successfully cleared up the backlog of legal work and had their activities perpetuated in an inscribed decree praising them for their work (*IG II² 778–779*).

Normal administrative work also continued in the cities. In the 240s one of the annual priests appointed to the Athenian temple of Asklepios found no proper record of the extensive possessions of the temple and, being an orderly man, he did not like the prevailing disorder and so urged the city council to take steps to have these possessions catalogued; in due course a decree was passed, a committee appointed, the catalogue was made, and the whole procedure, including the lengthy catalogue, engraved on stone (*IG II² 1534*). It is therefore clear that religious and civic life in the temples, law courts, gymnasia, and philosophical schools was far from coming to a halt in the third century, even at Athens while the city was occupied by the Macedonians. It is, however, also obvious that many Athenians and other Greeks deeply resented the Macedonian occupation that restricted their opportunity to act and react to affairs as they themselves wished. Nevertheless, the civic institutions, in Athens and elsewhere, continued to function more or less satisfactorily during these years, and were there, ready to be filled with life as soon as opportunity offered – at Athens it was in 229 – to pay off the garrison and buy political freedom.

The one major state that had traditionally exerted hegemonial influence on Greek affairs and that did not fall under Macedonian control early in the third century was Sparta. Although Sparta did not participate in the defense of Greece against the Celts in 279, and so passed up a rare chance to refurbish its tarnished charisma, nevertheless from the late 280s onwards, under the influence of king


Areus, it began once more to claim a leading role in Peloponnesian affairs. The highpoint of this phase was certainly the Chremonidean War against Macedonia in the 260s, which Areus and his Spartans together with the Athenians, led by Chremonides, provoked – but lost. Sparta was, however, in the third century also bedevilled by sociopolitical problems. The traditional constitutional structure of the state required that each full citizen-soldier possess an adequately large farm, from which he could live independently and fulfil his socioeconomic obligations towards the state – citizenship was in effect defined by the possession of such a farm. A further peculiarity of the Spartan social system lay in the testamentary law, which, compared with other Greek states, was particularly favorable to women. Over the centuries this had, however, gradually led to an extreme redistribution of farm lands into the hands of women, the richest of whom by the third century even controlled large estates, but they were, of course, not available to Sparta as regular citizen-soldiers. As a direct result of this long-term development in the pattern of landholding, a massive reduction in the number of male farm owners, therefore of citizen-soldiers, had taken place, to the point where in the 240s king Agis IV – whose hegemonial aims for Sparta were at least as ambitious as those of Areus had been – saw the only solution to the military problem in a redistribution of the land of large estates, particularly of those owned by women, to individual farmers. The aim was that they would then again each be able to produce sufficient income to qualify as citizens and therefore be available for the army.

Agis' ideas were so revolutionary that he was murdered for his pains by representatives of the rich landowners. His ideas, however, remained in the air, and Kleomenes III, who after 235 also aimed to pursue an aggressive policy towards Sparta's Peloponnesian neighbors, now largely integrated into the Achaian League, saw no alternative to taking them up again. The plans themselves were a curious mixture of revolution and conservatism – neither Agis nor Kleomenes seems to have even considered the possibility of merely redefining the conditions for citizenship, so that poor men could also be recruited as citizen-soldiers. It was thus almost inevitable that Kleomenes' royal putsch in 227, which eradicated the constitutional blocking elements of the Ephors and the Council of Elders (*gerousia*), was publicly presented merely as the restoration of the (mythical) egalitarian landholding structure allegedly created in prehistoric times by the (mythical) founding father of the Spartan state, Lykourgos (Plutarch, *Agis and Kleomenes*).

Had Kleomenes not had the misfortune to have as his chief opponent Antigonos III Doson, one of the most talented Macedonian kings of the century, the resurgence of Spartan influence in the

Peloponnese, based on his new socioeconomic structure, might well have proved irresistible and Sparta rather than the Achaian League have become the major political force in the Peloponnese. This, at least, was the very real fear of Aratos and the Achaians when they appealed to Doson for aid in 225. In the event, Kleomenes' defeat by Doson's army of allies at Sellasia marked the permanent end of Sparta as a major political element. For the next years, Spartan affairs were dominated by the quarrels of the injured conservative landowners and the frustrated revolutionaries, and these created such a high level of disorder and dissension that Sparta never again became a major influence on Greek affairs. What survived was merely the myth of once egalitarian Sparta, created and promulgated by Kleomenes and his advisers as the slogan for the revolution, but ready to confuse later generations, who were impressed at the sociorevolutionary components of his policy and happy to believe that such a utopian state had once existed.

Asia



281	Accession of Antiochos I; troubles in Babylonia and northern Syria
281/0 279/8	Death of Zipoitēs of Bithynia; accession of Nikomedes I; Nikomedes invites Celts (Galatians) to Asia Minor; subsequent widespread disorders
ca. 274–271	“First Syrian War”
ca. 269	“Battle of the Elephants”
ca. 263	Death of Philetairos of Pergamon
261	Death of Antiochos I; accession of Antiochos II
ca. 255f.	“Second Syrian War”; Ariarathes of Kappadokia takes royal title
ca. 253	Peace between Ptolemy II and Antiochos II; Antiochos divorces Laodike and marries Berenike
ca. 250	Death of Nikomedes of Bithynia
after 250	Antiochos’ European expedition
246	Deaths of Ptolemy II and Antiochos II; accession of Ptolemy III “Euergetes” and outbreak of “Third Syrian War” (Laodikean War)
241	End of Third Syrian War; death of Eumenes of Pergamon and accession of Attalos
ca. 240f.	“War of the Brothers” (Seleukos II and Antiochos “Hierax”)
ca. 238	Attalos’ victory over Galatians at the source of the Kaikos; subsequent successes against Hierax; Attalos takes royal title
228	Death of Antiochos Hierax
227	Earthquake on Rhodes
226	Death of Seleukos II; accession of Seleukos III
223	Death of Seleukos III; accession of Antiochos III

I The Structure of Empire

The battle at Koroupedion gave Seleukos Nikator the brief perspective of adding Macedonian Europe to his gigantic Asian domain; his murder at Lysimacheia shattered such dreams for his dynasty for nearly a century, during which his successors struggled to maintain their hold on Asia. Challenges were multifarious and would have been difficult enough to meet, had the dynastic ruling structure been stable, but given the regular disputes within the ruling family that broke out with ever-increasing intensity over the next half-century it is hardly surprising that opponents of the regime ever and again found the opportunity to look to their own advantage. In some areas they were able to establish effective independence at the cost of the dynastic regime. It was, however, not until the second century that this process became so strong and widespread that the Seleukid empire ceased to be a major power. In the half-century covered by this chapter the heirs of Seleukos Nikator were major players in the Macedonian Great Game.

The sheer size of the area that Seleukos controlled, stretching as it now did from the Aegean to the Hindu Kush, meant that the central government was dependent on loyal subordinates, especially in the remoter areas, for the effective administration of law, taxation, and security. This was, of course, not a new problem, but one that the Persian predecessors of the Macedonians, the Achaimenids, had also faced and had solved by granting extremely wide competences to regional administrators (“satraps”) as the price for their loyalty; in many areas local elite groups, who saw their own local interests served by their overarching support of the distant central authority, were used for the purpose. The system had its dangers, and regional dynasts, serving as satraps but enjoying local support, often enough made themselves independent, for longer or shorter periods; but as long as the central power remained intact, such satrapal “revolts” were normally relatively short-term affairs. When the Macedonians under Alexander the Great took over the Persian empire, they also took over the Persian administrative system – it resembled the Macedonian in spirit, though on a much larger scale, and was in any case the only serious possibility – and Seleukos himself saw no need, or opportunity, of changing it fundamentally. Why change a winning team?

Such changes as were made were related to the nature of the new rulers – Macedonians, not Persians – and the resulting greater importance attached to the western, largely Greek-speaking, provinces. Whereas the Persians had their base in Iran, at Susa, and merely controlled the hinge province of Babylonia from there through

an appointed governor, Seleukos founded a new Greek-style city on the Tigris, Seleukeia, as his governmental seat in the area. It had the double advantage of providing a familiar social environment for a Greek-speaking administration and of allowing Babylonian elites to continue their accustomed way of life in the old Mesopotamian cities without daily confrontation with their western conquerors; those who wished to adapt to the new system were welcome to do so, the possibility being offered by nearby Seleukeia. When Seleukos gained northern Syria he built new major cities there also – Seleukeia, Antiocheia, Laodikeia, and Apameia – from which he could exert control of Asia Minor and Syria. This remained the basic administrative structure after his death, the only further major development being after Koroupedion the establishment of a permanent seat of Seleukid regional government in Asia Minor at the old Lydian and Persian satrapal capital of Sardeis. From this time onwards Sardeis was encouraged to develop into a Greek-style city with its own independent local city administration.

The internal dynamics of the Seleukid empire in the third century are therefore conditioned by this tripartite administrative structure, with government bases that were also royal residences in Babylonia, northern Syria, and western Asia Minor. Challenges to Seleukid rule accordingly concentrated on one or other of these unequal areas. During the third century the eastern satrapies enjoyed some major investments in royally sponsored city-building, as far afield as Aï Khanoum on the river Oxos in modern Afghanistan, and they seem on the whole to have remained loyal – or perhaps merely indifferent – to Seleukid rule, providing much-needed manpower for the armies and income for the dynasty's struggles in the Mediterranean area, just as they had for the Persians before them. The threat from the nomadic Parthians, living in the steppes beyond the Caspian Sea, to the cultivated areas in northern Iran, which in the second century put an end to Seleukid rule in Iran and Babylonia, had not yet developed, and such challenges as arose from the nomads were met satisfactorily by the dynasty. The ruling king, however, always felt it desirable, if not essential, to keep up personal contacts with the regional Iranian elites by visiting himself with some regularity, or at least sending a senior representative of the dynasty – often the heir apparent – in order to encourage and bolster their support. The main challenges in this period came not from Iran and Babylonia, but from the other two sections of the empire where, just as in the previous generation, the main opponents were the other Macedonian dynasties, or those who thought to imitate them. In particular Ptolemy II Philadelphos and Ptolemy III Euergetes, operating from their rich fortress Egypt, continued to exert interests in southern Syria (which they controlled

as far north as the river Eleutheros), in Cyprus, and on the southern and western coasts of Asia Minor, as and when the opportunity offered. Their chief aim was to ensure that neither the ruling Seleukid alone nor the Seleukid in combination with the Antigonids in Macedonia would ever be in a position to challenge for control of Egypt itself, as Perdikkas, and then Antigonos and Demetrios, had done in the earlier period.

The fact that the challenges in the west affected areas that were inhabited largely by Greeks and were in general structured by traditionally self-governing Greek cities means that we have far more information about activities in the west than in the east. The Seleukids and their challengers inevitably cultivated the Greek population in these areas since, if they could not be won over or coerced, there could be no effective long-term hegemony. The basic problem was identical with that faced by the Antigonids in Greece: widespread use of force was counterproductive, and could only be temporarily successful in controlling traditional Greek cities, since it rapidly caused resentment, once a perceived emergency was over, and resulted in a political backlash that prevented winning hearts and minds. For the historian this situation has a particularly favorable side-effect. Most Greek cities in Asia Minor, since Alexander's overthrow of the Persians, were organized internally as democracies, being selfgoverning through a council and a sovereign assembly of citizens which elected civic officials for short terms of office (one-year terms were usual, though in some places even shorter terms are known). These democracies also aimed at a certain level of transparency in their decision-making on the model first practiced extensively in Athens, and therefore tended to publish their decisions, the most important of them on stone, whether by engraving them on the walls of public buildings or on separately standing stone stelai. Often enough these engraved documents praise some prominent individual, for whom a statue or other honors were voted, and describe at length his achievements for his city. These inscriptions can still be read and careers reconstructed. Wise kings took the trouble to pay attention to the political susceptibilities of the city authorities and treat them with respect, at least formally and for most of the time, writing letters and making recommendations rather than simply issuing orders, or granting occasional privileges instead of always making demands. These royal documents also tended to be inscribed in public places in the cities, and many of them have survived, offering the modern historian a body of authentic original documents with which not only events but also the mentality of the participants in this delicate mutual relationship can be tentatively reconstructed.

II Antiochos I “Soter”

After Koroupedion Seleukos Nikator had no time before his death to consolidate Seleukid hold on what had been Lysimachos’ territory. Antiochos, his designated successor, who followed his father’s precedent in rapidly appointing his own eldest son Seleukos as co-ruler, was not present and was confronted with an uprising of some sort in Babylonia (Boiy 140) as well as in the Seleukis, the city-region of Northern Syria – this latter had perhaps been stimulated by Ptolemy Philadelphos – when the news of his father’s murder arrived there. By the time he had settled these problems and arrived in Asia Minor he was faced with Antigonos Gonatas’ attempt to gain control of the Dardanelles. That was

Figure 4 Posthumous official coin portrait of Antiochos I wearing the diadem, perhaps issued at Apameia in the interregnum, ca. 246. The reverse records his cult name *Soter* (“Savior”). © Copyright the Trustees of The British Museum.



serious enough in itself, but trouble threatened also on the Asiatic side of the narrows. The local Bithynian dynast Zipoites never accepted Lysimachos’ claims to rule in the area and had already taken the royal title to show his opposition to the Macedonian imperialists, so it was inevitable that he did not acknowledge Seleukos or Antiochos as having any rights in his area at all. Zipoites, however, died shortly after Seleukos, and a struggle for the succession broke out among his sons, of whom Nikomedes – the first Greek name in the family – allied himself with Antigonos and some of the local Greek cities, including Herakleia and Byzantion, before Antiochos arrived on the scene.

The constellation looked immediately threatening for Antiochos, and the more distant future in Asia looked not much better when the two Macedonians made peace and so eradicated the immediate

challenge from the related dynasty, since Nikomedes then invited a group of the marauding Celts, who had made their way eastwards through Thrace after their failure at Delphi, to cross to Asia Minor and serve him as mercenaries in his ongoing struggle with his brother Zipoites. This he won and then managed to build up a small kingdom for himself on the Gulf of Astakos, where he later founded the name-city Nikomedeia as the seat of government, so reinforcing the claim to recognition and independence that his father had staked. The city still exists, betraying its dynastic origin in its Turkish name Iznik. Fraught with long-term consequences for the whole area, however, was the presence of the now demobilized Celts in the long-settled rich coastal regions of Asia Minor (these Asian Celts are henceforth known by their Greek name, “Galatians”). Antiochos therefore found himself immediately confronted with a serious double problem. He needed to cope with the marauding Galatian invaders, while at the same time he was establishing Seleukid rule in the Greek cities and the neighboring territories that had been part of Lysimachos’ kingdom – and that despite Ptolemaic interference in coastal areas, where Miletos and Samos, as well as some other places, became Ptolemaic outposts at this time (*I.Milet*, *Delphinion* 123, lines 38–40 = Burstein 25; *Syll.*³ 390 = Austin² 256 = Burstein 92).

Around 269 – the precise date is uncertain – he finally defeated the Galatians decisively in a famous battle in which sixteen elephants that frightened off the Galatian cavalry played a critical role and so gave the battle the name “Battle of the Elephants” (Lucian, *Zeuxis* 9f.). After that, they allowed themselves to be settled on land in Phrygia, in three separate tribal areas, where they indeed remained a standing threat to the coastal area and were always ready to provide mercenaries, as and when required, to whoever needed them, but at least they now had a base for settling their families and were no longer continually on the move. Before this, their decade of constant marauding had caused severe damage and turned the Galatians into a classic barbarian bogey for the Greeks of Asia Minor: Apollo’s temple at Didyma near Miletos suffered the kind of plundering that Delphi had been spared (*I.Didyma* 426), and traces of reaction to their presence are preserved from the cities of Miletos, Priene, Thyateira, Kyzikos, and Erythrai as well as from some villages in the upper Maiander valley (*Anthologia Palatina* 7.492 [Miletos]; *OGIS* 765 [Priene]; Keil and Premerstein, no. 19 [Thyateira]; *OGIS* 748 = Austin² 225 [Kyzikos]; *OGIS* 223 = *RC* 15 = Austin² 170 = Burstein 23 = *BD*² 72 [Erythrai]; Wörrle, *Chiron* 1975, 62–64 = Austin² 168 = Burstein 19 [Maiander villages]). Even those cities not directly affected had to pay a special “Galatian War Levy” to cover the immediate local costs of Antiochos’ army, as the cited inscription from Erythrai shows.

The one positive feature of these bleak years for Antiochos was that he could legitimately present himself as protector of the civilization of the Greek cities from the barbarism of the marauding Galatians and even expect genuine gratitude from the Greeks for this, since individual cities could not hope to cope alone in the long term, despite occasional local successes. Lysimachos' rule had prevented the creation of effective regional federal structures, such as emerged in Greece at this time in the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues. Some of the cities even instituted a cult of the king who had saved them from the Galatian menace – manifestations of Antiochos as “Soter” (“Savior”) are known from Bargylia, Teos, and Smyrna, and the so-called Ionian League associated Antiochos, his son Antiochos, and his wife Stratonike with an altar in the cult and festival they still kept up in honor of Alexander the Great (*OGIS* 219 = Austin² 162 = BD² 16 [Ilion]; *Syll.*³ 426 [Bargylia]; *CIG* 3075 [Teos]; *OGIS* 229 line 100 = Austin² 174 = BD² 29 [Smyrna]; *OGIS* 222 = Austin² 169 = BD² 20 [Ionian League]). A further immediate success was that Philetairos, Lysimachos' governor of the treasury-fortress of Pergamon, who joined Seleukos before Koroupedion but after Seleukos' death had toyed with the idea of trying for independence like the Bithynian Nikomedes, decided to throw in his lot with Antiochos. As a result, he enjoyed a wide-ranging local competence. Seleukid coins issued in Pergamon will have helped pay for the successes against the Galatians, and we know explicitly that Philetairos generously supported Kyzikos during the Galatian War (*OGIS* 748 = Austin² 225).

Antiochos resided at Sardeis until 274, and his success against the Galatians might have come sooner, had he not been recalled by events in the Levant, where Ptolemy Philadelphos took advantage of Antiochos' absence to attack Seleukid territory, perhaps even sending ships into the Persian Gulf. Evidence from Babylon shows that Antiochos had at least to cross the Euphrates to counter the Ptolemaic advance, and that he required and received logistical support from his satrap in Babylonia (Boiy 141). This so-called “First Syrian War” remains obscure in detail, but seems to have occupied the years until 271. One incident concerned Ptolemy's half-brother Magas, who ruled Kyrene for him. Magas had married Apama, a daughter of Antiochos, and therefore probably enjoyed Antiochos' support for an attack on Egypt from the west, which Ptolemy was able to defeat, thanks to a group of 4,000 newly acquired Galatian mercenaries. They, however, turned out to be a two-edged weapon, for they caused more trouble than they were worth and themselves had to be eradicated by the regular troops. Magas then remained in control at Kyrene with the royal title (Pausanias 1.7.1–3). At some point Antiochos gained control of Damascus (Polyainos 4.15), while on the coast Ptolemy

occupied Marathos; but the peace treaty that ended hostilities restored the status quo in the area and seemed sufficiently stable to allow Antiochos to return to Asia Minor and put an end to the Galatians' wanderings. There is some evidence that the settled Galatians received regular payments from at least some of the Greek states, including Pergamon. With Pergamon itself Antiochos also formed a dynastic connection, intended to ensure good relations. Antiochis, daughter of Achaïos, a relative of Seleukos Nikator who possessed estates in the upper Maiander valley, was married to Attalos, a nephew of Philetairos (Strabo 13.4.2).

Between the Galatian settlement and the death of Antiochos in June 261 little is known. Some time after the Battle of the Elephants an alleged plot by the co-regent Seleukos (Trogus, *Prologus* 26) led to his death and replacement by his younger brother Antiochos, who then as Antiochos II duly succeeded his father in 261. Evidence from Babylonia, dated as late as August 14, 266, shows Seleukos still recognized there, therefore presumably still alive, but the younger Antiochos was now also associated in rule in a unique triumvirate. Western evidence is contradictory: a text from Stratonikeia dated to 268 omits Seleukos and shows the younger Antiochos as co-ruler (*SEG* 30, 1278), another from the upper Maiander valley (near modern Denizli) from January 267 omits the younger Antiochos and shows Seleukos still as co-ruler (*Chiron* 1975, 59 = Austin² 168). It is therefore impossible to date Seleukos' elimination precisely:

Figure 5 Philetairos of Pergamon. Roman copy of a Greek original portrait. Note the absence of the diadem, since Philetairos did not claim the royal title. Found at Herculaneum. Museo Nazionale, Naples. Alinari Archives-Florence.



it was after January 267, was not known in Babylon in August 266, but Antiochos II was certainly already associated with his father as early as 268. Before the death of Antiochos I, Philetairos died at Pergamon in 263 and was succeeded by a nephew, Eumenes. He was much less respectful of Seleukid ambitions in Asia Minor and at some point even defeated Antiochos near his residence city Sardeis (Strabo 13.4.2). This is the first indication we possess of Pergamon's serious expansionist ambitions, though Philetairos had been anxious enough to extend his influence in principle by using his wealth to create goodwill outside his area of direct control: we know of such diplomatic investments from Kyzikos, which received regular subventions for several years, and from Thespiiai in Boiotia in central Greece; Philetairos and his family also received recognition at Delphi as honorary representatives (*proxenoi*) and benefactors of the shrine (OGIS 748 = Austin² 225 [Kyzikos]; OGIS 310 + p. 355; 749 [Thespiiai]; Holleaux, *Études* II, 9–16 = Austin² 227 = Burstein 84 [Delphi]). Since the survival of evidence of this kind is quite

accidental, we may assume that such activity was more widespread, but Antiochos could hardly regard it as a provocation, since buying goodwill was a technique that he also had learned from his parents, and as long as the Galatians remained a threat cooperation was important.

III The Middle Years

Recent inner-dynastic feuding, which made the accession of Antiochos II seem insecure, led to a renewal of hostilities with Ptolemy Philadelphos, who took the opportunity to occupy or reoccupy major coastal cities in Asia Minor, including Ephesos, Miletos, and Halikarnassos. He even set up his son Ptolemy in Ephesos as governor of these overseas possessions. Antiochos was aided by disagreements among his opponents. Ptolemy “the son” was soon assassinated by mercenaries led by an Aitolian named Timarchos, who set himself up as autocratic ruler (a “tyrant”) in Miletos and also temporarily occupied neighboring Samos (Trogus, *Prologus* 26; Athenaios 13.593ab). When Timarchos was driven out, it was by Antiochos’ troops, who then continued to occupy Samian possessions on the mainland (*IG* XII 6, 11 [= *SEG* 1, 366] = Austin² 132 = BD² 76). Some obscure military activity also took place in Syria, so justifying the modern name “Second Syrian War” for it, but the critical event that determined Seleukid activity for the next generation was the peace treaty with Ptolemy, made perhaps in 253. This involved Antiochos’ repudiating his current wife Laodike, with whom he already had at least two young sons – called, inevitably, Seleukos and Antiochos – and taking instead Berenike, daughter of Ptolemy Philadelphos and his first wife Arsinoe I (Jerome, in *Danielem* 11.6 [= Porphyrios of Tyre, *FgrHist* 260 F43]). Berenike brought such a magnificent dowry with her that she was disrespectfully known as the “Dowry-Bringer” (“*Phernophoros*”), but what the magnificent dowry consisted of – whether, for example, Syrian territories were involved – is not known. Certainly the Lebanon and places farther south (“Koile Syria”) seem to have remained Ptolemaic, and Ptolemaic presence in the Aegean and Asia Minor was by no means eradicated by the agreement. At about the same time, Antiochos tried to cement a relationship with the Antigonids in Macedonia, as his father had done, by giving his sister Stratonike to Antigonos Gonatas’ son Demetrios (Justin 28, 1, 1). In this way the three Macedonian monarchies – despite all their differences and disputes over material matters – remained dynastically linked to each other in this generation, just as

before: the Macedonian ruling class maintained its internal cohesion.

While the tensions with Ptolemy II Philadelphos dominated the reign of Antiochos II, other dynasts, especially in Asia Minor from which we have some evidence, but probably elsewhere also, enjoyed greater freedom of action. Around 255 the local dynast in Kappadokia, Ariarathes, took the Greek royal title *Basileus* (Diodoros 31.19.6) in imitation of the Macedonian dynasties, thus asserting his claim to be ruling an independent state, and in Bithynia Nikomedes continued to use the royal title and even gave his name to his newly founded capital city, Nikomedeia. (It is, however, perhaps worth noting that Eumenes of Pergamon, whose territories were much closer to the Seleukid heartlands of central Asia Minor, did not yet risk this provocation.) Nikomedes, like Philetairos and Eumenes of Pergamon, cultivated a civilized attitude to traditional Greek cities and institutions. He enjoyed a cult on the island of Kos, doubtless a result of some material help granted (RC 25 = Burstein 26), and his ivory statue could still be admired at Olympia in the second century AD (Pausanias 5.12.7). He also enjoyed good relations with his neighbors (except for Antiochos II). While he was preparing his succession, preferring the younger child of his second marriage to Ziaelas, the adult son of his first, he asked his immediate neighbors, Antigonos Gonatas in Macedonia and the cities of Byzantion, Herakleia, and Kios, as well as Ptolemy Philadelphos, to ensure his chosen form of succession – in vain, as it happened, since once Nikomedes died, around 250, Ziaelas swiftly engaged Galatian mercenaries (as Nikomedes himself had done a generation earlier) to help his return, and his putsch was successful (Memnon of Herakleia [*FgrHist* 434] F14 [22]). Nikomedes' premortal diplomacy thus actually proved ineffective, but it does show the range of states that he claimed to be his friends and which recognized the independent kingdom of Bithynia. During these Bithynian troubles, Antiochos II exploited the dynastic uncertainties there to intervene in Europe, as his grandfather Seleukos Nikator had done. He penetrated as far as the river Hebros, where he besieged the Thracian city Kypsela and made the European Thracians (or, at least, some of them) his allies (Polyainos 4.16). This European intervention was a deliberate policy decision, and a recently published inscription records the oaths sworn while making an alliance with Lysimacheia, now the main Greek city of the area, explicitly guaranteeing its independence (*I.Ilion* 45 = SEG 31, 1056 = Austin² 171 = Burstein 22). Explicit independence is not the usual relationship with the crown known from cities under Seleukid control in Asia Minor, and its generous novelty suggests that Antiochos was starting a new European initiative in the ex-Lysimachean Thracian region.

Because of the close relationship between the Macedonian dynasties, dynastic events, especially disagreements within the individual dynasties, remained a dominant factor in the political life of the monarchies and always had a serious effect on the areas they ruled. A critical time was the death of a king and the accession of a new man. When Antiochos II died in 246 within a few months of Ptolemy Philadelphos, his recent strategic marital policy, whatever its advantages had been in securing good relations with Egypt, threw the kingdom into turbulences, the like of which it had not yet experienced. Laodike and her sons had taken up residence at Ephesos since her divorce, while Berenike with a baby boy lived in the dynastic capital city, Syrian Antioch. When Antiochos II suddenly died under mysterious circumstances in summer 246, he was at Ephesos and it was inevitably claimed that foul play was responsible. Laodike was certainly not minded to accept that neither of her sons would succeed their father, and the claim was launched that Antiochos had expressed the deathbed wish that her eldest son Seleukos, who was then about twenty years old, should succeed him. Not everybody, including Sophron, Antiochos' governor of Ephesos, who immediately recognized Berenike's child (who now at the latest adopted the dynastic name Antiochos [SEG 42, 994]), was convinced by this intimate declaration. Since it amounted to an existential challenge to Berenike and her Ptolemaic supporters, the so-called "Laodikean War," otherwise known as the "Third Syrian War," broke out immediately when the new king in Egypt, Ptolemy III "Euergetes," energetically set out from Alexandria in person at the head of an army to assert the interests of his sister Berenike in Antioch (Polyainos 8.50; Phylarchos [*FgrHist* 81] F24).

The twenty years following the death of Antiochos II were among the most dramatic, but in detail are among the most obscure, in the early history of the Seleukid state. A papyrus found at Gurob in the Fayum preserves a report on Ptolemy's actions in Seleukeia and Antioch – it is sometimes thought to be Ptolemy's own report, but if so what was it doing in a Fayum village? – and explains that he met no resistance there, while a Ptolemaic fleet operating in neighboring Kilikia cut off communications and the flow of cash to Laodike. The papyrus breaks off just as the Ptolemaic forces are being welcomed in Antioch (*FgrHist* 160 = Austin² 266 = Burstein 98 = BD² 27). From this point on we are reliant on the late literary tradition represented by Justin for the information that somebody loyal to Laodike had by then already assassinated Berenike and her child (27.1.1–7). A curious inscription inscribed on a marble throne, set up by some Ptolemaic official at the elephant-hunting center Adulis in Eritrea, tells more. The stone itself is now lost and the text only partially transmitted in

the manuscripts of the sixth-century AD traveler Kosmas (known as “Indikopleustes,” “the Sailor to India”), who copied as much of it as was still legible in his day (Kosmas 2.58). Its specific relationship to the locality where it was found emerges from the emphasis the text places on how the locally captured elephants had helped Ptolemy to his successes – he had been accompanied by “the army and the cavalry and the navy and the elephants from Trogoditis (Eritrea) and Ethiopia that his father and above all he himself hunted and transported to Egypt from those parts and trained for military use.” The document, though in Greek, was clearly intended to cater to specific local interests. For the modern historian, however, more interesting than this curious origin is the claim the text makes to Egyptian control and conquest of Seleukid territories in Asia: “He [Ptolemy] became master of all the land this side of the Euphrates and of Kilikia and Pamphylia and Ionia and the Hellespont and Thrace and of all the forces and Indian elephants in these lands, and made subject all the rulers in the various regions; he crossed the Euphrates river and after subjecting to himself Mesopotamia and Babylonia and Sousiane and Persis and Media and all the rest of the land up to Baktria and after seeking out all the temple belongings that had been carried out of Egypt by the Persians and bringing them back with the rest of the treasure from the various regions, he sent his forces to Egypt” (OGIS 54 = Austin² 268 = Burstein 99 = BD² 26).

The claim to personal achievement was doubtless exaggerated, implying as it does the conquest of the whole Seleukid kingdom east of the Euphrates. Ptolemy and his armies may well, however, have gone as far as Babylonia and, at least temporarily, have received some kind of loyalty symbols from Seleukid officials from the Upper Satrapies, perhaps even including Diodotos in distant Baktria (Northern Afghanistan). Diodotos enjoyed an extremely independent position within the Seleukid system, and around this time even began calling himself *Basileus* – perhaps a Ptolemaic concession to the distant ruler of that rich central Asian province. Jerome, however, excerpting Porphyrios of Tyre, has a much more modest version of Ptolemaic conquests: “....he came with a great army and entered into the province of the King of the North – that is, Seleukos called Kallinikos, who was ruling in Syria with his mother Laodike – and dealt masterfully with them and was so successful as to take Syria and Kilikia and the upper parts across the Euphrates and almost all Asia. When he heard that a rebellion was afoot in Egypt, he plundered the kingdom of Seleukos, taking 40,000 talents of silver and costly vases and 2,500 images of the gods, amongst which were those Kambyases had carried away to Persia when Egypt was captured” (Jerome, *in Danielem* 11.8 = Porphyrios [*FgrHist* 260] F43 = BD² 51–52

emended). The precise timescale of all this activity is unclear, but by 241 the war was certainly over and Ptolemy back in Egypt. Seleukos II, starting from an unstable base in Asia Minor, where even Ephesos became Ptolemaic – though Smyrna remained conspicuously loyal and received generous treatments as a result (*OGIS* 228, 229 = BD² 28; *OGIS* 229 = BD² 29 = Austin² 174) – reoccupied the Seleukid cities in northern Syria and already in 245 was able to act in Babylonia, associating his brother Antiochos with him. Probably connected with the recovery of Babylonia was the gift to the inhabitants of Babylon, Borsippa, and Kutha of some royal domain lands in the area that had probably been part of Laodike's divorce settlement (Boiy 145–146; 151). The grant will have served as a sweetener, aimed to reconcile the population of the crucially important hinge province with the restoration of Seleukid rule.

Shortly before the peace was made with Ptolemy in 241, Seleukos' younger brother Antiochos, later known as Hierax, "the Falcon," was given formal responsibility for ruling Seleukid Asia Minor. This freed Seleukos to deal only with Ptolemy and was probably a contributory factor to bringing about the peace treaty (Justin 27.2.9). As it was, the proud boast of the Adulis inscription was, by the time of the peace, already a distant episode and had no longer-term effect on the Seleukid position in the main areas of the kingdom. That the satrapy of Parthyene was threatened by nomads at this time – later, once they became settled in that area, known to us as "Parthians" – may, or may not, have resulted from the troubles faced by Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax in the west, but the invasions were not sufficiently serious to shake Seleukid control of the area as a whole. Satraps in the distant provinces had always enjoyed greater independence of action than those closer to the center of affairs – the Seleukid governmental system depended on this flexibility – and this factor will explain the notion that Baktria also became "independent" at this time. There is, however, no really good indication that "King" Diodotos' relations with the Seleukid kings seriously deteriorated.

It was, however, in Asia Minor that Seleukos II, after the peace with Ptolemy, had most immediate difficulties, and these were solely related to the activities of his brother Hierax. Ptolemy regained influence in the coastal regions during the Laodikean War, now reaching into Europe as far as the Thracian coastal cities of Ainos and Maroneia, but caused no further disturbance. The severe disagreement between the two ruling brothers, which soon resulted in fratricidal war, forced the minor powers in Asia Minor, Pergamon, Bithynia, Kappadokia, and Pontos, to look to their own interests, joining or opposing one or other (or even both) of the Seleukid contestants. The Galatians, who were as always prepared to fight as mercenaries for

whatever cause paid best, held the wild card once more. We possess the text of a letter written by Ziaelas of Bithynia during the Laodikean War around 242 to the island state of Kos. It was part of a major initiative started by the Koans to have their temple of Asklepios and their festival of the god recognized as “sacred and inviolable” – a particularly valuable diplomatic achievement at this time of political and military disruption. The replies to the requests of their ambassadors were engraved and published in the sanctuary of Asklepios for all visitors to see (Rigsby 8–52). Many kings and cities responded, among them Seleukos II and Ptolemy III, but Ziaelas’ letter went further than any other in attending to the particular circumstances of the time, drawing attention among other things to his excellent relations with Ptolemy (Rigsby 11 = RC 25 = Austin² 66 = Burstein 26). In central and northern Asia Minor Seleukos attempted to bind both Pontos and Kappadokia to him by marriage agreements, in Pontos Mithridates II receiving his sister Laodike, in Kappadokia Ariarathes III received another sister Stratonike (Diodoros 31.19.6; Justin 38.5.3). This was satisfactory as long as the common enemy was Ptolemy, but as soon as the Seleukid brothers began their civil war the dynastic links worked in both directions and left Mithridates and Ariarathes free to support whichever brother they wished, and both chose Hierax who seemed to be in control of Asia Minor. As soon as Seleukos, moving in from Syria with an army, tried to pressure his brother to capitulate, Antiochos hired ever-ready Galatian mercenaries, and in 240 or 239 defeated his brother on territory settled by the Galatians near Ankyra (Ankara), after Seleukos had penetrated into Lydia but was unable to capture Sardeis (Justin 27.2.10–12; Trogus, *Prologus* 27).

The general disruption in Asia Minor caused by this Seleukid inner-dynastic war provided a great opportunity for little Pergamon, which had also seen a change of ruler in 241, Eumenes being succeeded by his nephew Attalos, whom he had earlier adopted. Just as Eumenes had begun by challenging Antiochos I twenty years before, so Attalos now joined the fray in the War of the Brothers. This conflict, which the Galatian mercenaries decided in Antiochos’ favor, had the undesirable side-effect of suggesting to the Galatians that they alone were militarily strong in the region, and this situation, as in the 270s and 260s, threatened the stability of the whole of western Asia Minor. Perhaps after the battle at Ankyra Attalos therefore had little choice but to oppose them; in any case, the next known major event was a famous Pergamene victory over Galatians near the source of the river Kaikos, perhaps around 238, in or near the eastern edge of Pergamene territory (OGIS 269; 276). The place of the battle makes it clear that the Galatians were the aggressors. Whether Antiochos Hierax was

involved here is uncertain, but at some date in the 230s Attalos was indeed able to defeat him several times, with or without Galatians.

The Pergamene victories are known from a victory monument that Attalos set up later at Pergamon, from which large parts of the inscriptions, but not the sculpture, have survived (*OGIS* 273–279 = Austin² 231 = Burstein 85). Unfortunately we have no way of telling the precise date or the order of Attalos' successes or the length of time involved in achieving them. They were certainly all before Hierax's death in 228, after he had been driven to seek refuge in Thrace, but for Pergamon they provided a turning point, for at an early stage in the series, perhaps after the great battle at the sources of the Kaikos, Attalos joined his fellow regional dynasts in Asia Minor in taking the royal title and is henceforth known as "King Attalos" (Polybios 18.41.7–8; Strabo 13.4.2). The iconography of the victory monument made history, employing the popular cliché of the victory of civilization over barbarism of which the Greeks were so fond, going back at least to the famous victories against Persia 250 years earlier, this time also being celebrated by the best artists of the time. The famous Roman marble statue of "the dying Gaul" is probably a copy of a bronze statue from this monument. It seems that Attalos, following up his predecessor's attitude, was going overboard in depicting Pergamon (and himself) as defenders of civilization, therefore as worthy companions and successors to Athens and Sparta of old. It was a gigantic jump in power and prestige within not much more than a decade. As a result of Hierax's successes against Seleukos, Hierax had briefly gained control of Seleukid Asia Minor; but when he was driven out after his defeats by Attalos, it was Attalos who immediately became the possessor of all parts of Asia Minor that Hierax had claimed to rule. By 228 Seleukid Asia Minor, it might well have seemed, was a phenomenon of the past.

Seleukos II himself spent the years after losing Asia Minor to Hierax in consolidating his influence in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Upper Satrapies in Iran that had seen little, if any, royal presence since Antiochos I. By the time Hierax fled and then died, Seleukos was back in Syria, and would have been able to begin negotiations with Hierax, had his brother still been there. His continuing interest in Asia Minor is shown by his participation in the widespread efforts to help Rhodes when a terrible earthquake hit the island in 227, destroying, among other things, the famous colossus, the Rhodian memorial to their defeat of Demetrios Poliorketes in 305 (Polybios 5.89). But banal mortality struck first, in the form of an accidental fall from a horse that ended all his ambitions (Justin 27.3.12). He left two sons by Laodike, granddaughter of Achaïos and daughter of Andromachos, of whom the elder, also called Seleukos (III), was about eighteen years

old. He had, however, good advisers in his grandfather Andromachos and his mother's brother, the younger Achaios, both of whom had traditional family interests in Asia Minor and would scarcely tolerate, certainly not without a struggle, the continued occupation by the first Pergamene king of rich and populous lands that had by now been Seleukid for half a century, and Macedonian for more than a century. But Seleukos III was no more blessed with good fortune than his father had been. Under circumstances unknown, his grandfather Andromachos ended up a Ptolemaic prisoner and spent the next years in captivity in Alexandria (Polybios 4.51); and when in 223 an expedition led by Seleukos and Achaios finally crossed the Tauros and headed for confrontation with Attalos, Seleukos was assassinated while still in Phrygia, leaving Achaios in sole charge of the expeditionary force (Polybios 4.48.6–9). Seleukos' younger brother Antiochos, in the meanwhile about twenty years old and now without internal family competition, was currently far away in Babylonia, having been entrusted in a by now traditional Seleukid way with the general government of the Upper Satrapies. The division of power, as always, made good practical sense, as long as mutual trust existed. But the sudden death of Seleukos III left the young Antiochos on his own. It must have seemed, not for the first time in recent years, that the Seleukid kingdom was crumbling to pieces under the continuing lack of stability at the center. It was 223, a mere two years before the succession of Philip V in Macedonia and Ptolemy IV in Alexandria. These were the men who were about to face a world soon to be shaken in its elements by events in which they had no direct part: Hannibal's challenge to Rome in Italy in the years after 218. We shall postpone the continuation of the political story to a later chapter.

Figure 6 Official coin portrait of Seleukos III wearing the diadem, issued at Antioch or Apameia in Syria, 226–223. © Copyright the Trustees of The British Museum.



IV Power and Government

Royalty

The mid-third century in Asia was the time when a new longer-term political and administrative structure was created out of the ruins of the Persian empire and the disordered conditions left behind by the first half-century of uncontrolled Macedonian imperialism. In the first phase, the Macedonian ruling elite, despite disagreements and violent disputes among themselves, aimed to stick together against outsiders, continuing to forge marriage links only within the closed circle of the new Macedonian royal dynasties. The usefulness of dynastic marriage as a diplomatic mechanism, coupled with the serious security and power-political problems thrown up by the Galatian question in Asia Minor, gradually led to the extension of the circle of those dynasts participating in the Macedonian marriage circus. This widening of the ruling clique went hand in hand with the general recognition of several “new” royal dynasties on the edge of Seleukid territory in Asia that had not originated in Macedonia, but imitated the evolving Macedonian practice under Alexander’s successors.

The earliest seems to have been in Bithynia, where the indigenous despot Zipoites already at the time of Lysimachos claimed royalty for himself, and where his son Nikomedes, thanks to Galatian military support, managed to maintain his kingdom as an independent entity. By the 230s this status was so far accepted that Antiochos Hierax was glad to accept as wife a daughter of the current Bithynian king Ziaelas (Porphyrios [*FgrHist* 260] F32, 8). Before this, in central Asia Minor the dynastic families in southern Kappadokia, usually simply called Kappadokia (where most of the kings were known under the Grecized name Ariarathes), and northern Kappadokia, commonly known as Pontos (where the dynastic name Mithridates dominated), had been accepted as royal and marriageable by the Seleukids – the current Ariarathes (III) received Stratonike, daughter of Antiochos II, perhaps already in the 250s (Diodoros 31.19.6), and in the 240s Mithridates II of Pontos married Laodike, another daughter of Antiochos II, whom he received from her brother Seleukos II (Justin 38.5.3; Porphyrios F32, 6). The pattern is clear. Where the Seleukids saw no hope of conquest, they pragmatically chose to recognize their neighboring ruling dynasties as “royal” (as long as they were not actively hostile) and tried to bind them into the small Macedonian-dominated ruling caste through the traditional Macedonian diplomatic technique of marriage alliances.

Exceptions merely prove the rule. Once Philetairos at Pergamon

decided to support Seleukos Nikator before Koroupedion and then desisted from challenging Antiochos I, a relatively low-level marriage was arranged between the families: Philetairos' nephew Attalos married Antiochis, the daughter of a regional grandee, Achaïos, who was in some way related to the Seleukids. When this Attalos did not follow his uncle as ruler but a more aggressive nephew, Eumenes, took over at Pergamon in 263, no further personal binding element was attempted (but Eumenes chose not to provoke further enmity by claiming "royalty"). Only his successor, another Attalos, who became involved in the Seleukid War of the Brothers in the 230s when Hierax's Galatian mercenaries attacked Pergamene territory, took the step of joining the royals and declaring himself "King." Given the conditions of the time, this amounted to a clear challenge to the Seleukids, therefore the diplomatic intimacy that a marriage alliance implied did not come into question for Attalos: he chose as his wife and queen Apollonis, the daughter of a prominent citizen of the large Greek city of Kyzikos, which had been cultivated by the Pergamenes as far back as the time of Philetairos. With Apollonis Attalos produced the four sons who were to dominate Asia Minor in the second century (Strabo 3.4.1–2). The Pergamenes did not therefore participate in the international dynastic marriage market at this time. Nor, as far as we can tell – although there has been a lot of academic speculation about them – did the "kings" of Baktria, who from the middle of the third century onwards gradually asserted increasing independence from Antiochos II, and at some time and occasion unknown adopted the royal title, which they publicized on the coinage they issued to pay their troops (illustrations in Holt, *Thundering Zeus*, plates 3–25).

Little is known in detail about the nature of the government in the Asiatic monarchies of the third century, but there is no reason to assume that it was any less personalized than what we know of the periods before and after. The kings personally made major decisions and personally led their armies on campaign, just as Philip and Alexander and their immediate successors had done. At court their highest associates and ministers were called "friends" and owed their power and influence to their personal attachment to the king. There is no reason to believe that different practices ruled in the newly emerging third-century kingdoms such as Bithynia, Pergamon, Kappadokia, or Pontos. Regional administrators in the Seleukid kingdom were certainly personally appointed by the kings; indeed, at the highest regional level the Seleukids preferred to keep the posts in the family, though this was no guarantee of success, as the disagreement between Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax showed only too well. But even at the level of regional or provincial government local officials could find themselves in conflict, as seems to have

happened to Olympichos in Karia. Olympichos was appointed by Seleukos II but was inevitably drawn into the War of the Brothers in the 230s, which he exploited to build up a personal influence in the region that he maintained for more than twenty years, without, however, trying to found a dynasty, as far as we know. It is more than probable that Olympichos' experience was repeated in many marginal areas of the kingdom at various times, where several other locally powerful men called "dynasts" are known (for Asia Minor cf. Polybios 5.90.1; *OGIS* 229 = Austin² 174 = BD² 29; Bikerman 166f.; for inscriptions concerning Olympichos see Austin² 179).

As a result of this generally rather labile structure of the multiethnic Asian monarchies that unlike Macedonia or – rather differently – the Ptolemies in Egypt could not summon up loyalty by appeals to unifying national traditions, the personal charisma of the ruling monarch was an essential integrating element. This was traditionally gained in the first instance through military success. A good king was in the first instance a victorious king, who earned the support of his subjects by defeating their enemies and letting them participate in the fruits of victory. As a late source put it, perhaps reflecting contemporary third-century opinion, "kingship is an office that is not liable to community control ... neither nature nor right grant men in general kingships, but only those who are capable of leading an army and managing affairs of state sensibly, such as Philip and the successors of Alexander" (*Suda*, s.v. *Basileia*). In the last resort the power and acceptability of a king was directly related to his proven, or anticipated, success in war. He was therefore to a great extent dependent on his army, for defense, for aggression against external enemies, and for internal security. Given the extremely disparate ethnic elements of which the kingdom was composed, this was a particularly sensitive problem for the Seleukids.

Armies

Given the fundamental importance of the military factor, surprisingly little is known about the precise nature of the royal armies of this period, beyond the fact that paid professional service seems to have been prominent everywhere. We are dependent on a few literary accounts of the line-up for major battles to learn what manpower the Seleukids could raise in an extreme case. At Raphia in 217 the total battle army of Antiochos III comprised 62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 102 elephants (Polybios 5.79). This was broken down into major units of heavily armed infantry raised throughout the kingdom, including some 20,000 men called "Macedonians" and 10,000 Asians, with the addition of specialist troops – cavalry, archers, slingers –

recruited both from within and as mercenaries from without the kingdom. It is unlikely that this represents a standing army, since it was a special royal effort for the planned invasion of Egypt. Polybios' list, however, is one of the few pieces of evidence we have for the fact that in the third century a Seleukid army at war in the west called upon the Iranian elements of the empire, just as their Persian predecessors had done, and these men served in the infantry as trained Persian archers or as Median cavalry. The Iranians fought together with the westerners from Asia Minor, whether these were the sons of Macedonian settlers fighting in the phalanx, Lydian slingers, specially recruited regional units, or mercenaries from Greek cities in Europe, from Crete, from Thrace, or even from distant Illyria.

Each unit served under its own officers. In the case of the mercenaries these were probably the men who recruited them and negotiated their terms of service, but in general this principle of personal responsibility was as characteristic of the army as of other aspects of Seleukid state organization. The army command structure was personalized, named individuals being responsible for the units which they commanded and which bore their names – unlike, for example, the Romans of the empire, who merely numbered their legions and regularly changed their commanders. It was a system that was employed both by the Persians and by the Macedonians under Alexander, and was perhaps inevitable in a multiethnic army.

Apart from rare battle descriptions, our information for the formative years of the third century is restricted to Asia Minor, where the local dimensions of military activity were probably rather smaller, though war of some kind or other was virtually continuous on the mainland throughout the period. The central military factor was the permanent presence of the Galatians, who were either a threat to regional security or a ready source of expendable mercenaries – or both at the same time – to be fought against or to be hired, just as the immediate political situation demanded. The Bithynians were particularly prominent users of Galatian mercenaries for their repeated inner-dynastic struggles, Nikomedes I having the dubious honor of having encouraged them to come to Asia Minor in the first place; but Antiochos Hierax also had no hesitation in employing Galatians in the War of the Brothers, and Seleukos III was assassinated by a disloyal Galatian mercenary commander. In general, however, the Seleukid kings and the Pergamene rulers sought their military support in their own territories, viewing the Galatians as troublemakers and a permanent threat to their security. The standard procedure, once the initial threat from them had been reduced by Antiochos I, seems to have been to station troops as small garrisons at strategic places, from where they could serve to defend the country.

Mercenaries were mostly used for this purpose, the practice having the advantage that they could be hoped to be loyal to their royal paymaster (even if he raised the funds to pay them by levying the local population) and not show solidarity with dissatisfied elements of the local population whom they were supposed to guard and control. Two important documents from the third century illustrate some of the problems that the local stationing of mercenary troops might cause, one from Pergamon under Eumenes, the other from Smyrna under Seleukos II.

At some time, perhaps fairly soon after the death of Philetairos in 263, troops stationed in two frontier forts, Philetaireia and Attaleia, most of whom were professional regular soldiers, engaged in a wide-ranging dispute with Eumenes concerning their terms of service. When this was resolved, the agreement that was reached constituted a substantial document that was published on stone stelai set up in four prominent temple precincts in the region, including one at Pergamon, from where the text has been recovered. The dispute lasted for some four months, and at some stage a member of the ruling dynasty, Eumenes son of Attalos (not the ruler Eumenes), was involved in negotiations that involved his being pressured to swear an oath – the final agreement released him from its terms. The soldiers were concerned above all with their pay and allowances and general terms of service. Eumenes had provoked the crisis by wanting to introduce some changes to the contracts of service made by Philetairos, who had originally recruited the soldiers and subsequently in 269/8 granted them the generous privilege of tax freedom for their possessions, should they leave Pergamene service and move elsewhere. Eumenes was now forced to agree to restore the original conditions of service, at least in this respect, as well as to pay all money due for the contract period – pay seems to have been in arrears – and to regulate open questions concerning allowances and the whole future pay system. Once this was settled, the soldiers swore an extremely detailed oath of loyalty to Eumenes, and Eumenes in return swore an oath committing himself to uphold the agreement and to treat the troops fairly in the future. Among the units listed explicitly in his oath, to whom he made the promise, were some volunteer citizen units, who received no pay as regulars but had nevertheless shown solidarity with the professionals; in the end they also swore the same oath of loyalty to Eumenes, as the others had. This document is a fine illustration of the interdependence of the dynast and his troops during the build-up phase of the Pergamene kingdom. The soldiers were in it for the money, and their loyalty depended solely on regular payments and fair, indeed privileged, treatment at the hands of the paymaster. Without the troops Eumenes was nothing, but without Eumenes the

troops had no regular employment, therefore no pay, and in this document both sides recognized their interdependence (OGIS 266 = Austin² 230 = BD² 23).

The other example concerns Seleukos II and the city of Smyrna, and dates from the time of the Laodikean War, after 246. It also serves as an illustration of the symbiotic nature of the relationship of the Seleukid kings with the old Greek cities of Asia Minor at this time. Smyrna had cultivated the Seleukid rulers from the beginning, as a member of the Ionian League joining in honoring Antiochos I and his wife Stratonike with a cult (OGIS 222 = Austin² 169 = BD² 20) and organizing one of their own for the king with the epithet “Savior” (“*Soter*”) to commemorate his successful actions against the Galatians (OGIS 229 line 100); Smyrna also associated Stratonike with the local Aphrodite as “Aphrodite Stratonikis” (OGIS 228 = BD² 28). Antiochos II received a cult and festival there, the *Antiocheia* (Robert, *Ét. anat.* 90f.), and names of months were changed to honor the Seleukid dynasty, “Antiocheon,” “Stratonikeon,” and “Laodikeon” decorating the local calendar for centuries afterwards (Robert, *OMS* 2, 786f.). It is therefore not surprising that Smyrna, unlike neighboring Ephesos, immediately supported the sons of Laodike in the war against Berenike and Ptolemy III, and in due course received an appropriate reward for its loyalty.

The information about this is contained in three documents recorded at Smyrna in the 240s and engraved together on a stone which is now in Oxford. The substantive part of the documentation concerns the status of some Seleukid military units stationed at or near neighboring Magnesia under Sipylos and their integration into the civic body of Smyrna – in effect a *synoikismos*, such as earlier Macedonian kings, especially Antigonos and Lysimachos, had encouraged at several places in Asia Minor. The main differences are that the local authorities at Smyrna themselves did the negotiating here in the absence of the king, who was away in Syria, and that the main body of people involved in the citizenship deal were not themselves already citizens of Magnesia. Most of them were soldiers stationed in the area, explicitly “the military settlers (*katoikoi*) in Magnesia, the cavalry and soldiers in the city and those in the encampment and other inhabitants of Magnesia, insofar as they are free and Greek.” The new citizens were to be fully integrated into the city-state of Smyrna, which also allotted money from its own funds to help those wishing to build houses. Smyrna then took over responsibility for the security of Magnesia, sending its own officials to receive the keys of the fortifications “in order to keep the city loyal to King Seleukos.” At the head of the oath that the new citizens swore were the interests of King Seleukos: “I shall abide by the agreements

which I conclude with the people of Smyrna for all time; and I shall preserve the alliance and goodwill towards King Seleukos and the city of Smyrna; and I shall protect and preserve what I have received in charge from King Seleukos to the extent of my capability and shall restore it to King Seleukos; and I shall break no term of the agreement nor shall I change to the disadvantage of the partner any clause therein in any way or on any pretext whatever.”

Overlooked in the first negotiations was a group of soldier-settlers at a fortress called Old Magnesia (*Palaimagnesia*). Some of them had benefited from earlier tax-free land grants that were extended by Antiochos I, whereas others who joined the garrison later enjoyed no such privileges, and the disparity was causing dissatisfaction. Since the people of Smyrna saw it as being urgent that they also take over responsibility for the security of Old Magnesia, “in order that all interests of the state that concern King Seleukos shall remain secure for him,” they tried to iron out the disparity: they not only confirmed the tax freedom of the earlier land grants but promised those without land a cavalryman’s allotment – usually rather larger than an infantryman’s – from neighboring territory. Citizenship of Smyrna was also offered, which meant that, although the men were to continue living in Old Magnesia and occupying the fortress, they now served under a Smyrnaean commander. The new citizens included even a unit of Persian troops under the command of the Iranian Otanes. Smyrna then also undertook to negotiate about the future responsibility of the royal treasury for allowances that it had traditionally paid (*OGIS* 229 = Austin² 174 = BD² 29).

Kings and the old cities

There can be no doubt where the sympathies of Smyrna lay concerning the familial dispute in the House of Seleukos, no doubt also that they realized the critical importance of the troops stationed locally for the success of their king. The authorities at Smyrna and the people’s assembly that voted to accept the new soldier-citizens and their families clearly had no wish to become part of the Ptolemaic external empire. They saw it as the mutual interest of their city and of Seleukos, even in the absence of the king in Syria, to undertake considerable effort and to incur substantial expense in order to look after Seleukos’ security interests in the area; they themselves took the initiative in persuading the troops stationed at Magnesia to remain loyal to Seleukos rather than to Berenike’s son. In the first decree on the stone, which provides us with the reasoning behind their actions, the people of Smyrna refer to their excellent experience of Seleukos’ father and grandmother (for whom they had already created cults and

a festival), but also that Seleukos II himself, before setting off for Syria, had “confirmed for the People (*Demos*) its autonomy and democracy, and he wrote to the kings and the dynasts and the cities and the leagues, asking them to recognize the temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis as inviolable (*asylon*) and our city as sacred and inviolable (*hiera kai asyla*).” He did this because “he is generous in spirit and knows how to return thanks to those who benefited him” (lines 10–13).

In making his declaration, Seleukos was doubtless reacting to a request of the Smyrnaeans themselves that they supported with an oracle of Apollo. The model they were following may have been an earlier initiative of the Delphic Amphiktyons in the troubled 260s in central Greece, when they issued a declaration of this kind in favor of the shrine of Athena Itonia, near Koroneia in Boiotia (*CID* 4.38; Rigsby 1). Seleukos’ declaration was, in fact, the start of a whole series of such well-publicized declarations, and the first known to us that also included a city as well as a temple, but it was probably not unique: he perhaps issued a parallel declaration for similar reasons for Miletos at about the same time (see below). Very soon afterwards, the city of Kos, in this case without explicit royal support, launched a similar international campaign among the Greek states to ensure the safe status of its city and the famous temple of the healing god Asklepios (Rigsby 8–52). Such diplomatic campaigns began at a time of trouble – the Smyrnaeans say explicitly that they and their territory were oppressed by great dangers and enemy attacks just at the time when Seleukos rewarded their steadfastness by writing his famous open letter – and aimed to exert political and moral pressure on potential attackers and plunderers to refrain from violence. Clearly, the more influential states that could be won over to participate, the more effective such efforts would be. We happen to have one reply to the Smyrnaeans’ request – Seleukos’ letter was carried around and presented by Smyrnan envoys – from Delphi, where it was engraved on the temple wall for all visitors to see and imitate. The Delphians agree to the request “just as king Seleukos has written and as the city of Smyrna requests.” When the sacred envoys of Apollo (the *theoroi*) reached Smyrna to announce the next Pythian festival – probably that of 242 – they were instructed to praise king Seleukos for what he had done and for his piety in following the oracle of the god, and to offer a sacrifice to Aphrodite Stratonikis at Smyrna (*OGIS* 228 = Rigsby 7 = *BD²* 28).

This affair at Smyrna, which took place in a crisis situation for the king, illustrates how important it was for the effective functioning of the monarchies that the subordinate units, especially the major Greek cities, felt that their own interest was intimately involved with the fate

of “their” monarchy. Generous treatment and the creation of a feeling of mutual interest – even interdependence – was by far the best way to assure present and future loyalty. It was not always as easy as it seems to have been for Seleukos II at Smyrna, where his ancestors had also invested heavily in local goodwill and reaped appropriate thanks and long-term loyalty. The neighboring metropolis Ephesos, where Seleukos and Antiochos Hierax lived with their divorced mother Laodike until the death of Antiochos II, changed hands several times within a few years during the third century. When Lysimachos was killed at Koroupedion, his newly founded Arsinoe-Ephesos dropped its dynastic attachment on coming into Seleukid hands. The city then remained Seleukid until sometime after 266, when it became a Ptolemaic stronghold, but by the time of Laodike’s divorce in 253 it had been retaken by Antiochos, and Laodike could take up residence there. The support of the local commander, Sophron, for Berenike (and Ptolemy) after Antiochos’ death brought it once again into Ptolemaic hands, and thereafter it remained Ptolemaic for the rest of the century, serving as a major base in the area with a garrison and a strong naval presence (evidence in Bagnall 170–171). Given this series of relatively quick changes of possession, it will not be surprising that no evidence of real communal loyalty towards any of the kings is known from the city from this period, apart from its participation in honors for Antiochos I and his family in the 260s, voted by the Ionian League, of which Ephesos was a member at the time (*OGIS* 222 = Austin² 169 = BD² 20). For the latter part of the century Ephesos was simply an object to be won rather than an actively cooperating participant in royal affairs, such as Smyrna clearly was.

The varying fortunes of the great old cities of Asia Minor can be further illustrated by Miletos and the prominent internationally esteemed temple and oracle of Apollo at Didyma attached to it. The oracle was closed for more than a century after the city and temple were ransacked by Persian troops in 494, as punishment for the Milesians’ having taken the lead in the disastrous Ionian Revolt, and it only began prophesying again in 331 when the Macedonians under Alexander drove the Persians out of Asia Minor. Now in the 240s, at about the time that Seleukos II publicly announced his support for autonomy and democracy at Smyrna and declared the whole city there “sacred and inviolable,” he also wrote a letter to Miletos, which the recipients thought sufficiently important to engrave in the sanctuary at Didyma, where it was found in the nineteenth century. Seleukos emphasizes the benefits that his ancestors and especially his father Antiochos II had conferred on Miletos, “because of the oracles issuing from the shrine of Apollo at Didyma in your territory and because of our relationship to the god.” He goes on to praise the

Milesians for their long-term loyalty in responding to these favors granted, expressed most recently by the gift of a wreath of honor woven from the twigs of a holy tree growing in the sanctuary at Didyma and presented by two Milesian envoys (*OGIS* 227 = *RC* 22 = Austin² 175). The stone breaks off just where Seleukos announced his own special privileges for Miletos, but later documentation suggests that the parallel with Smyrna was fairly complete: like Smyrna, Miletos also continued to enjoy its democratic constitution and remained without garrison or other systematic royal interference, therefore “free,” for the next several decades. By the end of the century the Milesians claimed that their city and the temple at Didyma had for a long time been widely recognized as “sacred and inviolable” – doubtless since the time of Seleukos II (*Syll*³ 590).

The reasons Seleukos gives in his letter for his own favorable attitude to Miletos take us back to Seleukos I, the founder of the dynasty, who claimed the support of the oracle at Didyma for his kingship, and at some time even began to assert that his family actually descended from Apollo. After Ipsos Seleukos and his family started showing concrete interest in Didyma and in the Milesians’ wish to rebuild the temple, destroyed by the Persians in 494. With this wish they entered into competition with their neighbors at Ephesos, whose splendid new temple of Artemis was to provide an extravagant home for Apollo’s sister. As it happened, one of Seleukos I’s most successful generals, Damodamas, was a Milesian, and he took the lead in interesting the royal house in making concrete financial investments in the rebuilding program at Didyma. Seleukos, his wife Apama, and his son Antiochos all participated during the 290s, and two decrees honoring Apama and Antiochos with statues for their active financial participation in the building program were drafted by Demodamas himself and passed by the Milesians (*I.Didyma* 480 = Austin² 53; *OGIS* 213). A major contributory factor to Seleukos’ interest in Didyma was the finding of the famous sixth-century bronze cult statue at Ekbatana, where it had been brought by plundering Persians after 494. It may well have already been found when Alexander’s expedition reached the city, but it was Seleukos who chose to restore it to its original home, perhaps here also encouraged by Damodamas, who accompanied him on his great expedition into the Upper Satrapies (Pausanias 1.16.3). A little later, in 288/7, Seleukos made another major gift of gold and silver cultic vessels and other equipment to the temple (*OGIS* 214 = *RC* 5). The Milesians, who subsequently suffered severely under Lysimachos, will have greeted Seleukos’ victory at Koroupedion with relief. They demonstrated this by naming – not Seleukos himself, who was dead too soon to reap honors in Miletos – Antiochos I immediately as their most prestigious

annual official, the “Wreath-Bearer” (*Stephanephoros*), who gave his name to the year for 280/79 (*I.Milet* 1, 123 = Burstein 25).

During the disorder in Asia Minor after Koroupedion Miletos was taken by the Ptolemaic fleet and remained Ptolemaic for some twenty years. The Milesians immediately received a gift of land from Ptolemy II, perhaps that “near Miletos” previously in possession of Ptolemy I’s divorced wife Eurydike when her daughter married Demetrios Poliorketes (*RC* 14 line 3; Plutarch, *Demetrios* 46.3). The Ptolemaic presence, however, failed utterly to protect Didyma from the plundering Galatians in the 270s, who seized what they could find, including most of Seleukos’ recent gifts (*I.Didyma* 426). In the 260s Ptolemaic officials were still present, probably resident, at Miletos, and they included Ptolemy, Philadelphos’ son and planned successor, and the admiral Kallikrates of Samos, whose nearby island home had also been a Ptolemaic base since Koroupedion. A Milesian decree from the time describes a threatening war situation – attacks by land and sea, perhaps connected in some way with the Chremonidean War – that led to an extravagant declaration of loyalty by the Milesians to Ptolemy and his descendants “for all time,” which can hardly have been wholly sincere (*I.Milet*, 1, 139 = Austin² 259 = Burstein 95 = BD² 21). The political situation must indeed have been critical. A few years later Miletos, like Ephesos, was shaken by the revolt of Ptolemy “the son,” and at Miletos the Aitolian mercenary leader Timarchos took control until he was overthrown with the support of Antiochos II, who then duly received cult honors and the name “Theos,” “God,” from the grateful Milesians (Appian, *Syriake* 65). The restoration of their freedom from the severe Ptolemaic rule remained for the Milesians an epochal date that was long and proudly remembered. More than a century later the aristocratic priestess Chryso, a descendant of Hippomachos, son of Athe-naios, proudly named him as the man “who restored the freedom and democracy, taking it from the hands of King Antiochos Theos, with whom he was closely associated” (*OGIS* 226). Like Damodamas a generation before him, Hippomachos had used his influence at court in the interests of his home city. Both king and city had good reason to be satisfied with the coincidence of interests that freed Miletos, but also created such long-lasting enthusiasm for the freedom-bringer that voluntary loyalty lasted into the next generation of rulers, as the letter of Seleukos II shows, and well beyond.

How the Milesians reacted to the War of the Brothers, in which their patron Seleukos II was forced to abandon Asia Minor to Antiochos Hierax, we do not know, but documents dating to 234/3 and 229/8 show Miletos massively increasing its potential fighting population by granting citizenship to (probably) several thousand

persons from many different cities in Crete, who wished to emigrate. Perhaps they were mercenary soldiers, like those integrated into Smyrna a few years before. No royal interference is traceable, but the Milesians covered themselves morally by obtaining oracular support for their actions from Apollo at Didyma (*I.Milet* 36–38).

Royal foundations

The Seleukid kings of the third century were, as these examples show, in principle aware that generous treatment of the prestigious old cities of Asia Minor was the best way to keep control of them. But this was only one aspect of the relationship between the kings and their cities. A large number of cities were actually founded anew by the Seleukid kings and their competitors, many of them being given dynastic names, such as Antiocheia or Seleukeia, and they were mostly, but not exclusively, situated in areas where the Greek tradition of self-governing city-states was not well established, or indeed was altogether unknown. The interest of the kings in encouraging communities to govern, and therefore to tax, themselves is clear, given the limited educated manpower available for administration. A city that had a city council and unpaid officials recruited from the better-off members of the community was much easier to organize and control than a group of isolated villages living apart without any unified local governmental responsibility. It was also likely to be more prosperous, providing markets, law courts, and self-defense mechanisms, along with temples, theaters, educational institutions, games, and festivals of all kinds, which increased both the prosperity and the quality of life of the inhabitants. Such cities also contributed to the spread of the Greek language and thought-patterns throughout the huge areas governed by the Macedonian kings. The Greeks of the Hellenistic empires resembled modern English speakers in their reluctance to learn other languages – it was the world that had to change, that needed to learn to speak Greek, in order to accommodate the colonists and the royal administrations. So Greek indeed spread even wider without, however, ever wholly replacing the local indigenous languages, except perhaps in some parts of heavily populated coastal Asia Minor, where the indigenous languages in Karia and Lykia seem to have gradually disappeared. This, however, happened also to the regional Greek dialects under the pressure for uniformity, at least as far as the written language was concerned, in favor of the “common language,” the *koine*, of the colonists that gradually became the *lingua franca* of the whole eastern Mediterranean basin.

The most dramatic developments in this respect concern Iran and

other parts of the Seleukid Upper Satrapies where, following Alexander's lead, Seleukos I and his successors invested heavily in the urban infrastructure of Greek-style self-governing cities. Their aim was to extend Greek administrative practices to the heart of what had been the Persian empire, and the hope was raised of creating a tolerable sociopolitical environment in which western Greek settlers – soldiers, traders, and administrators – might feel reasonably at home and so provide a longer-term administrative continuity in these remote areas. Military settlers whom Alexander had left in these parts without adequate provision for their social needs had set off for home as soon as Alexander was dead! The most striking of the new Seleukid foundations was that at Ai Khanoum on the river Oxos (Amu Darya) in Baktria (near modern Kunduz in northern Afghanistan). Founded under Seleukos by one of his associates called Kineas as a major population center, and systematically built up by his successors, it is the best known of these distant communities because of systematic French excavations there. Before the city was overrun by nomads and abandoned in the later second century, the Greek architects employed by the Seleukids had equipped it with a Macedonian palace, stoai, and other public buildings such as a gymnasium and a theater; Greek funerary monuments with Greek inscriptions were found. Temples of course could not be forgotten, and they included a shrine for the formal founder of the city, Kineas, with an inscription recording maxims on good behavior that had been brought direct from Delphi by a third-century traveler called Klearchos, perhaps the well-known philosopher from Soloi in Cyprus (Robert, *OMS* 5, 516 = Austin² 186 = Burstein 49). Weapons, Greek fine and coarse pottery, and other small imported items were also found in large quantities, before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan stopped the excavation. The original Greek name of the city remains unknown (see Holt, *Thundering Zeus*, 37ff.). Other foundations in Baktria and Iran are known by name, though not always identifiable on the ground, and in due course even the old Persian capital Susa received a Greek name, Seleukeia “on the Eulaios,” with a Greek-style public administration based on a citizen assembly that passed its own decrees (Rigsby 111 line 108). This kind of development we can trace in detail rather better at the old Lydian capital Sardis in western Asia Minor.

To what extent this massive colonizing activity led to a significant level of population mixing, to anything we might like to term “Hellenizing,” is impossible to tell. If one may judge from Babylonia, where there is some evidence, at the upper levels of society a tendency is ascertainable to adopt Greek names; the best-known cases, however, are local elite citizens who achieved high posts in the royal administration, such as Anu-uballit, otherwise known as Nikarchos,

Seleukid governor of Uruk under Antiochos II (Boiy 282). A gradual adoption of Greek administrative practice – for instance, the use of papyrus written in Greek and Aramaic and the abandonment of clay tablets in cuneiform Akkadian is noticeable, but perhaps rather as part of an administrative modernization process associated with increasing efficiency within the kingdom rather than as a conscious cultural adoption. At many places, including Babylon, Greek troops were settled and Greek social institutions created for them, as at Ai Khanoum. But to what extent the indigenous populations participated, if at all, is quite uncertain. The Seleukid kings in the third century were certainly equally concerned to invest in indigenous temples in order to maintain their acceptance with the non-Greek populations, and there can be no question of any kind of cultural crusade to bring “Greek civilization” or “democracy” to the Upper Satrapies. Any transcultural flow – to some extent inevitable, if members of the local elites wished to maintain their traditional place serving their distant king – seems to have been strictly limited in its extent. The Greek and the indigenous populations will have largely lived side by side, as happened in most modern colonial societies, with only occasional cross-cultural transfers, and these perhaps mostly limited to superficial phenomena, such as taking fashionable foreign, i.e., Greek, names for children. It is, however, important to establish that the Seleukid kings continued to invest massively in their Iranian and trans-Iranian territories in the third century, and that this reflected a real wish to consolidate their power there and to exploit the economic potential of that rich but distant part of their empire. The fact that we possess far more detailed information about the older Greek-settled areas of the west should not be allowed to obscure this.

We have no detailed information about how new Seleukid cities were founded, even at the most basic level, for instance where the land came from that was distributed to the new settlers, or indeed where the settlers came from. We must simply assume that a great deal of royal domain land was taken over from the Persians, and that the Macedonian conquerors were therefore able to distribute it without worrying about offending previous owners. There is evidence that large estates could be and were privatized by Seleukid kings, in order to reward high officials or to pay off family members. The elder Achaïos, who was in some way related to Seleukos I, held estates in the middle Maiander valley in the 260s, not far from the place where a little later Antiochos II founded Laodikeia on the Lykos (*Chiron* 1975, 59–60, lines 24–25 = Austin² 168 = Burstein 19). Near Miletos Eurydike, Ptolemy I’s divorced wife, received estates that after Koroupedion were adjoined to Miletos by Ptolemy II (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 46.3; RC 14 line 3); in Babylonia Laodike, the divorced wife

of Antiochos II, received lands, probably as part of her divorce settlement, which she was able to distribute to the local communities, when seeking support during the Laodikean War (Boiy 145–146). In Hellespontine Phrygia at the time of her divorce Laodike was able to buy for a purely nominal sum a huge estate, estimated at 15,000 hectares, with all its villages and villagers, on condition that she join it for administrative purposes to one of the Greek cities in the area. This would have the effect of raising the theoretical tax base of the chosen city (we do not know which city she chose) and generally improve the regional land administration. The arrangement, since it concerned the transfer of royal land, had to be registered in the royal archive at Sardeis (*OGIS* 225 = *RC* 18–20 = Austin² 173 = Burstein 24 = BD² 25).

This type of transaction involving the privatization of domain land and thereby increasing the tax base of Greek cities seems to have been quite common in Asia Minor, since alone of the major monarchies the Seleukids, as main heirs to the Persians, were extremely rich in domain land. We have from Priene a series of documents dating probably from the 270s, in which the Seleukid official Larichos of Mytilene negotiated the conditions under which he would add a gift of land that he had received to Prienean territory (*I.Priene* 18). We know that the Mysian coastal town Pitane under Antiochos I bought up some royal lands for a large sum – 380 talents – doubtless at the time of the Galatian wars (*OGIS* 335); and a famous document from Ilion shows Antiochos I rewarding one of his officers, Aristodikides of neighboring Assos, with gifts of large estates in the area, which he then joined to Ilion on the understanding that, like Larichos in Priene, he would be granted local privileges responding to the benefactions he conferred on the city by choosing it as the administrator of his new lands (*OGIS* 221 = *RC* 10–12 = Austin² 164 = BD² 18).

In all these cases the motives of the donors or sellers will have been mixed. On the one level, the wish to please the immediate recipients of the lands, both the new private owners and the cities which received a new super-rich and highly influential citizen and – at least in principle, whatever the short-term taxation privileges may have been – a new taxpayer. At a deeper level, however, the kings were gradually altering the structure of landholding and strengthening existing urbanization, a process that ran parallel to the creation of new centrally sponsored foundations in areas where self-governing cities hardly existed. This was, of course, an important economic factor. A document from a new foundation of Ptolemy II, Arsinoe near Nagidos in Rough Kilikia, makes this factor abundantly clear. Some time after the foundation of the new city a dispute of some kind with neighboring Nagidos arose about the ownership of some of the land,

and once this had been sorted out by the Ptolemaic administrators, the local Ptolemaic officer Thraseas wrote to the new settlers of Arsinoe that, “since the Nagidians have delimited the territory, so that it is yours and no dispute remains, you will do well to work the land and plant all of it, so that you yourselves may enjoy prosperity and that the revenues which you contribute to the king may be more than those that were produced previously” (*SEG* 39, 1426 = Austin² 272). There is no reason to assume that the Seleukids in their own new foundations set different priorities.

The politics of gratitude

Cities in the Hellenistic monarchies in the third century, both new and old, had a dual purpose: to serve the interests of their citizens at the local level and of their kings within the kingdom as a whole. Naturally there was great variation in the perception of mutual interests, and the level of royal influence aimed at and achieved varied from time to time both geographically and according to the political strength of the royal administration in each area. In the third century the Ptolemies and the Pergamenes seem to have aimed at a greater level of control of the cities in their kingdoms, at least in Asia Minor, than did the Seleukid kings, though this impression may be false, being conditioned merely by the accident of survival of the limited documentation. Certainly Ptolemaic and Pergamene garrisons and local administrators and commanders are well attested in the third century, as documents from many, even quite small, places show. In the case of the Ptolemies this situation may, however, have been conditioned by the chequerboard nature of their scattered possessions, which always made a local presence desirable in order to uphold their interests. At the same time, however, despite the controlling presence of a garrison or local royal administration, there seems to have been little formal interference in the working of democratic institutions in the cities, where decrees proposed by an elected council and voted by an assembly of citizens were the most widespread expression of local political activity. On the whole, the kings respected these forms, knowing better than to ruin a functioning system that allowed subordinate communities the freedom to run their own affairs, while at the same time they could feel grateful for the protecting royal hand that allowed them to do so. Only at Pergamon, it seems, was the chief magistracy, the annual board of five generals (*strategoî*), already under Eumenes appointed by the monarch; on the other hand we know nothing about the organization of other residence cities at this time, such as Antioch or Alexandria, where the situation might well have been similar (*OGIS* 267 = Austin² 229 = BD² 80).

If the kings needed the cities and accordingly cultivated them with the provision of security, with gifts and attention to local sensitivities, the cities equally needed to cultivate good relations with “their” king, at levels beyond mere economic cooperation. The small Greek cities had always been ready to show thanks to outsiders who helped and supported them in one way or another – for whatever reason – with a publicly celebrated wreath of honor, or even a statue for particularly generous benefactors; but with the Macedonian conquest of Persia and the subsequent creation of the successor monarchies, a totally new dimension of power difference emerged between the cities and potential benefactors, each of which was able to hurt or help a Greek city in an existential way. From this time onwards, therefore, the Greek communities increasingly felt the need to find new ways of thanking their royal benefactors who, for instance, provided more or less effective protection against other dynasts without too much interference in the internal affairs of the communities, a situation that they liked to call “freedom and autonomy.” Since the only other powers that were even theoretically strong enough to equal this kind of existential support were the gods, it did not take long for city cults of the kings and dynasts, beginning with Alexander himself, to be created. These took various forms, but regularly included an annual sacrifice to commemorate the benefaction, which might take place at a special sanctuary in the context of a celebration of artistic or athletic competitions in honor of the benefactor and called by his name, such as *Alexandreia*, *Antiocheia*, *Ptolemaia*, etc. It was a regular joyful communal occasion, and the meat from the sacrifice would be divided up among the participants. By the beginning of the third century, this development was so well established that the writer and philosopher Euhemerios of Messene, who had spent time with Kassandros at Pella, could advance the theory that the old Greek gods were actually nothing more than humans, whose benefactions to men were so great that they had become gods (Diodoros 6.1.2).

This development was not restricted to Asia Minor – witness the reception of the “liberator” Demetrios Poliorketes at Athens in 307 – but was particularly widespread there, as a result of the enormous changes of status and power that the Asian cities had experienced since the Macedonian overthrow of the Persians. The continuing unrest caused by the wars of the successors, the Galatian invasion, and the subsequent struggles for supremacy among the emerging dynasties in the third century made an additional contribution to their feeling of inadequacy. This is not in itself surprising; nor is it surprising that the expectation of the kings and dynasts grew, that extravagant thanks for perceived benefactions came to be expected, to be regarded as normal, and that cultic institutions even began to be encouraged by the rulers,

both for their deceased predecessors and occasionally even for themselves. We cannot trace all the details of this development here, which may well have differed regionally. Egypt, as we shall see, was rather a special case which, however, did not prevent others from imitating aspects of what went on there. But in Asia Minor the tendency seems to have been home grown. When the Ionian League voted cultic honors for Antiochos I in the context of his successes in protecting the cities against the Galatians (*OGIS* 222 = Austin² 169 = BD² 20), or when Antiochos II received similar honors at Miletos after causing the deposition of the Aitolian tyrant Timarchos (Appian, *Syriake* 65), then genuine gratitude for the benefaction is obvious enough and easily comprehensible.

That kings, however, were something special and could simply achieve more, and therefore required greater and different forms of thanks than normal men received, is illustrated by the contrast with the much less prominent honors voted by one of the Ionian cities, Priene, for their own citizen Sotas, who at great personal risk successfully organized the defense of the city against the Galatians: he received the modest honors of a wreath of olive presented at the public celebration of the *Dionysia* and a long inscription set up at the temple of Athena in the city describing his achievements (now in Berlin) (*I.Priene* 17 = Burstein 17). The same difference in quality emerges from an inscription from Samos, from around 280 in Ptolemaic hands and practicing since then a city cult of Ptolemy I. Here in the 240s a rich citizen, Boulagoras, was honored for services rendered to his home city over a longer period. In particular Boulagoras had been a successful diplomat in the 250s on a delicate mission to Antiochos II, who after chasing the tyrant Timarchos from Miletos (and perhaps also from Samos) simply occupied Samian lands on the mainland in the area known as Anaia and granted them to some of his friends. Boulagoras pursued the king to Sardeis and persuaded him to give them back to their Samian owners. He also advanced money for an important mission to Alexandria – a whole talent – as well as on three occasions making a loan for buying grain in a food emergency; other less spectacular duties for the city were also listed in the catalogue of his achievements. For all this he had to be satisfied (and doubtless was satisfied) with being crowned with a golden wreath of honor when the tragedies were performed at the *Dionysia*, and that the text of the long decree listing his services be engraved on stone and set up in the temple precinct of Hera (*IG* XII 6, 1, 11 = Austin² 132 = BD² 76).

Pergamene rulers, even though not yet kings, were also richer and more splendid than normal men. When the Aiolian city Kyme appealed to Philetairos at Pergamon asking for help with supplies of


weapons from his factory at the time of the Galatian troubles in the 270s, Philetairos gave them as a present 600 shields. This was not the first time he had helped Kyme, since a thanksgiving festival called *Philetaireia* already existed there, as well as a shrine called the *Philetaireion* with a special “sacred house” in it. In this, in addition to any existing sacred equipment, a new exceptionally fine statue of Philetairos and a golden wreath of honor were now placed. Both of these decisions were publicly announced at the next festival of Dionysos, with which a more recent creation, the *Antiocheia* (a thanksgiving festival for Antiochos I), was now held at the same time (SEG 50, 1195; partial tr. in Austin² 226). A similar *Philetaireia* festival that continued to be celebrated for at least a century is known from Kyzikos, where Philetairos made a regular series of substantial gifts, including supplies at the time of the Galatian War (CIG 3660; OGIS 748 = Austin² 225 with Robert, *Ét. anat.* 199).

At Pergamon itself, where the dynasts, later called kings, were resident and therefore had a much greater and more immediate influence on the wishes and attitudes of the representatives of the city community, the first sign in the area of a state cult for a ruler in his lifetime is attested. Philetairos’ successor Eumenes requested the city authorities at some time before 241 to consider giving public thanks to the current five *strategoi* on their leaving office, as he himself intended to do. The people in assembly naturally thought this was an excellent idea and duly agreed in a resolution “to praise Eumenes because on every occasion he cares for the good of the *demos* and honors and crowns those citizens who join him in following this objective, because he wishes to make the officials appointed especially eager to take care of sacred and civic affairs. In order that the support of the *demos* for Eumenes be widely visible with regard to these men, the *demos* shall decree: to crown them at the *Panathenaia* with a gold wreath of honor on account of their excellence and their goodwill towards Eumenes and the *demos*; the annually appointed treasurers shall always grant them a sheep at the *Eumeneia* and they shall take it and sacrifice it for Eumenes the Benefactor (*Euergetes*), so that the gratitude of the *demos* may be clear to all” (OGIS 267 = Austin² 229 = BD² 80).

This text makes quite clear that in the residence city of the Pergamene dynast a personal cult of Eumenes the Benefactor, together with a named festival and a sacrificial altar, was already in place before Eumenes’ death (and, incidentally, before a Pergamene ruler had chosen to adopt the title “King”). Here the connection between ruler power and ruler cult is unmistakable, even though the decree is drafted in terms of a general thanksgiving. Eumenes obviously imposed his wishes on the assembly, which he seems to have

controlled at will, and received regular cultic attention from the citizens of his residence city in his lifetime. This was, in a sense, an extension of the sporadic Greek city thanksgiving cults for non-resident benefactors to the ever-present ruler, a practice that at this time we otherwise only know from Egypt, where the existing older tradition was, of course, quite different. But in Greek Asia Minor, Pergamon, where the citizen community of the residence city was dominated by the ruler's presence, showed the way, and in another generation the Seleukids were ready to follow.

Egypt



283/2	Death of Ptolemy I “Soter”; sole rule of Ptolemy II “Philadelphos”
ca. 281	Ptolemy II takes Samos
ca. 279	Ptolemy II takes Miletos
ca. 274	Ptolemy II marries Arsinoe II
270	Death of Arsinoe II
ca. 250	Death of Magas of Kyrene
246	Death of Ptolemy II “Philadelphos”; accession of Ptolemy III “Euergetes”; outbreak of Laodikean War
238	Kanopos Decree

I Founding Ptolemaic Rule

Ptolemaic forces had not participated in the epochal battle of Koroupedion, but a fleet commanded by the Phoinikian Philokles, king of Sidon, was present in the Aegean at the time, enjoying the political support of the League of the Islanders, which Ptolemy I had recently taken over from Demetrios Poliorketes. This meant that in the Aegean Ptolemy II Philadelphos was easily able to take advantage of Lysimachos’ defeat. He took control of Samos at this time (*Syll.*³ 390 = Austin² 256 = Burstein 92), and a couple of years later, while Antiochos I remained involved with consolidating his authority in his father’s empire, Miletos was also won as a base for the Ptolemaic Aegean fleet (*I.Milet* 123, lines 38–40 = Burstein 25). In the immediately following years Ptolemaic rule was extended or consolidated in coastal areas of south and southwest Asia Minor, even stretching into some inland areas in Karia and Lykia; and the by now traditionally good relations with the strategically situated islands Kos

(where Philadelphos had been born in 308) and Rhodes could easily be upheld. At the same time, while Antiochos I was involved with internal problems, Ptolemy made sure that his own hold on Koile Syria (the Lebanon and points south) would not be seriously challenged by his Seleukid neighbor. Cyprus and many places on the coast of Kilikia had long been Ptolemaic possessions and, despite Demetrios' efforts, had remained so.

Figure 7 Idealized coin portraits of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe II, on the reverse of Ptolemy I and Berenike I, all wearing the diadem; a commemoration gold coin issued by the Alexandrian mint after the death of Arsinoe in 270 as an affirmation of dynastic solidarity. Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



Kyrene was acquired by Ptolemy I in the first years after Alexander's death and, despite the adventurism of its military governor Ophellas in later years, remained Ptolemaic in the long term (Diodoros 18.19–21). Ophellas was not alone among the minor Macedonians in these years to entertain illusions of grandeur. He served Ptolemy loyally, it seems, after the conquest of Kyrene in 321, but in 309 he was tempted by the Syrakusan tyrant Agathokles to join him in attacking Carthage. For Ophellas, this involved a march of some 2,000 kilometers along the North African coast – no distance, of course, for someone who had been to India with Alexander! – which he undertook in autumn 308 with a mercenary troop that he had recruited in Greece. His adventure ended abruptly as soon as he arrived, when he was assassinated by his partner (Diodoros 20.40–42). Thereafter Kyrene, after a brief period from which we have no knowledge, was from about 300 onwards kept in the extended Ptolemaic family, being placed in the hands of Magas, a son of Berenike by her first Macedonian husband Philip, and therefore a maternal half-brother of Philadelphos.

Ptolemaic activities in Asia Minor and Syria are sufficiently visible in the years after Koroupedion to demonstrate that Ptolemy II was rich and powerful enough to follow up his perceived interests, whether economic or strategic, at relatively great distances from his Egyptian base. This all had to be paid for, and a war fleet was an expensive commodity, then as now, that almost certainly could not be financed merely from the contributions of those it claimed to protect, though evidence suggests that places where Ptolemaic garrisons or ships were stationed were expected to pay at least for the day-to-day running expenses of the “guests.” But in order to understand the dynamics of Ptolemaic foreign policy, it is essential to look briefly at their internal Egyptian affairs, since it was here that those financial resources were won which made the extravagant foreign policy possible in the first place. We shall return to the foreign possessions in section V of this chapter below.

The Macedonians’ attitude to Egypt was conditioned above all by the precedent of Alexander, who had learned in Asia Minor and Syria how unpopular in general Persian rule was and therefore had tried, with some initial successes, to present the Macedonians as freedom-bringers. In Egypt the basic situation when he arrived there was no different, and in stark contrast with the Persians Alexander treated Egyptian traditions and the Egyptian governing classes, especially the administrators and the priests, with respect, leaving the regional administration largely untouched in detail when he marched on in 331, though he placed it under the supervision of a locally born Greek, Kleomenes of Naukratis. Alexander was regarded as Pharaoh by the Egyptians and had presumably undergone some kind of crowning ceremony at Memphis, where he certainly made offerings to the royal god Apis in the temple of Ptah. He had also spectacularly made a respectful pilgrimage to the Siwah oasis, where he visited the temple of Amun (known to the Greeks as Ammon and closely identified with their Zeus). At some time during his time in Egypt, he had also chosen the site for a name-city on the coast, near the Egyptian settlement of Rhakotis. On all these occasions his companion Ptolemy was with him.

When Ptolemy returned to Egypt as “satrap” in 323, Alexander’s was the obvious model for him to follow. Kleomenes was immediately removed from office – allegedly for corruption and misuse of power, but whatever the real reason, there was simply no need to retain him, once a Macedonian ruler was permanently present in person – and Ptolemy and his friends began to settle in (Pausanias 1.6.3). The problems of adaptation to the Egyptian sociopolitical environment were, however, much greater for Ptolemy than they had been for Alexander, who after his initial immediate demonstration of sympathy

for things Egyptian had quickly moved on. In contrast, Ptolemy planned a long-term residence, and the European troops he had brought with him needed both pay and a long-term perspective for life after their military service, if they were to serve loyally and prove to be a stabilizing factor for the new regime, as well as a source of recruitment in coming generations. In the short term these troops successfully defended Egypt against Perdikkas' attack in 321/0, against Demetrios in 312, and against Demetrios and Antigonos in 306/5, after which Ptolemy joined his Macedonian competitors in taking the royal title. His victorious troops will have rejoiced with him – and demanded their rewards.

Precise information about how Ptolemy I coped with this problem has not survived, but if we look back from later times, it seems inevitable that the system of settling European troops on the land in their units, to serve both as garrison and farmers at the same time, that is well known from the time of the later Ptolemies, must have begun under Ptolemy I. It is a system that we have also seen operating in Asia Minor, and indeed its beginnings must go back to Philip II in Macedonia, who was the first Macedonian king we know of to settle newly won territories with loyal active troops. There must also have been then, as later, a Greek-speaking military administration in the areas where the troops were settled, in order to organize the settlements in the first place and to uphold their military character. These settlements will have acted as an internal security force, in case of opposition to the presence of the foreign conquerors. In the course of time, each of the forty Egyptian provinces (the “*nomes*”) received a Greek-speaking military commander (*strategos*) alongside the existing civilian administrator (at first the “*nomarchs*,” eventually replaced by Greek *oikonomoi*), but the build-up was probably gradual and related to the specific situation of the ruling elites in each nome. At the level of the civilian administration, few details are known from the earliest period, but it is unlikely that major changes of personnel were made. Certainly some traditional Egyptian elite families are explicitly known to have retained their influence and their posts in the nome administration (Lloyd, in Ogden, *Hellenistic World*), and there may well have been many such cases, since anything else would merely have been counterproductive. Ptolemy I desperately needed a functioning taxation system to provide pay for his troops and to finance his external wars and, despite his military dominance, he had no immediate prospect of creating a new one. To maintain in power the traditional Egyptian elite families in the nome administration was therefore financially essential in the short term, but was also a useful way of showing the Egyptian elites that in some important respects nothing much had changed since Alexander's death.

The other influential population group in Egypt was composed of the priests of the multifarious cults, whose temples owned large swathes of land throughout the country and locally exerted major economic and sociopolitical influence. It was therefore essential for Ptolemy to win them over and to tap into that source of wealth and local influence. To point a contrast with the unloved Persians – the political aim that Alexander had particularly emphasized – was clearly an important way of gaining popularity in these influential circles; and where the Persians had despised, or at best ignored, the Egyptian temples, the Macedonians began to cultivate them, even in distant Upper Egypt, where already under Alexander certain royally sponsored investments in religious buildings are known, from Luxor and from Karnak. This practice continued, and Ptolemy I, both as satrap in the name of the Macedonian kings Philip III and Alexander IV and then as king in his own right, sponsored temple buildings. A famous document dating from 311, the so-called “Stele of the Satrap,” records the satisfaction of the temple priests at Buto in the Nile delta. Ptolemy landed there on his return to Egypt after the successful battle of Gaza and immediately confirmed the local temple in its possession of certain lands, which one of the Persian kings, Xerxes or Artaxerxes, had confiscated. The priests proudly had the document engraved in stone: “I Ptolemy, the satrap, restore to Horus, the avenger of his father, the lord of Pe, and to Buto, the lady of Pe and Tep, the territory of Patanut, from this day forth and for ever, with all its villages, all its towns, all its inhabitants, all its fields, all its waters, all its oxen, all its birds, all its herds, and all things produced in it, as it was aforetime, together with what has been added since by the gift, made by the king, the lord of both lands, Khabbash, the ever living” (tr. Bevan, *House of Ptolemy*, 31). Ptolemy was clearly playing the Egyptian card. Given this basic attitude to things Egyptian, it could surprise nobody that in 304, when Ptolemy thought the time was ripe to adopt the royal title, just as his Macedonian competitors were doing, he also entered fully into the Egyptian tradition and arranged for himself to be crowned at the traditional ceremonial center Memphis as Pharaoh of Upper and Lower Egypt.

II New and Old

The legacy of Alexander in Egypt, however, also included a major Macedonian component and Ptolemy had no qualms about exploiting the charisma of the dead conqueror, whose mummified body he had captured at Damascus in 321 and in due course interred at the

Pharaonic capital Memphis. The new city of Alexander was chosen to be the center of government for the new Macedonian regime, and by the time the Stele of the Satrap was set up in November 311 Ptolemy had already taken up residence in the new city on the coast – perhaps even some years before this – and was quickly turning it into the governmental center of his new Egyptian kingdom. At some point Alexander's body was moved into a suitable building in his name-city. The new city, like Seleukeia on the Tigris in Babylonia for Seleukos, had many advantages for the new conquering dynasty, since like the dynasty itself it was new and untrammelled with longstanding existing habits, traditions, and myths that the conquering new ruler would almost inevitably have trampled on in an old city. Here in Alexandria the Ptolemaic dynasty could create its own traditions without seriously hurting anybody's sensibilities; and as far as the new Greek and Macedonian population was concerned, a Greek sociopolitical environment could be created from scratch without disturbing Egyptian sensibilities: the day-to-day massive confrontation of cultures that would have been inevitable, had Ptolemy built up a Greek central administration at (say) Memphis, could so be elegantly avoided, and with it the political tensions that it might cause. A parallel city structure for Upper Egypt, where Thebes had traditionally dominated political and social life, was created for the Greek settlers and administrators at Ptolemais. The site chosen, somewhat further north than Thebes, was doubtless, like Alexandria, intended to avoid unnecessary local provocation. Together with the old Greek settlement at Naukratis in the delta, the three cities remained the only Greek-style *poleis* in Egypt in the third century.

Ptolemy I's sensitive handling of the Egyptian elites (while retaining overall control in the hand of the royal administration, to which in the last resort all officials had to report), was a policy that was passed on and further developed by his son and successor Ptolemy II Philadelphos, who formally ruled in association with his father from 285/4, then alone from 282. One of the major internal problems that had emerged by then concerned the long-term accommodation of Greek immigrants in a fundamentally agricultural economy, where not much land was available for redistribution (despite the theory that all land belonged to the Pharaoh), without seriously offending existing cultivators. Part of the solution was found in a program of land reclamation in the Fayum, an enormous depression where a huge lake (lake Moeris) offered opportunities for extensive water engineering. Here a large quantity of good agricultural land was recovered from the desert fringes through a complex system of water control and redistribution, involving the Nile flood, the lake, and an expensive system of dikes and sluices. The land so won was used for settling new

farmers (including military men), and this enormous long-term project dominated the middle years of the century, and seems to have been particularly forced along by Ptolemy Philadelphos.

By the time Ptolemy I died in winter 283/2 it must have become clear both to the Egyptians and to the recent immigrants that the Ptolemies, despite their Macedonian origins and Macedonia-oriented foreign policy, were there to stay, that Egypt was no longer – if it had ever been – merely regarded as an economic springboard for a return to Macedonia, and that foreign policy, even aggressive foreign policy, was in the last resort defensive. From the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphos onwards we are better able to examine the internal structure of the government in Ptolemaic Egypt, thanks to the ever-increasing numbers of papyrus documents that have survived from this period. They come in particular from places on the edge of the deserts that were brought under cultivation by the Ptolemaic administration, thanks to their vigorous irrigation program. These were places which centuries later returned to desert conditions when the centrally directed irrigation system broke down, thus creating the dry conditions required to preserve over centuries documents written on papyrus. The aim of the Ptolemaic administration in these areas was twofold: to accommodate new immigrant farmers, including soldiers for internal security purposes, but also in general to increase the amount of taxable land under cultivation, so that the revenues of the central government be increased. Egypt was poor in many raw materials – good building timber was particularly scarce – but thanks to the annual Nile flood and the fertile sediments it spread over the land, it was extremely rich in agricultural potential, and by the time of Ptolemy II measures were being taken to optimize this traditional source of wealth. Not only was new land brought under cultivation, but new crops were also being tried out, especially by the Greek immigrants in the Fayum, who were anxious to cultivate plants that they knew from home. We are quite well informed about this kind of development in the 250s and 240s, since a large private archive of the correspondence of Zenon, a Greek from Kaunos in Karia, has survived. In these years Zenon was chief administrator of a “Gift Estate” (*dorea*) that Philadelphos had granted his chief minister (the *dioiketes*), Apollonios, to develop and exploit, situated near the Fayum new town Philadelphia. In Egypt such gift estates, similar in nature to those we have already met in Macedonia and Asia Minor, were granted merely for the lifetime of the recipient, so that in the long term the central administration also had a lively interest in their development and prosperity. Zenon was very active in Apollonios’ interest, also exploiting the high position of his employer to pull rank with the minor bureaucrats in the area, in order to increase the revenues of the

estate, but also by supervising closely the farmers working on it and making sure that the irrigation system was maintained and functioned optimally.

In the Ptolemaic administrative system the lowest formally organized unit was the village (*kome*), where the village secretary (*komogrammateus*) was responsible for keeping detailed records for taxation purposes of the land under cultivation and of other taxable commodities. He was responsible to his superior at the level of the nome, the nomarch, the *strategos* or the financial administrator, the *oikonomos*, or in some cases, as in the Fayum, to intermediate district officials; and they in turn were held responsible by the central government in Alexandria, the head of which was the *dioiketes*. Within this broad pyramidal administrative framework, a horde of specialist officials operated, who were largely concerned with security and with taxation, the collection of some of which was farmed out to private capitalists – whose activities, however, also had to be controlled by the bureaucracy – in all their multifarious facets. In most respects the Ptolemaic administration merely took over a functioning system that in principle had existed for centuries, the major changes being in the language of the administration, where Greek now became predominant for official documentation, and in the place of the seat of the government.

In detail, of course, many changes were made in the interests of efficiency or for particular purposes, such as when Ptolemy II Philadelphos introduced detailed rules establishing a state-controlled monopoly of vegetable oil production, distribution, and sale, or new regulations, the so-called Revenue Laws, concerning the tax of one-sixth of the production on wine (the *apomoira*), in order to finance the cult of his deceased sister-wife Arsinoe II in the Egyptian temples (Bingen, *P. Revenue Laws*; selection in *SP* 203 (text) = Austin² 296, 297 = Burstein 94 = BD² 114). Under the Ptolemies almost everything seems to have been taxed: there was certainly no area of economic activity where royal officials did not in some way assert central government financial interests, no person or institution, including the temples, which did not pay some kind of tax or rent on their lands, animals, or in connection with other economic activities. This massive state interference was not, in principle, new, and it is clear from the surviving documentation that local variations in method, efficiency, and willingness of the population to cooperate existed within the corporate structure of what was now indisputably Ptolemaic Egypt. The overall aim nevertheless remained firm, to squeeze as much income as possible from the peasants and workers in all areas of (mostly) agricultural production – but some areas of manufacturing, such as textiles, were also especially favored by close

governmental attention. The system aimed at the same time to satisfy the Egyptian and Greek elites through the provision of jobs in the royal administration, or through gifts of land which pleased the recipients and at the same time increased production and taxation potential. Major investment in the area of traditional religion was aimed at winning the Egyptians, and city-style infra-structural improvements were intended to satisfy the many Greeks who were living outside the few cities.

With Ptolemy II Philadelphos we meet the first Ptolemy who made really massive investments in temple-building in Egypt, so setting a trend that continued until the end of the dynasty and marked the ever-increasing intensity of the symbiosis of the traditional religious establishment in Egypt and the interests of the ruling Macedonian kings. Particular attention was paid at this time to distant Upper Egypt, where the king in person – purely for geographic reasons – could visit only extremely rarely. Here Ptolemy II and Ptolemy III instituted a massive building program at the Isis sanctuary at Philai, near modern Aswan, which was largely financed by the attribution of the tax income from the area immediately south of the first cataract known as the “Twelve Mile Land” (*Dodekaschoinos*). Also at Elephantine and at Karnak new buildings were erected in these years; at Edfu the largest temple of the whole Ptolemaic period (which still stands) was begun in 237 under Ptolemy III to honor Horus, while the cult centers of the delta were by no means neglected (details in Hölbl).

Among the immigrant population on the land the absence of that classic Greek educational institution, the gymnasium, was clearly felt to be a serious deficiency to their quality of life, but private initiatives among the troops settled on the land in the delta and the Fayum, where European settlers were most numerous, began to fill the gap with the active encouragement of the governmental authorities. A text from the Fayum village of Samareia illustrates this well. A private gymnasium was founded there by one Apollodoros, an energetic regimental commander from Nagidos in Kilikia, who with his men had been allotted land in or near the village. The building he put up at private expense he dedicated to Ptolemy Philadelphos – perhaps there had been a public subsidy – but after Apollodoros’ death the buildings became dilapidated. When his heirs wished to refurbish it, they had to obtain permission to conduct the repairs from the nome *strategos*, since a subsidiary building had to be pulled down in the course of the work (*P.Entreuxis* 8 = Austin² 318). Here we see direct government interest in encouraging, but also in bureaucratically controlling, private investment initiatives in the infrastructure of Greek-style education. This is also nicely illustrated by a government regulation of Philadelphos (*P.Hal.* 1.260–265 = BD² 124) exempting from the salt

tax, which otherwise everybody had to pay, teachers of Greek reading and writing, and instructors in physical training; but victors at certain named Greek-style festivals and games – the *Alexandreia*, the *Basileia*, and the *Ptolemaieia* – also received the same privilege. A long inscription concerning the *Basileia* of March 267 BC, perhaps originating in the Fayum or at Memphis, lists the winners of various competitive events with their places of origin: Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly, Boiotia, and Tarentum in Italy represent Europe; Halikarnassos and Samos are Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean: only one man of Egyptian origin won a prize, and he was a Greek from Naukratis (*SEG* 27, 1114 = Austin² 294).

III Alexandria and Ptolemais

Parallel to the investment in the Greek cultural infrastructure of the country districts, where significant numbers of Greek immigrants were settled, ran the development of Alexandria and Ptolemais. By the end of the reign of Philadelphos in 246 an association of “Dionysian Artists,” professional participants in Greek-style competitive festivals, had one of its bases at Ptolemais and was, according to its constitution, concerned primarily with celebrating the cults of Dionysos and of the currently ruling royal couple, Philadelphos and Arsinoe II under their official cultic name “Sibling-Loving Gods” (*Theoi Philadelphoi*). A decree, which their assembly voted in honor of a local functionary, Lysimachos son of Ptolemaios, was followed by a list of participants at the meeting, arranged according to their artistic specialties: there were tragic, comic, and epic poets, singers, dancers and musicians, actors, producers, and wardrobe personnel (*OGIS* 51 = Le Guen, *TE* 61). In Alexandria the city expanded massively in the third century, although the first surviving detailed description of it occurs in the *Geography* of Strabo, written shortly after the end of the Ptolemaic period (Strabo 17.1.6–10 = Austin² 292). It is, however, certain that the third century was a boom period for Alexandria, as for the rest of Ptolemaic Egypt. By the time of Philadelphos the harbor had become so important that one of the richest courtiers, Sostratos of Knidos, had the famous lighthouse, the Pharos, built at his own expense as an aid to navigation. Sostratos was a well-known figure in the Aegean area, whence he originated and where in the early 270s he received a grant of citizenship “in all the islands” for his help given to the League of the Islanders and their representatives when they came to Alexandria to conduct business with the king (*OGIS* 67 = Durrbach 21). Honors for him from Kaunos, Kyrene, and Delos were also

published and engraved at Delos (OGIS 68 = Durrbach 23; Durrbach 22, 24), while at Delphi he received a range of privileges as “Honorary Representative and Benefactor” (*proxenos kai euergetes*) (OGIS 66). There is a report that Sostratos was actually the architect of the Pharos, but given his other activities that is very improbable.

The city’s life was certainly dominated by the harbor, with its docks and warehouses, and of course the Pharos, and then the palace area that included the new scientific academy, the Mouseion, which had a publicly funded staff of researchers and an associated working library, later to become famous as the largest in the world. But the normal city infrastructure was also built out, with an agora, market halls, and porticoes, a theater, several gymnasia and a stadion, as well as major cult sites for the public exercise of politicized religion, such as the tomb of Alexander, the huge temple of Sarapis dedicated by Ptolemy III, the *Arsinoeion* built for Arsinoe II after her death in 270, as well as temples of the traditional gods of the Greek pantheon. It is clear that the main population group that the city aimed to cater for was the Greek-speaking immigrants, but they were being offered something special, a unique combination of elements that they could not find elsewhere, though its basic structure remained familiar. It was also not long before a significant Jewish population, living in its own quarter, developed, which together with the local Egyptian environment very soon helped create in the city an extremely cosmopolitan social atmosphere and, among other things, led in due course to the translation into Greek of the holy books of the Jews for the Greek-speaking Jews of Alexandria (the so-called Septuagint, so-named after the seventy translators who were alleged to have participated in the work). The characteristic position of Alexandria as a kind of foreign body attached to but not wholly integrated into Egypt is illustrated by the name by which it was known throughout antiquity, “Alexandria near Egypt,” not “Alexandria in Egypt.”

In the third century the Ptolemies took major steps to integrate themselves as rulers into both the Greek and the Egyptian sociocultural environments in which they lived. For the Egyptians the Pharaoh was the man who represented the divine element that conquered chaos and so created and continued to preserve the basic order that human society requires. According to this theory, all authority, also in the sphere of religion, therefore originated with the Pharaoh. Since the Ptolemies, in contrast with Alexander, were not only Pharaohs but also resident in Egypt, they were virtually compelled to take on the traditional Pharaonic role, visiting Egyptian temples and performing such standard ritual acts as their office demanded. For the Greeks, Alexander, as founder of Alexandria, could and did receive cultic honors after his death as founder of the city, but

this cult alone was too diffuse, too Greek traditional, and not sufficiently reflective of the rule of the current rulers to satisfy Ptolemy I, who therefore in 290/89 founded another official dynastic cult of Alexander, this time with an annually appointed priest. This man always belonged to the Greek elite, and his name was now attached to the calendaric definition of his year – annual priests defined the year in several Macedonian cities, so the practice was well enough known. As a result, the new Alexander cult in Alexandria became a mechanism for binding the immigrant elite into the monarchic system by giving them a high-profile social interest in maintaining it. When Ptolemy I died, he was himself soon granted official cultic honors by his son and successor with the cult title “Soter” (“Savior”), a title which he may already have acquired among some of the Greeks after his help for Rhodes during the famous siege by Demetrios Poliorketes. This title now became the official titlature in Egypt for the founder of the dynasty. At the same time, a penteteric festival for him, taking place like the Olympic Games every four years, was instituted by Philadelphos and known as the *Ptolemaieia*. For this a diplomatic campaign was launched throughout the Greek world, urging its recognition as equivalent to the Olympic Games (which meant that those cities accepting the idea committed themselves to rewarding the winners of the competitions in Alexandria out of their own funds, in the same way as if they had won at Olympia; this could be quite expensive, if many citizens were successful). We know for certain that members of the Ptolemaic empire in Greece were put under pressure to accept the new festival: representatives of the League of the Islanders met at Samos when summoned by the Ptolemaic commander Philokles, king of Sidon, and the Boiotian Bacchon, the “Nesiarch” (chief officer of the League), and they passed a decree binding their members to agree to Ptolemy’s request. The little island states, however, also agreed to join forces and share the sizable costs of sending official representatives (*theoroi*) to Alexandria – only three men would travel each time to represent the whole League – and of the sacrifice they would be expected to perform at the festival on behalf of the League (Syll.³ 390 = Austin² 256 = Burstein 92).

At one of the first celebrations of the new festival, perhaps even the first ever, a phenomenally extravagant series of carnival-like processions was organized to impress the visitors and the local population with the might and wealth of the Ptolemaic state. The Rhodian Kallixeinos, who lived in the second century BC, wrote a detailed description of the event in his book “On Alexandria,” which was followed several centuries later by Athenaios, whose work has survived and preserves a partial description (*FgrHist* 627 = Athenaios

5, 197C–203B = Austin² 258). The wealth and extravagance of the Ptolemaic state also attracted poets to Alexandria, hoping for lucrative royal patronage, among them the Syrakusan Theokritos, who had already tried for success in his home city at the newly established court of Hieron. Sometime during the 270s he turned up in Alexandria and composed an enkômion on Ptolemy Philadelphos and Arsinoë which still survives. Since Theokritos could not afford to risk expressing sentiments that he thought would not help him, the basic mood of his poem will reflect the official line; it therefore gives us an impression of how the royal couple in the second Ptolemaic generation wished to be presented to the Greek elite at this time – only the elite come into question as audience for the pretentious poem, which nobody else could have comprehended! As a true representative of the Greek educational tradition it inevitably has lots of Homeric echoes, but in its main part it is a fairly concrete panegyric of Ptolemaic imperialism and the successes of the new regime in holding onto Egypt and the outside territories. As a statement of the mental image that the Ptolemaic court wished to present to the Greek and Macedonian world in the 270s, Theokritos' poem is a unique piece of evidence and deserves a longer quotation, since it also propagates the current Macedonian royal ideology of the descent of the Ptolemaic dynasty from Zeus:

Zeus son of Kronos cares for august kings, but preeminent is the one whom Zeus has loved from the moment of his birth. Prosperity attends him in abundance, and vast is the territory he rules, and vast the sea.

Countless countries and countless nations, helped by the rain of Zeus, cause their crops to grow, but none is as productive as the lowlands of Egypt when the flooding Nile waters and breaks up the soil, nor does any have as many towns of men skilled in work ... over all these mighty Ptolemy rules as king. In addition he takes for himself a part of Phoinikia, Arabia, Syria, Libya, and the dark-skinned Ethiopians. He gives orders to all the Pamphylians, to the Kilikian spearmen, to the Lykians and the warlike Karians and to the islands of the Kyklades, since his are the finest ships that sail the seas.... In wealth he could outweigh all the kings, so great are the riches that come daily from everywhere to his opulent home; his people go about their business in security. No enemy by land has crossed the teeming Nile to raise the battle cry in villages that are not his nor has he leaped in arms onto the shore from a swift ship with hostile intent to seize the herds of Egypt. So great is the man who reigns over the broad plains, fair-haired Ptolemy, a skilled spearman, who as a good king cares

deeply for the preservation of his paternal inheritance and adds to it himself. (Selection from Theokritos 17, after Austin² 255)

We do not know how much Theokritos earned with his panegyric, but since it is the only one of its kind included in his collected works it seems he was not asked for another. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly captures the spirit of the times in Alexandria with its baroque pride in wealth and empire.

IV Ruler Cult

After the deaths of Lysimachos and Ptolemy Keraunos, Philadelphos' charismatic sister Arsinoe, who had been married to each of them in turn, arrived in Egypt from Macedonia, seeking refuge from the advancing power of Antigonos Gonatas. Philadelphos soon came under her influence, and around 274 he even made her his wife, although she was his full sister, and rejected his first wife who had already borne him children (also an Arsinoe, daughter of Lysimachos and Antipater's daughter Nikaia). She is henceforth known to historians as Arsinoe II. Sibling marriage was not a normal Macedonian or Greek practice, and even in tolerant cosmopolitan Alexandria eyebrows were raised (though only among the Greeks, since such marriages were not unknown in Egypt). For the Ptolemaic dynasty, however, it was the first of many such marriages, as the kings gradually freed themselves from the current Macedonian practice, whereby the Macedonian dynasts almost always took a wife from one of the other Macedonian dynasties. It was also the first time that a Ptolemaic queen acquired not only formal prominence in court protocol but actual influence on affairs of state, so picking up a Macedonian tradition personified by Olympias and Eurydike, but also setting a precedent for later ambitious Ptolemaic queens. Moreover, this first Ptolemaic sibling marriage was also a step towards creating a sacral position for the ruling royal couple. Since Ptolemy I Soter already propagated the idea that his family descended directly from Zeus, through his son Herakles, just as the Macedonian Argeads had done, it was easy enough for Philadelphos to justify his sibling marriage by pointing to the heavenly relationship of Zeus and Hera, who as children of Kronos were at the same time siblings and husband and wife. Theokritos, in his enkomion on Philadelphos, was happy enough to versify this Olympian parallel to please the royal couple (Theokritos 17, 128–134). From there it was only a relatively small step to creating a cult of the still living "Sibling-Loving Gods" (*Theoi Philadelphoi*) and attach it for ritual purposes to the existing cult of the

dead Alexander. When Arsinoe died in 270, her cult was officially encouraged throughout Egypt – not just for the European immigrants – and its spread was stimulated by the provision of state financing through the tax known as the *apomoira*, one-sixth on the produce of vineyards. This meant that Arsinoe II entered all Egyptian temples as a kind of guest of the chief god of each temple (*synnaos*), a procedure that was not wholly unprecedented in Egyptian cult practice. At the same time, some temples were built specially for Arsinoe alone, including a particularly spectacular one in Alexandria, where she also received her own annual priestess, the “Basket Carrier” (*Kanephoros*), who was always an upper-class young Greek woman. Her temple, the *Arsinoeion*, was decorated with a spectacular obelisk brought in from Helioupolis. The newly won land in the Fayum was also organized around this time as a new nome under the name “Arsinoites,” where the name-giving Arsinoe II served as chief nome goddess both for Egyptians and for Greeks.

Figure 8 Idealized coin portrait of Arsinoe II on an unusually large commemoration coin (*dekadrachmon*), issued at Alexandria after her death in 270. Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



When Philadelphos himself died in 246, the religious symbiosis he aimed to achieve was established as a loyalty system for at least the elites of the Greek and Egyptian populations, centering on the officially propagated series of cults both of the living and of the dead rulers. It was, however, developing in quite a different way from the purely Greek city thanksgiving cults known from the areas ruled by the other Macedonian monarchies. Under Ptolemy III Euergetes and Berenike this development went still a stage further. A major document, of which seven engraved copies, three of them virtually complete, still survive, shows how the new extension of the royal cult practice was put into effect. It perhaps also sheds light on the mechanisms employed by Philadelphos to institute his new royal cults, which are not known in detail. This document, the “Kanopos Decree,” named after the place near Alexandria where it was written and agreed, is a decree of a meeting of priestly representatives from all parts of Egypt on the occasion of the birthday of Ptolemy III in March 238. It is cast in the standard form and language of a Greek city-state decree, but was also published on the same stones in translations both into “Sacred Letters” (i.e., hieroglyphs) and into the standard Egyptian written language (demotic). Such synods of priests were apparently by this time annual events, though they did not always meet at the same place – we do not know when the practice began – and were concerned with all matters associated with the cults: it was a habit which in due course was taken up by the Christian Church and is practiced still today. On this occasion two main decisions were taken and published throughout Egypt, engraved imperishably on bronze tablets or stone stelai that were set up in all the important temples of the land. One concerned the new organization of the cult of King Ptolemy and Queen Berenike as “Benefactor Gods” (*Theoi Euergetai*) – a title they already used in Greek cult. In all the major Egyptian temples the priests were to add this title to their own official title (i.e., from now on they were all, for example, “Priest [or Priestess] of Isis and the *Theoi Euergetai*”) and this title was always to be used in business transactions and engraved into the official rings worn by the priests. Moreover, all priestly personnel who had taken office since Ptolemy III came to the throne in 246 were to be reorganized in a special new priestly “division” (*phyle*) that was to have equal rights of representation with each of the existing four “divisions”; specific rules for cult rituals were also laid down. The details are so precise and complex that the whole affair can only have been carefully planned in advance. It was doubtless arranged by the royal authorities in negotiation with representatives of the priests, since the reform of the royal cult also went hand in hand with a reform of the sacred calendar. From now onwards the five (or in every fourth year six)

extra days which were added to the Egyptian year of 360 days (12 months each of 30 days) in order to accommodate the solar year, were for the first time to be added regularly at a fixed time at the end of the year. In order to ensure that they were nowhere forgotten, they were to be instituted as festival days for the cult of the *Theoi Euergetai*. Unforeseen, however, was the death of the child princess Berenike, the daughter of the royal couple, while the synod of priests was in session, so that special arrangements for a cult of the princess had to be improvised at short notice. The priests seem to have managed this with bravura (OGIS 56 = Austin² 271 = BD² 164).

The reasons why the assembled priestly representatives of the temples were prepared to add these especial honors for the ruling couple to the already existing royal cult were listed at the beginning of the decree. Apart from his general goodwill and generosity towards the temples, Ptolemy Euergetes was praised for restoring temple property plundered by the Persians and for defeating his enemies – a reflection of the Laodikean War which had just ended in 242. At much greater length, emphasis is laid on his more recent attention to the needs of the people and the temples at a time when the Nile flood was so disastrously low that much land remained uncultivable and a serious famine threatened – an exceptional catastrophe in a land that usually produced a huge surplus for export. In this situation the royal couple, forgetting the needs of their exchequer, imported grain at great expense “from Syria and Phoinikia and Cyprus and several other places,” thereby leaving “an immortal benefaction and the greatest possible memorial of their goodness to present and future generations” (lines 11–20).

The economic crisis gave Ptolemy III a great chance to prove his practical worth to the priests and the population in general by adequately filling the traditional Pharaonic role of overcoming chaos and creating order in a very concrete way that everybody immediately noticed and appreciated. His religious advisers at court obviously knew how to exploit this achievement in order to drive ahead the acceptance of the dynasty within the traditional structures of the Egyptian religious establishment, so that the symbiosis of political and religious power and its public representation would become ever clearer throughout Egypt for all temple visitors to see. It was no accident that only a year later Ptolemy personally inaugurated the erection of the gigantic Horus temple at Edfu in Upper Egypt, where the personal presence of the monarch – for geographic reasons – was much rarer than in Lower Egypt. At Alexandria Ptolemy III also began to build the great temple of Sarapis, who as the god Osarapis of Memphis had been introduced to Alexandria by Soter, but up to now had occupied more modest quarters.

V External Possessions

Three explicitly named areas from which Ptolemy imported grain were integral parts of the Ptolemaic external empire. This had been built up by Ptolemy I largely for strategic reasons – both economic and military – in order to protect Egypt from invasion, but also to be able to exploit the shipbuilding timber and other raw materials that Egypt itself did not have from Lebanon, Cyprus, and the Taurus region of Kilikia, and so to create the navy that Theokritos proudly mentioned in his poem. This provided a more distant defense mechanism against any potential Antigonid aggression in the Aegean area, or beyond, in cooperation with the Seleukids. Holding distant places meant, of course, incurring expenses and implied some form of organization and administration, since they were certainly expected at least to cover their costs, if not to turn a profit. In Ptolemaic Phoinikia and Syria the form of administration closely resembled that of Egypt itself. “Koile Syria” south of the river Eleutheros and Phoinikia had been Ptolemaic since the defeat of Antigonos at Ipsos in 301. The later Seleukids were reluctant to accept this status quo, which Seleukos Nikator had tolerated after Ipsos, and three “Syrian Wars” were fought with Antiochos I, Antiochos II, and Seleukos II during the reigns of Philadelphos and Euergetes. The most spectacular was the “Laodikean War” 246–242 in which Ptolemy III even captured Seleukeia in Pieria (which remained a Ptolemaic exclave until after his death in 221) and invaded Mesopotamia. The disputed area nevertheless remained Ptolemaic throughout the middle years of the third century (see chapter 6 above).

As in Egypt itself, soldiers were stationed at strategic locations in Ptolemaic Syria, sometimes being given land-lots (*kleroi*), just as some senior officials were given larger estates, like the *doreai* in Egypt itself, though in one known case, that of the general and high priest Ptolemaios at Skythopolis, the grant seems to have been inheritable, as was usual in the other Macedonian kingdoms outside Egypt (*SEG* 29, 1613). The whole area was broken up for administrative purposes into provinces, called “hyparchies,” parallel to the Egyptian nomes, with both military and civilian administrators, whereby the civilian official (called *oikonomos*, as in Egypt) had responsibility also for finances and taxation. As in Egypt the lowest administrative level was the village, where the local taxation register was made and kept up to date. The old Phoinikian cities on the coast retained some level of independent local administrations within the Ptolemaic system. Significant advantages for the elites could emerge from cooperation with the Ptolemaic government: Philokles, king of Sidon, for instance, became an important man in Ptolemaic service as admiral in the

Aegean in the 280s, where traders from his city had traveled and done business for centuries (Syll.³ 390 = Austin² 256 = Burstein 92 = BD² 73). The cities will nevertheless have been expected to contribute financially to their security. On the land outside the territories belonging to the cities, taxes were farmed out to local men, who in this way were bound into the sociopolitical system by being enabled to make personal profits while serving Ptolemaic interests. The most prominent example is that of Joseph, son of Tobias from Jerusalem, known from Josephos (*Jewish Antiquities* 12.154f.). Private economic activities of Greeks from Alexandria benefited from the legal and political cover granted by the Ptolemaic colonial system, as we know from the Zenon archive. It is therefore not surprising that some examples of local Phoinikian participation in Greek-style cultural activities, especially athletics, are known. As early as the 270s young men from Sidon and Byblos won prizes at a boxing competition on Delos – perhaps they were there in connection with Philokles' naval activities in the area; a man from Tyre dedicated two elephant tusks to Apollo on Delos at about the same time (*IG* XI 2, 203, 68–70). A couple of generations later a rich Sidonian with a Greek name, Diotimos son of Dionysios, but occupying the official position of Sufet in the city, was honored at Sidon with a Greek inscription that included an epigram in verse celebrating his victory in the chariot race at the Nemean Games in Greece (Moretti, *Inscr.ag.gr.* 41 = Austin² 140 = Burstein 34). The long Ptolemaic presence in the area obviously favored the spread of the Greek language, knowledge of which soon became widespread, and at least some of the local elites saw clear advantages in participating in Greek social and cultural activities.

Cyprus, also named as a source of imported grain by the priests at Kanopos, was an island with many ancient Greek and Phoinikian cities when it finally became indisputably Ptolemaic after Ipsos (an earlier Ptolemaic presence, under Menelaos, Ptolemy Soter's brother, had been ejected by Demetrios Poliorketes at the battle of Salamis in 306). In the third century the evidence suggests that the cities, all or most of which received Ptolemaic garrisons, remained the backbone of the Ptolemaic imperial system, though controlled by the garrisons and perhaps supervised by a civilian financial administration run by an *oikono-mos*, who will also have been responsible for exploiting the timber and metal mines of the island, as well as for taxing the agricultural production (Bagnall 38ff.).

The third strategic area relatively close to Egypt and controlled by the Ptolemies was Kyrene, where Greeks had settled already in the sixth century and which Ptolemy I had seized and reorganized when he came to Egypt in 323. His aim was doubtless to prevent another

Macedonian competitor from taking it (see *SEG* 9, 1 = Austin² 29). After Ipsos Kyrene was entrusted to Soter's step-son Magas. We know nothing of Magas' early years, but he presumably placed garrisons in the cities and made arrangements to exploit the economic potential of the area. At some time after the death of Ptolemy Soter, Magas, having married Apama, a daughter of Antiochos I, challenged Philadelphos for Egypt and took the royal title; but his challenge was defeated, though some arrangement was made that allowed "King Magas" to continue ruling in Kyrene until his death around 250, while Kyrene officially remained a Ptolemaic province. This ambiguous status emerges from a treaty – a mutual defense pact – which Magas made with the Cretan commune of the Oreioi at some time unknown. In this document Magas uses the royal title, while his territory is explicitly described as a province (*eparchia*) (*StV* 3, 468). The text nevertheless shows that Magas regarded himself as independently responsible for the security of Kyrene.

When Magas' daughter Berenike married Ptolemy III Euergetes after Magas' death (despite attempts by her Seleukid mother to prevent this), Kyrene finally returned to Ptolemaic direct control. The next years witnessed the takeover of the cities by the dynasty: the harbor town Barke became Ptolemais, a new harbor near modern Benghazi was named Berenike, and yet another new city, perhaps only a renaming of the existing city of Taucheira as Arsinoe, completed the dynastic program. The new cities, together with the main city of Kyrene itself, were encouraged to form a League (*koinon*), and this was even allowed to issue its own coins. There were doubtless soldiers and governors present, as well as a system of taxation in operation, but there is no evidence on these until later times (see Bagnall 25ff.).

Outside these areas Ptolemaic external possessions were scattered outposts in southern Asia Minor and the Aegean area, some of which, such as Ephesos and Miletos, changed hands fairly frequently. Their main purpose, as we have seen, was to provide bases for the fleet and for political agitation in the spheres of influence of the Seleukid and Antigonid kings, both in Asia Minor and in Europe, so that none of them seriously developed the idea of repeating Anti-gonos' and Demetrios' direct attack on Egypt. They also provided the Ptolemaic kings with taxation income, but perhaps equally important was access to skilled Greek personnel for their administration and cultural activities, as well as officers for the army and navy. Also important was their function in upholding the Ptolemaic claim to be a force to be reckoned with in the concert of third-century Macedonian great powers – an intangible but important source of prestige and self-esteem, which was addressed by Theokritos in his panegyric poem.

These external possessions also required an organization, but

although certain military and financial officials (*strategoi* and *oikonomoi*) with regional responsibilities are known at various times in the third century, such as a *strat-egos* and an *oikonomos* of Karia (P.Cair.Zen. 59341 = BD² 68) or a *strategos* of the Hellespontine and Thracian regions under Euergetes (Syll.³ 502 = Austin² 269), from whose presence alone we can infer widespread garrisons and a taxation system, detailed knowledge is fragmentary. Nonetheless it is clear that Ptolemaic officials had few qualms about interfering in the internal affairs of the cities they ruled, particularly where a garrison was present and troops needed to be quartered and supplied at local expense. Here clashes between the local city authorities and the regional representative of the royal administration were programmed into the system, and several documents illustrate these tensions and their effects on the local citizenry. The accommodation and supply of troops, whether standing garrisons or temporary residents, was a permanent bone of contention with the citizens of the occupied cities (RC 30 = Austin² 279 [Soloi]; BD² 68 [Kalynda]). A text dating from 248 shows a local businessman trying to use his influence with the central authorities in Alexandria in order to pressure the local city administration in Karian Kalynda to fulfill certain financial obligations (BD² 68). In some areas new settlements were encouraged, despite local opposition, as at Arsinoe near Nagidos in Kilikia (SEG 39, 1426 = Austin² 272), or small old towns were brought together under pressure from the royal government in a *synoikismos* – this, of course, not just a Ptolemaic inclination – as known from Chalketor in Karia (Marek in *Chiron* 12, 1984, 119f.).

The Ptolemaic administration could, of course, also be genuinely helpful, as when Hippomedon, the local *strategos*, helped out at Samothrake at a time of famine (Syll.³ 502 = Austin² 269), or the various commanders in the Aegean area who offered assistance against other (Macedonian) oppressors, such as Kallias at Athens in the early 280s (SEG 28, 60 = Austin² 55 = Burstein 55), or a Cretan officer from Rhaukos (whose name is lost), commander of the garrison of Thera, who was involved in defending the island and its inhabitants from attacks by pirates (IG XI 1, 1291). The governors of Peloponnesian Methana also helped and subsidized Aratos and the Achaian League in the 240s (see above, chapter 5). Many of these men received honorary decrees from local communities, with or without statues, thanking them for their support, doubtless in many cases entirely genuine in the concrete situation, though some may well be routine, merely meeting the expectation of the governors. This is perhaps the case at Itanos in eastern Crete, where the Ptolemaic commander Patroklos received local citizenship, but where a Ptolemaic garrison existed for decades afterwards (I.Cret. III 4, 2–3),

or at Delos, the center and official meeting place of the League of the Islanders, where during the third century while the League was under Ptolemaic influence, the city or the League members regularly voted the expected honors for Ptolemaic commanders, the “Nesiarch” or other Ptolemaic officials (Durrbach 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26). In general, the evidence for the government of the Ptolemaic external possessions in the third century suggests that the Ptolemaic kings tried to rule more directly and with a rather heavier hand, as they were accustomed to do in Egypt itself, than did their Macedonian competitors in the area, though this impression may be merely a result of the selective survival of evidence.

Part III

THE CHALLENGE OF ROME

The historian Polybios, whose *Histories* record the rise of Rome to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean basin, chose the year 220 to begin the main part of his work. In his view, events in the Mediterranean area which until that time had developed largely separately in the different regions began to interconnect and eventually – with the Roman dominance that was largely achieved by the middle of the second century BC– were so interlinked that their history became a single story. This process he called *symploke*, “interweaving.” When Polybios wrote his work in the years after 168 he had the advantage of already knowing approximately what the *symploke* would look like in its finished form, and he wrote in particular to try to explain it to his Greek contemporaries, many of whom were stunned at the speed with which their world had changed within two generations and experienced great difficulty in coming to terms with Rome’s newly acquired dominance.

Contemporaries living at the time when Polybios thought the process had begun had, of course, no inkling of how their world was about to change, and therefore went on living much as before. Rulers and statesmen in the eastern Mediterranean region therefore continued to run their affairs according to the practice and criteria that had developed during the last century. Structurally the three major Macedonian monarchies – the Antigonids in Europe, the Seleukids in Asia, and the Ptolemies in Egypt – continued to define the range within which political and social developments in the region took place. Rome did not impinge on all three powers with the same weight at the same time. The process was gradual, but accelerated quickly. It could not fail to be influenced by the existential struggle with the Carthaginians, led by Hannibal, that occupied Rome in Italy and Iberia, as well as by the reaction of the eastern powers to these events. But it was also a fact that after Rome’s defeat of Hannibal was completed in 201, many longer-standing structures and mentalities no longer fitted so well into the new Mediterranean world, shaken and altered as it was by this generation-long conflict. The war with

Hannibal changed Roman attitudes not just to Carthage but to the whole world around them, and created a situation in which Roman aristocrats, never lacking in self-confidence, began to take an active interest in trans-Adriatic events, whether or not they still saw serious danger lurking there. Up to this time, the Hellenistic powers seem to have thought themselves not much affected by what was going on in Italy. Even the First Punic War (264–241), which ejected Carthage from Sicily, had left the dominant Greek power on the island, the Syracusan monarchy, intact as a friend and ally of Rome. Viewed from a safe distance, from Alexandria, Antioch, or even Pella, it must have seemed that Syracuse had actually done rather well out of its cooperation with Rome in that war. During and especially after the Hannibalic war that perception changed. The eastern powers were compelled to take the increasingly self-assertive, indeed aggressive, Roman awareness of the Hellenistic world seriously and develop suitable reactions to it – not least because during the war, thanks to an unforgivable failure to respect Roman interests by the new young king at Syracuse, Hieronymos, at a time of desperate danger for Rome, the monarchy there had been abolished, the city taken by storm and plundered. Its territory was confiscated and most of it incorporated into the Roman province of Sicily.

In 220 this was still in the future, and each of the three major monarchies was immediately concerned with its own problems. All three had quite unexpectedly recently had to cope with a change of regime, Antigonos Doson, Seleukos III, and Ptolemy III all dying within the space of two years, and the new kings, Philip V in Macedonia, Antiochos III in the Seleukid empire, and Ptolemy IV “Philopator” in Egypt, were all young and inexperienced, at first each having to find and then assert his own specific role within the sociopolitical fabric of advisers and courtiers, military commanders and administrators, created by his predecessor. Each also inherited a by now traditional agenda specific to the grown interests of his dynasty, following more or less effectively the lines of policy and attitudes to the world around them laid down over the last generations. For this reason it will be convenient, following Polybios’ own model, in these chapters to continue to treat each area separately, noting however in the course of time the increasing interdependence of their action radius and the contribution made by Roman interventions to that finally inextricable interweaving that Polybios called *symploke*.

Clouds in the West

325 300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25	
223	Accession of Antiochos III
222-220	Rebellion of Molon in Media
222/1	Death of Ptolemy III and Antigonos Doson; accession of Ptolemy IV and Philip V
221	Death of Kleomenes III in Alexandria
219	Antiochos III recovers Seleukeia; outbreak of “Fourth Syrian War”; “Second Illyrian War”; outbreak of “Social War”
217	Battle of Raphia; peace of Naupaktos; [battle of Trasimene]
216	Antiochos attacks Achaïos; [battle of Cannae]
214/13	Siege and capture of Sardeis; death of Achaïos; outbreak of “First Macedonian War”
212	Antiochos III in Armenia; Philip V takes Lissos
211	Aitolian alliance with Rome
ca. 210	Antiochos III at Ekbatana; Attalos of Pergamon takes Aigina
208–206	Siege of Baktra
206	Aitolian peace with Philip V
205	Antiochos III in Babylon; Peace of Phoinike

I Egypt

Ptolemy IV “Philopator” (“Father-Loving”) succeeded his father as a twenty-year-old during the winter 222/1. His grooming for the succession proved to be inadequate and the succession itself was not unchallenged, since his mother Berenike favored her younger son Magas, and the deceased Ptolemy III “Euergetes” also had a brother, Lysimachos, whom some courtiers favored. The man who pushed through Philopator’s succession was a prominent court official, an Alexandrian called Sosibios, son of Dioskorides, who had enjoyed

Euergetes' favor and even been priest of Alexander in 235/4, after serving earlier in the Aegean area (*IG XI 4*, 649 = Durrbach 44). Sosibios turned out to be a ruthless minister, once he got the chance to prove himself, within a short time arranging the deaths of Lysimachos, Magas, and Berenike herself and so catapulting himself into a position of such influence with the young king that he remained virtually unchallenged as long as Philopator lived (until 204). Associated with Sosibios at the head of affairs in Alexandria were members of an immigrant family from Samos, children of Oinante who had been mistress of Euergetes and whose daughter Agathokleia served the same function for Philopator. Her son, Agathokles, had also been brought up at court together with Philopator – rumors of a sexual relationship were in circulation – and on Philopator's succession Agathokles rose to be highly influential in affairs of state, as a direct result of his longstanding personal friendship with the king.

Sosibios and, to a lesser extent, Agathokles were the effective governors of Ptolemaic Egypt throughout the reign of Philopator, Sosibios offering a guarantee of continuity with the policies of Euergetes, despite the disinclination of the young monarch for active interest in affairs of state. He preferred – as several ancient sources independently, and scathingly, report – private pleasures to public duties (e.g., Polybios 5.34; 14.11–12; Justin 30.1–2.5). It was the first time that such an unpolitical and basically unsuitable person occupied the throne of one of the Macedonian monarchies but, given the well-established structure of the Egyptian court and administrative bureaucracy, it was no disaster. It might, in fact, have been very much worse if this Ptolemy had insisted – like his contemporaries in Syria and Macedonia – on exercising his nominal right to direct public affairs, instead of entrusting the day-to-day running of the state to his advisers. He was ready enough to do his duty of stabilizing the dynasty in power by quickly marrying his young sister Arsinoe (now known to historians as Arsinoe III) and so monopolizing all remaining potential figureheads of dynastic significance, just as his father and his grandfather had done. This turned out to be an adequate contribution.

The basic elements of policy were therefore marked by continuity with the by now well-established traditions of the Ptolemaic state. Unprecedented situations, which indeed occurred, required ad hoc decisions, but these were taken as far as possible within the framework of established policies. As far as we can tell, no major initiatives were developed, such dynamic elements as there were coming as a result of pressure from outside. One foreign policy decision, however, needed taking urgently. A few months before Euergetes' death the Spartan king Kleomenes, who had enjoyed Ptolemaic subsidies as long as he kept Antigonos Doson engaged in

Greece, was comprehensively defeated at Sellasia and fled with a group of friends and associates, accompanied by their families, to Alexandria, where they were initially received as honored guests. What Euergetes would have done with Kleomenes in the longer term, had he lived, we cannot tell, but for Sosibios in 221 Kleomenes was simply an embarrassment, since Euergetes' expensive policy of subsidizing anti-Antigonid elements in the Peloponnese and central Greece had clearly failed. There could be no question of irritating the homeland Macedonians further, where the young Philip V had just taken over from his uncle Antigonos Doson, and the possibility of a less aggressive and less expensive stance needed to be explored. Circumstances beyond his control were therefore creating in Alexandria the appearance that Kleomenes had become a dangerous guest, particularly since many of the mercenaries forming the Alexandrian garrison had been recruited in the Peloponnese and actually admired him for what he had achieved at home. Kleomenes and his Spartan associates were therefore put under house arrest to prevent further contact with the garrison. As a result of this, their uncertain future began to seem so bleak – they knew by then what had happened to the royal opponents of Philopator – that they made a breakout from their comfortable prison and tried to encourage Alexandrians passing by in the street to join them in a spontaneous putsch against the regime of Sosibios in the name of “freedom.” The well-fed Alexandrians looked at them as if they had come from another planet, and the Spartans saw no way out except through suicide. Female Spartan exiles, who had not participated in the putsch, were nevertheless put to death by the Alexandrian authorities (Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 33f.; Polybios 5.35f.). For Sosibios these judicial murders marked the end of Euergetes' Peloponnesian adventures.

Much more serious was the situation in Palestine and Syria. While Euergetes still lived Antiochos III, shortly after his succession in 223, launched an attack on Ptolemaic Syria, but had to break it off in order to deal with the rebellion of Molon, his senior commander in Media. Ptolemy still controlled Seleukeia in Pieria, the main harbor of Antioch, that Euergetes had taken during the Laodikeian War, and this was without doubt a severe disadvantage for Antiochos. When he returned in 220 from suppressing Molon in Mesopotamia, he immediately launched a successful attack on Seleukeia and took it by storm (219). The Ptolemaic commander in Syria, an Aitolian mercenary officer called Theodotos, already felt his position endangered by Sosibios' machinations at court in Alexandria and in 219, after losing Seleukeia, offered to hand over to Antiochos the southern Phoinikian port cities of Ptolemais and Tyros (Polybios 5.58–62). This was the start-signal for the “Fourth Syrian War” that dragged

on until 217. Fortunately for the Ptolemaic administration, there was no spontaneous movement in the cities of southern Syria and Palestine to welcome the Seleukid invaders who, despite the support of the Aitolian commander Theodotos, now serving Antiochos in the same function as he had served Ptolemy, had to advance city by city, everywhere struggling to overcome local resistance. This procedure was so laborious that despite taking Gaza Antiochos made no attempt on Egypt itself. Negotiations, however, proved fruitless, though they did give Sosibios time to recruit more mercenaries from Greece and – a new step for the Ptolemies, forced on them by the emergency – to train native Egyptian troops to fight in the phalanx in the Macedonian way. That this development was Sosibios' own idea seems proved by the fact that he was their commander in the field when the armies joined battle near Raphia, south of Gaza, in early summer 217. For this expedition Sosibios had persuaded the lethargic Philopator to (formally) lead the expedition personally and to show himself to the troops – his sister-wife Arsinoe was also there to support him – and the presence of their Pharaoh gave the Egyptian troops such a psychological boost that in the end the Ptolemaic troops won the battle and so secured Ptolemaic hold on what they called “Koile Syria” for Philopator's lifetime. The peace terms that Sosibios personally negotiated allowed Antiochos to retain Seleukeia. For Euergetes in 245, winning and holding Seleukeia had been a matter of personal and dynastic prestige; for Sosibios in 217, it was merely an expensive extravagance that he was probably glad to see go, as long as Antiochos agreed to the by now traditional division of Syrian territory at the river Eleutheros (Polybios 5.62–71; 79–87).

The crisis in Syria was provoked by Antiochos, but Sosibios and his associates mastered it in the end. The measures they took to respond to the threat, however, had repercussions on the internal stability of the Ptolemaic state, which at about the same time was suffering losses in the far south from the expansion of the Nubian kingdom. This now controlled the Nile valley as far north as Philai (Aswan). More important in the short term, however, was dissatisfaction expressed by the returning Egyptian native troops who, fighting in the phalanx for their Pharaoh, had made a major contribution to Ptolemy's success at Raphia. Polybios comments that they thought that with a suitable leader they could now set themselves up as a state within the state, which did indeed happen not long afterwards (Polybios 5.107). “Not long afterwards” in fact amounted to some ten years, after which we do have some evidence for an independent native Egyptian Pharaoh called Herwennefer based on Thebes, but whose influence extended at least as far north as Abydos in middle Egypt. Polybios also mentions a savage guerrilla-type war fought during Ptolemy IV's reign, though he

does not say when it began, only that it was brutal though unspectacular – no big battle took place (Polybios 14.12.4–5). An important document dating from the time of his successor, Ptolemy V, optimistically called “Epiphanes,” “the Renowned,” refers to attacks on temples in the delta region, and this suggests that the rebels were active there and regarded the priests as enemies because they supported the Ptolemaic regime that from the beginning had always made efforts to woo them (the “Rosetta Stone”: OGIS 90 = Austin² 283 = Burstein 103 = BD² 165).

This internal regional conflict – in the south doubtless supported by the Nubian kings – thus carried on beyond the death of Philopator in 204, and is the first important sign we have that all was not well with the Ptolemaic system of government in Egypt. In the light of later developments, it becomes clear that Ptolemy IV was the last of the dynasty to be able to rule with relative ease over his inherited kingdom according to the traditions of his ancestors, both inside and outside Egypt. The pressures on the financial and military system created by the Syrian crisis, despite the military success at Raphia that the Egyptian priests in one of their long decrees suitably celebrated in traditional terms (the “Raphia decree” = Austin² 276 = Bevan, *House of Ptolemy*, appendix), were sufficient to cause such extreme social tensions within the country as the century-old Ptolemaic government had not yet experienced. Ptolemy III had begun major temple-building projects, particularly in southern Egypt, in order to maintain the loyalty of the influential priestly classes, and this massive construction activity, despite the budgetary pressures caused by the Syrian war, continued to be funded under Philopator. In 206, however, at the most spectacular of Euergetes’ building projects, the gigantic Horus temple at Edfu, work was broken off because of local disturbances and the general insecurity associated with the rebellion of Herwennefer. When Philopator died in 204, he left his child successor, Ptolemy V “Epiphanes,” serious problems in this connection that occupied the first two decades of a long reign. We shall return to them in chapter 12 below (for more details see Hölbl).

Ptolemy IV was the last of the Ptolemies to play a major independent role in the power politics of the Aegean area. He inherited along with Cyprus and Koile Syria a string of bases on the southern and western coasts of Asia Minor – most important were perhaps Samos and Ephesos – stretching as far north as the coast of Thrace, where Ainos and Maroneia were Ptolemaic bases, as well as in the islands, though the Island League seems to have ceased to function. Excellent relations were upheld with the big independent islands Rhodes and Kos, and Ptolemaic garrisons at Thera and Itanos in eastern Crete ensured safe passage for Ptolemaic ships in the

southern Aegean; friendly contacts with other Cretan cities gave Egypt access to a good source of mercenary troops, in case of need.

Euergetes' policies in mainland Greece, facilitated by his naval base at Methana, had brought him friendly contacts with many of the neighbors, above all with the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, but also after 229/8 with Athens, once the city freed itself from direct Macedonian control. By the time of his death, however, direct commitments in the Peloponnese had been reduced to granting asylum to Kleomenes when he fled Sparta after Sellasia in 222. The chief strategic aim of all this activity was always to maintain a presence and assert the prestige required of a major global player in the world of the Macedonian monarchies, in order – in the last resort – to prevent either the Antigonid or the Seleukid king's being sufficiently strong to seriously endanger the interests of Ptolemaic Egypt. The successful short-term recruitment of mercenary soldiers and officers in Greece – especially in Crete, the Peloponnese, and Aitolia – for the Syrian war illustrates the advantages of the policy in practice.

Despite these unchanging basic interests, Sosibios and Agathokles adopted a less aggressive stance in the Aegean area, particularly after the Syrian war was won. During the war itself, they had asked friendly Greek states – Rhodes, Byzantion, and Kyzikos – to try to mediate the dispute with Antiochos (Polybios 5.63.4–7), and mediators from these states duly came to Egypt and talked to both parties without, however, coming to any satisfactory solution of the problem. From 219 onwards in mainland Greece war raged between the Aitolian League and Doson's Security Pact, now led by Philip V, and in 218 here too Rhodes, accompanied by representatives of Aitolia-friendly Chios, tried to mediate, but Philip showed no interest in peace. In summer 217 the Rhodians tried again, this time accompanied by Byzantion and representatives of Ptolemy – this must have been shortly after Raphia – and in this instance circumstances were favorable for peace, terms of which were agreed at a conference meeting at Naupaktos later in the summer. It is not clear why the Egyptians saw advantage in Philip's making peace. Peace would inevitably free him to develop activities elsewhere, and Ptolemaic interests could well be negatively affected – in Thrace, for instance. More important than these political dangers from Macedonia, however, was probably the maintenance of good relations with Aitolia – an important source of mercenaries – and the wish to demonstrate solidarity with the non-belligerent Greek states. They clearly saw danger for themselves, perhaps especially for their commercial interests, in the continuing war and the resultant instability in Greece. The mediators might well have been surprised at their success, since

they could not have foreseen the result of an ongoing power struggle at the Macedonian court. This brought Demetrios of Pharos to the fore precisely at this time, and his recommendation that Philip stop fighting Aitolia in order to engage in the Adriatic and take advantage of Roman defeats by Hannibal convinced Philip to try this new policy (the news of the battle of Trasimene reached Greece just when the peace negotiations began [on this in more detail see section III, pp. 181–4, below]).

Eight years later, war again raged in southern and central Greece between the Aitolians and Philip's allies, but this time Roman contingents supported the Aitolians (the "First Macedonian War"). The same group of non-belligerents, joined variously by Athens, Mytilene, or by Amynder of Athamania – Egypt was again acting basically in the Aitolian interest – met up with the warring parties several times, starting in 209, but it was 206 before peace was made between Aitolia and Philip and still another year before the Romans withdrew (the "Peace of Phoinike": see below, section III). Once again, it is difficult to know what Sosibios thought he stood to gain by the peace initiative, apart from showing solidarity with Aitolia and the concerned non-belligerents. It would doubtless have given the wrong signal, if Egypt had not participated in efforts to find a diplomatic solution; but the peace treaty that left Philip free to develop interests elsewhere, while the unexpected death of Philopator in 204 created political turmoil in Alexandria, proved to be a total disaster for the Ptolemaic position in the Aegean basin. Under the prevailing conditions, it allowed, indeed virtually encouraged, that fatal strategic cooperation between the rival Macedonian dynasties, the Antigonids and the Seleukids, that it had been the primary aim of Ptolemaic policy for more than a century to prevent. In the first instance this Aegean development had little to do with the war to the death being fought out in Italy, Spain, and Africa between Rome and Carthage, in which Egypt from the wings endeavored to maintain a Rome-friendly neutrality, but at the lowest possible level of contact. The devastating events at Syracuse in 212 resulting from choice of the new young king, Hieronymos, to support Carthage against Rome, must have shocked the Egyptians, since under his predecessor, Rome's friend Hieron, Syracuse had kept up fairly close friendly contacts with Alexandria. Nevertheless, it was not western events that conditioned the next dynamic phase of the relations of the three Macedonian monarchies, but inherent continuities in the struggle between them: in an important sense, the last phase of the century-old struggle for supremacy in the world created by the Macedonians of Alexander the Great was just beginning. To comprehend this fully we now need to consider the Seleukids.

II Seleukid Asia

When Seleukos III was assassinated in 223 while on campaign against Attalos of Pergamon, his army tried to persuade his uncle Achaïos, an experienced man with family estates in Asia Minor who was accompanying the expedition, to become king himself. Achaïos refused in favor of Seleukos' younger brother, Antiochos. Now aged around twenty, Antiochos was currently occupying the traditional position of the Seleukid second in command as ruler of the Upper Satrapies, based at Seleukeia on the Tigris. Here he was gaining administrative experience and making contacts in the important eastern parts of the kingdom. Antiochos accepted the challenge (and is henceforth known to us as Antiochos III), but was inevitably at first wholly dependent on his advisers and helpers, of whom the most influential at court at Antioch was the chief minister (*epi ton pragmaton*), the Karian Hermeias. The two main regional commands, in Asia Minor and in the Upper Satrapies, were given to Achaïos and Molon respectively. Molon combined with his general command the function of satrap of Media, supported by his brother Alexandros in Persis. Neither had responsibility for Mesopotamia (Polybios 5.40.6–7). The command structure was traditional and in principle adequate for the needs of the gigantic empire. The king himself sat at the center and could devote himself to the needs of the empire as a whole, whether from Antioch or from Seleukeia on the Tigris. One of the first requirements for a Seleukid king was to acquire a suitable wife, and she was quickly found in Antiochos' cousin Laodike, daughter of Mithridates of Pontic Kappadokia and Antiochos' aunt (also a Laodike). The importance of binding the independent kingdom of Pontos to the Seleukids at the time when Achaïos was campaigning to restore Seleukid rule in the rest of Asia Minor cannot be overestimated. Two years after the wedding, a son and potential successor, almost inevitably called Antiochos, was born; six or seven more children followed, including two more sons, at short intervals. The dynasty, it must have seemed, was well on the way to recovery and to perpetuating itself after the dissensions of the last two decades.

Figure 9 Official coin portrait of Achaïos wearing the diadem; the reverse names him “King Achaïos.” Issued by him at Sardeis, 220–213. Calouste Gulbenkian Museum, Lisbon. Photo: Reinaldo Viegas, digit: Magda Gomes, April 2007.



In the meanwhile the first serious problems emerged. Hermeias, who dominated the court and the king in his first two years, yearned to extend Seleukid power into Ptolemaic southern Syria, which the Ptolemies called Koile Syria. The young king was to lead the planned expedition, at least nominally, and a success would bring him the military prestige that he currently lacked and make his (and incidentally Hermeias') authority less challengeable. Koile Syria was a particularly attractive objective, since the desire for it originated in an old Seleukid claim, going back to Seleukos I's success at Ipsos in 301. His agreement with Kassander and Lysimachos at that time gave him Antigonid Syria and Palestine as his share of the spoils. Ptolemy I had, however, occupied these lands while the others were fighting Antigonos in distant western Asia Minor, and the situation had subsequently been tolerated by Seleukos, who had enough to do after Ipsos without provoking war with his old patron, Ptolemy. Ptolemy's successors then simply retained their control over the area, under Ptolemy III even extending it to include the main harbor of the Seleukid heartland, Seleukeia in Pieria, and temporarily much more, during the Laodikean War in the 240s. Ptolemaic troops still held

Seleukeia. In 222 Hermeias began military preparations to challenge Ptolemy III, when in Media Molon made himself independent – we do not know why – even issuing coins in his own name with the title “king” (*basileus*) with which to pay his troops. The decision – not undisputed – of the crown council was to split forces and to send generals, but not the king himself, against Molon: Hermeias argued that Antiochos would gain little prestige there, even if he won, against the rebellious subordinate, and if he lost it would be a disaster for the dynasty. The Syrian plans were therefore not abandoned, even when the first armies sent out against Molon were unsuccessful. The death of Ptolemy III in winter 222/1 only made the Syrian scheme seem more attractive to Hermeias, so that despite disagreements about strategy another army was sent out to Mesopotamia in 221, while Antiochos and Hermeias invaded Ptolemaic Koile Syria.

It was only when news reached them that Molon had defeated the second army and even occupied most of Mesopotamia, including the dynastic capital Seleukeia on the Tigris, that the seriousness of events in the east finally struck home. The Syrian adventure was broken off and the royal army set in march for Mesopotamia. It did not take it long. By spring 220 the war there was over. Antiochos was victorious and in the course of the year he reorganized the men in charge of the region and visited some adjacent territories. Equally important for future developments, however, was the fact that Hermeias personally lost out through this speedy royal victory. The king won his prestige where his generals had failed, and where Hermeias had thought none was to be gained. Moreover, Hermeias made himself so offensive during the expedition that a court conspiracy (in which Antiochos shared knowledge) led to his assassination, publicly justified on the highly improbable grounds that he was plotting against the king. Antiochos thus freed himself in this classic Macedonian way from the shackles of the most prominent member of the older generation of court officials. He then returned to Antioch with his victorious troops, where he could greet his new-born son and heir and look forward to a future of independence from overbearing inherited ministers (Polybios 5.40.4–56).

The idea of challenging Ptolemy for control of Syria and Palestine, however, did not die with Hermeias. As we have seen, the next three years until the battle of Raphia in early summer 217 saw Antiochos operating with all his energies in this sector, only to be foiled by the Ptolemaic army in the big battle, when it came. This continuous activity in Syria is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that in 220, sometime after the defeat of Molon, Achaios, who by then had successfully wrested the territories occupied by Attalos of Pergamon from him and reestablished the Seleukid administration based at

Sardeis, began to wear a diadem and so claim in public the title “king.” Three years before he had refused the chance, when the army offered it to him. Our single source, a later Seleukid court account used by Polybios, is unfortunately quite unreliable when it comes to elucidating motivation for such internal events, so that we have no good idea of how and why this occurred. Polybios’ source offered him the story, which he retells, that Achaïos, after showing himself to the troops at Laodikeia in Phrygia wearing the diadem, set off eastwards with them; but when the troops began to suspect that he was intending to challenge Antiochos in Syria they refused to go any further, whereupon Achaïos, denying the truth of their suspicions, turned them loose on the wild mountaineers of Pisidia – an area that was in any case well within his area of formal competence (Polybios 5.57). The same court source informed Polybios that during the unsuccessful peace negotiations of 218 between Antiochos and Ptolemaic officials the Ptolemaic side wanted to include Achaïos in the draft treaty, but Antiochos refused (Polybios 67.12–13). In the final treaty after Raphia Achaïos played no part, but as soon as Antiochos’ Syrian plans ended in disaster, he decided in 216 to attack Achaïos.

It is difficult to know what actually happened. The fact that Antiochos obviously felt completely safe in spending three whole years devoted to the war with Ptolemy suggests that Achaïos and he had agreed on a practical division of responsibilities – like Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax in the previous generation – that Achaïos would rule, with or without the royal title, in Asia Minor where he knew his way about, while Antiochos would rule in Syria and the Upper Satrapies. The division of labor was traditional in the dynasty, and the royal title for an effectively ruling senior member of the dynasty was not unprecedented. Only when Antiochos’ efforts in southern Syria collapsed is there evidence of a change of plan; only then, for reasons unknown, did Antiochos decide to challenge Achaïos in Asia Minor and, when he resisted, begin to depict him as a rebel. Since Polybios’ court source dates from after this time, it is hardly surprising that it chose to present Achaïos as a rebel from the time when he took the diadem in 220. So it developed the curious politically correct account of the campaign in 220, allegedly directed against Syria which the troops objected to (though they did not object to Achaïos’ diadem as such!) and ended up operating in Pisidia, which needed pacifying anyway. It also perpetuated the Seleukid version of Ptolemy’s attempt to include Achaïos in a peace treaty in 218 which, if it really happened, only made sense if Achaïos were generally recognized as joint ruler and Sosibios wished him also to be bound by the terms under consideration. According to our politically correct source, this was rejected by Antiochos, precisely on the grounds that Achaïos was

a rebel – but if this were so at the time, it was unimaginably obtuse of Sosibios to even try to include him in a formal peace treaty! The official designation of Achaïos as a rebel is therefore later than these negotiations, and Antiochos' rejection of his inclusion in the treaty cannot be authentic. This also emerges from an action of 220 or 219. In one of these years Achaïos' father Andromachos, who had been held hostage in Alexandria for several years – it is not known why – was released after Rhodian representations on the grounds that Achaïos was sufficiently powerful at the time to be worth winning over (Polybios 4.51). The context suggests that there was hope that Achaïos might exert influence on Antiochos in connection with the Syrian war, which would be a nugatory consideration if Achaïos were already regarded as a rebel by Antiochos. At the time, he clearly was not, despite his diadem. We must therefore conclude that Achaïos was recognized by Antiochos at this time as a legitimate joint king in Asia Minor, and that the later writers used by Polybios conditioned their account of this period by adopting the official version of the disreputable events which followed.

Antiochos did not have an easy passage through Asia Minor, where Achaïos was not unpopular. The price of a non-interference agreement with Attalos was the recognition of the Pergamene kingdom's right to exist, though additional concrete territorial concessions were few, if any. Only then, in the third year of the campaign in 214, could the royal army shut up the "rebel" in his headquarters city Sardeis, which was duly captured and sacked as if it were a foreign city. Late in 214 Achaïos himself was captured, mutilated in Persian fashion by cutting off his extremities, then his head, while the body was impaled. The extravagant "foreignness" of the conquest and of Achaïos' punishment, reflecting as it does the non-Greek socialization of the young Antiochos, whose earliest governmental experience had been in Mesopotamia and the Upper Satrapies – though it also reminded the Sardians that they had once been a Persian city – was doubtless intentional, a demonstration of Seleukid imperial power, intended to disguise the disreputable aspects of this pointless inner-dynastic bloodletting by redrawing the picture of events of the last years in the way Antiochos chose to paint it. Nobody at the Seleukid court would now risk promoting an alternative version, even if it were nearer to the truth. Polybios' "official" account suggests that nobody dared to (Polybios 7.15–18; 8.15–22).

With the death of Achaïos Antiochos finally eliminated the last of the senior advisers he had inherited from his father and brother. The military prestige that Hermeias hoped he would find in defeating the external enemy had in the end been won less spectacularly and at a greater cost in blood to the kingdom by defeating real and imagined

usurpers, thereby eliminating all potential challengers to his unique position of power. Antiochos was now reliant on men he chose himself, who had participated in the battles against Molon, conspired in the assassination of Hermeias, shared the hopes and disappointments of the Syrian campaign, and now supported the king in his version of the internal dynastic struggle against his colleague Achaïos. In Asia Minor the new Seleukid viceroy, the Macedonian Zeuxis, who succeeded Achaïos in the governor's palace at Sardeis, once it was refurbished, had been with Antiochos from the beginning and was about to dominate Seleukid Asia Minor for as long as there was such a thing. Antiochos ruled unchallenged. The deliberate damage caused to Sardeis during the siege and the brutal foreign-style punishment exercised on Achaïos marked the end of the conquering war phase in the region and Antiochos, doubtless now advised by Zeuxis, returned to the traditional Seleukid practice of ruling along with the self-governing Greek-style cities, not over them.

The case of Sardeis, where several documents dating from shortly after the siege in 213 have been found, illustrates the change of attitude. Sardeis, originally the royal Lydian capital, then seat of a Persian satrap and later of the Macedonian governor of Lydia under Alexander and the successors, had only gradually during the third century acquired the characteristic social and political trappings of a Greek city, with its citizen assembly, preparatory council, and elected annual magistrates, and with its theater and gymnasium as social centers. Quite how long this process took is unclear; but by the 220s it was widely accepted as a Greek city, since a Sardian citizen was by then acting as host to the Delphic *"theoroi,"* the ambassadors of Apollo who visited the Greek cities every four years to announce the date of the next Pythian festival and invite participation in it (*Syll.*³ 548). Perhaps the short period of Pergamene control in the 220s had added impetus to the development of Greek-style institutions at Sardeis, and Attalos' own good relations with the Aitolians who controlled Delphi may well have contributed to the city's being recognized as sufficiently Greek to be deemed worthy of receiving the sacred ambassadors of Apollo. Whether Achaïos worked along with the communal institutions of the city or not is unknown, but his popularity suggests he did. The shock of Antiochos' demonstrative "oriental" punishment will therefore have been all the greater in Sardeis, if in recent years the city had been encouraged to "think Greek."

The Greek institutions were certainly not abolished by Zeuxis; indeed, the documents dating from 213 show them already functioning again, and this was in everybody's interest. A royal letter replying to an official delegation from the city dated to March 213

granted financial concessions for three years, the right to cut wood in the royal forests for rebuilding, as and when Zeuxis might decide, and the restoration of the gymnasium for public use – perhaps it had been confiscated by the military: “We have written to Zeuxis and Ktesikles [perhaps a financial official] about all these things” (SEG 39, 1283 = Ma 1). In June 213 another letter arrived, this time from queen Laodike, gracefully thanking the Sardians, who had again sent a delegation to the court, for a decree through which Sardeis instituted a new Greek-style thanksgiving festival, the *Laodikeia*. This was to be celebrated on Laodike’s birthday with a procession and a sacrifice to Zeus Genethlios, the especial protector of families, and its purpose was, in Laodike’s words, “for the safe preservation of our brother, king Antiochos, of ourselves and of our children.” She ends with a patronal phrase, which after Antiochos’ recent show of violence will have been balm on the Sardians’ souls: “we accept the honors gladly, praise the enthusiasm of the *demos*, and we shall always endeavor to act advantageously towards your city” (SEG 39, 1284 = Ma 2).

At the same time, or just a little later, Antiochos himself wrote to the Sardians again, this time agreeing to set up a fund for financing the olive oil used in the gymnasium and to ease the rules about accommodating his garrison troops in the city, as well as to alleviate certain rental charges for royal property. He also granted freedom from royal taxation for the three days of the new *Laodikeia* festival. Once again, “we have written concerning all these things to Zeuxis ...” (SEG 39, 1285 = Ma 3). These royal letters represent only some accidentally well-preserved examples of the activity of the Seleukid royal administrators to restore Sardeis to viability as a self-governing community (though its practical competence in initiating serious business was, of course, severely restricted by the presence of the royal administration and the garrison troops in the citadel). Fragments of other documents also survive, and they suggest an ongoing program aimed at restoring local social and political competences, while at the same time the overriding interests of the king remain clear. The language of discourse is patronal – especially evident in Laodike’s letter – but all this diplomatic activity and its permanent publication by the city authorities in Sardeis suggest that both sides recognized the need to restore a certain measure of mutual respect at the level of visible public communication. The fact that Antiochos was prepared to indulge the Sardians in diplomatic exchanges, rather than just to give orders, shows that his new advisers led by Zeuxis were anxious to return to the mutually advantageous “diplomatic” relationship between cities and Seleukid kings in Asia Minor established by Antiochos I and II.

Antiochos seems to have had perfect trust in Zeuxis, since his

distant activities restoring Seleukid influence in the east over the next several years gave him no opportunity to chide him. He stayed in touch, however, with affairs of Asia Minor, as a letter written from Media to Zeuxis in spring 209 shows. One of Antiochos' "friends," a man called Nikanor, asked the king to reconstitute for him the function of "overseer of the temples in Asia Minor" that Antiochos II had created, though the post had lapsed as a result of the subsequent dynastic disorders in the region. Antiochos agreed to the proposal and wrote to Zeuxis about it, telling him to make the necessary arrangements; the documentation about this fairly routine piece of business was later engraved on stone in one of the temples, presumably by Nikanor himself, to document the king's benefaction to him (*SEG* 37, 1010 = Ma 4).

In 212 Antiochos was in Armenia, where the local ruler Xerxes quickly acknowledged his authority (Polybios 8.23); we next find him sailing down the Euphrates with an army (Polybios 9.4.3), presumably heading for Seleukeia on the Tigris, after which he is recorded collecting a large army at Ekbatana in Media – in 210 or 209 – in preparation for an expedition to the easternmost parts of the kingdom. His aim was to restore Seleukid authority in those distant territories, where a Seleukid king had not been seen since the days of his father, or perhaps even longer. Particularly important was the rich land of Baktria that had enjoyed an unacknowledged independence since the 240s under two Greek rulers named Diodotos, father and son, who even began to use the royal title. Their current successor, a Greek from Magnesia on the Maiander called Euthydemos, who had come to power in Baktria through a putsch – he was perhaps originally a mercenary commander – also claimed royalty. Antiochos' massive preparations in Ekbatana show that he was taking no chances. Treasure confiscated from the local temple of Anahita amounted to nearly 4,000 talents (about 140 metric tons) of precious metals that he turned into coin with which to pay the troops. At some time before he left on the expedition – perhaps while he was still at Seleukeia on the Tigris in 210 – he granted his young son Antiochos the royal title and began to include him in the official protocol – just in case something went wrong during his "anabasis," as his expedition, imitating the title of Xenophon's classic work, was styled.

Polybios' account of these campaigns, which went on until 205 when Antiochos was back in Mesopotamia attending the New Year's festival at Babylon, is largely lost, so that we only know about disjointed episodes. In Parthia some raiders were ejected, while the Parthian warlord Arsakes submitted (Justin 41.5–7), but Baktria proved more difficult. Before an agreement with Euthydemos came about and Antiochos could move on, an unbroken two-year siege of

the capital city Baktra (208–206) was needed to induce the two leaders to negotiate – Teleas, one of Antiochos’ friends, like Euthydemos a Magnesians from Magnesia on the Maiander, proved an acceptable and capable go-between. The result saved face on both sides. The publicity accompanying the agreement assured those interested that it had been made out of solidarity with the interests of the Greek population in remote Baktria, constantly threatened by the nomadic tribes surrounding them. Euthydemos and his son Demetrios were, however, recognized by Antiochos as “kings,” Antiochos even promising one of his many daughters to Demetrios to consolidate the agreement, and a formal alliance was made. Euthydemos then supplied rations for Antiochos’ army and gave him his war elephants. After this Antiochos left Baktria, crossed the Hindu Kush, where he met up with another local warlord, Sophagasenos, who presented him with still more elephants and agreed to pay a generous subsidy to get rid of him. Antiochos then set off westwards through southern Iran and crossed the Persian Gulf to visit Bahrain and Gerrha, but he returned to Seleukeia on the Tigris in time to participate in the Babylonian New Year celebrations in April 205 (Boiy 155). Polybios sums up the results so: “As a result of this expedition he impressed not only the Asians but also the Europeans with his kingly qualities” (Polybios 11.34). Antiochos had now achieved, indeed by far surpassed, the level of charisma through military success that Hermeias had initially sought for him in the Syrian war against Ptolemy. He could now present himself as a true successor of Seleukos I, the founder of the dynasty, by his visiting and reorganizing the Seleukid “Far East” and obtaining spectacular gifts from India. It will have surprised nobody that on his return some subordinates and subject communities began calling him sporadically, but with increasing frequency, *Megas*, “The Great.” At first the new title was simply attached to his name in the form “Antiochos *Megas*,” but after further conquests it came to be used in the form best known to the Greeks from their classic description of the Persian king as “Great King” (*Basileus Megas*). So far as we know, neither form of the title was ever officially used by Antiochos in referring to himself.

Until Antiochos’ return from the Upper Satrapies in 205 Seleukid activities offer no support for Polybios’ idea that all events in his field of vision were somehow interconnected. In Greece and the Aegean the “Social War” (220– 217: see below) and the “First Macedonian War” (214–205: see below) took place without Seleukid participation or even show of interest. This did not, however, apply to the minor powers in the area, particularly not to Pergamon and Bithynia, now ruled by king Prousius, who at some time entered a marital relationship with the new Macedonian king Philip V, perhaps taking

his sister Apama as wife. This relationship resulted from the complementarity of their interests in the northern Aegean, while Prousius' smoldering hostility to his neighbor Pergamon was reflected in turn in Pergamene cultivation of good relations with Macedonian opponents in Greece, especially the Aitolian League. At some time before 219, Attalos financed the defenses of the fortress Elaos in Aitolia (Polybios 4.65.3), and a major building operation at Aitolian-controlled Delphi, a more than 30-meter-long stoa, was financed by Attalos and ready for use by 209 (*CID* 4.85). These good relations, which were also formalized in an alliance, led to Attalos' participation as Aitolian ally in the First Macedonian War, when the Aitolians joined Rome in 211. Pergamon may no longer have been a major power in Asia Minor, which it had briefly become in the 220s, but the agreement with Antiochos at the time of his campaign against Achaïos left Attalos with some harbor towns and a sizable war fleet, with which he was able to support the anti-Macedonian coalition in Greece. His chief prize was the island of Aigina that the coalition forces captured in 210 and then sold to Attalos for a mere thirty talents; spoils from the island were dedicated at Pergamon (*OGIS* 281), and Aitolian enthusiasm for Attalos' support peaked in their electing him honorary leader of the League (*strategos*) for the civil year 210/9 (Livy 27.29.10).

Until 208 Attalos continued to support the anti-Macedonian coalition, even supplying some garrison troops for the little Phokian city Lilaia, near Delphi (*ISE* 2, 81), and generally making himself useful with his fleet, while personally getting to know the Roman commanders. This proved to be a far-sighted political investment, since despite his withdrawal from most military actions after 208 because of a well-timed attack on his territory in Asia Minor by Prousius, he was included in the Peace of Phoinike that ended the war in 205 among the Roman allies, while Prousius was included among Philip's. In the very year of the peace treaty Attalos was instrumental in helping a high-powered senatorial delegation transfer a famous magnetic stone that was thought to be a manifestation of the Great Mother, whose main temple was at Phrygian Pessinous – at the time in Galatian territory – to Rome, where it was expected to aid the Romans in finally defeating Hannibal (Livy 29.10.4).

It is easy to get the impression from the literary sources, whose interest in wars and the activities of the Great Powers dominates their narrative, that nothing else was going on in Asia in these years except war. At a level below that of the Great Powers, this is clearly incorrect, as many inscriptions show: normal life, even normal intercity sociopolitical communication, continued regardless, since the wars that took place were not "total wars" in the modern sense, with

mutually exclusive block-building that prevented normal communication or social contacts. From two cities in Asia Minor during these years we have series of documents that make this abundantly clear, from Miletos and from Magnesia on the Maiander. While Achaïos was still *persona grata* with Antiochos in 218/17, Miletos entered an agreement with the neighboring city of Seleukeia-Tralleis that laid down the conditions under which a citizen of the one city could become a citizen of the other. For Miletos it was important that the people of Seleukeia-Tralleis, whether or not they chose to become citizens of Miletos, undertook to organize a regular procession and sacrifice at the great Milesian temple of Apollo at Didyma, and this may well have been the decisive factor that initiated the whole arrangement (*StV* 537). Three years later (215/14, therefore in the middle of Antiochos' war against Achaïos), an almost identical arrangement was made between Miletos and Karian Mylasa (*StV* 539), and an undated fragment of an inscription shows that a third agreement in similar terms was made around this time with another city, the name of which is broken off on the stone (*StV* 538). Also during these years of apparent crisis the Milesians started a widespread campaign to upgrade their festival at Didyma to be "penteteric" (i.e., it took place every four years) of the highest class, equal in status to the Olympic Games: a document from Kos dated between 218 and 208 recognizing their wish documents this new initiative (*Syll.*³ 590 with Habicht, *Chiron* 30, 308f. on the date). We do not know how widespread immediate recognition was, since further documentation is not available, but the festival continued to be celebrated in this form for centuries, which suggests the campaign was successful. Miletos clearly enjoyed prosperity at this time, demonstrated again during the last years of Antiochos' campaigns in the east (206/5), when a rich Milesian, Eudamos, who ten years earlier had occupied the expensive ceremonial post of chief magistrate (*stephanephoros*) at Miletos, made a large private donation to the city. Its chief purpose was to pay the salaries of teachers and gymnastic trainers for the male children of the citizens, but it was also intended to finance their participation in the newly inaugurated penteteric *Didymeia* (*Syll.*³ 577 = Austin² 138).

Magnesia on the Maiander also chose what might superficially seem a most unfavorable time – 208 – for starting a major initiative throughout the Greek world to have its city and territory recognized as "sacred and inviolate" and its newly reorganized competitive festival in honor of the local manifestation of Artemis, known as "Leukophryene" ("She of the White Brow"), accepted as "Crowning Games." They were to be equal in status to the Delphic Pythia, and so rather more modest than Miletos' slightly earlier ambitions for the

Didy-meia. The Magnesians were extraordinarily successful, and were so proud of their achievement that they inscribed on the walls of the main stoa in their agora a large selection of the acceptances their envoys received – where texts were identical, cities agreeing to the same text were merely listed as doing so. Some 160 names have been recovered, and perhaps as many as one-third of the documents have not survived. The recipients range from war-torn Sicily (Syracuse) through war-torn Greece (both Aitolian and Macedonian allies are included) to the kings Attalos, Antiochos father and son, Ptolemy, and from the east the Seleukid colony in Persia known as “Antiocheia in Persis,” where Antiochos was residing when the Magnesians envoys reached him (Rigsby 66–131). The envoys were obviously not prevented from traveling by the ongoing Hannibalic war in Italy or the ongoing First Macedonian War in Greece; nor were the combatants so deeply engaged in their warfare as not to be able to attend to this pan-Hellenic religious business. If we only had these documents, we would have no idea that a war was going on at all. In Asia Minor there is no sign of a looming crisis.

III Europe

The “Social War”

It was probably the developments in Greek Europe that first gave Polybios the idea of events weaving together throughout the world in the years after 220. His major theme was Rome’s rise to world power during the following two generations, and Rome’s serious involvement east of the Adriatic indeed began in European Greece in these years. So his metaphor is perhaps not so surprising, even if it does not seem appropriate when applied to points farther east. In Europe, the main event opening the epoch was the sudden death of the Macedonian king, Antigonos Doson, late in 222 or early 221, and the succession of his seventeen-year-old nephew Philip V, son of Demetrios II and the Epeiros princess Phthia. Born in 238, Philip had been too young to succeed his father directly in 229, and was really still too young in 222/1. But he was the only chance for the monarchy, the only way of avoiding the sort of years-long dissension that Epeiros had suffered in the 230s, and the senior Macedonians at court who had served Doson well had no interest in changing the governmental system on the Epeiros model. Most of the highly placed men who had formed Doson’s crown council expected to be able to continue in post and to

direct the young king in upholding the policies that they and Doson had so successfully developed during the last eight years. Doson's will appointed the main officers of state for the first years, in order to guarantee a safe regime change: Apelles was to be prime minister and chief guardian, Megaleas secretary of state, Leontios commander of the elite peltast regiment, Alexandros chamberlain with command of the royal bodyguards, and Taurion commissioner for the Peloponnese (Polybios 4.87.8). Events involving Macedonia over the next several years were conditioned by rivalries within this group of senior advisers, as well as by Philip's own increasing irritation at their continuing influence and his attempts to break free from it. As with Antiochos at Antioch, so was Philip's maturity as a ruling king not achieved without violence, disguised as self-defense and exercised against his inherited advisers.

The parameters of Macedonian policy at first stayed much the same as they had been for generations: in the north it remained regularly necessary to look after the frontier regions against threats from the non-Greek neighbors in Dardania, Illyria, and Thrace; in the west influence on Epeiros was more difficult to exert since the abolition of the monarchy there, but the area remained a priority; to the south the Thessalian cities, supported by the Macedonian castle and garrison at Demetrias, provided a bulwark against the ever-expanding Aitolian League. Macedonian friends and allies in central and southern Greece were now organized together in Doson's Security Pact, which was supported by permanent Macedonian garrisons in the castles at Chalkis in Euboia and Akrokorinth in the Peloponnese. Together with Demetrias Philip later called these castles "the Fetters of Greece." In the Aegean, Macedonia tried to keep up a presence in order to prevent Antiochos and Ptolemy from becoming overpowering, and certain cities of Crete were tied to Macedonia by treaties that facilitated the recruitment of mercenaries. Only one thing had changed since the time of his father, though at the time it did not impinge on Macedonian interests too much, and that was the Roman protectorate over the Greek and native communities of southern Illyria, which had been entrusted in some way to Rome's friend Demetrios of Pharos when the Roman legions left in 228. The future development of this Roman bridgehead on Balkan soil could have been foreseen neither by Macedonia nor by Rome when Philip came to the throne in 222/1.

The Romans neglected Illyria after 228, being occupied above all with a serious Celtic invasion of Italy that reached southern Etruria, dangerously close to Rome itself, before it could be stopped. As a result, Demetrios of Pharos, who in effect had been left in charge of the Illyrians as a Roman friend – on condition that Illyrians did not

sail south of Lissos, as the peace treaty laid down – soon gained the impression that Rome no longer cared much about Illyria. He aided Doson with a mercenary contingent in the 220s, participating in the campaign of Sellasia in 222; at about the same time he extended his landward influence to the little town of Dimale, one of the communities that Rome regarded as a free friend. There was no perceptible Roman reaction. Demetrios then took courage and in 220, together with another Illyrian chieftain, Skerdilaidas, manned altogether ninety small pirate ships (so-called *lemboi*) and raided the western coast of the Peloponnese as far as Pylos in Messenia, taking up again the age-old Illyrian piratical tradition that the Roman intervention had temporarily stopped (Polybios 4.16.6; 10). This time Greek complaints reached Rome and were heard, so that in summer 219 a Roman fleet crossed the Adriatic, “freed” Dimale, destroyed Demetrios’ home base at Pharos, and though it failed to capture Demetrios himself who was able to get away, it took many members of his family and associates into Roman custody in Italy. The expedition was all over in a few weeks, hardly deserving its modern name, the “Second Illyrian War” (Polybios 3.16; 18–19). Demetrios fled to Pella where he was granted asylum; Skerdilaidas, whose influence at home was unaffected by the Roman intervention, even joined the Security Pact for a while, which had just begun a war against Aitolia. His ships would be useful for its operations on the Adriatic coast, and he was paid a subsidy of twenty talents for his help (Polybios 4.29).

These three factors: the exile of Demetrios of Pharos in Macedonia while his friends and family were interned in Italy, the alliance of Skerdilaidas, and the war against Aitolia, where operations inevitably took place largely in western central Greece, taken together with Philip’s energetic will to prove himself a real Macedonian king, created a situation in which a clash of interests between Macedonia and Rome for the first time became a possibility, even if at first merely a remote one. The Aitolian war (known as the “Social War,” since the Macedonian allies – *socii* in Latin – were primarily involved) was the critical catalyst. Doson’s activities in northeast and central Greece had turned back the process of Aitolian expansion, and his cementing the Macedonian leadership of all anti-Aitolian elements in the Security Pact (even though its first actions were directed against Kleomenes in Sparta) provided an organizational structure that might well have ensured a stable future. Doson’s death, however, robbed the Pact of its prestigious leader, and the Aitolian central authorities, who under threat from Doson had made efforts to curb the traditional banditry of individual Aitolians in the interests of their League as a whole, lost their leverage on their fellow Aitolians. Aitolian raiders, therefore,

began once more, with or without the support of Illyrians, to exercise private initiative in seeking plunder from their neighbors, a particularly lucrative area for operations being the Peloponnesian cities and their territories, but Epeiros suffered also. A uniquely extravagant act in 220 was the capture of a Macedonian naval ship near Kythera and the sale of the vessel, officers, and men on the slave market. In Achaia the levy was called out against Aitolian raiders, but military incompetence by Aratos led to a defeat; the most spectacular privateering Aitolian land operation was the massacre of the inhabitants of the small Arkadian mountain town Kynaitha, which was a member of the Achaian League, where the raiders were at first invited in by supporters of one of two warring factions, but ended up massacring both and thoroughly plundering the place (Polybios 4.3–19).

Those who suffered under these and other Aitolian actions were not much concerned to distinguish between official activities of the League (which these were not) and large-scale “private” operations (which they were). At a summer meeting of delegates of the Security Pact in 220 enough members had been affected to justify a declaration of war on the Aitolians. They also asserted, as part of their war aims, a generally felt desire to restore the Delphic shrine to the control of a traditionally constituted Amphiktyonic Council, not one dominated by Aitolian representatives. The Aitolians reacted brusquely by electing one of the most prominent freebooters of 220, Skopas of Trichonion, to be their League general (*strategos*) for 219. The war could begin (Polybios 4.25–27).

As with Antiochos’ first military operation, parallel to the long- and short-term military aims there raged behind the scenes a power struggle among the king’s advisers for control of events and influence over him. The presence of Demetrios of Pharos at court after 219 proved decisive, when under his influence a group of officers led by Taurion advocated the building of a larger Macedonian fleet in order to be able to operate against Aitolia in western coastal waters. Demetrios had lost his own fleet, with which he had helped Taurion in 220, when the Romans chased him from Pharos. On the other hand, Macedonian traditionalists like Apelles, Megaleas, and the peltast commander Leontios were highly skeptical about this potential move away from traditional Macedonian land-based strength, but in 218, the second year of the war, during which Macedonian-led allied troops spectacularly invaded central Aitolia and even plundered the remote federal sanctuary Thermon in reprisal for Skopas’ attacks on Macedonian Dion and Epeiros Dodona the previous year, the political crisis at the court peaked. The three prominent opponents of the naval program were eliminated, either by murder or enforced suicide. As

usual at Macedonian courts, the survivors alleged a plot against the king (Polybios 5.7–9; 13–16; 25–28). The whole affair illustrates, however, once more the central importance in the Macedonian world of personal relationships with the men who ultimately took the decisions: the kings.

As the war entered its third year with no sign of an end to the costly destruction taking place all around central Greece, envoys sent out by Byzantion, Rhodes, Chios, and Ptolemy IV in early summer 217 caught both parties in the mood for making peace, and by that summer a treaty, based on each party's retaining what it held at the time, was agreed after lengthy negotiations at Naupaktos in southern Aitolia (Polybios 5.103.7). Philip recognized a dead end when he saw one, and nothing more was to be gained by pursuing the Aitolian war further. Both sides had wounds enough to lick, especially in Thessaly, which had been much fought over. Representatives of Thessalian Larissa at the peace negotiations intimated to Philip that the war had left their city underpopulated and the agricultural land undercultivated. Philip wrote at once to them, in September 217, using his royal authority to urge the Larissans to accept into their citizenship other Greeks resident in their city, in order to bolster their citizen population. This proved in the event to be politically difficult, and after initial registration of potential new citizens had taken place, the lists – for reasons we do not know – were destroyed. Rather less than two years later Philip wrote again, urging the same procedure and arguing, with remarkable awareness of Italian conditions, that the Romans had become strong by extending their citizenship, even incorporating freed slaves, and had even been able to found many colonies (Syll.³ 543 = Austin² 75 = Burstein 65 = BD² 32). This time the lists were validated and inscribed on stone along with the royal letters. The whole procedure nevertheless shows the limits of royal power in a sensitive local affair such as citizenship rights. At about the same time, a smoldering dispute between the border cities Gonnoi (in Thessalian Perrhaibia) and Herakleion (in Macedonia) about the possession of some lands situated near the strategic vale of Tempe was solved by royal intervention (Ager 54).

The Aitolians encountered similar local postwar problems in their part of Thessaly, where two longstanding border disputes concerning the city of Melitaia in Achaia Phthiotis and its neighbors Xyniai and Pereia were finally brought to a solution by Aitolian arbitrators; at Pereia regulations were even drawn up to unite the two communities through a *synoikismos* (Ager 55, 56). Farther west, the Akarnanian League, which had fought the war on Philip's side, drew up an agreement with its member city Anaktorion concerning the financing of the refurbishment of the temple and the organization of the festival

of Apollo at Aktion. The war had seriously damaged the area and Anaktorion itself was now unable to raise the necessary finance alone. Two copies of the detailed agreement were engraved, one set up at Aktion, the other at Olympia, where it was found in 1954 (StV 523). In Aitolia itself, the festival of the *Soteria* at Delphi was due in autumn 217 – it seems unlikely that the *Pythia* will have taken place the previous year because of the war – but shortly after the Peace of Naupaktos it was already possible to hold at least the musical competition. A preserved list of winners lists successful competitors who came from Korinth, Boiotia, Sikyon, Histiaia, and also from farther afield, from Rhodes. One of the allies' explicit aims in the war had been to restore the Amphiktyonic Council to its traditional membership structure, but in this they patently failed: in no other year did so many Aitolian representatives (*hieromnemes*) attend the council meeting when the *Soteria* were celebrated – fifteen seats were occupied by Aitolians, whose names are all recorded (Nachtergaeel, *Galates*, 65).

The First Macedonian War

Philip came increasingly under the influence of Demetrios of Pharos, once his old advisers were eliminated, but an interest in obtaining some kind of control over the cities in Illyria was not merely Demetrios' wish. By the time of the Peace of Naupaktos in 217 Skerdilaidas, who after Demetrios' departure from Illyria took his place as the most influential Illyrian chief, had not only abandoned the Security Pact, but in 217 provoked Philip sorely by carrying out a raid on the Upper Macedonian territory of Dassaretis. Once the Aitolian peace was made, the renegade Skerdilaidas was therefore top of the list for Macedonian attention. During winter 217/16 Philip imported into Macedonia skilled Illyrian shipwrights, who built him a fleet of 100 Illyrian-style pirate *lemboi* that were already available for action by the sailing season 216. He will have anticipated no reaction from Rome, since Hannibal had defeated the consul Flamin-ius at Lake Trasimene in Etruria shortly before the Peace of Naupaktos, and was now camped in southeastern Italy, awaiting the Roman reaction. Illyria must therefore have seemed a safe enough objective to Philip and Demetrios, when they sailed to attack Skerdilaidas. Skerdilaidas, however, was devious and, depicting himself now as a friend of Rome, sent news of the Macedonian interference to a Roman squadron stationed in western Sicily, and the mere rumor that Roman ships were on the way was sufficient to make Philip abandon his plans and return home (Polybios 5.108–110).

Philip's second letter to Larissa dated August 215, with its

approving reference to Roman strength gained through the extension of citizenship and colonization, contrasts paradoxically with an approach that he made to Hannibal in the same year through an Athenian go-between called Xenophanes. This matter became known when Xenophanes and three Carthaginians were arrested by a Roman ship, and the text of an agreement, which Hannibal and his staff had already sworn to, was found in their baggage. The three Carthaginians were to be witnesses to Philip's oath, if he accepted what Xenophanes had negotiated. The captured document, even without evidence of Philip's agreement to its terms, seemed to show a planned cooperation, "sharing friends and enemies, unless preexisting treaties spoke against it," being one of the formulations, but above all, "you will be our allies in the war that we are fighting against the Romans, until the Gods give us and you peace. You will help us as need might be and as we shall agree." The only concrete clause concerned Illyria, when the war should be over. The Romans were to cease "possessing Kerkyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Atintania, and the Parthini" – all the communities and peoples that had been free friends under Roman protection since 228 – "and restore to Demetrios of Pharos his captive friends and relations" (Polybios 7.9). This list and its explicitly hostile interpretation of Rome's relationship to its free friends – they are described as Roman "possessions" – betray the hand of Philip's aggressive Illyrian adviser, whose idea it had presumably been to approach Hannibal in the first place. After Hannibal's success at Cannae in 216, not only the Balkan states thought the war in Italy would soon be over and that a peace would be reached through negotiation. It must have seemed important to get in on the act, since nobody in the Balkans could wish that Hannibal's Carthaginians would simply take over Roman "possessions" in Illyria. At the time, this must have seemed a real possibility, and Demetrios had in any case nothing to lose.

The captured text conditioned the future attitude of the Roman senate towards Macedonia, ignoring the fact that Philip had not yet sworn to it, indeed had not even seen it, since it and the Carthaginian witnesses never reached Pella. Moreover, no practical cooperation between Hannibal and Philip ever took place. For Rome, however, the very approach to Hannibal qualified as an unprovoked "stab in the back" in Rome's darkest hour, never to be forgotten, and the Roman interpretation dominated later historiography – even Polybios has his knowledge of the "agreement" from the captured text that he saw in Rome. Hardly surprisingly, the role of Demetrios of Pharos in persuading Philip became exaggerated in the telling – details could not really be known – to the extent that Polybios wrote that Demetrios urged negotiations leading to the peace of Naupaktos while the news

of Trasimene in 217 was still fresh, “in order to rid himself of the Aitolian war as soon as possible, to tackle the Illyrian problem, and then cross over to Italy ... An expedition to Italy was the start of a challenge for rule over the world, which suited nobody better than him” (Polybios 5.101.8–10). Roman demonizing of Demetrios of Pharos is clear from this passage, which reflects the politically correct Roman interpretation of the outbreak of the First Macedonian War. The fears aroused by the capture of Xenophanes and the Carthaginian negotiators brought a squadron of Roman ships to Illyrian waters in 214, and the region remained a war sector for the next nine years. The text of the draft treaty, as interpreted at Rome, put Philip firmly into the role of aggressor and so justified Roman actions both now and later. Had the envoys and the “agreement” not been captured, Philip’s minimal actions in Illyria alone would scarcely have justified the expense of Roman actions in the east. Polybios, with the benefit of hindsight, also wrote a speech that he attributed to one of the leading Aitolian delegates at the peace conference of 217, Agelaos of Naupaktos, in which war in the west was recommended to Philip as a suitable object of his attention, if he wished “to compete for the sovereignty of the world.” Peace should be made now while the Greeks could look after their own affairs and not wait for the “clouds of war” – a Homeric phrase – “now looming in the west to settle on Greece” (Polybios 5.104). The speech is not authentic, the foresight attributed to Agelaos (who had actually been one of the instigators of the war) has its origin in Polybios’ hindsight, and Polybios’ hindsight was conditioned by Roman fearful dreaming.

It suited the Romans to think that Philip wished to join Hannibal, when all he really wanted to do was to control Illyria. In fact, at the time when he was supposedly planning to come to Italy he was far more occupied with the affairs of the largest of his Peloponnesian allies, the Achaian League, further complicated by lingering political dissatisfaction both at Sparta and Messene, where internal post-revolutionary social differentiation was reflected in differing group sympathies for the protagonists of the Social War. During the war Philip had only undertaken one campaign in the Peloponnese, but had tried to influence events through a string of garrisons that were still in place. Nevertheless, Sparta fairly soon joined Aitolia, whereas the Messenians were badly split, and after the end of the Social War serious civil disturbances broke out there. These led to two Macedonian military interventions, in 215 and 214, in the course of which Demetrios of Pharos was killed while trying to organize a putsch in the city. Despite subsequent bloodshed and plundering by the Macedonian troops that was intended to shock the Messenians into submission, a few years later Messene again joined Aitolia (Polybios

7.10–14; 8.8–12; Plutarch, *Aratos* 49–50).

At about the same time Aratos of Sikyon, one of the founding fathers of the modern Achaian League, the man who had brought about its pro-Macedonian alignment in the 220s and since then had been influential as an adviser on Peloponnesian affairs, died and so left Philip without a serious Peloponnesian lobbyist on his staff, just as the struggle with Rome was about to strain the Security Pact to the utmost. Under the circumstances, the rumor that Philip had treated Aratos to a slow-working poison was probably inevitable (Polybios 8.12). It is therefore hardly surprising that the Achaian Polybios regarded Philip's political development during these years, as he changed and lost his older advisers, as a moral fall from grace, from being "everybody's darling" to a lonely self-absorbed autocrat (Polybios 7.11).

When Aratos died, the Achaian League lost its most experienced and influential leader, just as the League was being dragged unwillingly into war with Rome as Philip's ally. Late in 214 Philip sent 120 *lemboi* into Illyrian waters, where Skerdilaidas was still operating, captured Orikos, and was busy with an attack on Apollonia when a Roman fleet of some fifty heavy quinqueremes arrived. It was summoned by Skerdilaidas from Brundisium (Brindisi), where it had been stationed since the capture of Xenophanes and the Carthaginians. Philip was quite unexpectedly shut into the narrow waters at the mouth of the Aous river with all his ships, which – even if he had wanted to fight – would have been no match for the heavy Roman battleships. He chose to fire them and retreat immediately over the mountains to Macedonia rather than confront the Romans, whose seriousness about their engagement in Illyria he and Demetrios had massively underestimated (Livy 24.40). During the next couple of years he successfully avoided confronting the Roman fleet, while continuing to operate against Illyria by land, and he had some successes, winning over even some of Rome's inland "friends," including Dimale. In 212 he landed a coup when he took Skerdilaidas' fortress Lissos and reached the coast north of the Roman protectorate (Polybios 8.13–14). Again, no confrontation took place with any Romans. They continued to hold all the Greek harbor towns in the area, but since Philip had no fleet anyway, this only prevented what could not happen. If the Romans believed the implications of the captured "treaty," that Philip might once have intended to cross to Italy, as later historiography asserted, the commander on the spot, Laevinus, must have known this was impossible: Philip was logistically incapable of putting troops into Italy, and the single short confrontation at Apollonia showed that he had no stomach for any kind of engagement with Roman troops. The war in Illyria, such as it

was, had been begun under false assumptions and really could have been already over, since Philip will also have been satisfied with his influence in the Illyrian hinterland that prevented Skerdilaidas from attacking Macedonia.

Under the circumstances, Philip must have been shocked at Roman persistence – particularly if he had never seen the text of the draft treaty with Hannibal – but even more so, had he known that the original area of Laevinus’ official field of operations was gradually extended by the senate, year for year, from being merely an observation of Philip’s movements in 214 (Livy 24.10.4) to a much wider “Greece and Macedonia” in 213 (Livy 24.44.5), from which even “Macedonia” was dropped in 212 and 211 (Livy 25.3.6; 26.1.12). Instead of reducing its commitment, the senate was, at least theoretically, extending it to the whole area covered by the members of Philip’s Security Pact (which as “Philip’s allies” was explicitly mentioned in Hannibal’s document). While Philip was operating in the Illyrian mountains, Laevinus was busy making contacts in Greece, the most fruitful of which – ominously – was with the Aitolian League. The Aitolians had not learned to love the peace of Naupaktos because, although it stopped Philip’s attacks on them, it also committed them to ceasing their own persistent semi-private raiding. When Laevinus therefore offered concrete aid in capturing Akarnania and parts of southern Epeiros, as far north as the Roman “friends” at Kerkyra – the Romans would claim for themselves only the mobile booty from joint successes (“human capital” for the slave market, above all) – the current Aitolian leadership became weak and in 211 made a formal treaty that immediately involved them again in active war against Philip and his Security Pact members. This time they would have Roman naval support. Aitolian allies – Sparta, Elis in the Peloponnese, Skerdilaidas and his son Pleuratos in Illyria, and Attalos of Pergamon were explicitly invited to join in, and all did so.

Rightly or wrongly, the Hannibalic war now affected the European Greeks in an immediate, and mostly negative, way, which a few years before nobody could have dreamed of being possible. It is here that we see for the first time the reality of Polybios’ “interweaving” of events. Given the identity of the combatants, it was virtually inevitable that the same areas in central and southern Greece that had suffered from the Social War would again be affected; and now the Romans and Attalos were providing logistical support, the Romans slipping comfortably into the role of being a leading Greek state, fighting along with the Aitolians for objectives that the Aitolians defined. The immediate Roman aim was simply to keep Philip occupied in Greece as long as Hannibal remained undefeated in Italy, and successive Roman commanders were happy enough to do just

that, enjoying easy plunder as it came into their hands, but otherwise taking no major initiative. They had no interest in making peace, though forces were reduced, since this section of the war was probably paying for itself anyway, and delegates from non-combatant states – as in the “Social War,” Rhodes, Chios, and Ptolemy IV, now joined by Athens and Amyntas of Athamania – found this out to their disappointment when they tried to mediate on several occasions between 209 and 207 (Livy 27.30.5; 10; 28.7.13–15). The war inevitably caused great damage in the areas where it was fought, Roman swordsmanship impressing the Greeks with its thorough destructiveness, sparing neither man nor beast, unless it could be turned into cash. This happened notoriously with the island of Aigina, a member of the Achaian League, which was captured by Sulpicius Galba in 210, the population sold into slavery and the island itself sold off at a knockdown price to Attalos of Pergamon by the Aitolians. It remained Pergamene until the end of the dynasty in 133 (Polybios 9.42.5; 22.8.9–10).

By 206 the Aitolians were again war-weary, disappointed not to have gained Akarnania and disillusioned with their Roman ally's lackluster performance. Despite their treaty with Rome, they agreed to end hostilities; a year later Rome followed, in a peace deal negotiated at the Epeiro federal capital, Phoinike. Until 206 the Romans had been happy enough to fight to the last Aitolian, but had no interest in a lengthy go-it-alone, since by now Hannibal had left Italy and all available Roman forces were required for the coming campaign in Africa. Philip was therefore allowed to retain much of what he had recently acquired in the mountains, with the exception of Rome's old friends the Parthini and Dimale, as well as two other recently taken forts. Allies on both sides were also “written into” the treaty (*adscripti*), most importantly by Philip Prousius of Bithynia, in addition to the remaining members of the Security Pact – Achaia, Boiotia, Thessaly, Akarnania, and Epeiros. Rome included Attalos and his satellite city Ilion, identified as the Troy from which some Romans liked to trace their origins, the Illyrian Pleuratos, the current Spartan ruler Nabis, Elis, Messene, and Athens (Livy 29.12.13).

At the end of this chapter it is worth reflecting briefly on the epochal nature of the events preceding the Peace of Phoinike, which in its lists of *adscripti* illustrates that intimate interweaving of interests and events that Polybios regarded as characteristic of the period (his *symploke*), though we have seen that with the exception of Attalos no Asian power was yet “interwoven” – Prousius is not known to have actually done anything outside Asia Minor. The mediation attempts of Rhodes and Ptolemy and others illustrate the interconnections that surely existed, though at a much less intense level than with the

warring parties themselves. The major development was clearly the eight-year-long presence of Roman troops in the Balkans, years in which Roman commanders and officers made friends and enemies, years in which they got to know the richness, but also the complexity, of interstate relations in the Greek world, years in which they tried to fit into the existing structure of interstate relations, but also to manipulate them for their own perceived interests. The Peace of Phoinike could not turn back the clock. Friendships and resentments, personal and public, could be regulated and described by a treaty. But in the nature of things, contacts were interpersonal and were not broken off merely because of a treaty – particularly not those with friends – just because the war was over and the soldiers went home. They would be back.

Storm in the Balkans

325 300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25

205	Peace of Phoinike
204	Death of Ptolemy "Philopator"; accession of Ptolemy V "Epiphanes"; outbreak of "Cretan War"
203	Antiochos III in western Asia Minor
202	Philip V operates in the north Aegean, takes Lysimacheia, Chalkedon, Kios, Myrleia, and Thasos; [Battle of Zama]
201-200	"Fifth Syrian War"
201	Philip V takes Samos and operates in Karia; battles of Lade and Chios; attack on Pergamon
201/200	Philip shut into Bargylia; appeal of Attalos and Rhodes to Rome
201	Roman envoys in Greece; Athens declares war on Macedonia; Roman army crosses to Illyria for "Second Macedonian War"
198	Titus Quinctius Flamininus takes command in Greece; Aitolia and Achaia join Rome
197	Battle of Kynoskephalai; death of Attalos of Pergamon; Antiochos III operates in coastal Asia Minor
196	Antiochos III at Lysimacheia; Flamininus' Isthmian proclamation
195	Allies campaign against Nabis; Nemean Games
194	Romans withdraw troops from Balkans
193	Senate ratifies Flamininus' <i>acta</i> ; delegates from Greece and from Antiochos III in Rome
192	Outbreak of war between Antiochos III and Rome
191	Battle of Thermopylai; defeat of Antiochos III
190/89	Battle of Magnesia; defeat and capitulation of Antiochos III
189	Capitulation of Aitolia

I Intermezzo

The events of the fifteen years that followed the “Peace of Phoinike” changed permanently the state structure of the Macedonia-dominated Hellenistic world. The critical nature of the nearest future was, however, not immediately apparent to the two major players, Philip V in Macedonia, who had just made what seemed to be a favorable treaty with Rome, and Antiochos III, returning to Syria after his glorious expedition to India. Indeed, a wholly traditional window of opportunity seemed to be opening up, when in 204 Ptolemy IV Philopator, still in his mid-thirties, suddenly died at Alexandria, leaving his six-year-old son, soon to be known as Ptolemy V Epiphanes, as his successor. At about the same time, his long-term chief adviser Sosibios also died, and a struggle for influence at court quickly left queen Arsinoe (III), Epiphanes’ mother, as well as Agathokles, his family, and closest associates all dead (Polybios 15.24a–34). Envoys were indeed sent out by the new Alexandrian regime to Macedonia and to Antiochos, also to Rome and doubtless to other interested states, announcing the takeover of Epiphanes and claiming continuity with the regime of his father. But it is hardly surprising that Philip, whose activities in western Greece were now formally restricted by the treaty with Rome, and Antiochos, fresh from his Iranian successes, began to eye Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, Asia Minor, and Syria as being up for grabs, particularly since the new regime in Alexandria was occupied not only with itself but also with the ongoing indigenous revolt in the south and civil disturbances in the delta region.

A further area where local conditions attracted the interest of external powers was Crete, the cities of which for centuries now had supplied specialist troops to those who could afford to pay for them, and so stimulated the political interest of potential employers. Recently a major war in Crete itself had split the leading cities, Knosos and Gortyn, over their claim to lead the Cretan Federation (*koinon*). This bitter war – the “War of Lyttos” (ca. 222–218), which also caused a civil war in Gortyn – also attracted postwar non-Cretan intervention, on the side of the Federation, now under the leadership of the dominant faction in Gortyn, from Philip and his Greek allies, on the side of Knosos from Rhodes. Philip was even formally declared “Protector” (*prostates*) of the Federation. A new war in Crete, known to contemporaries simply as the “Cretan War” (*Kretikos Polemos*), blew up again ca. 204, at a time when Philip was in any case on the lookout for new opportunities, and Rhodes, as always, was eager to expand its influence in order to avoid being absorbed by the major powers. Details are no longer recoverable, but a series of treaties preserved by

inscriptions show that Rhodes and Attalos were trying to cement long-term interests on the island in order to counteract the existing strong position at Gortyn and with the Federation that Philip still enjoyed. There is, however, no evidence that the external powers clashed militarily on the island. (Treaties: Rhodes and Hierapytna: StV 551 = Austin² 113; Rhodes and Olous: StV 552; Attalos and Lato, Attalos and Malla: Ducrey-van Effenterre, *Kretika Chronika* 1, 1969, 277f. [with French tr.]).

The island of Rhodes, which began to play a major political role at this period, owed its primary importance to its unique strategic position at the southeastern corner of the Aegean, which made it a natural port of call for shipping traveling to and from the eastern Mediterranean. The island, which became a unified state with a democratic constitution in the later fifth century, had from the earliest times exploited its position both to acquire territorial possessions on the neighboring mainland (the *Peraia* in Karia), which it used to extend its state territory by integrating the population as full citizens into its state structure, and to build up widespread trading contacts. By the early Hellenistic period the island had acquired an important role as a center of the long-distance Aegean grain trade – most Greek cities were chronically dependent on agrarian imports either from Egypt or from the Ukraine – and had also invested in a sizable navy to protect its interests. During the wars of the successors, the Rhodians struggled to maintain good relations with all powers in order to preserve their own independent position, but were forced to suffer the attack of Demetrios Poliorketes in 304, when they refused to take his side in his and Antigonos' dispute with Ptolemy I. This uncomfortable polarization brought the city unexpected support at the time from Demetrios' opponents – especially from Ptolemy – as well as an enormous boost in prestige when Demetrios was forced to withdraw and to concede the Rhodians the right to uphold their friendly relations with Ptolemy. The Rhodians celebrated their success by erecting an enormous statue of their protector god Halios (the sun) at the harbor, known as “the colossus of Rhodes,” where every shipper entering the port could not fail to see it and be reminded by it of Demetrios' defeat.

During the third century the Rhodian democracy upheld its principle of not tying itself to any of the major powers, even to the extent of fighting against Ptolemy II in the 250s, when it saw its Aegean interests threatened by Ptolemaic naval hegemony. All in all this policy of engaged neutrality proved successful, Rhodes flourished economically, and when a serious earthquake shook the city in 227 Rhodian prestige was so great that all major powers sent contributions for rebuilding, though the colossus proved to be irreparably damaged.

It was, therefore, in a sense only a natural continuation of this independent policy when Rhodes played a leading role among those states trying to mediate both in the Social War, the “Fourth Syrian War,” and the “First Macedonian War” – all these warlike activities of the major powers threatened the stability of the status quo in the Aegean area on which Rhodian prosperity depended. In the Peace of Phoinike Rhodes was therefore not listed as an ally of either side, though potential points of irritation with Macedonia existed in Karia, since Doson’s expedition there in 227, and Rhodian activity in Crete in these years was clearly intended to counteract the influence there exerted by Philip V.

Evidence for developments of the years after the Peace of Phoinike until 201/200 is slight and uneven, only a broad picture emerging. In Europe, Philip began a new orientation of his expansionist policies, aiming to avoid provoking Rome or Aitolia by setting priorities in the traditional area of Macedonian interests in the North Aegean, but also by following up the initiatives of his uncle Antigonos Doson in southwestern Asia Minor, where, however, he risked provoking Rhodes. At home he reorganized the military recruitment system in Macedonia, and drew up strict disciplinary rules for the army and for garrison troops. The documents that inform us about these rules are unfortunately not dated precisely, but best suit this period of readjustment. It is a remarkable fact that they were widely circulated and officially published on stone throughout the kingdom. Two of them are still known, each from two separate copies, so it is clear that the reforms were intended to be both permanent and well publicized (Hatzopoulos, *L’armée macédonienne*). At the same time, Philip built up a fleet again which he began to use in the Aegean, where a clash with the existing interests of other powers – Ptolemy, Rhodes, and Pergamon above all – became almost inevitable. Nevertheless, Philip’s first actions after 205 were in traditional Macedonian areas: against the Dardanians in the Axios (Vardar) valley and towards the establishment of good relations with the Thracian Odrysians in the valley of the Hebros. A small Macedonian fleet commanded by Herakleides, an exile from Tarentum, operated in the Aegean and incurred the wrath of the Rhodians, who now, or perhaps only later, claimed rather improbably that he was responsible for the outbreak of a major fire in their dockyards (Polybios 13.4–5; Polyainos 5.17.2).

Antiochos

In Asia Minor Antiochos paid his first visit since defeating Achaïos, and followed up Zeuxis’ steady expansion of the Seleukid presence in the area since 213. In May 203 the Seleukid takeover of little Amyzon

in Karia was quite recent – Zeuxis wrote to the Amyzonians assuring them good treatment, such as they had received from Ptolemy (RC 38 = Ma 5). Neighboring Alabanda and Alinda also joined, or rejoined, the Seleukid fold at about this time, and Mylasa, where Olympichos, the Seleukid governor who had gone over to Doson in the 220s, had ruled earlier, also received friendly attention from Zeuxis (Ma 15). Antiochos himself operated in Ionia, where he took Teos from Attalos in 203 (SEG 41, 1003 = Austin² 191 = Ma 17), perhaps also Lebedos and Kolophon, thus presenting a challenge to nearby Ptolemaic Ephesos as well as to the remaining Attalid possessions in the area. Antiochos was anxious to appear generous at Teos, where the Asian guild of the so-called “Dionysian Artists” had recently taken up permanent residence, perhaps under Attalid protection (SEG 2, 580 = Le Guen, TE 39). The Dionysian Artists were an association of men (*koinon*) organized as a religious society honoring Dionysos that provided participants for the cultural competitions at the major religious festivals. Their prestigious status as an independent international organization was widely recognized and respected. Antiochos now canceled taxes raised by Attalos and, paying especial respect to the Dionysian Artists, declared the city and its territory “sacred and inviolable.” As at Sardeis in 213, a series of ambassadors from Teos went back and forth to Antiochos and Laodike, reporting honors voted to the king and to Laodike – statues, altars, regular sacrifices, even a Laodike fountain – were decreed over the next months or years, in an endeavor to demonstrate loyalty and enthusiasm for the unavoidable change of master. Antiochos had nothing to lose and everything to gain by showing generosity (Ma 17 = Le Guen, TE 42; 18–19). Teos then launched an international campaign to have its status as “sacred and inviolable” recognized, just as neighboring Miletos and Magnesia had done a few years before, and their envoys enjoyed the support of Antiochos, but also that of Philip of Macedonia, being accompanied by a locally resident Macedonian called Perdikkas when they visited Cretan cities that were under Philip’s influence (Rigsby 132–161).

Figure 10 Official coin portrait of the young Antiochos III, issued at Antioch or Apameia in Syria, 223–200. Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



After 203 Seleukid expansion in Asia Minor seems to have ceased, although in Karia further possibilities, especially on the coasts, were easily available. But Ptolemaic weakness offered Antiochos a much more attractive window of opportunity than merely to gain control of a few tiny coastal cities in Asia Minor. A renewed attempt to realize the old Seleukid claim on Koile Syria and Palestine, where the chances of his seasoned troops must now have seemed much better than at the time of his first attempt in 220, was a chance not to be missed. As a result, some kind of agreement was reached with Philip, who now conveniently shared Antiochos' hostility to Attalos of Pergamon, concerning the coastal cities still held by Ptolemaic garrisons, above all in Karia. This was, of course, not the first time that Antigonid and Seleukid interests had coincided. Indeed, the need to prevent such cooperation had been a major driving force for Ptolemaic engagement in the Aegean area under the first three Ptolemies. Now the long-feared worst-case scenario had come about. Nevertheless, both the extent and the importance of this local agreement were later exaggerated by historians writing about it, whether on Rhodes, which

was badly affected by Philip's aggressive actions in and near its mainland *Peraia*, or by Polybios himself, who turned it into a secret "robber treaty," aimed at dividing up Ptolemaic possessions everywhere, including Egypt itself. In fact, the agreement cannot have been much more than a mutual non-intervention pact, whereby Zeuxis was committed to giving some logistical support to Philip's coastal operations in Karia (Polybios 3.3.8; 15.20; 16.1; Appian, *Makedonike* 4.1).

In Syria, Antiochos was now finally able to occupy Ptolemaic Koile Syria and Palestine in what we call the "Fifth Syrian War," almost exactly one hundred years after Seleukos Nikator's success at Ipsos in 301 founded his claim to the area. The main attack was well prepared and took place early in 201. Seleukid troops pushed on quickly to Gaza, where they met their first serious resistance, but by the autumn the city had fallen (Polybios 3.2.8; 16.18.2; 22a). During the next months, a Ptolemaic counterattack led by the Aitolian mercenary general Skopas, who had gone to serve in Egypt in 205 when the war in Greece ceased, reestablished Ptolemaic control temporarily in Judaea, and Skopas pushed on up the Jordan valley, perhaps trying to isolate the Seleukid troops in the south. He reached Panion before being forced to face Antiochos' army. This time the result was not in doubt. Skopas' forces were virtually annihilated and he himself and some survivors took refuge at Sidon, where he was besieged. Attempts to relieve him failed, and after holding out for several months he gave himself up early in 199, received honorable release, and therewith Ptolemaic Koile Syria and Palestine were gone forever. A new Seleukid administration took over responsibility at once.

Not much is known about how the change of regime immediately affected the inhabitants. Until the 160s we have very little information about the area, but one prominent family, originating at Aspendos in Pamphylia and until the crisis serving the Ptolemaic government in Syria, saw the writing on the wall in time and changed sides while the going was good. Ptolemaios, son of Thraseas, was an officer of Ptolemy IV and had exercised a command at the battle of Raphia (Polybios 5.65.3). He currently possessed estates – doubtless granted to him or an earlier member of his family by the king – in the Jordan valley near Skythopolis, but as early as 199 he had already obtained the status of Seleukid general and high priest of Koile Syria and Phoinikia. This post his father had held before him under Ptolemy IV (*SEG* 39, 1596) and it was a directly parallel position to the recently recreated Seleukid post in Asia Minor, now held by Nikanor. The correspondence which Ptolemaios conducted with the king concerning the future status of his estates under the new administration – all major questions were decided in Ptolemaios' favor – he had engraved

on stone and set up permanently, in order to document publicly the confirmation of his privileged ownership by the new Seleukid administration (*SEG* 29, 1613 = Austin² 193). Somewhat later, the same Ptolemaios set up a dedication to “Hermes, Herakles, and the Great King Antiochos” at Soloi in Kilikia, sometime after 197 when Soloi returned to Seleukid control (*OGIS* 230).

The documentation concerning the estates of Ptolemaios also illustrates incidentally the existence by 199 of a whole range of Seleukid administrative officials, both financial and military, who were by then already in post in the new territories. How many of them shared Ptolemaios’ survival abilities at a lower level of prominence, being simply taken over by Antiochos’ men because they knew the ropes locally, is not known, but it is improbable that he was the only one. Some local elites, like the Transjordanian Jewish family of the Tobiads, whose representative Joseph we have already met as Ptolemaic tax-farmer under Ptolemy III Euergetes, survived as a local elite under the Seleukids, just as their ancestors had done under the Persians and more recently under the Ptolemies. Even though the family story led to later Jewish romancing, it seems most probable that, despite the change of regime, their longstanding private contacts with the Jewish community in Alexandria were not broken off by the Seleukid takeover, which certainly erected no iron curtain. Whether the Tobiads continued to operate as tax-farmers is, however, unknown (novelistic account in Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 12.154f.).

The status of existing cities and communities also required attention after the conquest. Here the pattern seems to have been similar to what we have already seen in Sardeis and Teos, if a royal letter written to the Jews in Jerusalem preserved by Josephos is anything to go by. The letter is directed to none other than the local governor, Ptolemaios, whom we have just met as landowner at Skythopolis, and begins by thanking the Jewish authorities for their help in expelling the Ptolemaic garrison, so justifying generous treatment to repair war damage. As in the Greek cities and their gymnasia in Asia Minor, so in Jerusalem generous grants were made to the Jews to enable them to continue sacrificial activity at the temple and to import building timber tax free; their right to live under their own laws was explicitly confirmed, and population elements that had been taken away and enslaved were restored, as far as possible. Special tax relief was also granted to some specific population groups (Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 12.138–144 = Austin² 215 = Burstein 35). Details of such grants doubtless varied from place to place, depending on local conditions and needs, as well as on the attitude shown by the beneficiaries towards the conqueror during the war. But in general it seems clear that it was not just selfless philanthropy that

conditioned Antiochos' attitude to his new subjects but the hard-headed realization that the newly conquered territories would be much easier to control and exploit if the traditional elites could be won over by generous treatment, whether as individuals or as whole communities. The restoration of stable political and social conditions and the prosperity that was likely to go along with them was so obviously in the interests both of the conqueror and the conquered that it would be a great surprise if Antiochos' treatment of the Jews of Jerusalem was fundamentally exceptional.

Macedonia

While Antiochos was enjoying the satisfaction of achieving the century-old objective in Syria that none of his dynastic predecessors had accomplished, Philip's contemporary expansionist activities in the Aegean area were giving cause for widespread concern among the middle-range powers. In 202 he operated with his new fleet in the north Aegean and the Sea of Marmara, where he cooperated with his brother-in-law Prousius in Bithynia. During the recent war the Aitolian League had provocatively expanded its activities into this area of traditional Macedonian interest, doubtless encouraged by Pergamon and Rome, and Aitolian operatives were still active there. At Lysimacheia Philip expelled an Aitolian garrison, Chalkedon was an Aitolian ally when Philip took it; an Aitolian commander (*strategos*) was present at Kios when Philip and Prousius took the city. These brushes with recently developed Aitolian interests, together with other Macedonian activities in the area – pressure on Byzantion and the capture of Myrleia – stimulated an Aitolian appeal to Rome which, however, was turned down: Hannibal was still not finally defeated in Africa and the Aitolians were in any case no longer regarded as reliable allies (Livy 31.29.4). On returning home along the north Aegean coast, Philip seized the island of Thasos and treated it so roughly that our hostile source – here again exaggerating – talks of “enslavement” (Polybios 15.24.1–3). Kios, after being plundered, was refounded by Prousius as a dynastic city, “Prousius by the Sea,” while Myrleia also received a dynastic name, becoming Apameia, named after Apama, Philip's sister and Prousius' wife (Strabo 12.4.3). It seems clear that nobody in the area except the Aitolians was paying much attention to Rome.

In 201 Philip's aggressive activities in the Aegean provoked both Rhodes and Pergamon to oppose him physically. During the year he took Ptolemaic Samos, though he could not hold it for long; he was then attacked at Lade near Miletos by a Rhodian fleet, thus opening active hostilities that were to have a desperate ending for him. In

recent years the Rhodians had modestly expanded their traditional territorial holdings in the Karian mainland area (the *Peraia*): inland Stratonikeia had been given them by Seleukos II, and more recently friendly relations with coastal Iasos and some other places had been established. Philip now began to operate precisely in this area, taking up contacts that Doson created a quarter of a century ago and that his governor Olympichos subsequently kept up for him. Some of these Karian “friendships” had to be restored by force – probably against Rhodian opposition – as at Euromos, where Philip’s old general, Alexandros son of Admetos, retook the town, the citizens then thanking him effusively for doing “what they had hoped for,” in particular for causing no damage and for restoring exiles; they even demonstrated the seriousness of their enthusiasm by renaming their city “Philippoi” (*SEG* 43, 706; *SEG* 36, 973 = Ma 29). The exiles restored by Alexandros were clearly very grateful and after their restoration very influential at Euromos.

Figure 11 Early official coin portrait of the young Macedonian king Philip V wearing the diadem, probably issued at Pella, ca. 220–217. Calouste Gulbenkian Museum, Lisbon. Photo: Reinaldo Viegas, digit: Magda Gomes, April 2007.



Philip had not forgotten Attalos of Pergamon's gratuitous provocation in 211, when he joined Aitolia and Rome. Philip now set out to pay him back, launching an attack on Pergamon itself, where he caused a great deal of damage outside the city walls, including the destruction of Attalos' victory shrine, the *Nikephorion*, built to commemorate his victories against the Galatians. This piece of barbarism provoked immediate naval cooperation between Attalos and the Rhodians, who inflicted serious damage on Philip's fleet in an encounter near Chios. Philip nevertheless continued to operate in the eastern Aegean, but when autumn came he found himself and his new fleet shut into the little Karian harbor of Bargylia by the Rhodian fleet, which kept up a blockade throughout the winter 201/200. As supplies began to run out, Philip's foragers experienced increasing difficulty in finding supplies, and felt forced to use violence against local suppliers as well as to operate ever farther afield. This inevitably made Philip unpopular in the area and caused irritation with the Seleukid administrators, since such casual and unforeseen actions made it

virtually impossible to avoid damaging Seleukid interests: Philip complained to Zeuxis that he was failing to support him as his agreement with Antiochos had foreseen (Polybios 16.1–2; 24).

All this was going on without Philip's paying much attention to events in the west, where in 202 Hannibal was comprehensively defeated on his home soil near Zama and by spring 201 the peace treaty ending the long war with Carthage was agreed. Under these circumstances, Philip's gratuitous attack on Pergamon that drove Attalos and Rhodes into coalition proved to be a major error of judgment, for Attalos did not forget his cooperation with Rome, which had made him party to the Peace of Phoinike as *adscriptus*. While Philip was operating in Karia, Attalos and the Rhodians sent envoys to Rome, doubtless hoping that Rome, now freed from the Carthaginian war, would exert sufficient diplomatic pressure on Philip to make him drop his plans to dominate Aegean affairs. When the envoys arrived in Rome late in 201, shortly before the consular elections for 200, they could scarcely have suspected that a number of influential senators, now that Hannibal was finally defeated, still regarded Philip as unfinished business and would welcome the complaints of their Greek friends as support for arguments against Roman waverers. In the consular elections, the old commander in Greece, Publius Sulpicius Galba, was one of those elected, but even before the consuls entered office a high-powered delegation was sent off to Greece to attend to the immediate complaints of their friends. Their instructions were to insist to Philip that he cease making war on "the Greeks" and that he compensate Attalos, as assessed by a neutral commission, for the damage he had done in his attack on Pergamon. They were empowered to threaten Roman intervention in case of non-compliance (Polybios 16.27).

By the time these Roman envoys reached Greece early in 200, Philip had extricated his fleet from Bargylia and was again operating in north Aegean waters, now against Abydos on the Dardanelles. The Roman envoys informed the governments in the places they visited en route of their purpose – Epeiros, the Athamanian king Amyntandros, the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, and Athens. Only at Athens did they receive an unadulterated welcome, for since the previous autumn Athens rather surprisingly also found itself in a serious clinch with Macedonia. Athenian policy since the ejection of the Macedonian garrison in 229/8 had been dominated by the brothers Eurykleides and Mikion, who after the liberation of the city had persuaded their fellow-citizens that only a policy of neutrality was sustainable. This was carried out initially with the background support of Egypt, since in the 220s Ptolemy III found it convenient to support Athens, while Doson was building up his Security Pact in Greece. Neutral Athens

was of course not a member of this, but Ptolemaic financial and moral support was gratefully received, a new citizenship division (a *phyle*) “Ptolemais” being created, which served to integrate immediate gratitude into the permanent political structure of the city. This had all worked out quite well, and Athens managed to avoid immediate involvement in the Social War and the First Macedonian War, despite the presence of Macedonian fortresses nearby at Korinth and Chalkis.

By 200 Eurykleides and Mikion were both dead and the labile situation in Egypt meant that at the most only moral support could be expected from there. It was therefore an ill-considered act when in autumn 201 the Athenians condemned and put to death two young Akarnanians, who had accidentally participated in some of the secret religious rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries reserved for the initiated. Moral outrage is more often than not a bad political adviser, and the political dimension of the affair was initially ignored. It was soon brought home to the Athenians, since Akarnania was a loyal Macedonian ally. An Akarnanian protest received a sympathetic hearing from Philip and produced active Macedonian support for a punitive raid on Athens – Philip, given his renewed naval activity in the Aegean, would doubtless have loved to have the Peiraeus in Macedonian hands again. Four Athenian ships were actually arrested by the royal fleet (Liv. 31.14.6f.). The Athenians reacted in the only way they knew: by manning the forts in the country at Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sounion, and by canceling all honors ever voted for an Antigonid king, including the two-century-old *phylai* Antigonis and Demetrias, as well as the priesthoods that looked after their memorial cult. A gilded equestrian statue of Demetrios Poliorketes was demolished, and every mention of an Antigonid king in a public document was supposed to be chiseled out – many inscriptions that otherwise survive intact were thus defaced by the act of *damnatio memoriae* (Liv. 31.44.2–9).

When the Roman senators arrived at Athens, they therefore found themselves in the middle of a full-scale crisis. Athens had already appealed, for lack on any real alternative, to Attalos and Rhodes, who were in any case at war with Philip, and Attalos in person and Rhodian representatives were present and supported the Romans in urging the Athenians to formally join in the war. Their arguments were helped by the presence of a Rhodian flotilla in the Peiraeus, which had successfully recovered the four captured Athenian ships, and by Attalos’ assertion that only those who participated in the war could hope to profit from it. Athens accepted the challenge and declared war on Philip (Polybios 16.25–26). When the next Macedonian attack on Attika occurred, its commander Nikanor was met outside the city walls by members of the Roman delegation, who

communicated their message from the senate to Philip and urged Nikanor to pass it on to his king (Polybios 16.27). At about the same time the Athenians sent one of their prominent citizens, Kephisodoros, who had already been instrumental in gaining the support of Attalos and Rhodes, to Rome to inform the senate of their action and their expectation of help (Pausanias 1.36.6). Once the war was over, Kephisodoros was honored for his life's work of service to the state, in particular for his embassies "on the most serious matters concerning the security of the cities of Athens and Peiraieus and the land of Attika" (*ISE* 33). At Athens Attalos replaced the dishonored Macedonians by being honored with the creation of a new *phyle* with all the appropriate cultic impedimenta, named "Attalis" after him.

Philip showed himself unimpressed by the Roman ultimatum, and after the Roman delegates left for Rhodes, en route for Alexandria where they wanted to find out what was going on in Syria and perhaps even mediate a peace, the Macedonians attacked Attica again, this time commanded by Philokles, Philip's fortress commander at Chalkis (Livy 31.26). Philip himself set off for the Dardanelles, en route taking control of all remaining Ptolemaic towns and forts in the area, including the important cities of Ainos and Maroneia. He then laid siege to Abydos, a strategic city controlling the narrows, which was supported by some Pergamene and Rhodian forces. Philip was in effect acting as if the Roman envoys were mere do-gooding tourists, mixing in where they had no right to, and his reaction to a visit at Abydos by one of the envoys, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus who came from Rhodes while the siege was going on, merely showed a hardened attitude. Lepidus repeated what Nikanor had been told at Athens, adding – in view of Philip's most recent activities – that he should stop attacking Ptolemaic possessions. Philip's answer was to advise the Romans to respect the treaty of Phoinike, otherwise he knew how to look after himself (Polybios 16.34).

This dialogue of the deaf shows that Philip still had no real appreciation of what was going on in the Roman senate, now that Hannibal was defeated. Caught up in the power-political thinking of the last century of Macedonia-dominated history, he failed to realize that Roman interests by now extended beyond the shores of Epeiros, whether he liked it or not, and that his current Greek opponents saw nothing but immediate advantage for themselves in invoking Rome on their side in a new edition of the First Macedonian War. Nor did he know how close the immediate danger was. At Rome a war-weary people's assembly at first rejected a war motion for renewed hostilities against Macedonia that the senate favored, but after some concessions to war veterans, a new motion was accepted. The experienced consul Publius Sulpicius Galba was given the command, and by late summer

200 he was ready to cross the Adriatic with a large fleet (fifty ships) and a consular army of two legions, just as Abydos was being forced to capitulate to Philip. While the Roman army was building up its landing base in Illyria, part of the fleet went on to the Peiraieus, and with some Athenian aid raided Philip's fortress of Chalkis, without being able to take it. From their base in Illyria some Roman raiding parties also ravaged territories in Upper Macedonia (Livy 31.22–23; 27). That the situation was serious nobody could now deny, but that the Roman intention was to dismantle the dominating position of Macedonia in southern Greece that it had held for almost a century and a half, since the days of the great Philip II, nobody in the Greek world, not even the most ardent supporter of Roman intervention, could seriously have suspected.

II Romans in the Balkans

The year 200 saw the beginning of the end of the political world that the Macedonians had created. We are, however, not concerned here with elucidating in detail Roman motives for interfering so drastically in Greece. It seems clear enough in general that the Roman governing class saw the war against Philip as a continuation, or conclusion, of the Hannibalic War, and the initial aim was – as it had been with Carthage – to dismantle the structural political mechanisms of the state that made the appearance of a threat possible in the first place. Questions concerning what was to follow the demolition of the Macedonian hegemony were secondary, and had to be worked out by the men on the spot during the course of the military operations, to which priority was given. It was inevitably a messy business, given the complexity of the state structure of Greece at this time, as well as the existence of local and regional agendas and traditions that led to greater support or sympathy for one or other of the warring parties. It soon became clear that neutrality was not an option. Under pressure from the overwhelming force that Rome was able to bring to bear, the Macedonian alliance crumbled, but this did not mean that everybody everywhere welcomed the disappearance of Macedonian influence in Greece with equal enthusiasm. There were enough people who thought they still benefited from it.

The Romans began selling their war to the Greeks by announcing a kind of protectorate: Philip was to stop fighting against “the Greeks” (though at the time only Attalos and Rhodes were meant). In the course of the war, in order to gain goodwill among Philip's erstwhile allies, this program was extended in 198 by the new commander,

Titus Quinctius Flamininus, to encompass a demand that Philip additionally evacuate the whole of Greece. Once the Macedonian army had been comprehensively defeated in a major battle at Kynoskephalai in Thessaly in summer 197, Flamininus' extensive demands had to be realized in order to retain the trust of the Greek allies, who had fought the war on this platform. Flamininus, whose command in Greece was renewed annually until 194, had his greatest moment at the Isthmian Games in 196, when he announced to the assembled representatives of the Greek states that the Roman senate declared the Greeks free, and listed explicitly which states and cities Philip had to evacuate – a well-staged media-friendly occasion that made his reputation in some circles as the “Philhellene” – but it soon became clear that freedom required political articulation, just as today free democratic elections do not necessarily bring about the kind of immediate stability or longer-term preparedness to act as the self-appointed liberators think fit. Nevertheless, in 194 Roman troops all went home and Flamininus celebrated a magnificent triumph. It seemed to many, but not to all, that political life could start anew: the limits of freedom needed to be tested.

This section will be concerned not so much with the military events of the war as with its immediate and longer-term effects on the Greek states, since there can be no doubt that the results of the war were the equivalent of a political tsunami, the effective annihilation of Macedonian influence south of the Olympos massif that had orchestrated Greek political and economic development for some 150 years. The dynamic element was the appearance of Rome as a “Hellenistic” power, and experimentation was needed in order to develop mechanisms for integrating the new superpower into the sociopolitical life of the Greek states. The six years of this initial Roman presence divide nicely into two phases: the “hot” war phase that lasted until summer 197, and the peace phase until 194.

War

In phase one everything was subordinated to military needs, Philip trying to keep the members of his Security Pact together, the Romans trying to break it up. In 200 and 199 Galba thought a direct attack on Macedonia through the mountains would be the best way to proceed, preferably with the support of the Aitolian League, as in the first war, while the fleet, supported by squadrons from Pergamon and Rhodes, attacked Macedonian coastal territories in the Aegean. But when the Aitolian League showed little enthusiasm for joining in and Galba failed to bring Philip to battle, despite ravaging the cultivated lands in Upper Macedonia, his ultimate successor Flamininus – an intermediate

commander, P. Villius, was in post only for a few months – felt compelled to spread his interests and look for allies. By the end of 198 he had won over the Aitolians, giving them the impression that they would again enjoy the favorable terms agreed in 212/11 – which he later denied he had done – and more importantly the Achaian League, so driving a major breach into the Macedonian position in southern Greece (the main source for the war is Livy 31–33).

The Achaian League under Aratos had only accepted Macedonian leadership reluctantly in the 220s, when it could no longer cope alone with the Spartan Kleomenes III's aggressive activities in the southern Peloponnese, but important members of the League, such as Argos and Megalopolis, had positively welcomed the move, since they shared a longstanding preference for friendship with Macedonia. Since that time, the citadel of Korinth, the Akrokorinth, housed a Macedonian garrison and certain places in western Achaia were also garrisoned by Philip during the Social War and the First Macedonian War. These wars, however, demonstrated Philip's inability to protect his allies effectively, despite the local garrisons. The most painful Achaian loss was the island of Aigina in 210, but a resurgent Sparta, at first under Machanidas and currently Nabis – both of whom depicted themselves as being in some sense continuators of Kleomenes' social policies – threw the Achaians onto their own resources and forced a reorganization of the army, for which the Megalopolitan Philopoimen was largely responsible (Polybios 11.8–18). In 207 he led the Achaians to victory against Machanidas at Mantinea, and since then they had managed to defend themselves adequately. The outbreak of war between Macedonia and Rome in 200 then uncovered the latent tensions in the Achaian body politic. The pro-Macedonian annual chief magistrate (*strategos*), Kykliadas, failed to persuade the League assembly to support Philip by sending troops to reinforce his garrisons in central Greece; and his successor in office, Aristainos, represented a group of opinion which – given the alternatives that currently presented themselves – massively preferred Rome to Macedon. A League assembly, meeting in September 198, was attended by a high-powered allied delegation, which included Lucius Flamininus, the brother of the Roman commander in chief, and Attalos in person. They spoke persuasively against Philip, and under the circumstances the federal assembly voted by a large majority to join the Roman side, though some representatives – especially those from Argos and Megalopolis – left the meeting in disgust before the already foreseeable decision was taken. Tensions ran high, and Kykliadas, now or perhaps even earlier, went into exile with Philip. An immediate attack by the allies on the Macedonian garrison in the Akrokorinth – apart from Argos, the only Macedonian garrison left in the

Peloponnese by then – failed, but the Achaian decision to support Rome left it isolated (Livy 32.19–23). During the following winter, Nabis at Sparta saw how the wind was blowing and also abandoned Philip, from whom he had only recently taken over Argos, and brought himself into the Roman camp. The Boiotian League in central Greece also soon followed suit, doubtless impressed by the Romans' physical presence when they chose the neighboring Phokian towns of Elateia and Antikyra as their main winter quarters.

Immediate fear of being squeezed by the war between the major powers rather than long-term strategic or other considerations certainly conditioned all these changes of allegiance, but each of the new Roman allies also had its own interests to look after and hoped to improve its position, thanks to Roman military aid. Some of these hopes were ventilated at a meeting of the warring parties at Nikaia, near Thermopylai, in November 198. Polybios recorded the demands of the most prominent Roman allies, a group to which his own fellow-citizens, the Achaians, now belonged. Each had his own priorities. On this occasion, speaking for Rome, Flamininus merely repeated an earlier Roman negotiating position, that Philip withdraw from Greece, adding that the Romans now also wanted some Illyrian possessions recently acquired by Philip, and demanded that Ptolemy recover the places Philip had taken from him. Of the allies, Attalos' representatives were most modest: Philip should restore ships and crews captured in the battle at Chios and repair temples that he had damaged at Pergamon; the Rhodian admiral, Akesimbrotos, was only interested in Philip's current possessions in Asia Minor, particularly in Karia but also on the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara; Achaia required Korinth and Argos, undamaged, while the Aitolians demanded the restoration – also undamaged – of all cities they had ever held in their League. The insistence that places be “undamaged” was a direct result of Philip's actions during the evacuation of parts of Thessaly, where he had pursued a scorched-earth policy, much to the annoyance of both his enemies and his erstwhile Thessalian friends (Polybios 18.13–14).

Each of the Greek allies thus had its own specific war aims, which did not even overlap; only Attalos did not claim territorial advantage. But when it came to the point of serious negotiation, a new and particularly threatening dimension of the Roman intervention emerged. Flamininus declared himself unable to make a decision on major issues without consulting the senate and urged all participants to send plenipotentiaries to Rome, while the armies could not do much anyway because of the winter season. This was not, of course, the first time that Greek envoys had visited Rome. It was, however, the first time that events on the ground in Greece were made

dependent on a detailed decision of the senate – whether the war should continue or not, and what its ultimate aims should be. It was the first time that a dispute among the Greeks themselves was dealt with at Rome by the senate sitting virtually as a mediator. Rome's allies were nevertheless encouraged by their reception, since the senators listened to them carefully, and when they all agreed on demanding that Philip evacuate the fortresses he liked to call the “Fetters of Greece” – Demetrias, Chalkis, and Akrokorinth – the senate took over their demand. Philip's envoys claimed they had no instructions on this fundamental question, whereupon the senate decided the war must go on. Rome's Greek allies were certainly not dissatisfied at their treatment, since they seemed to be about to achieve what they wanted, but the precedent was ominous, since the allies had no real alternative to their Roman pilgrimage. For the first time, concrete Greek interests were laid in the hands of the Roman senate and a decision requested. The senate was therefore becoming involved as supreme mediator in the details of Greek interstate strife, just as more than 150 years before the Macedonian king had been dragged – also not altogether unwillingly – into the toils of intercity dispute in southern Greece, and was only now being ejected again. The Roman senate was thus on the verge of taking on this now classic role of the Macedonian kings because it had decided to break Macedonian power once and for all. The new situation and the potential postwar power vacuum forced the issue.

By May or June 197 Philip had chosen to set everything on the chance of a major battle. He collected every man over sixteen years old at the national shrine at Dion – his recently created mobilization regulations will have facilitated this measure – and marched into Thessaly, heading for Demetrias. En route, near Pherai, he was blocked by Flamininus and his allied army, which included a large Aitolian contingent, and after some maneuvering, the armies met at Kynoskephalai near Skotoussa, some 20 miles inland from Demetrias. Philip's army ended the day virtually annihilated by Flamininus' troops, around half his men being killed or taken prisoner. Further resistance was futile and negotiations were begun.

The peace

The postwar phase was thereby opened. It would have been easier to apply the principle “to the victors the spoils,” if the victors had been able to agree amongst themselves how this was to be done, or even more basically what the spoils were. Roman demands had been that Philip evacuate “Greece”; it now became clear that they meant everything south of Mt. Olympus, including Thessaly, which had been

controlled by Macedonia for 150 years. The critical question was, what was to happen to the evacuated places and who was to decide disputed questions. It soon became clear that, whether the Greek allies liked it or not, the final decision on all questions lay in Roman hands, and the decisive Roman hands were those of the 300 senators who met together in Rome itself. This was most definitely a new dimension in the history of the Hellenistic world.

The full implications of this sea change did not immediately dawn on all participants in the process. Flamininus insisted that Philip and his own allies send representatives to Rome, so that the senate might decide on the sort of peace deal with Philip that Flamininus himself favored. In order to avoid the problem of dismantling and redistributing the territory of Macedonia itself (which the Aitolians, above all, wanted to do), he used the argument that Macedonia as a functioning state was a necessary bullwark against the northern non-Greek tribes. But what was to happen to the other local claims of the Greek allies, especially the Aitolians, who had played a major part in the battle and now expected their reward? What, if any, was to be the future role of Rome in evacuated Greece? A major open question was the possession of the “Fetters,” which after the battle had been occupied by Roman troops. Above all, who was going to decide these questions and put the decisions into practice? In a typical Hellenistic situation, the answer to the last question would have been easy enough: the victorious king and his council of friends, applying what they liked to call their “victor’s rights.” Flamininus was, however, no king – though to many Greeks he must often have seemed to be behaving like one – but a proconsul with flexible though ultimately temporary powers, and whose sociopolitical future was not going to be in ruling Greece but in taking his place as a senior statesman in the Roman senate. In the last resort, it was his fellow senators whom he needed to impress, above all to avoid offending, and the allied representatives who traveled to Rome in autumn 197 soon received answers to the question of who was going to decide what. In Rome this was not even perceived as a serious question. The senate listened attentively to the allies, decided to make peace with Philip as Flamininus had recommended, and appointed ten of its members (*legati*) to go to Greece to help Flamininus sort out answers to open questions on the ground. In the absence of any kind of generally recognized international law, the rule of the strongest, backed by visible military force, was inevitably decisive in distributing the spoils. Modern historians tend to call the decisions these senatorial *legati* took “the Roman settlement of Greece,” thus drawing attention to the one-sidedness of the decision-making process. The principles under which they operated were laid down in a senatorial decree (*senatus*

consultum) that also fixed such details as could be settled in Rome. Polybios gives a résumé: “All the other Greeks in Asia and in Europe were to be free and enjoy their own laws; before the Isthmian Games Philip was to hand over to the Romans those Greeks under his authority and the cities he garrisoned, and should restore freedom to Euromos, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasos, also Abydos, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthos, and remove his garrisons from them” (18.44). This means that a decision, the validity of which depended solely on Roman public law, was about to define the future structure and status of the Hellenistic states in Europe, and some in Asia. It was perhaps a small step for the Roman, but a mighty stride for the Hellenistic states.

Before we look at the way Flamininus and the ten *legati* did their business in the Balkans, it is important to remember Polybios’ idea of “*symploke*” and look briefly at other tentacles of the Hellenistic state system, which at this time were drawing Rome inexorably ever deeper into Greek affairs. Two other events of 197 proved to be as important for future developments as the battle of Kynoskephalai. Sometime early in the year Attalos died, being succeeded at Pergamon unproblematically by his son Eumenes (II), who showed no inclination to alter the political path trodden by his father. He was, however, immediately faced by a major challenge. In 198 Zeuxis took advantage of Attalos’ absence in Greece to attack Pergamene territory, but the real challenge came in 197 when Antiochos himself with a large fleet set out along the south coast of Asia Minor, mopping up remaining Ptolemaic coastal possessions in the area. By the end of the year, while the European Greeks were traveling to Rome to talk to the senate about peace and a prosperous future, he had already taken Ephesos, where he wintered, and some Seleukid troops had reached the Dardanelles at Abydos by then. In inner Karia Zeuxis was also active, and immediately after Kynoskephalai he made an agreement with the small Karian city Philippi (until 201 Euromos, which now went back to its old name), which had seen the writing on the wall for its Macedonian protector and decided it preferred to join Zeuxis rather than Rhodes (*SEG* 36, 973 = Ma 29). Iasos also threw out Philip’s garrison and was occupied by Antiochos’ troops before 196, so this was probably at the same time. Once again, among Rome’s friends, it was Pergamon and Rhodes that were potentially or actually most affected by these changes – the Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor were clearly lost for ever, despite Flamininus’ protective rhetoric about them, which he soon dropped.

This time the constellation in Europe seemed less favorable for Rome’s friends’ chances of involving Rome in their affairs, since only by a large stretch of the imagination could Antiochos be regarded as deserving Roman hostile attention. Indeed, the one diplomatic contact

we know of – in 200, when Roman *legati* tried to mediate in Syria – had been friendly-neutral. Rhodes recognized the problem and began to negotiate directly with Antiochos, as soon as he approached their common area of interest. Antiochos proved happy enough to let the Rhodians provisionally obtain some influence in a number of ex-Ptolemaic cities in Karia, including Kaunos and Halikarnassos, but also further afield at Samos, as long as their fleet did not otherwise block his progress. Eumenes will doubtless have expressed his concern at this development, but so soon after his father's death his own personal influence with the Romans still needed building up. In any case, in 197 Flamininus was fully occupied in Europe and had no mandate for operating farther afield, even if he had thought it advisable, or even urgent, to do so. This time it was left to two smaller communities, two individual cities, Smyrna and Lampsakos, to appeal directly to Rome. Smyrna had been declared “sacred and inviolable” as well as “free and tax-free” by Antiochos' father Seleukos II nearly fifty years before, and since then had upheld its special status through all the changes that had taken place in Asia Minor. Antiochos' current approach, however, was regarded at Smyrna as being intrinsically hostile, nor was Pergamon likely to prove much better at respecting Smyrna's privileged status (and was in any case much weaker). Rome was therefore chosen for an appeal, and Smyrna's envoys, arriving around the time that the senate was considering the terms of its peace with Philip, received a friendly reception.

The same happened to Lampsakos, about which a long inscription honoring Hegesias, the head of mission, informs us. The Greek historical conscience played a significant role in this action. Both Lampsakos and Massilia (Marseilles) had been founded – hundreds of years before – as colonies of Phokaia, and were therefore in a loose sense related. Moreover, the Lampsakenes also put forward the view that they were even related to the Romans through Rome's (alleged) Trojan origins, since Lampsakos was currently a member of the religious Ilian League, centered on the temple of Athena at Ilion (Troy). But the Massilian connection seemed a much better bet for a diplomatic initiative in the first instance, since it was well known that the city, at the latest since the Hannibalic War, enjoyed excellent relations with Rome. Hegesias therefore first traveled the length of the Mediterranean to Massilia to gain diplomatic support for Lampsakos' complaints in Rome against Antiochos. Whether or not the support of Massilia was really necessary, Hegesias was well received in Rome, and on his way back home he also conferred with the ten senatorial *legati* and Flamininus at their base at Korinth. Defense of the free status of Smyrna and Lampsakos then became part of the Roman diplomatic arsenal towards Antiochos (Livy 33.38.1–3; Syll.³ 591 =

In his newly acquired Asian territories Antiochos continued the type of patronal discourse that we saw used at Sardeis in 213 and at Teos in 204/3. On the one hand, the king (and/or queen Laodike) received thanks for their favorable treatment of a given city, formulated in an official decree passed by a public meeting of the citizens and formally presented to the royal authorities (sometimes transmitted through Zeuxis); on the other hand the royal conquerors showed themselves munificent, whether through tax relief, one-off gifts, guaranteed supplies – including the expensive oil used for anointing in the gymnasium – or cash distributions for one local purpose or another. Either now or earlier, thanksgiving cults of the ruler with regular – even monthly – sacrifices completed the euergetic circle of mutual giving, thanking, and showing respect. Two decisions from Karia, from Herakleia by Latmos and from Iasos, illustrate this restored patronal relationship in great detail (Ma 26 = Austin²198 = Burstein 36; 27; 28; 31). Elsewhere the patterns vary in detail according to local needs and conditions, but the discourse will have been widely repeated. Publication on stone once again emphasizes for us the essential importance for the subject communities of publicizing the functionality of this mutually beneficial patronal relationship, in addition to making known the precise immediate benefits that the cities obtained. The clearest statement of Antiochos' basic attitude was formulated in 196 at Smyrna, where he objected to the city's resistance and charged the citizens with "usurping" or "seizing" their freedom, while he insisted it be made clear to everybody that their freedom was dependent on a royal grant, was therefore a privilege, not a right (Livy 33.38.6). This was the discourse of patronal imperialism. Moreover, it operated in a politically closed zone. If we only possessed the Seleukid internal documents and the statements that give expression to an unchanging way of doing imperial business, we would have no idea that a major political crisis was brewing at this time, caused not least by the events that activated these very expressions of mutual respect from subordinate city and its monarchic ruler.

Back in Greece, at the end of winter 197/6 the senatorial *legati* set about putting into practice the *senatus consultum* that foresaw the "freedom" of the places evacuated by Philip. Their work was complicated by two factors, the precise ramifications of which were difficult to assess. One was connected with the disappointment of the Aitolian League at not receiving all the territories that it had hoped to regain in central Greece after ejecting the Macedonians. Since Flamininus had – at least temporarily – put Roman garrisons into the "Fetters" and some other strategic places, Aitolian representatives

began to proclaim to anybody who would listen that it looked as if they had thrown off Philip's garrisons, only to be dominated by Roman ones. For them, "Greek freedom" as currently experienced was a farce, since it restricted the freedom of their League to expand into the evacuated territories. The other imponderable factor was uncertainty about the ultimate aims of Antiochos, who had crossed the Dardanelles into Europe just as the *legati* began their work in Greece, and begun reconstructing the city of Lysimacheia in the Chersonese, recently evacuated by Philip after a devastating earthquake. In 197 Antiochos had already taken over some of the places in southern Asia Minor – but also Abydos – where Philip had installed garrisons and which now, after Philip's defeat, according to the Roman ideas formulated in the *senatus consultum*, belonged to Rome to dispose of – to liberate, as they saw it. The appeals of Smyrna and Lampsakos, doubtless reinforced by reports from Eumenes and perhaps from other places – Alexandria Troas is later named as having offered resistance to Antiochos – will have contributed to the uncertainty about how to react.

The *legati*, not surprisingly, did not all share the same opinion about how things would develop in these areas – how could they, since nobody really knew? Some preferred to maintain a residual Roman military presence in Greece, despite Aitolian complaints, others like Flamininus himself advocated evacuating the troops in order to create the firm impression that Rome entertained no longer-term plans for controlling Greece, now that Philip was defeated. An evacuation would stimulate a positive balance of Greek goodwill that could be activated to meet any future challenge. In summer 196 the international games at the Isthmia near Korinth were due to take place, and Flamininus chose the occasion to make a major policy statement. He emphasized the positive effects for the Greeks of the Roman victory by declaring all peoples south of Macedonia who had been dominated by the Macedonians "free, ungarrisoned, untaxed, and enjoying their own laws and way of life" (Polybios 18.46.5). The announcement was greeted with immediate expressions of enormous enthusiasm, though working out the details proved more problematic. One thing was, however, clear enough: that Macedonian control of lands south of Olympos – especially Thessaly and the "Fetters" – was gone forever, and that Rome intended to guarantee this situation. It was a dramatically assertive response to Aitolian suspicions.

Antiochos also sent representatives to the Games that were essentially a major pan-Hellenic religious occasion, and since the cities of Asia were mentioned in a general way in the *senatus consultum*, presumably included in order to accommodate the wishes of Eumenes and Rhodes as well as of Smyrna and Lampsakos, Antiochos'

representatives were interviewed by the *legati*. The official Roman position remained insistent on the restoration of the pre-197 status quo: Antiochos was to keep his hands off the autonomous cities, to make war on none of them, and to evacuate those that used to be Ptolemaic or had belonged to Philip. Moreover, he was not to cross to Europe with an army (which he had already done), since none of the Greeks were being fought against or were subject to anybody else, so requiring liberation by Antiochos. A Roman mission would visit Antiochos personally to pass on the message. When it finally did so, towards autumn 196, the Romans simply repeated these demands, only to receive the well-prepared reply that they had no right to interfere in Asia at all, since Antiochos did not mix in Italian affairs; Thrace was his by right, going back to his ancestor Seleukos' defeat of Lysimachos; as far as Ptolemaic possessions were concerned, he was about to marry a daughter to Ptolemy V, so Ptolemaic affairs were now a family matter and concerned nobody else; and Rhodes, not Rome, would be a suitable arbitrator for his dispute with Smyrna and Lampsakos (Polybios 18.50–52). The Roman envoys had no adequate answer to this consummate diplomatic performance, which Antiochos followed up next spring with a request for a formal alliance with Rome. Flamininus suggested his envoys take their request to Rome, since only the senate could decide such things, but they seem not to have done so. This was the last known contact between Rome and Antiochos for two years. The basic position of both parties was clear, but neither wanted to press the issue.

In Greece itself the *legati* and Flamininus spent their time visiting the newly liberated territories, talking to the people involved and deciding on new structures. The Aitolians were allowed to incorporate some contiguous territories, Phokis and East Lokris, into their League, but in Thessaly, apart from Phthiotic Thebes, their wishes were refused. The Thessalian cities were reorganized into a separate League of their own, which counted its first year from 197/6, the date of the restoration in principle of an ancient political structure that had largely lapsed under Macedonian rule. Problems associated with individual property rights were widespread after such a long period of Macedonian domination, and these required the individual attention of the Roman representatives. A letter written by Flamininus to the Thessalian city Chyretiai regulated such questions, and was regarded by the recipients as being so important that they had it engraved on stone, just as many such favorable decisions by kings were locally engraved throughout the Greek world. In this document we possess an early example of a Roman proconsul not only slipping automatically into the role of a king, using language indistinguishable in tone and attitude from royal utterances, but also having his communication

treated by the citizens with exactly the same kind of respect as they would have treated the letter of a king (Syll.³ 592 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 33 = BD² 37).

The Aitolian League may well have been dissatisfied, but so far its leaders merely complained verbally. A more serious problem for Flamininus' program presented itself in the Peloponnese where the current Spartan ruler, Nabis, whose enemies called him a "tyrant" – though he was related to one of the old royal families – had gained control of Argos from Philip during the war, and immediately thereafter joined Rome. Argos, when Nabis took over, was a member of the Achaian League, and Sparta had for centuries been Argos' major opponent in the Peloponnese. This conflict of principles might have been resolvable, had not Nabis also acquired the reputation of continuing to practice the social ideas of the Spartan revolutionaries, while at the same time running a pirate regime with the aid of some equally piratically inclined Cretans. All in all, he was represented as being a thoroughly bad lot, a serious thorn in the flesh of the rather conservative landowning governing classes in Achaia, who were only too happy to spread stories of Nabis' atrocities – even worse were those of his equally appalling wife! – all at the cost of the better-situated Achaia- supporting classes at Argos. Tensions therefore rose in the Peloponnese after the war. Flamininus still commanded an army that needed something useful to do, if its continued presence were not to feed further Aitolian discontents, and since the *legati* had not yet been able to agree on a date for total withdrawal, as Flamininus advised, Nabis' unpopular possession of Argos offered an opportunity for action not to be missed. Flamininus' Greek allies – except for the Aitolians, but now including Philip – were happy enough to send troop contingents for a short popular campaign to liberate Argos from the clutches of the Spartan tyrant. Nabis did not stand a chance, and once again Flamininus chose a convenient international religious festival – this time at the Nemean Games, celebrated near Argos, in autumn 195 – to publicize his success in liberating Argos, which was duly reincorporated in the Achaian League. At Sparta itself Nabis was left in control, though some Spartan territories, including its main port Gytheion, were put under Achaian supervision (Livy 34.22–40).

There was no further plausible function for a Roman army in Greece, though a slight shudder shook Roman equanimity when it became known in 195 that Hannibal had left Carthage and sought asylum in Syria, where he soon turned up at Antiochos' court. This ghost from the past did not, however, prevent Flamininus from staging a dramatic evacuation of Roman troops, the garrison on the Akrokorinth marching out just as the Greek dignitaries had assembled in the lower city to hear the official announcement that withdrawal

was imminent. The Greek cities were generous with their thanks, as they had learned from their past Macedonian masters that they should be: no fewer than 114 communities presented expensive gold wreaths to Flamininus. The campaign had, of course, also brought in booty: some two tons of gold, some of it coined, and another 25 tons of silver (1½ tons of it in the form of Attic tetradrachms) were taken to Italy together with artworks of all kinds, to be paraded in Rome in the triumphal procession – and this does not count what the troops managed to privatize as personal souvenirs. Italian prisoners taken by Hannibal and sold on the international slave markets, who were currently serving in Greece, were now bought up from their owners by the Greek states and restored to liberty as an especial thanksgiving for the successful liberation policy of the philhellenic Roman aristocrat. A series of gold coins bearing Flamininus' features together with a victory holding a victory wreath may have been issued to commemorate the occasion (Livy 34.48.2–52.12).

Many of the Greeks were doubtless genuinely grateful for the change of regime. The Lakonian town Gytheion, freed from Nabis, put up a statue and instituted a thanksgiving cult of Flamininus that was still going strong more than two centuries later (*SEG* 11, 922). Argos, also freed from Nabis, instituted an annual festival called the “*Titeia*,” commemorating its liberation by Titus Quinctius Flamininus (*BCH* 88, 1964, 607–609); Smyrna gave thanks for Roman support, setting a rather different precedent in inaugurating a cult of the “Goddess Rome” (“*Thea Rhome*”), and so personalizing the state, the complex republican structure of which was difficult to fathom for those used to structurally simple monarchies (Tacitus, *Annales* 4.56). This widespread use of standard thanksgiving mechanisms that had been created to express gratitude to the superhuman beings, the Macedonian kings after Alexander, shows how flexible and easily adaptable they were to the new conditions created by the activities of Roman armies in the Hellenistic world. It is more than a little ironic that the Roman who first received these thanksgiving symbols, originally created for monarchs, was the man whom the Greeks liked to remember as the bringer of their liberty from monarchic domination and who struggled with his peers to create the impression that Rome had no intention of entering on the imperial legacy of the eclipsed Macedonians in Greece.

III Antiochos III

The failure of diplomacy

The withdrawal of Roman troops in 194 and the senate's subsequent ratification of Flamininus' activities and dispositions offered the leading Hellenistic states an occasion for reflecting on their own essential interests and planning their future policies. Some found it easier than others to take Rome into consideration, while defining their own position. Easiest of all – if bitter enough – was the Macedonian position. Philip simply had no choice but to accept his territorial losses, his acceptance of which was guaranteed by a formal treaty with Rome and his giving highly placed hostages to ensure his compliance, the most prominent of them being his younger son Demetrios. It was rather Rome's friends and wartime allies who found postwar policy-making more difficult. They ranged from Achaia and Eumenes of Pergamon, whose acceptance of Roman patronage was immediate and uncompromising, hopeful of new benefits resulting from it, to the Aitolian League, the leaders of which since the decisive battle of Kynoskephalai in 197 had lost no opportunity to criticize recent Roman decisions and actions that they considered robbed them of their legitimate spoils of victory. Now that the legions had gone, they saw a chance of reversing at least some of the decisions. In general, the strongest supporters of Rome were the new governing classes who had been put in power in the liberated states by Flamininus, following the model of the Roman senate that consisted exclusively of property owners. These men now had everything to lose by a change of regime. On the other hand, the lower-class city-dwelling "democrats" who, disadvantaged by the Roman model, currently enjoyed little or no political participation in the affairs of their communities, were inevitably less enthusiastic about the Roman settlement. There were, however, great regional and local variations which we cannot assess exactly.

An intermediate attitude was cultivated by the Rhodians, who independently of Rome negotiated a *modus vivendi* with Antiochos in connection with some of the Karian cities – Antiochos was, after all, no enemy of Rome at the time and many people in Asia Minor will have regarded him as being at least an equally powerful player, and much nearer to home. This was certainly Antiochos' own attitude. At the level of diplomatic exchanges he had already denied Rome any right to interfere in the affairs of Asia and Egypt, upholding his dynasty's historic claim to the reconquest of Lysimachos' possessions. He settled his dispute with Ptolemy V over the Ptolemaic possessions in Syria by promising, and then in 194/3 giving, his daughter Kleopatra – the first in a long succession of Egyptian Kleopatras – to Ptolemy as wife, and saw no reason to cease acting as the major

remaining Macedonian power in the east. This basic position, which implied regarding his relationship with Rome as that of a friend and equal, he endeavored to cement through a formal alliance which should recognize his equal status.

While the senate was debating Flamininus' Greek settlement early in 193, a large number of delegates from Greek states, mostly encouraged by Flamininus who enjoyed showing his fellow Romans how many influential Greeks he knew, traveled to Rome. Among the visitors were two representatives sent by Antiochos, Menippos and Hegesianax. They, however, received special treatment, being interviewed separately by the current eastern experts, Flamininus and the ten *legati*. Their mission was to obtain a treaty of friendship, but at the same time to object once more to perceived Roman interference in Asia Minor, which Antiochos liked to regard as his own sphere of influence. The *legati* had, of course, liberated Philip's possessions there and accepted the appeal of Smyrna and Lampsakos, and perhaps of Alexandria Troas as well. On this issue they received no satisfaction. Flamininus confronted them with the demand that Antiochos keep out of Europe, if he wanted Rome to keep out of Asia, and then announced to the assembled Greeks that Rome would of course maintain faith with the proclamation of Greek freedom already made. The same three senators who had interviewed Antiochos at Lysimacheia in 196 were sent off to talk to him again (Livy 35.57–59).

Menippos' sole success was in a minor matter which, however, does show that Rome's accessibility to approaches by individual Greek communities was already well appreciated in Asia Minor, even in cities that accepted Antiochos' suzerainty. The citizens of Teos had asked Menippos to present to the senate their wish that Rome join other important states in recognizing their city as "sacred and inviolable." This subordinate matter, in effect, contradicted Menippos' stance on the major issue, that Rome had no right to involve itself in Asia Minor affairs at all, but he doubtless convinced himself that the Tean request concerned basically a local religious issue. The Romans had no problem with combining religion and politics. The praetor Marcus Valerius therefore wrote a letter to Teos in the name of the tribunes and the senate praising the worthiness of the Tean envoy Menippos and the goodwill of their city and granting their request, though there was a political sting in the tail: "as long as you uphold your goodwill towards us in the future." The Teans proudly engraved the document on stone, along with other similar texts (Syll.³ 601 = Rigsby 153 = Austin² 199 = BD² 39).

While this was going on at Rome, Antiochos was making dispositions for the future of his kingdom. His eldest son, Antiochos, had borne the royal title since 209 and was now given official

responsibility for the Upper Satrapies – the traditional function of the Seleukid heir apparent – and at about the same time Antiochos instituted an official state cult for his wife Laodike with high priestesses in each satrapy, to run parallel with an already existing cult of Antiochos and his ancestors. Two examples of the royal order setting up this cult have been preserved, one from Karia and one from a city called Laodikeia, near Nehavend in Iran (Ma 37 = BD² 158; Robert, *Hellenica* 7, 5–22 = Austin² 200). In each case a prominent aristocratic Macedonian lady was appointed priestess: in Laodikeia none other than Laodike, sister-wife of the viceroy Antiochos, in Karia Berenike, a granddaughter of Lysimachos. On the reasonable assumption that this cult of queen Laodike was intended to be empire-wide, the measure must be interpreted as an attempt to bind the elites of the empire visibly into the loyalty mechanisms represented by cult activity. The nearest parallel was the ruler cult in Alexandria, which might well have provided a model for Antiochos, since his younger daughter Kleopatra had just taken up residence there after her marriage to Ptolemy V.

The year may have seemed to have begun well enough with these measures of internal dynastic consolidation, but the problem in the west raised by the extension of Roman interests to Asia Minor did not just go away. In due course his envoys returned from Rome and reported their bad news, having called in at Aitolian-controlled Delphi en route, where Hegesianax was granted the honor of guest-friendship (*proxenia*) (Syll.³ 585, lines 44–45) and where they presumably also received information about Aitolian dissatisfaction. Then the three Roman *legati* sent to talk to Antiochos arrived in Asia Minor, where they first consulted with Eumenes, who urged an aggressive stance. There ensued a further delay in meeting Antiochos when they arrived, since he was in the field with his army fighting in Pisidia, and by the time they caught up with him at Apameia in Phrygia, they found him stricken by the news of the sudden death of his son and heir apparent, Antiochos, whom he had only just appointed to the Upper Satrapies. Antiochos in deep mourning could not face personal negotiations with the Romans, and let one Minnion, a trusted courtier, represent him when talks finally began at Ephesos. Minnion talked tough, convinced, according to Polybios, that if it came to war Antiochos would be bound to win, so there was no need to look for a compromise on the diplomatic issue. Not surprisingly, none was found (Livy 35.13.4–17.2).

The last round

The war that began late in 192 had more to do with activities in

Europe than in Asia. The catalyst was the continuing dissatisfaction of the Aitolians at their treatment by Flamininus, and a full year before this they began to take soundings, sending envoys with an anti-Roman message to Nabis in Sparta, to Philip at Pella, and to Antiochos in Asia. Their diplomatic activity induced the senate to send its own envoys to Greece in 192, among them Flamininus again, and to prepare a fleet to show the flag in Greek waters. This was placed under the command of the praetor, M. Atilius Serranus, but before he arrived it was already early autumn and by then events had moved on, though Flamininus and his fellow envoys had failed to steer them. In the Peloponnese, Nabis, with Aitolian encouragement, tried to retake the main Spartan port at Gytheion that Flamininus had placed under Achaian supervision. The Achaian *strategos* Philopoimen responded by sending troops and some ships, which however failed to save the town, though they did do a lot of damage elsewhere in Lakonia. This Achaian expedition was the first independent Greek military action by a Roman ally since 200, when the Roman legions entered the Balkans; it was not particularly successful, but no real disaster either, and showed that local action independent of Rome was still possible. It ended, however, when Flamininus called for a truce. Nabis used the breathing space he won through it to appeal for support to Aitolia, but the Aitolians were so shocked at his failure to resist the Achaians effectively that they sent a force to assassinate him and to take over Sparta themselves. The expedition ended in characteristic Aitolian indiscipline. After killing Nabis, the troops began plundering, and so provoked such violent resistance among the Spartans that they were nearly all killed. Philopoimen then rushed back to Sparta, put an Achaia-friendly government in place, and incorporated Sparta into the Achaian League without even consulting Flamininus. For the moment the local problem had been solved by local initiative (Livy 35.25–30; 35–37.3; Plutarch, *Philopoimen* 14–15).

Much more serious for Rome was the situation in central and northern Greece, where the Aitolians were at home. One of Philip's liberated "Fetters," Demetrias, succumbed to Aitolian pressure, despite Flamininus' presence; a little later, the Roman *legati* were simply denied a hearing when they requested an opportunity to present the Roman point of view at the *Panaitolika* meeting of the League, where Antiochos was represented by Menippos. The current Aitolian *strategos*, Thoas, managed to give the Romans the impression that Antiochos intended to come to Greece to support them, while he also persuaded Antiochos that the Balkan Greeks were only waiting for him to show up, in order to free themselves from Rome. Antiochos was not the only major ruler in history to be flattered into serious action by allowing himself to be fed a noble but false message,

constructed by sympathetic interested parties whose information he chose to class as reliable. Therefore when in late summer an Aitolian force captured Demetrias and urgently pressed Antiochos for action, he delayed little, being advised by men like Menippos and Minnion who thought they could only win, and with Hannibal in the background urging action. Apart from Atilius' few ships, soon to be strengthened by a Pergamene flotilla, Rome had no troops in the Balkans, so that Antiochos will have felt safe enough with his round 10,000 men, supported by 500 cavalry and six representative elephants, with which he crossed from Ephesos to Demetrias in autumn 192 (Livy 35.31–34; 41.1–43.6).

This situation provided the ultimate test for Flamininus' liberation policy. Did the Greek states recently freed from Macedonian control with their hand-picked Rome-friendly governments now see in Antiochos a viable alternative that was worth fighting for and risking their local position? It soon became clear that the vast majority did not. Demetrias accepted Aitolian overtures merely because Flamininus was reluctant to deny a rumor that Philip would get Demetrias again – it had its name from his great-grandfather, who had founded it – as prize for his support against Aitolia and Antiochos. Otherwise Antiochos found the diplomatic going extremely hard. The second central Greek “Fetter,” Chalkis, refused to let itself be liberated voluntarily by Antiochos, and therefore had to be “freed” by violence, as did other places in the area, all actions which did nothing to enhance the popularity of the new self-styled liberator. Boiotia refused to commit itself, and the Achaian League in the presence of Flamininus not only rejected Antiochos' advances but actually declared war on him – an initiative which the senate soon rewarded with a formal treaty of alliance. Some places, for local reasons, were more enthusiastic: Elis, long-term friend of the Aitolians and thorn in the flesh of the Achaians in the western Peloponnese, accepted a Seleukid garrison; Amynder of Athamania launched a hair-brained scheme to replace Philip in Macedonia itself with his own brother-in-law, and joined Antiochos when he was promised support, though his scheme inevitably merely solidified Philip's opposition to Antiochos and Aitolia. Otherwise nowhere was enthusiasm perceptible, and Antiochos did nothing to improve his reputation among the Greeks when, after taking Chalkis by force, he settled down there for the winter, enjoying nothing more than the luxury of a new marriage with the nubile daughter of a local citizen. The personal charisma that held an ancient monarchy together was being thoughtlessly squandered by the aging Antiochos (Livy 35.43.7–51; 36.5.1–11).

Antiochos' situation did not improve when spring came, by which time a Roman consular army under Marcus Acilius Glabrio had

crossed the Adriatic and marched across the Pindos into Thessaly, receiving en route the capitulation of the towns that Antiochos had taken by force in the autumn. Confronted by this quite unexpected Roman decisiveness, Antiochos saw no alternative to making a stand at the tradition-heavy pass of Thermopylai. Even the Aitolians were surprised at the sudden turn of events, and sent merely 4,000 men for the defense, half of which they detailed to defend their own nearby city Herakleia. Antiochos was massively outnumbered, since his gigantic empire had not had time to gather its massive resources, and a repeat performance of Hydarnes' march through the mountains by Marcus Porcius Cato took the defenders in the rear and put an end to Antiochos' resistance. Rescuing what was rescuable, he retired to Ephesos. The whole operation had lasted less than a year, but the devastating misjudgment concerning the commitment of both his friends and his (new) enemies that had brought it about would soon prove fatal to the ambitions of both Aitolia and Antiochos to remain global players in a world now increasingly dominated by Roman military might. Philip, like the Achaians, had the right instinct, offered the Romans logistical support before he was asked for it, and as a reward received back his hostage-son, Demetrios.

The last sad details of the war in Greece do not concern us here in detail. Glabrio turned out to be a hardliner where the Aitolians were concerned, and though they could not hope to win in the long term they succeeded in tying him down with a series of sieges of some of their larger cities, which proved time-consuming. His basic attitude, however, remained unchangeable: the Aitolians had to surrender unconditionally. This demand was supported by a majority in the senate, and Aitolian negotiators experienced it time and time again, until the loss of Ambrakia in 189 after three years of continuous fighting broke their spirit and led them to accept Roman terms. An indemnity of 500 talents, a ban on expansion of the League at the cost of Roman friends or places captured by Rome, an agreement to have "the same friends and enemies" as Rome – in effect, a ban on an independent foreign policy – and a unique clause, that the Aitolians were to "respect the empire and sovereignty (*maiestas*) of the Roman people without fraud," spelled out explicitly the moral obligation that the senate had hoped their Greek friends would have understood automatically from the beginning: the Aitolians had patently not done so (Polybios 21.29–32; Livy 38.8–11).

This agreement, ratified by the senate in 188, marked the end of the Aitolian League as a major power in Greece. With the loss of so many cities in central Greece, the League also lost its legitimacy to control Delphi, where with Roman help the traditional pre-Aitolian structure of the Amphiktyonic League as governing instance of the

shrine was reestablished in the 180s. Roman friends who had helped in the war were also rewarded, especially the Achaian League, which with Roman agreement now absorbed the last non-member cities in the Peloponnese, Messene and Elis, both of which had traditionally entertained closer relations with the Aitolians than now proved good for them. Achaia thus became, thanks to Roman support, the single major state remaining in southern Greece, and was now also rewarded by the senate with a treaty on equal terms to seal the excellent relationship (Livy 36.31.5–9; 36.35.7).

If Aitolian dissatisfaction with Rome's attitude in 196 in the end proved devastating to the ambitions of leading Aitolians for their state, the involvement of Antiochos in their affairs led directly to Rome's restructuring the whole state system in Asia Minor. This proved to be an equivalent disaster for the Seleukids. Antiochos' engagement in Greece might have been half-hearted but, taken together with the aggressively self-confident rhetoric used by his diplomats and his undeniable ambitions in Thrace, it was enough to inspire the senate, not amused from the start by Antiochos' granting asylum to Hannibal, to continue the war and, as it had done with Philip's Macedonia, to seek a drastic settlement that would put a stop to any ideas that any other power could be Rome's equal in areas in which Rome chose to be interested. Thanks to the longstanding support of Attalos and now of Eumenes at Pergamon, more recently of Rhodes and the cities which had appealed to Rome in 197, Asia Minor had already developed into an area of Roman interest, even though no Roman army had yet set foot on Asian soil.


That situation ended in 190, when Glabrio's successor as consul, Lucius Cornelius Scipio, accompanied by his more famous brother Publius "Africanus," who had defeated Hannibal in Africa in 202, led his consular army across the Dardanelles onto Asian soil. The Roman fleet, supported by Eumenes and Rhodes, had by then already crippled Antiochos' fleet in an encounter at Myonnesos near Samos and Ephesos, whereupon Antiochos withdrew his troops from Lysimacheia, since he could no longer guarantee communications. Moreover, Philip's brother-in-law, Prousius in Bithynia, despite his ongoing hostility towards Rome's friend Pergamon, was won over by Scipio's promising not to depose him. An offer by Antiochos to negotiate on Roman demands proved too little and too late to change Roman aims, which were already formulated in principle: Antiochos was to evacuate Asia Minor north and west of the Tauros and pay all Roman war costs (Polybios 21.14).

Personal monarchic pride and the Seleukid dynastic image made it inevitable that such a drastic demand could only be met after a major defeat on the battlefield. Under the prevailing circumstances, even a

severe defeat would bring more prestige, or at least constructive sympathy, than a negotiated retreat. In the meanwhile, the Seleukid royal army assembled in western Asia Minor, composed of some 60,000–70,000 fighting men representing, as the Seleukid royal army always tried to do for decisive encounters, all major parts of the empire. It ranged from the Macedonian core troops of the phalanx through regular light-armed from all parts of Asia Minor, to the elephant corps, an Arab camel corps, archers and slingers, the famous Iranian cavalry as well as Persian- style scythed chariots – in a word, the whole military panoply of the Seleukid empire was assembled and on show. The essentialist nature of the contest was reflected also by the high command, being composed of Antiochos and his son and new heir, Seleukos, in person, his elephant general Philippos, and his truest courtiers and advisers, Minnion and Zeuxis. If they went down, it would be with an almighty bang (Appian, *Syriake* 32; Livy 37.40).

The Romans mustered four legions with some allies, including Achaians and Pergamenes, in all some 30,000 men. Yet when it came to battle near Magnesia by Sipylos, not far from Sardeis, around the turn of the year 190/89, Roman discipline devastated the superficially impressive multicultural Seleukid assemblage, claiming 50,000 dead – doubtless an exaggerated number, but indicating the magnitude of the victory. Nobody was going to argue about the numbers. The Roman war machine, as at Kynoskephalai, proved superior to the Macedonian phalanx that had dominated warfare in the Greek world since Philip II created it a century and a half ago, and Antiochos, like Philip before him, now had no alternative to accepting the terms Rome dictated when serious talks about peace began at Phrygian Apameia (from which the resulting treaty takes its name). For the Greek world as a whole, the critical question now was, what would the Romans do with their victory? There could be no serious doubt about their power to decide at will. From their decision depended the future of the huge rich area north and west of the Tauros, now vacated for ever after more than ninety years of imperial exploitation by Seleukid troops and administrators.

Symploke



188	Peace treaty of Apameia
186–183	War between Prousius and Eumenes
183–179	War between Pharnakes of Pontos and Eumenes
185	Roman <i>legati</i> meet Philip V and Thessalians at Tempe
183	Philip V withdraws from Ainos and Maroneia
180s	Sporadic warfare in Lykia
182	Death of Philopomen
179/8	Death of Philip V and accession of Perseus; Xanthian appeal to Rome; Kallikrates of Leontion in Rome
177	Rhodian ships bring Seleukos' daughter to Perseus
ca. 178–171	Sporadic warfare in Lykia against Rhodes
172	Eumenes II in Rome
171	Outbreak of “Third Macedonian War”
168	Battle of Pydna
168–166	Eumenes' Galatian war

I Asia

As a result of the almost contemporary defeats of Antiochos III in Asia Minor and the Aitolian League in Greece, the “interweaving” of events, which Polybios had made a main theme of his work, was almost complete in 188 BC. Less theoretical observers might simply have noted the point at which Roman interests, of whatever kind, and Roman wishes, backed by the authority of the senate and in the last resort supported by the seemingly undefeatable might of the legions, began to be the decisive factor in the affairs of the Hellenistic world. After these military successes it was indisputably the Roman senate

that decided what was to happen to the defeated powers, and settled how the territorial and other spoils were to be distributed. The senate was arbiter for foe and for friend alike; friends might indeed advise, make suggestions or express wishes, but it was the senate in Rome that decided.

This situation was accepted willy-nilly by almost all parties, though in most cases without enthusiasm, and the next quarter-century proved to be a time for testing the limits of Roman commitment to the Greek world. This varied from time to time and from state to state, but by the mid-160s Rome was almost universally recognized as the dominant factor in the political mechanisms of the whole Hellenistic world. The way was rough, the political weather often uncomfortably stormy; misunderstandings and misinterpretations of decisions or wishes – occasionally deliberate – were frequent. The normal mechanisms of interstate contacts were westernized, running to an ever-increasing extent via Rome, and the senate experienced an unprecedented flood of envoys from Greek states, large and small, occasionally merely giving thanks or congratulation in the hope of future goodwill, but more often bearing concrete proposals or wishes. At first these concerned primarily details of the postwar settlements, but increasingly senatorial decisions were sought on purely local problems that in one way or another affected the peacefulness or the local economy – or both – of the areas concerned. Senatorial replies were often enough borne by a senatorial delegation, perhaps with instructions to investigate details and adjudicate disputes on the spot, in particular in cases where local laws or traditions seemed to stand in the way of Roman decisions or wishes. One important result of all this diplomatic activity was that ever larger numbers of leading Greeks gained experience in dealing with the Roman senate in Rome, but also that ever-increasing numbers of members of the senatorial class in Rome learned the Greek way of life and Greek mentality, and acquired immediate personal knowledge of the political and social structures that the wars had created.

Such diplomatic exchange was, of course, in itself nothing new; it was its intensity that increased dramatically, when in the spring after the defeat of Antiochos, in the words of Polybios, “Eumenes and the representatives of Antiochos, along with envoys from Rhodes and Smyrna and virtually all the peoples and communities on this side of the Tauros,” set off to travel to Rome (Polybios 21.17.11–12). They were all received by the senate, which took decisions in principle that were formulated in a senatorial decree (*senatus consultum*) concerning the future status of what used to be Antiochos’ territories “beyond the Tauros.” These principles were to be put into practice on the spot by

ten senatorial commissioners (*legati*).

The Seleukids

The draft treaty with Antiochos III that was formally sworn in Syria during the summer 188 foresaw the reduction of Seleukid power by restricting its territories to the eastern Mediterranean and Iran. What the Scipios had demanded before the battle – that Antiochos vacate all territories lying beyond the Tauros (seen from Syria) – was now extended by a demand for reparations. In all, 15,000 Attic talents (about 400 metric tons) of silver spread over twelve years was the cash demand; rather less was to be paid to Eumenes to compensate for war damage; additionally the Seleukid fleet was to be destroyed, apart from twelve smaller ships, and even they were not allowed to sail west of the river Kalykadnos (Göksu), unless they were on a diplomatic mission; the elephant corps was to be annihilated; twenty highly placed hostages were to be sent to Rome, and all anti-Roman politicians – including Hannibal – were to be delivered up (Hannibal, however, managed to escape before he was handed over). Once these terms were accepted, the two states concluded “friendship” (*amicitia*) for all time (Polybios 21.43; Livy 38.38).

For Antiochos and his successors the treaty with Rome marked the end of the dream of the dynasty to revive the massive Macedonian empire created almost a century before by Seleukos I Nikator in the last year of his life. The treaty did not merely mean that the Seleukids were now shut off from having influence in central and western Asia Minor: the shock of the massive defeat, the shattering of the great Macedonian dream, and the concomitant demonstration of the weakness of the central Seleukid government also had effects in the far eastern parts of the kingdom, where rudimentary control had only recently been reasserted with the greatest difficulty during Antiochos’ anabasis twenty years before. Now separatist tendencies became much stronger.

In this situation, Antiochos’ first priority was to consolidate the dynasty. By April 189 his eldest surviving son, Seleukos (IV), was already associated with him as joint king, replacing the recently deceased younger Antiochos (Boiy 158). The second major problem was a financial crisis of large proportions. Now cut off from the rich revenue-producing cities of western Asia Minor and, moreover, committed to paying Rome and Pergamon large sums of silver annually, ready money was extremely tight. Antiochos attempted to alleviate the situation by confiscating some rich temple property, perhaps in lieu of unpaid regional taxes. This he had done successfully

in Media in 211 in order to finance his anabasis, and he is recorded in February or March 187 as receiving expensive gifts of gold objects from the temple and city of Babylon (Boiy 156–157). On July 3 of the same year he was at Susa, the main city of Elam, with the same objective, but his initiative there went terribly wrong. Local opposition was so strong when the king tried to appropriate the treasures of a temple of Bāl that all his soldiers could not prevent his being lynched like a common criminal temple robber (Diodoros 28.3; 39.15; Justin 32.2.1–2).

Under Seleukos IV, who now ruled alone for twelve years, the kingdom continued to suffer from the financial pressure of having to pay 1,000 talents a year from reduced resources to Rome, and this seems to have hindered virtually every political initiative that might have interested contemporary historians. Seleukos IV is characterized as being weak and lacking initiative by the only sources to pass opinion on him (Appian, *Syriake* 349; Jerome, in *Danielem* 11.20 = Porphyrios [*FgrHist* 260] F48). Only in connection with his death and the succession of his brother Antiochos (IV) in 175 do we have fuller information. But since Antiochos was immediately able to undertake a more active policy, we must assume that Seleukos' unspectacular attempts at consolidation of the finances of the kingdom had not been fruitless. We shall return to Antiochos IV in Part IV, chapter 12.

Pergamon

If information concerning the defeated and territorially reduced Seleukid kingdom is extremely fragmentary for the years after the great defeat, in evacuated Asia Minor it was a case of the winner taking all. Thanks to Polybios' interest in the rise of Rome to world power and in affairs of his own time, as well as the Greek habit of engraving public documents on stone, much more information has been preserved about incidents and developments in this area. The *senatus consultum* that laid down the conditions under which the territories evacuated by Antiochos were to be treated by the ten *legati* basically divided up Seleukid Asia Minor at the river Maiander, the area to the north of it going to Pergamon, that to the south to the Rhodian republic. Within these areas, however, thanks to the liberation propaganda of the war years, many individual Greek cities had fought on the Roman side or otherwise aided the Roman war effort. It would therefore have been highly inappropriate, indeed politically counterproductive, to subject them to Pergamene or Rhodian taxation and political control. As a result, Roman friends – who qualified as such was defined in each case by the *legati* on the spot – were granted freedom and autonomy: that is, they were not to

be subject to Pergamon or to Rhodes, but owed their privileged status as independent cities to Rome alone. Various anomalies occurred for reasons we do not know in detail, such as the free status of Magnesia on the Maiander, which had supported Antiochos but been favored by the Scipios, or Eumenes' possession of the south coast harbor city Telmessos that lay in the middle of the Rhodian area. A dispute with Antiochos about whether Pamphylia lay "beyond the Tauros" or not (incidentally showing that the very general geographic definition enshrined in the treaty was based on inadequate information about conditions on the ground) was also in the end settled in favor of Eumenes.

When the legions returned to Italy – incidentally, suffering significant losses in men and booty while marching through Thrace, because the Macedonian king had not been informed that they were coming and so had been unable to provide a secure passage – Asia Minor was dominated by the two major Roman friends, Pergamon and Rhodes. In Bithynia, Prousius was allowed to survive thanks to his last-minute support of Rome, though his jealous hostility towards Pergamon was in no way diminished by the Roman favor shown to Eumenes. Further east, the Galatians, who had supported Antiochos, were at least temporarily quieted by a short sharp Roman expedition led by the consul Gnaeus Manlius Vulso in 189, while he waited for the *legati* to arrive. Still further east, Ariarathes IV in Kappadokia, who also had supported Antiochos, was too far away to concern Rome greatly: Vulso merely fined him 600 talents, but Eumenes cannily saw the strategic advantage of winning Kappadokia and asked for the hand of Stratonike, Ariarathes' daughter, while at the same time he used his influence with the Romans to negotiate a 50 percent reduction in the Kappadokian indemnity (Polybios 21.40.4–7; 44). That was a far-sighted move that dissolved Ariarathes' longstanding close association with the Seleukids and integrated Kappadokia into the western-dominated power structure of the new Asia Minor.

Figure 12 Official coin portrait of Eumenes II wearing the diadem, issued at Pergamon ca. 175–165. Bibliothèque nationale de France.



The Roman settlement did not solve all existing problems in Asia Minor. The first dispute, which actually led to war between Eumenes and Prousius, was, however, inherent in its terms. A territory bordering Mysia known as Phrygia Epiktetos (“Additional Phrygia”) that Prousius had occupied in the time of Attalos was formally recognized as Pergamene by the *legati*, though they did nothing to facilitate the territorial transfer. From 186 until 183 sporadic warfare took place over this issue, which also involved at least some of the Galatians, led by one Ortasion, before Eumenes could take over the disputed

territory. As a true Roman client, Eumenes in the end appealed to Rome to intervene on his behalf, and since the senate was unwilling to see Prousius expand – among other things, he had provocatively granted Hannibal asylum in 189 – none other than Titus Quinctius Flaminius, who was in Greece on other business in 183, was instructed to represent Roman interests in Bithynia. Hannibal remained indeed Rome’s chief object of interest there, but before Prousius could deliver him up Hannibal took his fate into his own

hands and committed suicide (Livy 39.50.10–51).

Shortly afterwards, the new king of Pontic Kappadokia (Pontos), Pharnakes, whose family was closely linked with the Seleukids – his grandmother was a sister of Seleukos II and he himself subsequently married a sister of Seleukos IV – occupied the prosperous Greek commercial city Sinope and launched an attack on his southern neighbor, Eumenes' father-in-law Ariarathes. Eumenes was immediately summoned to help and sent troops. Rome was not involved here, but both parties, as well as Rhodes, which was concerned about the fate of the free city of Sinope with which it had trading contacts, nevertheless sent embassies to Rome asking for intervention. Several times groups of senators traveled to Asia Minor to mediate, but despite their efforts the war continued, and it was 179 before a peace treaty was made. Few details of this war are known, but the prospect of a new power bloc emerging in eastern Anatolia, which might even include the Seleukids – Seleukos IV is recorded as having toyed with the idea of helping Pharnakes, but in the end he thought better of it – and so might challenge the dominance of Rome's friends Pergamon and Rhodes, was probably the main motivating factor for Roman interest in trying to broker a peace deal. In the end, Polybios' account of the peace treaty suggests that Rome's intervention was ineffective and that the parties made peace by themselves. Sinope, however, remained in Pharnakes' hands and became his main place of residence (Polybios 23.9.1–3; 24.1.1–3; 14–15; 25.2). The Galatians remained reasonably peaceful over the next years, but in 168 renewed troubles broke out with them, and these continued over several years, ending once more in a major Pergamene victory in 166. Again, little is known about the action in this war, except that at some stage Sardeis was seriously threatened and Eumenes himself narrowly escaped capture (Polybios 29.22; 30.1.2, 2.8, 3.7–9, 19.12; Diodoros 31.12–14; Polyainos 4.8.1; *OGIS* 305).

As soon as the war with Prousius and his Galatian allies was over, Eumenes began a major propaganda campaign, depicting himself as the protector of Greeks against barbarian attacks, following up precedents already set by Attalos after his defeat of the Galatian armies a generation before. For internal use within his kingdom he now took on the official epithet "Savior" (*Soter*), and promoted the cult of Athena Nikephoros ("Victory-Bringer"), founded by Attalos, by extending the festival of *Nikephoria* to a status equivalent to the traditional major Greek cult-festivals for Zeus and Apollo at Olympia and Delphi. Characteristic of these was that they took place with great pomp and universal recognition only every fourth year, and this was to be the case with the Pergamene *Nikephoria* in the future. Some documents concerning this image-projection campaign have been

preserved. The first comes from Telmessos, which became Pergamene after 189. Dating from the fourteenth year of “Eumenes Soter” (184/3), it praises Eumenes for “taking upon himself the war not merely on behalf of his own subjects but also for the other inhabitants of Asia; he risked the danger and, calling on the aid of the gods, fought successfully against Prousius and Ortasion and the Galatians and their allies; his victory was glorious and fine, just as we had prayed for to the gods” (Allen no.7 – Greek text only). That a newly won city should show official enthusiasm for the victory of its new ruler is not in itself, of course, a surprise. But the decree also illustrates a further characteristic of the Pergamene monarchy under Eumenes, when the Telmessians decree that their priests and priestesses are to pray that the gods “for the future grant to king Eumenes victory and might on land and sea, and also to his mother Queen Apollonis and to his brothers.” The Pergamene royal family is here associated in an integrated way, otherwise unknown outside the Ptolemaic kingdom, with the current activities of the king; and this type of family solidarity of all the living members of the ruling dynasty remained characteristically Pergamene to the end of the dynasty in 133. It provides a sharp contrast with the Macedonian monarchies of the Antigonids and Seleukids, though Antiochos III did try to integrate his queen Laodike in a similar way.

The victory propaganda was by no means restricted to Eumenes’ own kingdom or even to Asia Minor. Documents from Kos and Iasos, but above all from Delphi, where both the Aitolian League and the Amphiktyonic Council formulated and published decrees, show us the king approaching many influential cities outside his kingdom. His immediate purpose was to acquire universal recognition of the exalted status of the reorganized *Nikephoria* festival throughout the Greek world as being equivalent to the Olympic Games for athletics and equestrian events, and to the Pythian Games for musical events (the Olympic Games had no musical competitions). Moreover, the sanctuary of Athena Nikephoros, situated outside the walls of Pergamon – notoriously sacked by Philip V in 201 – should be recognized as “inviolate.” This campaign was of the same nature as those we know of in the third century for Smyrna, Kos, Magnesia on the Maiander, and Teos, and the language used in the acceptance decrees demonstrates the political dimension – Eumenes’ real purpose – of the whole operation. The Aitolians recall their old friendship with Eumenes’ ancestors (predictably omitting their disastrous *faux pas* in joining Antiochos III) and praise his “many major demonstrations of goodwill towards our people and the other Greeks” while accepting Eumenes’ requests in full. The decree begins by praising “King Eumenes and his brothers Attalos, Philetairos, and Athenaios, his

mother Queen Apollonis, and the people of Pergamon for their piety towards the gods.” Family solidarity was clearly part of the message that Eumenes wished to communicate, and not just within his kingdom (Syll.³ 629). The newly reorganized Amphiktyons begin in a similar way, but they naturally had no qualms about mentioning the Romans. “Eumenes inherited from his father Attalos his piety towards the gods and goodwill towards the Amphiktyons; he maintained his friendship towards the Romans and is continually being the cause of advantage to the Greeks, and after sharing the same risks made gifts to many of the Greek cities so that they might uphold their current independence; for this reason the Romans admired his attitude and extended his kingdom, convinced of the necessity that those kings who plot against the Greeks should receive the appropriate shock, that those who cause no harm deserve their greatest trust” (Syll.³ 630 = Austin² 237 = Burstein 87).

After the Galatian war in the 160s the reaction of some of the major cities that had felt threatened was even more extravagant in the form of their thanks. Sardeis instituted an important festival equivalent to the Pythian Games “for Athena and King Eumenes the Savior, to be called ‘The *Athenaia and Eumeneia*’ ” (OGIS 305). The independent city Miletos decreed a cult place (*temenos*) for Eumenes, and the League of the Ionian cities, which included Miletos, passed a fulsome decree declaring Eumenes “Benefactor of Greeks because of the major conflicts with the barbarians which he undertook and because of the enthusiasm and forethought he showed, so that the populations of the Greek cities might live forever in peace and prosperity.” Decreed were a golden wreath of valor, a golden (or perhaps gilded) statue, the proclamation of the decree at all festivals of the participating cities, and the naming of one of the festival days of the League after the king (OGIS 763 = RC 52 = Austin² 239 = Burstein 88 = BD² 47).

These official documents are primary evidence for the self-depiction of the Attalid dynasty of the late 180s, since the cities naturally only decreed what they knew would please the dynasty: the Pergamenes are friends of the Greeks, recognized and favored by the Romans, a close-knit dynasty where all members share the burden of ruling. The gifts to the cities that the Amphiktyons explicitly mention constitute a further aspect of Pergamene policy in the second century. The dynasty not only became rich as a result of Roman favor, but also systematically used its wealth to buy support in the most influential Greek cities and communities. Gifts ranged from the financing of a major building at Athens – a large hall (*stoa*) near the theater to protect visitors from sun and rain – to the traditional presentation of gold wreaths at Delos. Eumenes also was particularly interested in

investing in the younger generation: the largest number of individual grants known is related to the provision of facilities in communal gymnasia – the educational and training place of the young men. Since these grants were always the cause of decrees of thanks that were engraved and set up by the beneficiaries in the gymnasia, the one-off royal grant was monumentalized and became part of the civic structural decoration of the receiving city, lasting for centuries and perpetuating the goodwill of the donor in the minds of future generations of young citizens. This type of activity was, of course, in principle nothing new for a Hellenistic king, but its current extent was certainly new for a king of Pergamon, and it resulted directly from the extension of income-bringing territories granted by the Romans after 189 (evidence in Bringmann-Von Steuben).

The political dimension of such investment is illustrated well by the one known case where a gift was rejected. In the course of improving relations with important Roman friends in Greece, Eumenes offered the Achaian League in 185 a capital sum of 120 talents to be invested and the income from it used to help finance the meetings of the League's council. Apart from creating general goodwill, the immediate intention may well have been to enable less wealthy citizens to participate in public affairs, but opposition came from two quarters. The League as a whole wished to avoid becoming morally obligated to Eumenes – this does not seem to have been a problem with other known recipients of royal donations – and run the risk of having to take decisions influenced by such considerations. But another outstanding problem specifically affected Achaia, and Eumenes had underestimated its weight. His island Aigina, captured by the Roman allies during the First Macedonian War, was a member of the Achaian League when Attalos bought it from the Aitolians in 210. Aiginetan exiles living in Achaia seized the opportunity to raise the question. If Eumenes had so much spare capital, why could he not give the Achaians the island back, for which Attalos had paid merely a quarter of the sum – 30 talents? The new cash offer was rejected, the island remained Pergamene, and the Achaian council continued to finance itself (Polybios 22.7.3–8.13).

The territories that Eumenes acquired as a result of Antiochos' withdrawal and that henceforth provided the main source of his new wealth were not all administered in the same way. Some were certainly organized on a regional basis – Antiochos' Thracian territories in Europe, the Hellespontine coastal region, or the Ephesian hinterland are known examples of this – and they were governed by an official who at least sometimes bore the military title *strategos*. It may well be that the enlarged kingdom as a whole was organized in this way, whereby the Greek cities included in it kept their own

existing political and administrative organizations. Not all territorial boundaries were laid down by the Roman *legati*. The war with Prousius over Phrygia Epiktetos we have already noticed; a longer-term dispute also developed with Philip V over the right to control Ainos and Maroneia, Greek cities situated on the Thracian coast, which had been Ptolemaic before they were Seleukid, but they were situated in an area where Macedonian influence was traditionally strong. This dispute was temporarily settled by Rome to the advantage of neither of the disputants – the two cities were to be independent of both. But even where boundaries were clear, problems could occur and some evidence from the early years after the takeover offers examples. A decree of a Hellespontine city, probably Apollonia on the Rhyndakos, praised the *strategos* Korrhagos, a Macedonian in Pergamene service, for his aid in restoring the civilian apparatus of the city after the wars, not sparing personal expense. He had also successfully negotiated with Eumenes a temporary tax relief (five years in all) for the city until the local economy was back on its feet (*I.Prusa* 1001 = Allen 89, with English translation).

Two other texts concern Seleukid military settlements that became Pergamene after 188, one situated in Phrygia, the other near Telmessos. The Phrygian document concerns Tyriaion, an ethnically mixed community (one of the envoys is called Brennos, a Galatian name) that negotiated recognition from Eumenes as a self-governing Greek-style city-state with its own constitution, laws, and education facility (gymnasion). The grant was made possible, says Eumenes in the letter that the recipients proudly published on stone, because he himself had received full and legitimate possession of the area from the Romans, “who prevailed in war and by treaty.” He offered help in instituting the new city structure, and in a separate letter, also published on the same stone, suggests sources of revenue for the free oil distribution in the gymnasion. His local financial representative will see to a solution of the problem (*SEG* 47, 1745 = Austin² 236 = BD² 43). The second text dates from 181 and concerns an impoverished community situated near Telmessos, the Village of the Kardakes (*Kardakon Kome*); it was granted tax relief for several years, as well as the right to rebuild a dilapidated fortified tower as a refuge. The villagers had made their first approach on the matter to the Pergamene regional governor, Artemidoros, who then reported on their petition, doubtless making a recommendation, to Eumenes. The reply he received from the king he then passed on to the village. This decision was regarded as being so important to the community that the villagers had it engraved on stone (Maier, *Mauerbauin-schriften* 76 [text only]).

These three inscriptions show Eumenes adopting a flexible

approach to the reorganization of his territories, while at the same time making it clear that, once the immediate crisis was over, both Greek cities and other subject communities could be expected to pay a significant sum in taxation to the Pergamene treasury. Communication with subordinate communities seems to have usually taken place through a regional official, whose rights to interfere in the affairs of the cities, as soon as any difficulty arose, are illustrated in a royal letter setting out to resolve a complex of disputes between the people of Teos (which in 188 had again become Pergamene) and the Association of the Dionysian Artists resident there (RC 53 = Le Guen, *TE* 47). This long royal decision was regarded as particularly important, because the Dionysian Artists were also closely associated with the especially favored Pergamene royal cult of Dionysos “Kathegemon” (“the Leader”). It was therefore published at Pergamon, engraved on the walls of a temple of Dionysos. The language of the document leaves no doubt that Eumenes was issuing an order (*prostagma*) based on the recommendations of his local official, and that he expected it to be obeyed by both parties. There is sufficient evidence from other places to conclude that the issue of such royal instructions to subordinate officials and communities was the regular method of Pergamene imperial administration.

The most spectacular manifestation of Pergamon’s having reached Great Power status after 188 was the massive extension and reconstruction of the city of Pergamon itself. Until 188 the city had largely retained the structure it had had under Philetairos, as a small hill town with a defensive ring wall and buildings erected ad hoc in an intra-mural area of ca. 21 hectares. After 188 a new 4-kilometer-long massive city wall was built that enclosed an area of ca. 90 hectares, and particular attention was paid to the reconstruction of the representational area near the entrance to the royal residence. The most spectacular addition, beginning perhaps in the later 170s, was the gigantic free-standing altar situated close to the existing temples of Athena and Zeus and probably serving both. It was a monumental thank-offering to the Greek gods of civilization for their granting the success and prosperity that Pergamon had achieved over and against the dark forces of barbarism and destruction. The enormous dimensions of the Great Altar, 35 × 33 meters, offered massive wall space for decoration with state-of-the-art sculptures, celebrating Telephos, the rather obscure mythical founder of Pergamon, but above all Zeus and Athena. The impressive surviving remnants may still be admired in the Berlin Pergamon Museum, where they were brought in the nineteenth century.

The last important change that Great Power status brought with it to Pergamon was the particular emphasis that began to be placed on

the royal family in the public presentation of the kingdom. The Seleukids, especially Antiochos III, had made some efforts in this respect through the establishment of ruler cults, in which Antiochos' wife Laodike played a particularly prominent part. This was perhaps a late imitation of the much earlier development in third-century Ptolemaic Egypt, where the queens, beginning with Arsinoe II, received an extremely prominent place in the centrally organized ruler cult. The much publicized Ptolemaic family bonding was particularly emphasized by the use of cult names such as "Philadelphos" ("Sibling-Loving") and "Philopator" ("Father-Loving") used by Ptolemy II and Ptolemy IV, as well as by the frequent sibling marriages. In Pergamon it was the later Attalids who became famous for their closely bound family relationship, and this expressed itself especially in cult activities in the subject cities, not just for Eumenes and his queen Stratonike, but also for his mother and his brothers. Evidence from Teos, where the Dionysian Artists were resident, is most telling. Eumenes' mother Apollonis is particularly prominent there, after her death being formally associated with Aphrodite and receiving her own priestess, whom she shared with the still living Stratonike (Robert, *Ét. anat.* 19); at Phrygian Hierapolis she was described on her death as having "departed to the gods" (*OGIS* 308 = Austin² 240). Several inscriptions which honor Kraton of Chalkedon, a virtuoso flautist and leading light of the Dionysian Artists in mid-century, recall his cultic activities, which included supervising sacrifices "for the gods and the kings" (i.e., the dead Attalos and Eumenes [Le Guen, *TE* 44]), or in a text set up on Delos "for all the other gods, likewise for the kings [sc. Attalos and Eumenes] and the queens [Apollonis and Stratonike] and the brothers of king Eumenes [Attalos, Philetairos, and Athenaios]" (Durrbach 75 = Le Guen, *TE* 45 = Austin² 143). At some date unknown Eumenes also received a priest of his own at Teos (Le Guen, *TE* 48).

All this activity could be understood as being merely local city political reflexes reacting to the new monarchic ruler, such as had been current practice in the Greek cities since Alexander and which now continued under the Pergamene kings, also among the free cities – Miletos is a particularly prominent example of this, as we have seen. On the other hand, since 188 Teos and Hierapolis were ruled directly by Eumenes, and the utterances of the Dionysian Artists, while not quite extending to formal cult practice, can only be interpreted as formal expressions of loyalty. They represent, at least in principle, the desired official self-representational line of the dynasty that obviously encouraged the establishment of thanksgiving cults, festivals, and regular celebrations of dynastic events, such as birthdays or special "name days," in the subject cities. What does not seem to have

happened, however, is the creation of an officially sponsored dynastic cult of the living ruler at Pergamon itself, despite some early indications under Eumenes I. In this respect, “New Pergamon” after 188 upheld the old tradition of the Greek world in which it operated and wished to represent: only dead kings became gods in their own right.

Rhodes

The second big winner in the division of the spoils after the withdrawal of the Seleukids was the island of Rhodes, which received from the Romans Asia Minor south of the Maiander (with certain specific exceptions), but including Lykia, where a rudimentary federal state had kept the Lykians on the side of Antiochos III until his final defeat. As far as the Romans were concerned, the status of these places was identical to that of the territories granted to Eumenes. They were a voluntary gift to a friendly state, which they expected would show gratitude to Rome for the gift in its general behavior, also in areas of activity outside the gifted territories. In Karia Rhodes had a long tradition of direct interest – part of it, the so-called incorporated *Peraia*, was an integral part of the Rhodian state, the inhabitants there being full Rhodian citizens – and administrative structures already existed for coping with the geographic extension of responsibilities in the area. Subordinate to the “*strategos* [“general”] for the *Peraia*” were regional military officers (*hagemones* [“commanders”]), who had charge of garrisons; civilian officials called *epistatai* were largely responsible for financial matters such as taxation, but also for legal affairs. Other officials, also bearing the unspecific title *hagemon*, had independent functions in certain parts of the newly won Karian territories, as well as at Kaunos, which had been bought from the Ptolemaic governor in 197 (Syll.³ 619). We catch only rare glimpses of the interaction of local and Rhodian interests in the very fragmentary sources. One inscription, however, shows us Pamphilos, a leading citizen of the little inland town Apollonia Salbakes, trying to influence the ten *legati* at Apameia in favor of his hometown in some case of special interest; sometime later, however, he had to travel to Rhodes in order to represent his home community in a legal battle with a group of local Karian villagers. Responsibility had clearly passed to Rhodes, despite his diplomatic efforts to avoid this (Robert, *La Carie* II, no. 167).

In Karia Rhodian influence clearly now became much stronger than before, and in several places the Rhodian cult of Halios (the sun) was introduced, as well as the Rhodian calendar, according to which official documents were dated and festivals celebrated. These

characteristics were probably more widespread than our limited documentation directly illustrates. One especial sign of integration is known from Hyllarima, which went so far as to create a cult, together with a specially responsible priest, of the People (*Damos*) of Rhodes – a unique sign of the acceptance of Rhodian domination that can scarcely have happened without Rhodian encouragement (*I.Rhod.Per.* App. V, line 15; *LSAM* 56).

In Lykia the situation was quite different from the beginning. Sometime before 188 the Lykian cities had organized themselves into a loose federation (the “Lykian League”), and since they supported Antiochos until his final defeat they had nothing to lose by raising objections when the ten *legati* granted them to Rhodes, with all that that implied in terms of political control and taxation. Attribution to Rhodes must have seemed to the *legati* an obvious solution to the Lykian problem, because since the fourth century the island of Megiste, lying before the central Lykian coast, had been incorporated into the Rhodian state territory, and the west Lykian area around Daidala, governed by a *hegemon*, was Rhodian during the war against Antiochos. Rhodian economic penetration into many parts of Lykia was by then longstanding. The Lykians nevertheless objected to the political control that the Roman decision foresaw, and in 188 objected immediately. They were represented at Apameia by two envoys from Ilion who, because of their claimed relationship with Rome via the Troy legend, seemed particularly suitable to plead the case of the Lykians for mild treatment. The *legati* gave the Lykians the impression that they had achieved their aim, and the Ilions optimistically reported back that they had indeed won “freedom” for the Lykians, whereas in fact the Rhodians were granted Lykia, like Karia, as a gift. When a Lykian delegation came to Rhodes to discuss terms of a friendly alliance soon afterwards, its members were shocked to find that Rhodian officials had already been appointed to govern Lykia and Karia, “to instruct the cities how each matter was to be arranged.” The Rhodians refused to recognize the Lykian League as a negotiating partner, but the Lykians also simply refused to do what the Rhodians told them to do (Polybios 22.5).

The Rhodians had not expected to meet such a blatant refusal to accept their interpretation of the Roman grant, and immediately set up a military government in Lykia, extending the responsibilities of the existing *hegemon* in Daidala, parallel to that for the new territories in Karia (*Syll.*³ 619). They soon found that the opposition on the ground was much more bitter than they had imagined possible, and low-level armed resistance went on for several years. Not even the Lykian League could be dissolved, and it maintained traditional friendly contacts with the court in Alexandria that went back to the

pre-Antiochos period, as an honorary decree passed around 180 for a high Ptolemaic official, whose father had benefited the Lykian League, demonstrates (*OGIS* 99). All Lykian cities may not have been equally involved in the resistance movement. In particular the largest city, Xanthos, which had been especially favored by Antiochos III, seems to have come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Rhodian authorities – the text of a treaty has been found there, which includes the pledge not to act against the interests of Rome, Ilion, Rhodes, or their allies. But by 179/8 even Xanthos was sufficiently perturbed by Rhodian violence to appeal to Rome for calming interference, and the senate wrote a letter to Rhodes asserting that it was Roman policy that no free people be given over to any other into subjection, and stating that this principle also applied to the relationship between the Lykians and Rhodes. The Lykians were to be under the protection of the Rhodians, just as Rome's allied cities in Italy were under the protection of Rome (Livy 41.6.11–12).

This assertion did not really amount to a change of Roman policy, though the Rhodians chose to think it did, and their view was transmitted to Polybios by his Rhodian source, Zenon, and so entered the historical tradition as a standard view of the facts. When they ignored the senate's intervention and continued their efforts to impose their rule in Lykia by military means, Lykian resistance merely continued and another phase of sporadic warfare went on until around 171. Rhodes therefore had little joy from its new Lykian possessions, despite its aggressive attitude. The military activity must have cost at least as much as the rudimentary taxation system brought in, and it was a constant drain on Rhodian manpower and economic resources, as well as doing nothing to make Rhodian rule more palatable to its potential subjects.

The Free Cities

The Roman settlement left several cities in Asia Minor “free,” that is formally unattached to one or other of the new main powers, Pergamon and Rhodes, but only from very few do we have sufficient information to assess what this formal independence meant in practice. At Priene two related incidents illustrate the problems of these cities. Gnaeus Manlius Vulso and the ten *legati* had made a decision in favor of Samos concerning the centuries-old dispute between Priene and Samos about the possession of the mainland territory called Anaia. Priene was dissatisfied, and sometime after the *legati* went home appealed to the new regional Great Power, the Rhodians, who reversed the Romans' ruling. Half a century later, in 135, the Samians petitioned the senate directly, trying to exploit the

changed conditions of the time to revive the judgment of Manlius Vulso and the *legati* in their favor, but the senate upheld the Rhodian decision (*I.Priene* 37, 40, 41 with Habicht, *Chiron* 35, 2005, 137–46 on the date). This business illustrates well that Priene, although officially free and unattached to either of the new Great Powers, nevertheless saw no alternative to using its independence to involve one or other of them in its affairs, when it proved incapable of solving a problem itself. In the last resort, at the top of the pyramid of responsibility there was now always Rome.

The most informative documentation from this period comes from Miletos and involves that city and some of its neighbors, including Magnesia and Priene. Here the troubles began when Philip V invaded southern Asia Minor in 201 and, in order to gain local support, granted the territory of the run-down nearby city Myous to Magnesia on the Maiander. Until then Myous had been administered by Miletos, which had even organized some new settlers for the place and given them Milesian citizenship. Part of this territory was known as the “sacred land,” and in 189/8 Miletos obtained a decision from the Roman *legati* granting its restoration, though the precise boundaries were not laid down. Once the *legati* had left, this disputed territory and perhaps other areas where boundaries were unclear led to a series of disputes and rearrangements.

The first involved the little hill town of Pidasa, which had been taken by Philip V during his Karian expedition and then freed by the Romans in 196. Since it was left free in 188, it clearly had not joined Antiochos III, but freedom alone did not solve its problems. After a year or two it reached an agreement with Miletos for the two cities to merge (a “*sympoliteia*”), whereby a specific problem relating to the security of the area was prominent in Pidasa’s motivation, and this remained so for Miletos: one of the first clauses of the merger agreement concerned the security of some Pidasan mountain forts. Which of the neighbors had posed a threat so serious that it caused the Pidasans to give up their municipal independence remains unclear: the free city-state neighbors, Herakleia by Latmos and Mylasa, as well as the new Great Power in the area, Rhodes, are all conceivable, but the document does not tell us. It does, however, show that at that time the Pidasans regarded Miletos as their most effective protector, although both Mylasa and Herakleia were physically closer (*I.Milet* 149).

A couple of years later, around 185, Miletos made a major treaty with Herakleia by Latmos – the first approach came from Herakleia – that brought an end to a series of hostilities; an amnesty was declared for crimes committed during this period. The agreement involved, among other things, a declaration of mutual potential citizenship and

cooperation against any aggression, whereby it emerges that each city had already entered a mutual security treaty (*symmachia*) with the local Great Power, Rhodes: they now commit themselves to undertaking no action that would infringe its terms. Probably Rhodian mediators had helped bring about the agreement between the two opponents (*I.Milet* 150, lines 35–36). Two pieces of land had been in dispute, a piece of mountain near Myous, the other an area near Ionopolis, the Milesian harbor town through which Pidasa shipped goods to Miletos. The war had brought the disputes no nearer to a solution, so they decided to ask a “free democratic city” for mediation, whose decision was agreed to be binding. Probably Rhodes, the major power in the area, was meant by this flattering phrase, since we hear that Rhodes mediated a similar nearby dispute between Euromos and Mylasa, perhaps around the same time (Ager, no. 124).

The dispute between Miletos and Herakleia concerning the territory of Myous could be resolved by mediation, but that with Magnesia about a related territory led to a major local war in the later 180s, in which Miletos was supported by Herakleia, as their treaty foresaw, and Magnesia by Priene. This war clearly did not infringe the treaties with Rhodes, but it was nevertheless Rhodes that in the end took the lead in bringing the parties to the negotiating table, after all four combatants had had prisoners taken and presumably suffered other casualties and damage as well. A boundary for the disputed territory was agreed and the peace agreement was witnessed by representatives of free cities, many of them under Rhodian influence, but also including Athens, which claimed to be the mother city of the Ionians, and the post-188 southern Greek new Great Power, the Achaian League, together with some of its constituent cities (*I.Milet* 148, with Errington, *Chiron* 1989 on the date).

These relatively minor incidents illustrate very well the practical limits set to the theoretical freedom that the Roman *legati* had granted these cities, as well as the way in which they proved incapable of themselves solving outstanding disputes resulting from the decision of the *legati* without external intervention. They all needed outside help, or at least pressure, from the new major powers, whose own interest in the security and peacefulness of the free cities in their area of responsibility was certainly a motivating factor in their willingness to become involved. The Rhodians can have had no interest in allowing “their” free cities to provoke an appeal to Rome as the Lykians did, if they could possibly avoid it, and create the impression in Rome that they could not even keep the peace.

Mediation was not always so successful. Sometime later the erstwhile allies Magnesia and Priene disputed possession of some piece of territory, and when a first mediation attempt – we do not

know by whom – failed, both parties appealed directly to Rome. Unfortunately, the documentation is not precisely dated, but it probably belongs to the later 170s or the 160s. The senate listened to both sides, formulated the principle that the basis for mediation should be to favor the party that held the disputed territory at the time when the disputants entered the alliance with Rome, and instructed the praetor Marcus Aemilius to appoint a neutral city to make the judgment. He chose Mylasa, and the Mylasan mediators then decided in favor of Magnesia, which promptly published all the documents on stone, “because with the just judgment of the praetor the gods put an end to the dispute and our people defeated the people of Priene for the second time ...” (Syll.³ 679 = Ager 120 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 34 [lines 34–65]). The praetor thus joined the gods as the decisive factor in the Magnesians’ portrayal of their own success in this dispute between free cities.

Miletos seems to have recognized its practical weakness during the period after the war with Magnesia, but exercised its freedom to cultivate good relations not just with Rhodes but also with Pergamon. Eumenes was happy enough to facilitate this relationship, which was particularly promoted by a prominent Milesian named Eirenaios who had gained private influence with the Pergamene king. A series of documents dating from the 160s illustrates this, since it led to Eumenes particularly favoring Miletos among the Ionian cities. He provided a capital sum, on the suggestion of Eirenaios, for a new gymnasium (*SEG* 36, 1046), and when after Eumenes’ death a priesthood was created for Eumenes at Miletos, the initiative again probably came from Eirenaios (*SEG* 36, 1048). Eirenaios’ influence was not just limited to Pergamon, since another inscription records his activities in achieving duty-free status for Milesian goods being imported to the Seleukid kingdom, now ruled by Antiochos IV (*SEG* 36, 1046). The reason for Eirenaios’ particular influence at the two courts is not known, but the fact that free and democratic Miletos was happy enough to profit from the private influence of one of its most prominent citizens and to honor him in particularly extravagant language for his services is a characteristic of the time, which other cities that had access to such private influence increasingly began to employ. The importance for the free cities of maintaining good relations with one or more protecting “Great Powers” and the converse, the cultivation of the goodwill of the free cities by the Great Powers, which relied on the loyalty of local elites for exercising influence, gradually led to the diminution of the practical difference between “free” and “subject” communities. The free cities certainly were not subject to direct regular taxation, but it increasingly seemed appropriate to vote costly “wreaths” or to give other expensive

demonstrations of goodwill and loyalty (such as priesthoods, together with the associated costs for sacrificial animals) in order to keep up good relations with the regional Great Power. In the course of time, these expensive expressions of goodwill, becoming regular, came to be regarded as an essential part of the discourse of political friendship – in practice, municipal loyalty – between the larger and the smaller states, so obscuring in practice existing status differences between the smaller states, all of which resulted from the decision of the Roman *legati* in 188 and so counted as being fixed by law.

II Europe

European affairs after the withdrawal of the Romans in 188 developed no more smoothly than Asian. The changes in the political structure of the area necessitated by the Aitolians' defeat and the subsequent conditions imposed by the Roman settlement did not always result in an easy transition. As in Asia, many details remained unsettled and provided cause for disputes between those affected; serious disagreements led also to the resurgence of intracommunal violence and to appeals for help or mediation to third parties or, in the last instance, to Rome as ultimate authority. The newly created or massively changed sociopolitical structure of many of the postwar Greek states proved in the end incapable of coping with the problems caused by change without outside help.

Southern Greece

The state most immediately affected by the Aitolian defeat was, of course, the Aitolian League itself. Apart from the fact that the war had been waged largely on Aitolian soil, which therefore bore the brunt of the damage, the League also lost significant amounts of territory in the settlement and was compelled to pay reparations. From the loss of territory by the state many individual Aitolian citizens were immediately affected. Already in 190 a document engraved at Delphi records the confiscation by Manius Acilius Glabrio of some private lands in the neighborhood that before the war had been Aitolian territory (*Syll.*³ 609 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 12). A secondary result of the withdrawal of the Aitolians from dominating Delphi and the shrine of Apollo was that the Delphians themselves managed to persuade the Roman authorities not only to declare their city free (i.e., they obtained a Roman guarantee of freedom from Aitolian interference), but also to grant it direct administrative control of the important

pilgrim harbor Kirrha and of some territories that formally belonged to Apollo. When the Aitolians lost nearby member territories of their League, they also automatically lost the seats on the Amphiktyonic Council, traditionally occupied by those communities, which had given them a controlling majority at the Delphic shrine in the second half of the third century. These seats – presumably under Roman supervision – were now restored to their pre-Aitolian occupants, which meant, for example, that the Thessalian League, newly constituted by Flamininus after 196, regained the traditional large Thessalian representation on the Council, and that Philip V regained the two royal Macedonian seats, which Aitolian hostility had made it impossible or impolitic to occupy for more than a century.

These changes did not occur without friction. Aitolian reluctance to accept their inevitability led to the Delphian appeal to Rome just mentioned. The loss of their dominant position did not, however, mean that the Aitolians lost all influence at Delphi. Their decree accepting the Pergamene *Nikephoria* festival in 182 was engraved in the Delphic sanctuary, but the domination of the last years was gone (Syll.³ 629). In other respects also Aitolia had difficulty in coming to terms with change. Information is only sporadic, but some incidents suggest that the financial pressure on individuals was very great. A general cancelation of debts took place around 180 (Diodoros 29.33), but also on one occasion, in 174, no fewer than eighty political opponents of the ruling clique were physically eliminated; in the 160s, after the final defeat of Macedonia, a report of more than 500 murdered Aitolians reached the Roman authorities (Livy 45.28.6). Polybios rails at the increasing brutalization of Aitolian attitudes and at Aitolian irrational violence. Although as an Achaian politician he was no friend of the Aitolians, the concrete evidence suggests his judgment was not far wrong (Polybios 30.11).

In Polybios' own state, the Achaian League, the first decade after the withdrawal of the Roman troops in 188 was a turbulent period, despite Roman favor. During the Aitolian war, the Achaian League incorporated two large and difficult southern Peloponnesian territories, the independent states of Sparta and Messenia. Their accession was accepted by the Romans, for whom the League had been so important during the war that they had agreed to a formal treaty of friendship on equal terms, a particular honor. Sparta however, after its incorporation into the League in 192, proved extraordinarily difficult to integrate, since the various revolutionary regimes of the last half-century had created a large number of exiles who, depending on the time and circumstances of their exile, often represented conflicting interests. Many of them lived nearby in one or other of the perioikic cities that Flamininus had placed under Achaian

supervision in 195, and, once Sparta became a member of the League, these men pressed for restoration, whereby they also demanded the return of property that had once belonged to them or their families. Several contradictory group claims were involved, going back to the confiscation of large landholdings under Kleomenes III in the 220s, but also resulting from subsequent redistributions under later regimes, such as those of Machanidas and Nabis. Local Spartan patriotism, which opposed membership of the Achaian League on principle, also played a part as a political cross-current in all groups, and a residual loyalty to the revolutionary ideals of the various reformers, which especially affected the beneficiaries of the reforms, such as freed helots and the recipients of the land distributions, further complicated the picture. Last, but not least, a division of opinion developed among the Achaian leaders themselves concerning the rights of the Roman senate and its representatives to intervene in the internal affairs of the League concerning Sparta, since the “equal treaty” (the text of which is unfortunately not preserved) will certainly have asserted the autonomy of the treaty partners in their internal affairs.

The result was a disastrous mix, which the Achaians, led by two Arkadians from Megalopolis, Philopoimen and Polybios’ father Lykortas, made only more complex when they tried to solve some of the problems by violence. This not only caused much unnecessary bloodshed, it also stimulated appeals over the heads of the Achaian authorities to the Roman senate, which, increasingly irritated by the intractable nature of the problem and the Achaian government’s failure to cope with it, began to insist on the repatriation of all the exile groups, whatever their origin. The result was a dialogue of the deaf, which lasted until 182 when Philopoimen’s death removed the prime obstacle to a pragmatic settlement and brought about an improvement in the strained relations with Rome. Until then, Philopoimen and his political friends refused to accept the legitimacy of any Roman attempt to solve the Spartan question, although the Romans – in accordance with the terms of the treaty – respected Achaian autonomy by formulating their solutions merely as wishes, or even just suggestions.

This type of diplomatic language, if used by the senate in Italy towards one of the Italian allied states – whatever the precise wording of its treaty might have been – would have immediately been understood as a polite form of instruction, since the Italian cities were accustomed to attending to the real power-political difference between each of them and Rome rather than to the exact wording of their treaty. Achaian experience of Rome at this time was, however, still relatively slight, the “equal” treaty was too new, and the self-confidence of the current Megalopolitan leaders too great to

comprehend the Italian interpretation of their relationship to Rome as being in effect subordinate, despite what their treaty said. For them as Megalopolitans, the main driving force of their action was the perceived opportunity of finally ending the century-long tensions between their city and their Spartan neighbor. Only after Philopoimen's death, when in 180/79 an Achaian mission to Rome included Kallikrates of Leontion, did the position change fundamentally – Leontion was a city belonging geographically to Achaia, not to Arkadia, and Kallikrates' origin there may well have given him a different perspective on the Spartan problem. Kallikrates, in speaking to the senate, included the advice to change the rhetoric and make sure that Roman suggestions or wishes were formulated as instructions or orders. Kallikrates' visit to Rome was epoch-making and his influence in the League, thanks to explicit Roman support, remained strong into the 150s. The Spartan question was then quickly resolved – precise details are unknown – when Kallikrates returned home, and relative peace returned immediately to Sparta. Polybios excoriates Kallikrates for betraying Achaian League values and rights to the Roman hegemony. He argues that Philopoimen's policy was not anti-Roman; rather, it was simply pro-Achaian within the terms of the treaty and quite loyal to Rome on every major issue of common interest. Kallikrates unnecessarily sacrificed the chance of operating an independent policy, even in areas where Rome had no essential own interest (Polybios 24.8–10).

Polybios' attack on Kallikrates was certainly related to his own experience of his political opponent over the next years, during which Kallikrates' influence dominated affairs in Achaia at the cost of the Megalopolitan politicians led by Lykortas and Polybios himself; Polybios' own exile to Rome in the 160s was laid at the door of Kallikrates. But his attitude was also affected by the circumstances under which Philopoimen died in 182. Messene was incorporated into the Achaian League with Flamininus' support in 191, after some of the marginal Messenian cities had joined the League independently sometime previously. During the 180s the Messenian leader Deinokrates, who was personally a client of Flamininus, developed the wish to secede from the League and he tried to win over Flamininus for this idea when he was passing through Greece in 183 on his way to Asia Minor. The Achaian authorities, however, refused to summon an assembly to discuss the issue with Flamininus. Shortly afterwards Deinokrates led an armed secession, and when the Achaians were asked by the Roman senatorial legate Quintus Marcius Philippus to accept Roman arbitration, they simply refused and Philopoimen, once again *strategos* of the League, set off with an army to bring sense to the Messenians, as he saw it. This expedition turned into a major disaster;

Philopoimen was himself captured and shortly afterwards died in a Messenian prison. His successor in office as *strategos* of the League was Polybios' father, Lykortas, who ravaged Messenia with his army and captured the leaders of the rebellion, including Deinokrates, who was encouraged to commit suicide; others, less fortunate, were stoned to death, symbolically at Philopoimen's tomb. It was not an effective way to create Messenian enthusiasm for the League (Polybios 23.5; 9.8–15; 12; Plutarch, *Philopoimen* 18–21; Livy 39.49–50).

Messene was subsequently reintegrated into the League, probably with some territorial adjustments, but at great cost in manpower, destruction of crops, and prestige. This Messenian affair, carried out contrary to explicit Roman wishes, provided the immediate background, however unflattering for Lykortas and Polybios, to Kallikrates' mission to Rome. Kallikrates' success there produced the great advantage for Achaia of creating internal peace in the Peloponnese, until a new generation of politicians emerged, who thought they knew the world so much better than the older generation, and thereby even provoked a war with Rome. We shall return to this sad story in Part IV, chapter 11.

Macedonia and Northern Greece

During the Aitolian war Philip V supported Rome under an agreement made with the Roman praetor, Marcus Baebius Tamphilus, in 191 during the war with Antiochos. The terms foresaw that he be permitted to retain such places in Thessaly as he might capture from Antiochos and the Aitolians, who had again occupied parts of the area. In this way, despite the existence of the newly created free Thessalian League, Demetrias and Magnesia, some places in Perrhaibia, western Thessaly, and Phthiotis came under Macedonian control before the war in Greece ended in 188. Once it was over, the Thessalian League immediately pronounced a contradiction between the Macedonian reoccupation of these places and Thessalian freedom, so widely proclaimed in and after 196, and after an appeal to the senate a Roman senatorial delegation that included Marcus Baebius was sent to Greece in 185 to sort out the complaints. They met the complainants at Tempe, on the northern border of Thessaly with Macedonia, and after listening to the arguments presented by both sides decided in each case in favor of the Thessalian complainants. All Macedonian troops were to be withdrawn from the disputed areas; Philip's territory was to be bounded by its traditional Macedonian frontiers (what they were, however, was not explicitly laid down), and other local disputes were to be arbitrated. Philip had no alternative but to accept the Romans' decision (Livy 39.24–26).

A second dispute concerned two coastal cities in Thrace, Ainos and Maroneia, which had long been Ptolemaic, and were occupied by Antiochos when he began to operate in Europe after 197, but were then vacated after his defeat. Both towns were now claimed by Eumenes of Pergamon, who had been allotted Antiochos' other European possessions, as well as by Philip, who had other interests in the area. In order to avoid an invidious decision in this dispute between Roman allies, in 188 both places were declared free, but shortly afterwards Philip was induced by Macedonian sympathizers to supply garrison troops, ostensibly merely in order to provide protection against potentially hostile Thracian neighbors, but in practice also to keep Philip's friends in control of the cities. Local opponents of the pro-Macedonian cliques turned to Eumenes, and then appealed to the senate about this development, which added Ainos and Maroneia to the agenda of the three-man commission for Thessaly. When they investigated the matter at a meeting in Thessalonike, they refused to decide and merely referred it back to the senate, though they instructed Philip to withdraw his garrisons, and in 184 the senate even sent a new delegation to check that Philip had complied. Before it arrived, however, a Thracian attack at Maroneia caused many deaths – it was alleged, only among Philip's opponents, thus suggesting that he had instigated it himself – but in 183 Philip accepted the inevitability of the Roman demand and withdrew completely (Livy 39.27–29.2; 33.4; 34; 53.10).

Maroneia and Ainos were particularly important to Philip, since the Roman settlements of Greece and Illyria made a new orientation of Macedonian policy necessary. Philip sought this in the non-Greek north and east, in Dardania and Thrace, and so in a sense began to fulfill the function that Flamininus had postulated for Macedonia immediately after Kynoskephalai, while he countered self-seeking Aitolian demands to dismantle the state completely: Macedonia should provide a protective buffer between the city-states of southern Greece and the non-Greek peoples of the Balkans. Active measures were now taken against hostile neighbors, and in the later 180s the economic center of Thrace in the middle Hebros valley became a major focus for Macedonian activity. Since Ainos and Maroneia occupied important coastal sites not far from the mouth of the Hebros, they inevitably acquired strategic importance for Philip; their loss would certainly hinder his plans for the area. Internally in Macedonia itself, certain measures of consolidation were also put in hand during these years. The wars had cost Macedonia huge losses in men, and the allies in Greece were no longer available for military service. Measures were therefore taken to restore Macedonian manpower by resettling depopulated areas, particularly towards the frontiers, where some

friendly Thracian elements were brought in to replace Macedonian losses. Existing urban centers were granted an increased measure of local self-government and new ones were created to serve as centers for a more decentralized, regionally based administration. This, however, did not happen without exacerbating the tensions inevitably existing in the new smaller Macedonia and opposition to Philip's plans had to be eradicated by force.

Whether the Romans fully understood the importance of Ainos and Maroneia for Macedonia or not is unclear, but the senate certainly lost no opportunity of causing difficulties for Philip. Some senators even contemplated interfering in his inner-dynastic affairs. Philip had two sons, of whom the elder, Perseus, was foreseen for the succession. Perseus was thoroughly integrated into the new orientation of Macedonian policy: a new frontier city near Stoboi was even named Perseis after him, and he received as bride a Bastarnian princess from a Germanic tribe living on the lower Danube that Philip was currently cultivating. The younger son, Demetrios, had served as hostage in Rome for six years after 196, and as a result knew many leading Romans personally. He therefore seemed an entirely suitable person to represent Macedonian interests at Rome when in 183 a new wave of complaints about Philip's activities reached the senate – there were so many that it took three whole days to hear them all. Envoys this time even included Eumenes' brother, Athenaios, protesting about Philip's activities at Ainos and Maroneia and about some kind of aid that Philip had allegedly given Eumenes' local enemy in Asia Minor, Prousius of Bithynia (Polybios 23.1–3). The senate in plenary session could not even begin to decide on the detailed questions put to it, except to reassert that Ainos and Maroneia should be evacuated, now in favor of Eumenes; but when Demetrios presented Philip's answers to the complaints of the European Greeks, the senators announced that they would accept these as being made in good faith simply because it was Demetrios who was representing his father's interests. Flamininus also received the young man, and he made it clear he was *persona grata* at Rome; he wrote to Philip, urging him to send Demetrios again soon. Once back home, Roman favor went to Demetrios' head, and serious disputes emerged between him and Perseus; Demetrios created the impression that he was the senate's candidate for the succession – some senators may even have pushed this view – and when he suddenly died, given the tense atmosphere at court over this issue, it was bound to be said that Perseus had eliminated him. Perhaps it was even true. At any rate, this whole affair gave Perseus a bad reputation at Rome, when his father unexpectedly died in 179 and Perseus entered the succession, although the senate made no formal difficulty about renewing the

friendship it had officially had with Philip (Livy 40.58.9).

Philip V had ruled as king of Macedonia for more than four decades when he died in his late fifties, and in this time, despite every effort to uphold the Macedonian tradition, going back to his namesake Philip II, as a leading power in the whole Greek world, and beyond, he had seen his land reduced to the status of a mere regional authority within the concert of Hellenistic powers. The young Philip had not been the only eastern statesman to underestimate the dynamism and strength of the new Great Power in Italy, but he was certainly the first to experience the full force of Rome's hostility. Given the political tradition in which Philip had been educated and the leadership role in Greece which Antigonos Doson had so successfully reasserted for Macedonia, given also the dynamics of Roman expansion within Italy, it is a moot point as to whether a conflict between the Italian Great Power and the Balkan Great Power would not have occurred at some time, for one reason or another. The fact that the conflict occurred precisely when it did was, however, no accident but a direct result of Philip's ill-advised attempt to come to an agreement with Hannibal, when he thought Hannibal was winning the war in Italy. When Hannibal did not win the war, it was virtually inevitable that Philip's Macedonia would suffer for its young king's temerity, though the systematic way in which Rome dismantled Macedonia's Greek empire after the Second Macedonian War could not have been anticipated. Macedonia, despite the postwar treaty of friendship with Rome, never afterwards enjoyed Roman trust, and the sporadic Roman interference with Philip's postwar attempts to revive Macedonian dynamism merely shows that the Romans of that generation would do anything to prevent a resurgence of Macedonian influence outside the boundaries of Macedonia itself.

Perseus, therefore, never really had a chance. He was in his early thirties when he became king in Macedonia, and although he continued Philip's Thracian policies, with which he had been closely associated, he also immediately made efforts to reestablish good relations with the Greek-speaking world. Philip's internal consolidation policies during his last years had produced a significant number of tax exiles, who now resided in cities in southern Greece. Perseus soon decided on a general amnesty for debts to the Macedonian state, which he promulgated at major Greek sanctuaries, including Delphi and Delos. Refugees could return home, and in Macedonia itself political prisoners associated with internal troubles during Philip's last years were freed. At Delphi in autumn 178 Perseus' delegates took their seats at the Amphiktyonic Council. Other monarchies were also approached, and classic marital relationships made: Perseus' sister Apama married Eumenes' enemy, Prousius II of

Bithynia, and Perseus himself in 177 took a daughter of Seleukos IV. Since neither state was allowed by its treaty with Rome to possess sufficient large warships to supply the appropriate pomp and security, the Rhodian navy stepped in to provide transport for the Seleukid bride. In the mountains of central Greece in 174, Perseus disciplined the Dolopians, who resented the continuation of Macedonian “protection,” under which they had fallen during the Aitolian war, and soon afterwards he personally visited Delphi with a large military escort, whereupon enemies alleged he had conquered the shrine; he also allied himself with the Boiotians in central Greece.

Figure 13 Official coin portrait of the Macedonian king Perseus wearing the diadem, perhaps issued at Amphipolis, ca. 178–173. Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



All these activities, each harmless enough in itself, provoked criticism in some quarters, but his activities in Thrace and particularly his association with Prousius seem to have been critical catalysts for the looming disaster. Eumenes at least took them so seriously that in 172 he personally made the long journey to Rome to complain about

Perseus, none of whose activities, of course, could reasonably be interpreted as being directed against Rome, though this was exactly what Eumenes tried to do. Given the underlying hostility to Macedonia in the senate, it is not surprising that he had some success, the consuls appointed for 172 immediately making their wish known to be allotted Macedonia as field of operations (*provincia*). The senate, though refusing their wish as being premature, was nevertheless in an aggressive mood, since longstanding wars in Spain and Liguria had recently come to an end, and the social dynamics of the Roman political system demanded new fields of military activity, in which the consular commanders might have a chance of winning military glory and celebrating a prestigious triumph. Whether Eumenes knew this or not, his visit to Rome fell at an extremely favorable time for his project, and during 172 several delegations of senators traveled to Greece to ensure the loyalty of Roman friends, should it come to war with Perseus, which it duly did in 171 (from the Roman point of view, generally known as the "Third Macedonian War"). No serious attempt was ever made to talk to Perseus himself, but anti-Macedonian propaganda was developed in terms of the complaints first enunciated by Eumenes, an official letter to the Amphiktyons containing them being later engraved at Delphi on the victory monument of Aemilius Paullus, the consul who commanded the Roman troops in the final battle of Pydna in 168. When Perseus himself tried to begin negotiations, his efforts were blocked by Roman procrastination, or simply ignored.

Precisely why the senate decided to abolish the Macedonian monarchy in 171 is not known, but there can be little doubt that this was the basic aim of the war, which unexpectedly dragged on until the decisive battle could be fought in June 168, this time in the heartland of lower Macedonia, near Pydna. The successful commander, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, made booty to an extent that Rome had not yet seen, and indeed the prospect of rich pickings might well have been one of the stimuli for the war in the first place. Certainly the Roman war aim was nothing less than total victory, and some Greek states that misunderstood this and suggested mediation – Rhodes in particular took this view, but Eumenes in the end also toyed with the idea – suffered after the war for their temerity. Only total unquestioning loyalty counted. After the battle that allegedly left 20,000 Macedonians dead, Perseus managed to escape to Samothrake, but by the end of the year he had surrendered. The Macedonian monarchy that had created the Hellenistic world was no more.

Part IV

ROME IN THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

The battle of Pydna in 168 and the resulting abolition of the Macedonian monarchy changed the face of the Hellenistic world by destroying the power that had created it. Immediate effects on the Greek world were first felt in Europe, which thereby lost its one major Greek power, but the implications of Rome's drastic attitude towards Macedonia were soon felt throughout the Greek east. No corner was unaffected, although the speed and intensity of Roman penetration varied according to geographic and political factors. Polybios recognized the epochal nature of this development and he initially intended to end his account of Rome's rise to world power at this date, only extending it to 146/5 when his own personal experience gave him insight into major developments of those later years, which he felt the need to incorporate. The importance of the Roman victory at Pydna was thus immediately apparent to thinking contemporaries in the Greek world, who not only saw the might of the legions but also observed the ever-increasing level of diplomatic and administrative activity, and experienced at first hand the penetration of Italian businessmen, the *negotiatores*. Protected by the legions and the Roman name, these men came in increasing numbers to the trading centers of the Hellenic world, some even taking up long-term residence in Greek cities. As in the previous parts of this book, despite the full achievement of Polybios' *sympleke*, it will remain convenient to divide the treatment geographically into broad regional sections, since developments, though in principle running parallel, did have regional components characteristic of each area.

Europe

325	300	275	250	225	200	175	150	125	100	75	50	25
168	Battle of Pydna; subsequent reorganization of Macedonia											
155	Athenian appeal to senate about Oropos (embassy of the philosophers)											
150	Rebellion of Andriskos											
149/8	Achaian and Spartan embassies in Rome; death of Kallikrates											
148	Macedonia becomes a Roman province											
147	War between Sparta and Achaia											
146	"Achaian War"; destruction of Korinth											
138	Athens renews <i>Pythais</i> to Delphi											
112	Senate confirms privileges of Athenian Guild of Dionysian Artists											
88	Athens supports Mithridates VI											
86	Sulla's army sacks Athens											

I Macedonia

The terms imposed by Rome on Macedonia after the war destroyed the state that had dominated Greek affairs for almost two hundred years. Not only was the monarchy abolished and the aristocracy devastated by mass internment in Italy, but the state itself as a unified entity was dismantled by splitting up its territory into four separate geographic units, which may have been based on units of a royal regional organization, created by Philip V. These new units, known merely by numbers, not names, in order to avoid any emotional political identification with the past, were each to be governed by a representative council, were to have no formal economic, social, or military cooperation with each other, and were to pay to Rome half of the taxes previously paid to the royal exchequer. But since the gold

and silver mines, which had provided the initial economic basis for Macedonian prosperity, were now closed, this provision, though seeming generous at first sight, would inevitably cause hardship. The senate, tongue in cheek, chose to regard the four new “republics” otherwise as free, since they were no longer ruled by a king. A similar arrangement was made in Illyria where the current king, Gentios, had supported Perseus (Livy 45.18).

The demolition of the Macedonian state was not immediately accompanied by any formalized Roman supervision. The opinion of Marcus Porcius Cato, that the Macedonians had to be left free because Rome could not defend them, was probably widely shared. Yet the new mini-states proved to be extremely problematic, and by 163 violence, which Polybios (31.2.12) calls civil war, provoked a Roman investigation, and five years later the mines in Macedonia Prima (*Prote*) and Macedonia Secunda (*Deutera*) were reopened, with Rome taking a share of the profits. Unrest continued, however, and it was soon exploited by an adventurer called Andriskos, who claimed to be a son of Perseus and gained significant support when he invaded Macedonia with Thracian support troops in 150. Since the republics were not supposed to cooperate or maintain more than a small militia, Andriskos had no difficulty in defeating the ad hoc levies which they raised to oppose him, and it took the efforts of three Roman commanders to suppress the insurrection, the successful one being the praetor Marcus Caecilius Metellus in 148, who promptly took the title “Macedonicus” (Diodoros 31.40a; Livy, *Periocha* 49). This time the senate did not hesitate to install a direct supervision system. Macedonia became the fifth directly ruled overseas *provincia* of the Roman People, beginning a new era in 148, the year of Metellus’ defeat of Andriskos. The further history of Macedonia was therefore wholly conditioned by Roman interest; in 148 BC Macedonia ceased to be a Hellenistic state.

II Achaia

It is hardly surprising that Macedonia was severely treated after the war, since Perseus was after all the defeated enemy. More significant for the changed Roman attitude was the treatment of other Greeks, especially those states which actually counted as being Roman friends and had officially supported Rome during the war. Here we can establish a clear tendency on the part of the Roman senate to distinguish within the individual states between reliable Roman supporters and opponents or critics. The distinction was put into

immediate effect throughout Greece, Roman friends in the individual states being asked to provide lists of the names of local politicians who could be regarded as unreliable, and these lists formed the basis for a major internment program in Italy: from Achaia alone some 1,000 leading men, including the historian Polybios himself, were removed to Italy on the advice of Kallikrates, to serve as hostages for the good – i.e., Rome-friendly – behavior of the remaining members of their families (Pausanias 7.10.11). This massive subjudicial interference in the internal affairs of individual Greek states ensured that those men like Kallikrates of Leontion in Achaia, whom Rome particularly favored, would remain influential in their home state, since the men removed to Italy were by definition their local opponents; indeed, in many cases this was their only sin. The chief purpose of the action was to reduce political tensions in and between the Greek states.

A further aspect of this policy was the increasing tendency of the senate to insist that interstate disputes be settled by compulsory mediation, whereby disputes referred to Rome by the direct appeal of one or other party were often transferred by the senate to a suitable city in the region, which then provided mediators for a locally informed settlement. The principle was, of course, by no means new. The kings and the federal states had always exerted pressure on local disputants – the most frequent disputes concerned territorial demarcation – to settle their affairs amicably through the decisions of neutral third parties. What we see in the period after Pydna, however, is that the Roman senate increasingly takes on this role itself, though by no means exclusively. Kerkyra was asked directly to arbitrate in a dispute between Ambrakia and Athamania (Ager 131), but in 163 Roman *legati* became personally involved in a long-standing local dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta, which also involved the Achaian League at some stage (Ager 135, 136).

More complex were two problems concerning Athens. After Pydna the island of Delos with its internationally revered shrine of Apollo lost its independence and was transferred by Rome to Athenian administration, as it had been 150 years ago, before its “liberation” by Antigonos Monophthalmos in 314. We do not know exactly why this happened now, but must assume that the independent Delians had given Rome the impression that they favored Perseus. At the same time the harbor of Delos was declared to be tax free – that is, no customs dues were to be levied – and this unusual feature promptly attracted large numbers of traders and merchants, bankers and slave traders from many states, including from Italy. After serious disagreements with the new Athenian administration, the remaining Delians were, however, expelled from the island with the agreement

of Rome, and they took up residence in the territory of the Achaian League, being accepted as citizens there. The Achaian League possessed an agreement with Athens regulating the rights of citizens of the one state who wished to pursue private legal claims against citizens of the other – a customary arrangement among the Greek states – but when the ex-Delians, now Achaians, wished to implement this standing agreement to make claims relating to their expulsion from the island, the Athenians argued that it could not possibly apply to them, since they were not Achaians at the time of their expulsion. Certain acts of violence occurred, directed against Athenian property; but when in 159/8 both sides sent envoys to Rome asking for arbitration, the senate actually ruled against the Athenians (Polybios 32.7).

The second incident was more complex and had wider implications. It concerned the border city of Oropos, which because of its famous sanctuary of the god Amphiaraos had for centuries been disputed between Athens and Boiotia. When the Boiotian League was disbanded by Rome during the Third Macedonian War for supporting Perseus, Oropos became independent, but sometime later, around 158/7, it was pressured to attach itself to Athens. Subsequent dissatisfaction with their treatment by the Athenians induced the Oropians to appeal to Rome, where the senate nominated the Achaian city Sikyon as mediator. When the Athenians did not even bother to send representatives to the mediation hearing, they were fined the massive sum of 500 talents by the Sikyonians. That in turn provoked an Athenian appeal to the senate in 155, which was presented by the three current heads of the philosophical schools, Karneades of the Academy, Kritolaos the Peripatetic, and the Stoic Diogenes, who persuaded the senate to reduce the fine to 100 talents. Even that Athens did not pay, subsequently even putting a garrison into Oropos, and so provoking an Oropian appeal to Achaia, where the Oropians found an active supporter in Hieron of Aigeira. At this point the Athenian authorities expelled those Oropians who had been responsible for the appeal to Achaia, and only under threat of military intervention by the Achaian army did they withdraw their garrisons and enable the exiles to return home. Hieron received from the grateful Oropians a statue within the sacred precinct and a fulsome decree text recording his activities, both erected around 150 (Syll.³ 675 = Austin² 157).

These incidents show clearly that even after the Macedonian war the Greek states, all now friends of Rome and governed by men personally regarded as being reliable supporters of Rome, still occasionally resorted to violence to achieve local objectives, and were often enough prepared to ignore opinions expressed by or decisions

made in the senate. Since there was no permanent Roman presence in the area and visits by senatorial *legati* were sporadic and always brief, it obviously still seemed occasionally worth taking the risk of giving low-level offense to Rome in order to follow up local agendas that were felt to be urgent, even to the point of launching independent local military operations. This attitude went badly wrong in Achaia in the years following their successful support of Oropos against Athens, for which the Achaians had at least in principle Roman acquiescence. At home in the Peloponnese old political wounds still festered, especially at Sparta and Messene, whose membership of the League remained unenthusiastic, even though some individuals were prepared to participate and could rise to the highest office: the Spartan Menalkidas was League *strategos* in 151/50. This, however, did not mean that the Spartans as a body were in principle consoled to the idea of being members of the League. A year later, this same Menalkidas was leading a Spartan movement challenging Achaian League jurisdiction for local city affairs, which was so serious that the Achaian authorities countered it with military preparations. Both parties then appealed to Rome, the issue being so important for the League that the aged Kallikrates in person led the Achaian delegation. Unfortunately he died before reaching Rome, and the senate merely decided to send envoys to investigate who, however, did not arrive until summer 147, some eighteen months later. By then open warfare had broken out. This only ended when Metellus, who was currently fighting Andriskos in Macedonia, appealed for calm in the south. A series of Roman senatorial *legati*, using a variety of tactics and arguments, failed to solve the problem of Sparta's dissatisfaction and its wish to secede from the League, and when in 146 the Achaian *strategos* Kritolaos set out to solve the Spartan problem once and for all with a major military effort, the senate's patience ran out and the consul Lucius Mummius was instructed to levy an army for "the Achaian War." Mediation had completely failed (Pausanias 7.12–16).

This war devastated European Greece and effectively put an end to independent political activity in the area. In 146, the same year in which a Roman army commanded by Scipio Aemilianus, the adoptive son of the victor of Pydna, razed Carthage to the ground, Lucius Mummius destroyed Korinth. In the settlement that followed the disaster, the Achaian League was reduced to a small rump state, which meant that the long-term troublemakers Sparta and Messene were no longer members but "free." No Roman province was created in southern Greece at this time – it was more than a century, in 27 BC, before southern Greece again seemed important enough to Rome to require this step – but the proconsul of the new *provincia Macedonia* was given a supervisory mandate for the southern Greeks and the

defeated Achaians were expected to pay an annual tax to Rome. This arrangement meant in effect the end of the freedom of action of the states of mainland Greece – the “freedom” granted to Sparta and some other states depended on Rome’s continuing satisfaction with their behavior – and it made an appropriate end for the Achaian Polybios’ history of Rome’s rise to world power.

III Athens

The one European state to profit from the Third Macedonian War was Athens, being militarily too weak and politically too unambitious to present any kind of challenge to Rome. After the war Athens received as a gift from Rome a group of islands including the sacred island of Apollo, Delos, which had been administered by Athens in the distant past, until 314. The Athenians promptly took possession, replacing the Delians who were expelled with Rome’s acquiescence with settlers from the city (so-called “*kleruchs*”), an Athenian administration being in place before summer 166. Athenian Delos flourished, especially after the Achaian War, since one of the conditions laid down by the Romans was that no customs dues were to be levied at the harbor. The Augustan geographer Strabo writes: “Delos was already famous, but the destruction of Korinth by the Romans [in 146 BC] increased its reputation, since the merchants transferred their business there, attracted by the tax-free status of the temple and the convenience of the harbor, which is well situated for anyone sailing from Italy or Greece to Asia. The festival is a commercial affair, and even before the destruction of Korinth Romans more than other folk were accustomed to attend. When the Athenians took over the island they paid equal attention to sacred and commercial interests” (10.5.4 [C486]). Delos and its Athenian residents therefore experienced an economic boom in the half-century after 167, becoming an important center, above all for the slave trade, thanks to the Roman grant, the fundamental importance of which the new Delians remained well aware of. From the start, the goddess “Roma” was honored with a prominent new annual festival, the *Romaia*, celebrating Roman generosity and permanently marking Athenian gratitude.

Favor for Athens in principle did not, however, mean that every Athenian act or wish was acceptable to the senate. We have already noticed the disputes about the rights of the expelled Delians and the possession of Oropos, in both of which Rome decided against Athens, but even on the island itself Athenian acts could be challenged. At an early stage of the Athenian occupation a popular century-old private

cult of the Egyptian god Sarapis was suppressed by the Athenian authorities for reasons unknown. The priest, Demetrios, thereupon appealed to Rome, where the senate decided in his favor and instructed the Athenians accordingly. Demetrios proudly had the texts associated with the decision engraved and published in his temple precinct (Syll.³ 664 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 28).


While Delos prospered, the Athenians also cultivated good relations with the other major internationally famous shrine of Apollo at Delphi. In various Delphic disputes, whether concerning territorial boundaries or the distribution of voting rights on the Amphiktyonic Council, Athenians were chosen as mediators, and in 138 Athens renewed the long-forgotten practice of mounting an occasional festive procession, called the *Pythais*, from Athens to Delphi. This spectacular event was accompanied by musical performances, which in the years after 128 were given by members of the Athenian Guild of Dionysian Artists. Two years before this, the guild received the renewal of privileges originally granted by the Amphiktyons in 277 when they provided performers for the *Soteria*, celebrating the safe keeping of Delphi when threatened by the Celts (Le Guen, *TE* 2 = Syll.³ 399 = *CID* 4, 12; *TE* 6, 7 = Syll.³ 692 = *CID* 4, 114, 115). Since then, because of the Aitolian domination of Delphi and the Macedonian orientation of Athens in the middle years of the third century, the Athenian guild had been replaced at Delphi by a similar organization based at the isthmus of Korinth, and the privilege of this Isthmian guild had simply continued through the second century, though the political constellation which had created and justified it in the first place had long since disappeared. The newly awakened Athenian communal enthusiasm for Delphic matters after the Achaian War led almost inevitably to the wish of the Athenian guild once more to participate in Delphic festivals, since both prestige and money were involved. One result was a long-running dispute with the Isthmian guild that soon brought about a mediation attempt by a proconsul of Macedonia, Sisenna (119/18 or 118/17), and at least two appearances before the senate. In 112 it finally sided with the Athenian guild. As a result of this diplomatic success, the whole dossier of correspondence concerning the dispute was proudly made public by being inscribed on the walls of the Athenian treasure house at Delphi (Le Guen, *TE* 12 = Syll.³ 704–705 = Sherk, *RDGE* 15).

Athens had again become successful and prosperous, thanks to the support of Rome, and not a few Italians and Romans chose to take up residence there and let their sons be educated in the traditional training school for better-off citizens, the *Ephebeia*, that was opened to foreigners in the last quarter of the second century. Many of them combined this with business interests on Delos, finding Athens, with

its splendid architecture and multifarious cultural activities, a pleasant place to reside. This happy symbiosis of free city and dominating outside power might well have continued indefinitely, had not a majority of Athenians chosen to indulge in wishful thinking, to abandon their Roman benefactor, and to support the Pontic king, Mithridates VI Eupator, when he attacked the Roman province of Asia in 88. The reasons for this disastrous sudden change of attitude are unclear. The man chiefly responsible was the philosopher Athenion, who led an Athenian delegation to Mithridates and was then elected hoplite general on his return, so he certainly controlled a majority in the people's assembly for his wayward enthusiasm. This decision, however, created a no-win situation for the Athenians, who now suffered damage from both combatants in the war: the Athenian settlers on Delos, knowing well why they were so prosperous, remained staunchly loyal to Rome, which meant that Mithridates' general Archelaos ravaged the island, while Athens itself, having decided to support Mithridates, once Roman legions under the proconsul Lucius Cornelius Sulla reached Greece in 87 became a major military objective of the Romans, suffering a bitter siege over the winter 87/6 and a bloodbath when the legions finally broke through into the city on March 1, 86. Many buildings, especially in the Peiraeus, were seriously damaged or destroyed, and many statues and other artworks looted, though in the end some Athens-friendly senators on Sulla's staff prevented a total disaster, such as had devastated Korinth in 146 (Plutarch, *Sulla* 14).

Athens never again attempted an independent policy. The city became more than ever dominated by its own elite of richer citizens, who knew they had everything to lose by opposing Rome, though there was a desperate shortage of public funds to repair the war damage, since income from Delos was now massively reduced, as a result of the massacre of Roman and Italian residents there by Mithridates' troops under Archelaos. Just as the island was beginning to recover a little, it was again ransacked in 69 by pirates and its commercial heart destroyed for ever. Athens continued to be a favorite place for culturally interested Roman merchants and bankers to reside when they were in Greece – Cicero's friend Marcus Pomponius was known as "Atticus" because of a twenty-year-long residence in the city – but the devastating mistake of following Athenion and his successor Aristion in their support for Mithridates marked the practical end of Athens as a viable independent Hellenistic state.

Egypt and Asia



196	Ptolemy V “Epiphanes” crowned at Memphis
193	Ptolemy V marries Kleopatra I (“the Syrian”)
180	Death of Ptolemy V
176	Death of Kleopatra I
169	Outbreak of the “Sixth Syrian War”
168	Battle of Pydna; Attalos (II) in Rome; “Day of Eleusis”
167	Prousias II of Bithynia in Rome
159/8	Death of Eumenes of Pergamon, accession of Attalos II
156–154	War between Bithynia and Pergamon
148	Death of Prousias II of Bithynia; accession of Nikomedes II
138	Death of Attalos II of Pergamon; accession of Attalos III
133	Death of Attalos III, leaving Pergamon to Rome; rebellion of Aristonikos
129	Pergamon becomes the Roman province <i>Asia</i>

Despite the effective completion of Polybios’ *sympleke* after the battle of Pydna, it is hardly surprising that affairs of Asia, which were not immediately affected by the defeat of Perseus, developed within a rather different timescale from those in Europe. Nevertheless, the changed Roman attitude towards eastern affairs that led to the Third Macedonian War in the first place soon made itself felt in Asia, including places where Roman interest had hitherto been quite indifferent.

I The “Sixth Syrian War”

The one major development of the early years of the second century that had little or nothing to do with Roman expansionist activities was the recovery of a certain stability in Ptolemaic Egypt. When we last looked at Ptolemaic Egypt around the turn of the century (Part III, chapter 8), the land was being ruled by a clique of guardians acting for the child-king Ptolemy V “Epiphanes,” who were struggling with an insurrection in Upper Egypt and disaffection in the Nile delta region, and whose main recent claim to fame was the loss of Ptolemaic Syria and Palestine, as well as most of southern Asia Minor and the Aegean possessions, to Antiochos III and Philip V. Although Roman diplomacy of the time also claimed to represent Ptolemaic interests against the real enemies Philip V and Antiochos III – Rome had a longstanding desultory friendship with Ptolemaic Egypt, going back to the time of Ptolemy II “Philadelphos” – in practice nothing was done for Ptolemaic Egypt. Indeed, the restoration of lost Ptolemaic possessions in the Greek world would in the end have counteracted Roman freedom slogans aimed at winning over the immediate support of the Greek cities, as well as impeding the much more urgent requirement of satisfying the territorial ambitions of Eumenes of Pergamon and Rhodes in Asia Minor in the peace of Apameia. As a result, Ptolemaic possessions outside Egypt were reduced to Cyprus (which Antiochos III had failed to occupy), Kyrene, and some isolated bases in the Aegean, of which Arsinoe/Methana in the Peloponnese, Thera in the central Aegean, and Itanos in eastern Crete were the longest lasting.

Within Egypt, a gradual improvement of the security situation occurred, associated with the name of Polykrates of Argos, a senior officer who had fought at Raphia in 217 and governed Cyprus from 203 until 197 when he came back to Alexandria. At about the same time, the main rebellion in the delta was ended at Lykopolis, and the child-king, now about fourteen, was considered old enough to be officially declared of age. On March 26, 196 the crowning ceremony took place at Memphis, and it was accompanied by the execution of the leaders of the rebellion in the delta. Polykrates seems to have been a leading motivator of these events, which were accompanied by a series of political and financial concessions to the population, especially to the priests. A priestly assembly exploited the situation to justify a decree, published throughout Egypt in Greek, demotic and hieratic, urging the general setting up of statues of the new Pharaoh in the temples of Egypt. One copy of this important document is preserved on the trilingual Rosetta Stone, now in the British Museum, which when first found provided the key to understanding Egyptian hieroglyphs (*OGIS* 90 = Austin² 283 = Burstein 103 = BD² 165).

In Upper Egypt another decade was required before the

insurrection there could be ended by the general Komanos, who captured both the leader of the rebels, Anchwennefer, and his son, who was killed. Shortly afterwards, on October 9, 186, Epiphanes issued and published a major decree granting a wide range of financial and other concessions to the population, including a general amnesty for acts committed before October 3, 186 (a so-called *philanthropa* ["benefactions"] decree), in the hope of restoring security and economic stability after the years of effective independence of Upper Egypt (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 34). A major problem there had been that of farmers abandoning their land to avoid an excessive tax burden, and the royal concessions aimed at getting agriculture, the vital backbone of the Egyptian economy, back into normal operation. Shortly afterwards Polykrates finally stamped out some remaining nests of opposition in the delta, so that reconstruction could also begin there (Polybios 22.17.3–7).

At another level, the reign of Ptolemy V Epiphanes proved to be pivotal for the future of Ptolemaic Egypt. In 195 Kleopatra, daughter of Antiochos III, was formally affianced to Epiphanes, and the wedding took place in winter 194/3. The junction of the two Macedonian royal families was doubtless in the first instance an attempt by Antiochos III to consolidate Seleukid control of Koile Syria by sealing the personal relationship between the two dynasties (later a false claim was, however, made by Ptolemaic revanchists that Koile Syria had been part of Kleopatra's dowry). As long as Ptolemy Epiphanes and Kleopatra lived, Koile Syria remained Seleukid and the two dynasties seem to have lived in harmony. This was, unfortunately, not as long as might have been expected, since Ptolemy died, supposedly poisoned, as a thirty-year-old in 180, and Kleopatra followed him in 176, leaving three small children, the two boys both bearing the dynastic name Ptolemaios, the daughter being Kleopatra (II). At this point everything depended on the quality of those men appointed as regents, and once again, as after the death of Ptolemy IV, the Alexandrian court failed to produce adequate persons to fulfill this function. The two men who took over running the kingdom, Lenaios and Eulaios, had a bad press in the ancient sources – the one was allegedly a freed slave, the other a eunuch – which, however, results mainly (apart from the social prejudices of the sources) from their disastrous revanchist foreign policy. Their overriding aim was to regain Koile Syria, and in that they failed so drastically that the independence of Egypt itself was threatened and was only saved by a dramatic Roman intervention (Diodoros 30.15–16).

Here a word on a minor technical problem will be appropriate. Modern numbering of the later Ptolemies is confused by the fact that recent research has shown that a child of Ptolemy VIII, traditionally

numbered Ptolemy VII because it was thought that he had ruled in 145 before his father, never actually ruled at all in his own right, and therefore cannot qualify as a numbered ruling Ptolemy. However, in order to avoid confusion in a situation which is already complicated enough, and to maintain compatibility with older literature, the traditional numbering of the later Ptolemies which is found in most recent accounts is maintained here. This means that there is no Ptolemy VII in this book.

At home, the regents endeavored to consolidate the dynasty by encouraging the elder of the two boys, Ptolemy VI, now called “Philometor” (“Mother-Loving”), to marry his little sister Kleopatra (II) in order to diminish the inevitable sibling rivalry; and at some point the younger brother, also called Ptolemy, later when he came to the throne known as Ptolemy VIII “Euergetes” II (“Benefactor”), was formally associated in their rule in order to demonstrate the solidarity of the whole dynasty. Preparations were then made to invade Syria, and in spring 169 a Seleukid envoy informed the senate in Rome that this was happening. By this time Antiochos IV, who had succeeded his brother Seleukos IV in 176, having had plenty of warning of the impending attack, had put massive defensive measures into place. Choosing aggression as the best measure of defense, he marched into Egypt and defeated the Egyptian army near the fortified frontier town Pelousion, which he then occupied. A palace revolution thereupon replaced Eulaios and Lenaios with the experienced Komanos and Kineas, who began negotiations with Antiochos. By then he had occupied large parts of Lower Egypt, but not Alexandria. The dynastic question was complicated by the fact that Antiochos’ sister, Kleopatra I, was the mother of the ruling siblings in Alexandria, he therefore their uncle, and an agreement was reached whereby Antiochos in some way – the details are unknown – became protector of Ptolemy VI Philometor. When this became known in Alexandria the Alexandrian court refused to accept it, and set up an alternative regime headed by the younger brother. Thereupon Antiochos began to besiege Alexandria and the new government appealed to Rome, but its envoy was not heard until spring 168 (Polybios 27.19; 28.1; 18–23; Diodoros 30.14–18).

In the meanwhile, Antiochos returned to Syria and Ptolemy VI, instead of pursuing the siege, reached an agreement with his siblings to unite in opposition to Antiochos. In spring 168 Antiochos attacked and won over Ptolemaic Cyprus before returning to the siege of Alexandria with renewed forces. By this time Antiochos controlled most of Lower Egypt, and the Egyptian priests at the old capital Memphis accepted his authority, though he was probably not made Pharaoh. Meanwhile, in Rome the Alexandrian envoys were finally

admitted to the senate, which appointed a group of *legati* led by Gaius Popilius Laenas to intervene in Egypt. They, however, did not hurry, but waited at Delos for news from Macedonia, where in June Aemilius Paullus was facing the decisive battle against Perseus. When the news of Paullus' success at Pydna reached them, the *legati* immediately continued their journey to Alexandria. Their attitude was obviously directly conditioned by the fate of Perseus, and if events in Macedonia had not been so decisive, they might well have adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Antiochos. As it was, they were buoyed by the news of Pydna when they met up with Antiochos at Eleusis, a suburb of Alexandria, early in July 168. Popilius and Antiochos knew each other from Antiochos' years-long residence in Rome as hostage for his father after the treaty of Apameia twenty years before, but Popilius refused a formal greeting, expressing the senate's position in the form of an ultimatum: Antiochos was to break off the war and leave Egypt as soon as possible. The king asked for consultation time, but Popilius reacted by drawing a circle with his staff in the dust around the king and demanded a reply before he left it (Polybios 29.27.5). By July 30, Seleukid troops had left Egypt and Cyprus was again Ptolemaic.

The "Day of Eleusis" would not have been possible without the battle of Pydna and the resulting destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, since Popilius had no troops available and it was highly improbable that at this stage the senate would seriously have considered sending legions to Syria or Egypt. Yet the shock of the Macedonian disaster reverberated round the eastern Mediterranean basin, and Popilius knew how to exploit it. Antiochos was forced to recognize that Roman interests were now paramount, even in the most distant corners of the Mediterranean world, and if the senate chose to intervene it was capable of doing so. As far as Egypt was concerned, given the weakness of the current dynastic regime of the siblings, Popilius' intervention also marked a turning point that was characterized by the visit of the senior courtier, Noumenion, to Rome, sent to thank the senate in the name of the ruling kings (Polybios 30.16.1; Livy 45.13.4–8; see chapter 15 below). Their thanks expressed in effect Ptolemaic recognition of the overarching power of Rome in Mediterranean affairs, the power to make or break states, if the wish to do so were there. Pydna showed the Greek world what Rome could do, if it really wanted to, and the lesson, once learned – though some learned quicker than others – was never to be forgotten. Roman interests, or even potential Roman interests, provided from now on the immovable background curtain to all further major activities of every remaining Hellenistic state.

II Western Asia Minor

The defeat of Perseus at Pydna had widespread influence also on affairs of western Asia Minor. Of the three major states in the area, Rhodes, Pergamon, and Bithynia, only Eumenes II of Pergamon had shown initial enthusiasm for the war. His enemy Prousius II in Bithynia, because of his marital relationship with Perseus, at first urged mediation, while the Rhodians remained ostentatiously neutral when war broke out, even sending envoys to Rome to explain their position. The fact was that public opinion in Rhodes was split on the issue, particularly since the Roman senate had continually intervened in its affairs in Lykia in favor of the Lykians, and the Rhodians had certainly cultivated warmer relations with Perseus than they had enjoyed with Philip. As a result, this time Rhodes sent no ships to aid Rome's war effort, and early in 168, when the war had already been running for three years, chose to send envoys to Aemilius Paullus in Greece and to the senate in Rome, suggesting the issues between the combatants be settled diplomatically after all. They could not have arrived at a worse time. Aemilius Paullus told them to wait for a couple of weeks for an answer, in which time he destroyed the Macedonian army at Pydna. The Rhodian envoys sent to Rome to urge negotiations arrived almost at the same time as the news from Pydna, which left them stuttering embarrassed congratulations on the victory. The senate was not amused, interpreting the Rhodians' attitude as being pro-Macedonian (which it basically was), and some senators even contemplated the possibility of declaring war on Rhodes, while the legions were still in the area (Polybios 28.2; 16-17; 29.10-11; 19; Livy 44.23-29; 35.4-6; 45.3).

It did not come to that, but the senate made no bones about showing extreme irritation at the Rhodians' lack of sensitivity on the major issue, when they had been so generously treated by Rome in the Peace of Apameia. At home, the Rhodians reacted in shock at the treatment of their envoys at Rome, condemning to death leading statesmen whom they regarded as pro-Macedonian, though in fact the neutrality policy had been majority opinion in the island democracy. A series of envoys traveled to Rome over the next few years, desperately trying to restore the good relationship with the senate that had once been so fruitful for both sides, but they could not prevent the senate's declaring free the areas in Karia and Lykia that had become Rhodian after Apameia, and shortly afterwards taking the side of exiles from older Rhodian possessions in the area, Kaunos and Stratonikeia, instructing the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons from these places also. The Rhodians saw their only hope in putting their relationship with Rome on a formal legal basis – up to now they

had had no long-term treaty relationship – but it was 164 before the senate finally agreed to this, after receiving a positive report from the senior statesman, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who had visited the island during a recent official tour of the area. In the future the Rhodians would have no further problem in defining where they stood in any war in which Rome had an interest, since the critical clause in their treaty committed them to having the same friends and enemies as the Roman People. At the same time, the clause ruled out any future independent activity in areas where Rome might show an interest. From this time onwards, therefore, Rhodes sank to being no more than a regional center of commerce with localized strategic interests, in particular in the traditional *Peraia* in Karia, and played no further assertive role in major events of the Hellenistic world. Even her commerce and harbor turnover suffered, thanks to the new maritime competition from Delos' tax-free harbor (Polybios 30.4–5; 21; 23–24; 31).

Neither of the monarchies made the same major error of judgment concerning the Macedonian war as the Rhodian democracy, but both were affected by Rome's success. Prousius, who was related by marriage to Perseus, hastened personally to Rome in 167 to congratulate the senate on its victory, describing himself as a freed slave and addressing the senators to their faces as “savior gods.” Prousius' publicly demonstrated subservient attitude to the victors provoked Polybios' scorn, but in fact it merely illustrates the immediate shock that the demonstration of Roman power in Macedonia had caused in the Greek world. Since Prousius' father had been in danger of losing his kingdom in the 190s, only joining Rome at the very last minute, and since Prousius himself was congenitally hostile to Rome's great friend in the area, Pergamon, Prousius' hyperbolic flattery betrayed merely an existential anxiety over the shape of the post-Pydna world (Polybios 30.18; Livy 45.44).

It was, however, Pergamon which experienced the greatest postwar surprise, despite the participation of a Pergamene fleet in the operations of the war and despite Eumenes' important personal contribution to its publicistic justification. When his brother Attalos reached Rome late in 168 to congratulate the senate on the victory, he found to his astonishment widespread dissatisfaction at Eumenes' attitude during the war and was urged to regard himself as Rome's candidate for the succession – the sooner the better – a favor which, however, did not extend to granting his request for Ainos and Maroneia, now that the kingdom of Macedon had been demolished. Eumenes was still involved in yet another Galatian war that broke out at about the time of Pydna and demanded his personal attention; it may well have absorbed Pergamene energies in the last phases of the

Macedonian war and so contributed to the impression at Rome that Eumenes was no longer wholeheartedly involved in destroying Perseus. His well-known closeness to Antiochos IV, whom he had helped to the succession in Antioch and who was currently invading Egypt, will also scarcely have improved his image at Rome. Yet Attalos loyally asked for Roman intervention in the Galatian war, and Publius Licinius Crassus was dispatched, though to no avail (Polybios 30.1–3). When Attalos returned to Pergamon and made his report, Eumenes decided it was essential for him to travel again to Rome in person and he did so despite the ongoing Galatian war, arriving in Italy sometime after Prousius' dramatic performance in the senate, late in 167. The senate decided an interview with their old royal friend would be embarrassing under the circumstances and decreed ad hoc that for the future they would receive no more personal visits from ruling kings, a message that was conveyed to Eumenes by a junior senator, a quaestor, when he landed in Italy at Brundisium. Eumenes returned home with his business unaccomplished. Pergamene forces did, however, defeat the Galatians again, an event that was widely celebrated by the Greek communities which continued to regard them as a danger to civilization; but when the defeated Galatians in their turn appealed to Rome, having also learned how the world now worked, the senate decreed that they should be autonomous – that is, self-governing and not subject to Pergamene supervision – as long as they remained in their settlements and within the customary boundaries (Polybios 30.28).

Senatorial policy in this phase seems to have aimed at gradually reducing the dominance of Pergamon's position in Asia Minor that it had encouraged Eumenes to build up in the years after Apameia. Prousius understood the immediate situation well enough, though he did not appreciate its long-term implications, contrasting his own reception at Rome with that of Eumenes, and so began to agitate again about the old territorial disputes. The Galatians also now saw in the senate a supporting organization for their territorial ambitions, directed in the first instance against Eumenes' father-in-law, Ariarathes IV in Kappadokia. The culmination of Roman low-level provocation of Eumenes was reached in 164, when Roman *legati* led by Gaius Sulpicius Galus sent out a general invitation to cities and communities in Asia Minor to articulate claims on or criticism of Pergamene activities, and sat for ten days in the Pergamene regional capital Sardeis listening to them (Polybios 31.1; 6). The fact that no further action was taken on these issues shows that the senate's aim was rather to humiliate and weaken Pergamene authority than to seriously damage its basic position, but also to assert Roman interest – at least in principle – in the whole Hellenistic world (as it did with

Antiochos IV in Egypt). This message had been received and well understood at Pergamon by the time Attalos II succeeded Eumenes on the latter's death in 159/8.

Events of the 150s confirm this impression. Before his death, Eumenes was in close contact with Attis, the chief priest of the age-old shrine of the Great Mother at Pessinous in Phrygia that was now within Galatian territory. Attis himself was a Galatian. Some kind of cooperative action was being contemplated when Attalos, as Eumenes' successor, took over the negotiations. In the course of them he consulted his crown council and then reported back to Attis on the discussions there: "Chloros urgently drew attention to Roman interests, and advised that we should do nothing at all without consulting them. At first only a few agreed with him, but as the discussion went on over several days his view appealed more and more, and to launch an initiative without consulting them seemed to hazard great danger. For if we succeeded they would harbor jealousy and denigration and false suspicion, such as they felt towards my brother, and if we failed, it would be total disaster. For we thought that in that case they would not be sympathetic, but rather enjoy our discomfiture because we had undertaken such an important initiative without consulting them. As things are now, however, should we suffer some defeat – which god forbid! – after acting with their approval, we would receive help and be able to fight again with the goodwill of the gods. I therefore decided always to send to Rome envoys to consult regularly on matters where we are uncertain" (RC 61 = Austin² 244 = Sherck, *RGEDA* 29 = BD² 50). There is no clearer statement of the Pergamene perception of the senate's attitude towards the powers of Asia Minor at this time.

In the end it was Prousius, not Attalos, who overplayed his hand, not fully realizing, it seems, that lack of regular direct Roman intervention did not mean lack of Roman interest, nor that the tactical favor shown him in Rome while Eumenes still lived was not necessarily still valid, now that Rome's friend Attalos II had become king in Pergamon. In 156 Prousius launched an attack on Pergamene territory, whereupon Attalos sent his senior adviser and personal friend Andronikos to Rome to report. Publius Cornelius Lentulus was sent off to investigate, and by the time he returned, accompanied now by Attalos' younger brother Athenaios, Attalos had suffered a defeat. Three new senatorial *legati* were then sent out along with Athenaios with instructions to stop the fighting, but Prousius had the bit between his teeth, foolishly ignored the efforts of the *legati* to pressure him into negotiations, and even began to besiege Pergamon while the *legati* themselves were still in the city. Buildings outside the walls, including the *Nikephorion* that had been restored by Eumenes to commemorate

his victory against Prousius' father, and the increasingly famous temple of Asklepios, were plundered. When Prousius failed to capture Pergamon, he retired via an inland route, once again sacking temples as he went, in Polybios' words "waging war not only on men but on the gods" (Polybios 32.15).

Rome's resolution was challenged, and the report of the three senators who had suffered the ignominy of being besieged in Pergamon produced a wave of Roman diplomatic activity supporting Attalos (who in the meanwhile had raised contingents from his local allies and put out a fleet under the command of Athenaios) that effectively ended the war in 154. The agreement, reluctantly accepted by Prousius, imposed reparations on him to cover the cost of some of the damage he had caused (Polybios 32.16; 33.12–13; 16). Prousius thus learned the hard way that Roman patience was limited, even though the senate pursued no systematic policy in detail, and it was only when he was faced with the overwhelming forces of the Attalid allies that he bowed to Roman diplomatic pressure. Even then, a few years later, when his son Nikomedes had made some friends in Rome, he tried to negotiate a reduction of his indemnity, only to be confronted by a Pergamene embassy led by the redoubtable Andronikos, who pointed out that the original sum imposed for reparations was from the beginning inadequate and in no way sufficient to cover the repair of all the damage Prousius had caused. Shortly after this, Nikomedes acquired through Andronikos Pergamene support for a putsch against his father, whose activities at home and abroad had in the meanwhile made him extremely unpopular in Bithynia. The senate, given that wars were concurrently being fought at Carthage and in Macedonia against Andriskos, did not object and accepted Nikomedes II as legitimate ruler in Bithynia, while Attalos smoothed things over by supplying a Pergamene fleet for the war against Andriskos (Appian, *Mithridateios* 3–7). When the Achaian War blew up in 146 Pergamene troops were again made available to support Rome, and some of the less valuable objects from the sack of Korinth found their way as booty to Pergamon (Pausanias 7.16.8).

Attalos had every reason to be satisfied at the way the policy that he had formulated in his letter to Attis was working out in practice. When the Thracian chieftain Diegylis, who had been Prousius' brother-in-law, attacked Pergamene possessions in Europe around 144, even burning down Lysimacheia, Attalos managed to stop him, and probably even kill him, doubtless with the explicit moral support of the proconsul of Macedonia (Diodoros 33.14–15). Otherwise he continued the consolidation policies of Eumenes, founding or raising to the status of self-governing city at least three more communities, in Lydia Philadelphia, in Phrygia Eumeneia, and in Pamphylia Attaleia

(Antalya). He also continued Eumenes' policy of making generous gifts to influential cities, including a huge stoa on the edge of the agora at Athens (rebuilt and now used as base for the American archeological excavations), money for a school at Delphi, another stoa at Termessos, building subsidies at Miletos, harbor works at Ephesos, as well as smaller gifts and dedications at Delos, Samos, Ilion, Athens, and Delphi (details in Bringmann-Von Steuben). The building program at Pergamon itself was continued and Attalos gained a reputation for exercising a personal interest in collecting artworks. All in all, when Attalos, now eighty- one, died and handed on the kingdom to Eumenes' son, Attalos (III), in 138 the kingdom of Pergamon must have seemed as solidly established as it had ever been. It had weathered the storm caused by the change of Roman attitudes after Pydna that had rocked the ship of state in Eumenes' last years, and with the aid of Attalos' new cautiously considered policy towards Rome sailed into relatively untroubled waters.

Nobody would have been able to predict that a mere decade later the monarchy in Pergamon would be a thing of the past and a Roman provincial governor would already have taken responsibility for the territory. Until the premature death of Attalos III in 133, information about Pergamene affairs is rare, so that we do not really know why the childless king named the Roman People as his heir in his will. The only previous such case was the childless Ptolemy VIII "Euergetes" II, when ruling Kyrene in the 150s, who in order to discourage potential challengers, made and published a will naming Rome as his heir, should he die childless. He did not, and the will served its purpose, since he was not assassinated (see below, chapter 15). The precise text of Attalos' will is not known, so we cannot tell whether similar considerations had moved him, or indeed whether interested Roman friends had not themselves sown the idea; but for whatever reason, Attalos III's most spectacular act was his will (Strabo 13.4.2 [624]). Otherwise little is known about his activities. He was interested in plants, especially poisonous ones, which he cultivated in a private garden; an inscription from Pergamon informs us that at least once in his five years of rule he arrived home from a military expedition that was apostrophized by the city authorities as being so successful that the day of his triumphal entry into the city was in future to be celebrated annually by processions, sacrifices, and feasting. The event that provoked this official enthusiasm is otherwise unknown, but the rules for the celebrations were perpetuated by being published on stone (*OGIS* 332).


In the end Attalos died unexpectedly of natural causes, and the will, which left the kingdom to Rome, also laid down that the city of Pergamon together with its immediate territory should be "free," i.e.,

not directly controlled or taxed by whatever form of new authority the Roman People might establish. There was, however, given the distances involved, inevitably a longer period of uncertainty as to what the senate would actually do when the news reached Rome, and in this period of political hiatus a man called Aristonikos, claiming to be a natural son of Eumenes – he took the name Eumenes and issued coins in his name – stirred up a widespread rebellion in the kingdom against the provisions of the will. The rebellion stimulated the city authorities in Pergamon to take measures for the defense of the city, which included granting full citizenship to members of military units stationed in the city or its territory, and an improved status to freed and royal slaves (OGIS 338 = Austin² 248 = Burstein 91 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 39). The city of Pergamon did not then fall to the rebels. But by the time the senate decided to accept the will and the responsibilities associated with it – Rome was in the middle of the Gracchan crisis when the news of Attalos' death arrived – Aristonikos' movement had gained great momentum, and actions over the next years stretched from Karia in the south to northwest Mysia in the north; in all these areas Aristonikos was able to assemble a wide range of support, though many of the older cities remained loyal to Rome and helped the Roman forces fighting against Aristonikos. Even after Aristonikos' death in 129 some resistance to the Roman takeover continued in inland areas and was only gradually suppressed by extensive Roman military activity. Roman friends and allies in the area – especially Mithridates V of Pontos, Ariarathes V of Kappadokia, and Nikomedes II of Bithynia – were also called upon to support Roman forces; and no fewer than three consecutive consuls were active (one was killed in battle, one died of disease) before the terms of the *senatus consultum* accepting the will could begin to be put into effect by the third, Manius Aquillius, in and after 129 (OGIS 435 = Austin² 251 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 40; no fewer than ten inscriptions, mostly postwar honors for men who had served their home and the new sovereign power Rome well during the war, shed light on the events: conveniently listed in Bresson-Descat, 252–254; the most recent major discovery is in Dreyer-Engelmann, *I.Metropolis*).

As a result of these events, one of the most prominent remaining Hellenistic states ceased to exist as an independent entity. The growth of Pergamene power in the second century owed so much to Roman support that it was in a sense only reasonable that it should be the first Asian state to become a Roman province when no further Attalid king was available to continue the monarchy; it could be seen as a natural development of the policy formulated by Attalos II in his letter to Attis, that Roman interests should always take priority over regional interests. Pergamon was the second major Hellenistic state to

be abolished by Rome and turned into a directly administered province, controlled by Rome and exploited in the interests of the Roman state. Each, of course, had experienced specific local political constellations that conditioned the takeover, but each nevertheless offered an imitable model for the treatment of other states, for other kings, who found themselves weakened or troubled. The more areas Rome directly controlled, the more precedents were created, the easier it would be to take even more. After the acceptance of the will of Attalos III, it was only a matter of time before Roman interests would dominate and then control the whole of Anatolia and the Levant. All were not prepared to accept the inevitability of this development, but with the death of Aristonikos Pergamon at least ceased to have an independent role in Anatolian power play.

The End of the Seleukids



175	Accession of Antiochos IV
173/2	Appointment of Iason as High Priest in Jerusalem
169	Appointment of Menelaos as High Priest in Jerusalem
168	Antiochos' religious program in Jerusalem begins
166	Antiochos' parade at Daphne
165	Antiochos visits the Upper Satrapies; Judas Maccabaeus restores Yahweh cult in Jerusalem
164	Death of Antiochos IV; accession of Antiochos V
162	Demetrios (I) takes over at Antioch
161	Death of Judas Maccabaeus
153	Alexander Balas challenges Demetrios I at Antioch
150	Death of Demetrios I; formal accession of Balas
147	Demetrios II takes Antioch
145	Deaths of Balas and Ptolemy VI
143/2	First official year of Hasmonean state of Judaea
142	Diodotos "Tryphon" rules at Antioch
141	Parthians in Babylon
140/39	Demetrios II prisoner of Arsakes
135/4	Assassination of Simon, accession of Ioannes Hyrkanos in Judaea
131	Antiochos VII "Sidetes" takes Jerusalem
129	Death of Sidetes
128	Alexander Zabinas at Antioch
124	Death of Demetrios II; accession of Antiochos VIII "Grypos"
123	Death of Kleopatra "Thea"
114/13	Attack of Antiochos IX "Kyzikenos"
109/8	Division of Seleukid territory between Grypos and Kyzikenos

96	Death of Grypos
95	Death of Kyzikenos
84	Death of Philip, son of Grypos; Tigranes takes Antioch
69	Tigranes takes Ptolemais; death of Kleopatra "Selene"
64	Syria becomes a Roman province

I Antiochos IV

The Romans' expulsion of Antiochos IV from Egypt in summer 168 marked the effective end of his attempt to add a new dimension to Seleukid policy in the region and to create a new source of income. Success here would have been particularly important, because the Seleukid state had always suffered from a chronic lack of cash income; the loss of Asia Minor and the concomitant need to make reparations payments to Rome had made this weakness more visible than ever. The collapse of Antiochos' Egyptian plans also marked the beginning of a much speedier disintegration of Seleukid control over central parts of the empire. Antiochos III had consolidated control of the western Iranian provinces and spectacularly gained Ptolemaic Koile Syria in 200. Antiochos IV's attack on Egypt was initially provoked by revanchist Ptolemaic claims on Koile Syria, but here the Romans did not interfere, and southern Syria remained Seleukid after Antiochos' withdrawal from Egypt. Not that he had much joy of it, since the Jewish territories around Jerusalem soon afterwards began to resist Seleukid rule, under the leadership of the Hasmonean family, headed by the charismatic Judas Maccabaeus; the ultimate aim of the Hasmoneans, achieved in the course of time, was to carve out an independent Jewish state in Palestine under their own leadership. Major Phoinikian coastal cities also used every opportunity to develop independent positions, and in the eastern territories Seleukid weakness was exploited especially by the Parthian nomads, who made increasingly systematic incursions into the Iranian heartlands of the empire and began to establish permanent seats of government there. Further expansion could not be excluded.

Whereas detailed information about Parthian expansion into Iran is slight and sporadic, from Judaea we have relatively detailed information from Jewish sources which, however, had no interest in presenting a balanced view of the events that in the end produced the Hasmonean Jewish state. A sympathetic treatment of Seleukid problems could not be expected. Nevertheless, existing accounts allow a reconstruction of events that allows a certain insight into the motives of both sides in the conflict. When Antiochos III took over

Ptolemaic Koile Syria in 200, the Jews were granted rights to run their own affairs to a great extent under the executive officer known as the High Priest, who was

Figure 14 Official idealized coin portrait of Antiochos IV wearing the diadem; the reverse records his full cult title, *Theos epiphanes* (“King Antiochos, God, the Renowned”). Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



made responsible for taxation payments. Public money was also made available to support the expensive sacrificial program. This state subsidy continued under Seleukos IV, despite his need to pay large sums to Rome as indemnity, which occasionally even proved impossible (Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 12.138–153).

When Antiochos IV, returning from his time as hostage in Rome, gained the succession in Antioch on the death of his brother in 175 with the aid of Eumenes II of Pergamon, the devastated Seleukid treasury allowed no further payment to Rome until 173. It is therefore hardly surprising that financial interests sparked the first conflicts

with the Jewish establishment during these years. Here, however, a serious split had already opened between two broad social groups, those who wished to maintain a separate Jewish cultural identity at all costs, and those who were attracted by the idea of adopting certain aspects of the Hellenized way of life of the surrounding social environment, which had been ruled by Greek speakers since the time of Alexander the Great. The combination of Seleukid financial needs and Jewish cultural ambitions proved to be explosive and difficult to handle for the Seleukid authorities, who in principle were pleased when in 172 Iason, the leader of the “Hellenizers” at Jerusalem, offered them large sums of cash in return for appointing him as High Priest, instead of his traditionalist brother Onias (III). Iason also planned to reorganize Jerusalem as a Greek-style city-state, under the dynastic name Antiocheia, with a registered citizen list (which he would himself provide!), a gymnasium for exercising, and an organized upper-class educational institution, the “*Ephebeia*,” for young male citizens. Antiochos, as a Macedonian king, inevitably found this prospect attractive and of course agreed to it (II Macc. 4.1–23). He gained cash and fostered cultural adaptability at the same time.

Some three years later the scene in Jerusalem seemed to offer Antiochos still further financial possibilities, when one Menelaos, bearer of a Homeric name, offered to pay more than Iason, if only he were High Priest, so – although Menelaos was not a member of the traditional priestly family, as Iason was – he was recognized by the Seleukid authorities as High Priest. Various difficulties soon began to emerge, as internal opposition to Menelaos mounted, while he experienced difficulty in raising the money for the promised payments, without drawing on the funds of the temple. Direct intervention by the Seleukid garrison commander and by Menelaos’ brother Lysimachos provoked popular violence that took on an increasingly religious flavor, as the authorities used more and more of the temple treasures for secular purposes. The climate was not improved when in 169 Antiochos, returning from his first campaign in Egypt, personally entered Jerusalem with his troops and confiscated temple treasures, which his subordinates had so far failed to do to his satisfaction.

At this point the various social, religious, and financial factors combined to provoke what turned out to be fundamental resistance to the royal authority, overlaid with personal ambition and recrimination within the ruling class. Not only Jewish traditionalists (Hasidim) now opposed what was going on in their city. The plundering of temple treasures – which Seleukid kings had also practiced in Iran – and the use of soldiers to enforce compliance with Antiochos’ orders brought popular dissatisfaction at recent developments to the boil, and the five

sons of Matthatthias, led by Judas, fled the city and began to organize guerrilla resistance in the countryside. More oil was poured on the flames of discontent nurturing the resistance by Antiochos' decision to attack what he saw as the root of the problem, the close association of fundamentalist Jewish religious observance with the political rebellion. He saw a solution in banning worship in the temples of Jerusalem, which were to be renamed temples of Zeus (II Macc. 6.1–11), and those who continued to practice their Jewish faith elsewhere were also persecuted. These measures, taken in the months following Antiochos' forced withdrawal from Egypt, and which were accompanied by the building of a new fort for the Seleukid garrison in Jerusalem (the *Akra*), were intended to punish the religious-nationalist Jews and provide support for the Seleukid-friendly "Hellenizers," who still included the favored High Priest, Menelaos. The measures that most offended Jewish traditionalists were the non-Jewish religious rituals that took place at an altar to Zeus, erected in the temple precinct, which the contemporary author of the book of Daniel described in a vivid phrase as "the abomination of desolation" (Daniel 11.31). This attempt to curb the rebellion and to encourage the "Hellenizers" among the Jews by force merely led to a low-level guerrilla war by the resistance forces led by Judas Maccabaeus and his brothers, who had some unexpected successes against Seleukid commanders, and late in 165 were able to recover sufficient control in Jerusalem to be able to restore the Yahweh cult in the temple. Antiochos' High Priest Menelaos took refuge with the Seleukid garrison in the *Akra*.

This success took the wind out of the sails of the Seleukid authorities, who since the military defeats of 165 had begun desultory negotiations with the Jewish leaders. Antiochos himself and his royal army, after celebrating his success in Egypt with an extravagant exhibition of revived Seleukid power at Daphne, near Antioch, in 166, set off the next year for the Upper Satrapies, threatened as they were by the Parthian invaders. In autumn 165, while in Babylonia, he received Menelaos, who urged him to offer the rebels an amnesty and, in effect, to withdraw the religious edict that had proved counterproductive in order to prop up Menelaos and his pro-Seleukid supporters. While Menelaos was away, however, Judas' men seized the city, so making any concession by Antiochos irrelevant. Moreover, Roman envoys who were on their way to Antioch offered to represent Judas' interests when they reached the city, illustrating that since Pydna and the "Day of Eleusis" Rome was keeping a wary eye on what the Seleukid king was up to. Worse was to come. In autumn 164, while at Ekbatana in Media, Antiochos suffered a fatal accident, and his son and successor, a boy of nine, was controlled by his father's

chancellor, Lysias. He saw as his first priority the restoration of order in Jerusalem, and therefore wrote in the name of the little Antiochos V a letter, formally addressed to himself, but which he made known in Jerusalem, instructing him to restore the Jewish way of life and to withdraw support for the “Hellenizers” (II Macc. 11).

It was, however, already too late to stop the movement created by the Maccabaeen resistance. Its leaders were far from wanting a peace, which would only result in the restoration of the old pro-Seleukid elite to power in Jerusalem – this was, after all, Lysias’ aim. For the Maccabaeans and their supporters, the main question now was, which group of Jewish families was to enjoy dominating influence in Judaea, and so the fight continued, unaffected by any concessions granted by the Seleukid authorities. In the last resort their aim was to create an independent state of Judaea, ruled by the sons of Matthatias and their descendants, who now began to claim a much older pedigree, asserting decent from one Hasmonios (so: the “Hasmoneans”). Their aims were favored by two factors. First was the fact that the brothers held together, so that no fewer than three of them were able to head the movement in succession: Judas (d. 161), Jonathan (d. 143/2), and Simon (d. 135/4). The other factor was the internal disruption of the Seleukid dynasty following the death of Antiochos IV. A continuous series of disputes about the legitimate succession not only prevented the development of a consistent policy towards Judaea but, much worse, led to competitors for the throne at Antioch making ever larger concessions to the current ruler of Judaea in order to gain his support, or at least to prevent their opponent from getting it. This collapse of intradynastic solidarity – inherent, of course, in the dynastic system, as we saw in the third century in the dispute between Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax and shall observe again in Ptolemaic Egypt, but only now making itself again felt in the Seleukid kingdom – led to split loyalties among the officials, whose personal relationship with the ruling king had always been a characteristic feature of the Macedonian monarchies, and above all with the army.

II The Dynasty Collapses

The downward slippery slope was initiated by Antiochos IV himself, who enjoyed the support of Eumenes of Pergamon when he took over from his brother Seleukos IV in 175. At that time Seleukos’ eldest son Demetrios, who would normally have succeeded his father, was serving as hostage in Rome and could not intervene. When Antiochos suddenly died in 164 and his own son, Antiochos V, was only a child,

Demetrios became impatient at his continued life in a Roman gilded cage, which the senate refused to open for him: since Pydna and the “Day of Eleusis” it was no longer in Roman interests that the Seleukid monarchy should recover strength and efficiency. Indeed, Judas Maccabaeus before his death in 161 even negotiated a treaty with Rome that recognized the separate political entity of the Jewish people at a time when they were still officially part of a province of the Seleukid kingdom (I Macc. 8). In 162 Demetrios managed to escape from Italy in a cloak and dagger action, described in detail by Polybios who had come to know the young man in Italy, and when he landed at Tripolis in Phoinikia he was generally received with enthusiasm, including by the guard troops at Antioch, who seized Antiochos V and Lysias on Demetrios’ instruction and murdered them (Polybios 31.11–15; 33; 32.2–3; I Macc. 7.1–4; Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 12.389–390). Demetrios then pursued the struggle against the renegade Jews with great energy, though here also he suffered some defeats and had to endure the humiliation of the Jews’ receiving a treaty with Rome while his own position remained precarious, the senate only committing itself to a wait and see policy. In 161, however, his general Bacchides managed to kill Judas in a battle, and a period of peace followed, which Jonathan, who succeeded Judas as leader of the Hasmoneans, used to recuperate his forces (I Macc. 9.1–18).

It was, however, in Asia Minor that Demetrios made his first fundamental mistake by trying to restore traditional Seleukid influence in Kappadokia, through taking sides in an ongoing dynastic conflict there between Ariarathes V and his brother Orophernes. Ariarathes was far too conscious of the importance of his good relations with Pergamon – his sister Stratonike was Eumenes’ wife – and Rome to even consider a serious link with Demetrios, who offered him his sister Laodike, now Perseus’ widow. The senate, when it learned about the business, praised his good sense in refusing the connection. On the other hand, Ariarathes had no wish to provoke Demetrios unnecessarily, as he might well have done had he chosen to support the Milesian Timarchos, a senior officer of Antiochos V serving in the Upper Satrapies, who now declared his independence, even taking the royal title. Demetrios was therefore able to suppress him without suffering outside interference (Diodoros 31.27–30; 32–34: Appian, *Syriake* 47). The Pergamenes also were perturbed at Demetrios’ activities and Attalos II determined to try to regain the kind of influence at Antioch that Eumenes had enjoyed through supporting Antiochos IV. By 153 Attalos had found a suitable candidate to challenge Demetrios in Antioch, a man called Balas, who showed a superficial physical resemblance to Antiochos IV, and so

could claim with some plausibility to be his son. When he challenged Demetrios he enjoyed Roman tolerance, which Attalos had organized for him, and then took the name Alexander. Rome's positive attitude won Alexander Balas support also from the neighbors Ariarathes V and Ptolemy VI "Philometor," so that instead of heading straight for Antioch Balas chose to land in the south at Ptolemais-Ake, where he took up immediate contact with the Jews under Jonathan and made them extravagant concessions in order to win their support, the most important of them being that Jonathan would be formally recognized as High Priest. When in 150 it came to the armed struggle, Demetrios was killed, though not before he had brought his two sons Demetrios and Antiochos into safety (Diodoros 31.32a; Polybios 33.18; Appian, *Syriake* 67; Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.35–46; Justin 35.1).

Alexander Balas then consolidated his dynastic position by marrying Ptolemy VI's daughter Kleopatra "Thea" – herself a granddaughter of Antiochos III through her mother – though, given Balas' reluctance to undertake any serious responsibility for the state he had acquired, this connection merely enhanced Ptolemaic influence in the Seleukid empire. In 147 Demetrios' elder son, Demetrios (II), aided by a troop of Cretan mercenaries, crossed from Kilikia into northern Syria and was accepted at Antioch, where Balas was unpopular, since he still preferred to reside at Ptolemais. This crisis and Balas' lethargy gave Ptolemy the opportunity to recover Koile Syria (apart from Judaea), an action that so irritated Balas that he tried to have his father-in-law assassinated. The attempt failed, whereupon Ptolemy withdrew his support and his daughter, transferring both to Demetrios II, whom he now recognized as legitimate ruler in Antioch. This left Balas free to gather a mercenary troop in Kilikia himself, with which he soon entered Syria and confronted Ptolemy's army, which the king commanded in person, at the river Oinoparas, near Antioch. Balas was defeated and soon afterwards assassinated, but Ptolemy who had won the battle was so badly wounded that he also died soon afterwards, leaving the young and inexperienced Demetrios II with his Cretans in nominal control of what remained of Seleukid possessions (I Macc. 10.51–11.19; Appian, *Syriake* 67; Diodoros 32.9cd; Justin 35.2).

The chief beneficiaries of all this unproductive dynastic in-fighting were the Jews under Jonathan, who exploited Demetrios II's inexperience to have their privileges confirmed and even extended, and the Parthians, who by July 141 had gained sufficient influence in Babylonia that documents were dated there by their ruler Arsakes V, also known as Mithridates I (Boiy 166–167). At home in Antioch Demetrios and his Cretans soon made themselves unpopular and faced the challenge of Diodotos, the governor of Syrian Apameia, the

Seleukid military capital. Diodotos brought on a child, proclaiming him a son of Balas, and in summer 144 he entered Antioch in triumph, bringing home "Antiochos VI." Demetrios fled, this child Antiochos is not heard of again, and by 142 Diodotos was ruling independently and became known as "Tryphon," "the Magnificent." He also tried to tackle the Jewish problem, and indeed managed to eliminate Jonathan, only to find that his remaining brother, Simon, rallied to Demetrios, who again confirmed all Jewish privileges. Simon was finally able to expel the Seleukid garrison from the fortress, the *Akra*, at Jerusalem, and the year 143/2 became the first year of an era marking the officially proclaimed independence of the Hasmonean state of Judaea. Even worse was to come for the Seleukid. Having failed in Judaea and with Diodotos Tryphon still in control of Antioch, Demetrios decided to attend to the Parthian threat in Babylonia and Iran, only to be ignominiously taken prisoner by Arsakes-Mithridates in 140/39 (Appian, *Syriake* 67–68; Diodoros 33.4; 4a; 28; 28a; Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.131f.; 187f.).

This was the great chance for Demetrios' younger brother, Antiochos (VII), who had been brought up at Side in Pamphylia, and so was known as "Sidetes." He was staying at Rhodes when he heard the news of his brother's capture and resolved to challenge Tryphon. For this he received the support of Kleopatra Thea, who now married him as her third Seleukid king (after Balas and Demetrios II), granting him such prestige as her dynastic connections conferred in the hope of stabilizing the dynasty into which she had married. Antiochos VII managed to eliminate Tryphon and then attacked the two other major running problems, Judaea and Iran, in turn. In Judaea he even had some success. In 135 Simon was assassinated, apparently for inner-dynastic reasons, to be succeeded by his son Ioannes Hyrkanos. These internal Jewish troubles offered Antiochos a reason to intervene in the interest of restoring stability in the region, and he besieged Jerusalem in an attempt to break the nascent Jewish state and restore tribute payments. By 131 he had succeeded; the city walls were dismantled, tribute began to be paid again, and hostages were given as guarantors for good behavior, while Hyrkanos was allowed to remain High Priest. It was looking good for Antiochos Sidetes. He then turned to Iran, where his army swept through Babylonia and pressed on into Media with such speed that the current Parthian king, Arsakes VI Phraates II, began negotiations, even to the point of showing goodwill by releasing his royal captive Demetrios II, before he defeated and killed Antiochos in an unexpected attack (129) (Diodoros 34/35.1; 16–17; Appian, *Syriake* 68; Justin 36.1; 38.10; I Macc. 15.10–41; Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.218–253). The defeat of Antiochos Sidetes marked the end of Seleukid influence in Iran and Babylonia, which returned to

being Parthian provinces, and remained so for centuries. The death of Sidetes also marked the end of any serious Seleukid attempt to recover influence in Judaea. Indeed, Hyrkanos exploited Seleukid weakness after his death to extend his territory to include some Transjordanian Arabs and Samaria, and to consolidate his independent state so successfully that his immediate successor in 104, his eldest son Aristoboulos, even took the royal title (Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.301). His successors continued to use it until Judaea became a Roman client state in the settlement of the area by Pompeius in 63.

III Terminal Cancer

After the death of Antiochos Sidetes, the Seleukid kingdom ceased to play a constructive part in the history of the Hellenistic world, being reduced territorially to Syria (without Judaea) and plagued by inner-dynastic struggles, assassinations, and civil war. All this was further complicated by the dynastic relationship with the Ptolemies, going back to the marriage of Kleopatra I, “the Syrian,” daughter of Antiochos III, with Ptolemy V, and by the never-ending dispute with Alexandria concerning Koile Syria. Seleukid influence outside Syria melted away, and even in Syria itself it did not count for much. The kingdom became so weak and unimportant that even the Roman senate felt little inclination to intervene. It is a sorry tale that remains to be told.

When Demetrios II returned unexpectedly from his Parthian captivity, he was welcomed neither by his ex-wife, Kleopatra Thea, nor by her uncle, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II in Alexandria, who promptly set up a pretender, Alexander Zabinas, whom he escorted to Antioch in 128. The two contenders fought it out until 124/3, when Demetrios was killed at Tyros, after Kleopatra Thea had refused him the safety of her residence at Ptolemais. Kleopatra Thea had already issued some coins in her own name, and her personal ambitions to rule alone became clear when her eldest son by Demetrios, Seleukos, tried to claim the royal title and she had him assassinated (Justin 39.1; Appian, *Syriake* 69). Her second son, Antiochos (VIII) “Grypos” (“Hook-Nose”), was cleverer and first obtained support from Alexandria before claiming the Seleukid throne; his mother then accepted him, though coin portraits illustrate her own continued prominence. Grypos soon eliminated Alexander Zabinas, now abandoned by Alexandria, and coins were issued at Antioch in the names of Kleopatra and Antiochos in 123/2. Soon afterwards Kleopatra was poisoned. The official story put out to explain her

sudden disappearance was that she had tried to eliminate Grypos in this way but was herself forced to drink her own poisoned chalice. There was certainly no love lost between Grypos and the dominating old queen, who wanted to tolerate nobody, not even her own son, near her, and the official version must have had a superficial plausibility (Justin 39.1; Appian, *Syriake* 69). Grypos ought to have benefited from her disappearance and indeed he might well have ruled his rump kingdom for a long time, had not his mother in her three royal marriages been so prolific. He took up diplomatic contacts with the Roman administrators in Asia Minor and dedicated a statue of one of the governors, Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, at Delos. He himself received a statue there, dedicated by one of his courtiers, Bithys (Durrbach 120, 121), and at some time, date unknown, a bust of him was dedicated on the island by the Athenian Helianax (*OGIS* 260 = Durrbach 120; *OGIS* 259 = Durrbach 121; *OGIS* 258 = Durrbach 136h).

But an in-house challenger was soon to hand in the person of his uterine half-brother, also bearing the dynastic name Antiochos, a son of Sidetes, whom Kleopatra Thea had sent to safety at Kyzikos when Demetrios II unexpectedly returned from Parthian captivity in 129. This Antiochos (IX) was therefore unofficially known as “Kyzikenos.” Kyzikenos raised an army – presumably mercenaries – and, attacking from the north, quickly took over what was left of the kingdom, but he could not hold it, despite support from the Ptolemaic army of Cyprus which his new wife, the Ptolemaic princess Kleopatra (IV), daughter of Ptolemy VIII, brought with her as dowry. Grypos’ longerterm Ptolemaic wife, with whom he had at least six children, was Tryphaina, Kleopatra IV’s sister, and when Grypos recovered Antioch Tryphaina insisted on Kleopatra’s execution, only to suffer the same fate herself a year later, when Kyzikenos recaptured Antioch and Grypos had to flee to Aspendos in Pamphylia, now part of a Roman province. After further changes of fortune, from 109/8 onwards, some kind of unstable division of territory emerged, with Grypos holding the north (Justin 39.2–10; 3). Here he granted Seleukeia in Piérieia the ancient privilege of being declared “sacred and inviolable” – under the circumstances of an ongoing civil war, a cheap way of gaining popularity, since only his opponent came seriously into question as a violator of the city’s rights – and wrote to Ptolemy Alexander in Cyprus announcing this, as well as perhaps to other peoples and places. The letter was published on stone at Paphos. In return he received a dedication at Delos, describing him as benefactor, from the grateful Seleukeians. The important coastal city will doubtless have supported him against his opponents in the civil war (*OGIS* 257 = *RC* 71–72 = Austin² 222 = BD² 55; Durrbach 122).

Frequent Ptolemaic intervention in the south and aggressive behavior by the new Jewish king, Alexander Jannaeus, after 103 prevented Grypos and Kyzikenos from achieving any kind of stable condition. Josephos (*Jewish Antiquities* 13.327) compares the two kings at this time with exhausted athletes, who are too proud to give up their struggle. The Ptolemaic queen Kleopatra III continued her attempts to bind the currently leading Seleukids by marriage ties, her secret weapon being her remaining daughter Kleopatra “Selene,” who was united with Grypos around 103, during a Ptolemaic war in the south; but when Grypos was assassinated in 96 and Kyzikenos occupied Antioch, Selene married Kyzikenos (Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.365–366; Trogus, Prologus 39; Appian, *Syriake* 69).

The next generation of Seleukids did no better, the situation becoming ever more chaotic, since Grypos left no fewer than five sons, who were more than ready to compete with Kyzikenos’ son Antiochos (X) “Eusebes” (“the Pious”). He chose to try to bolster his position by marrying his father’s widow, Selene, when Kyzikenos was killed in eastern Kilikia in 95. So Selene equaled the record of Kleopatra Thea, of being married to three Seleukid kings in turn. Grypos’ five sons challenged for the throne and died off, one after the other, until in 84, on the death of Philip, the last of them, the remaining civil authorities in Syria, weary of the pointless civil wars between members of the dynasty, invited Tigranes of Armenia to take over in Antioch (Josephos, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.367–394; Appian, *Syriake* 69; Justin 40.1.1–4).


Tigranes was a Parthian protégé who had married a daughter of Mithridates VI “Eupator” of Pontos, currently at war with Rome in Asia Minor (see chapter 14, below). Tigranes’ own main strategic interests were therefore in eastern Anatolia and points even farther east, so that he normally ruled Syria and eastern Kilikia, which he also now occupied, through a deputy, Magadates (Appian, *Syriake* 48). Clashes took place with remaining Seleukid elements, especially in the south with Selene, who occupied Ptolemais and still nurtured hopes for the succession of her eldest son Antiochos. For him she tried to play the Roman card, sending him and his brother to Rome in 75 with extravagant presents for the new temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The brothers’ claim to Syria was accepted in principle by the senate which, however, did nothing practical to help them realize their claim, so that in 69 Tigranes was able to capture Ptolemais and with it Selene, who was imprisoned and later killed (Appian, *Syriake* 48; Strabo 11.14.15 [532]; 16.2.3 [750]). It was, however, not a good time for Tigranes, since Lucius Licinius Lucullus was currently winding up the Roman war against his father-in-law Mithridates in Anatolia and was not shy to include Tigranes’ Armenia in the list of enemies to be dealt

with. As a result Tigranes abandoned Syria, and Antiochos (XIII), who had been lingering in Roman territory in Asia Minor, returned to Antioch, claiming Roman support. His appearance at Antioch was, however, merely the signal for a new round of challenge and response – this time the challenger was Philip, son of Philip, who had some Arab support – and the two men exchanged the position of nominal ruler in Antioch several times until 64. In that year Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus arrived at Antioch after defeating the pirates and Mithridates (see chapter 14, below) and, within the broad framework of his fundamental reorganization of the political structure of the whole of Asia Minor and the Levant, decided that Syria was too important to be left to the haphazard winner of one of the endemic civil wars. By now the Parthians had reached the middle Euphrates and had therefore become much closer neighbors, and various Arab states – especially the Nabataeans of Petra – as well as the Jews showed no sign of ever again respecting Seleukid claims to exercise authority in the area. A political vacuum, after all that had happened over the last half-century, was by now unthinkable for Rome, so that the only practical measure was to establish direct Roman rule. Pompeius therefore instituted the Roman province of Syria, within which the city of Antioch enjoyed the privileged status of a self-governing city, free to use its own laws and traditional practices, and free from tribute (Appian, *Syriake* 49; 70; Justin 40.2; Diodoros 40.1ab; Cassius Dio 37.7a).

In this unworthy way the second of the great Macedonian monarchies came to an end, more with a whimper than a bang. The global conditions created by Rome's war against Mithridates and the pirate menace, and the resulting Roman mental change towards accepting formal responsibility for rich and distant territories, finally put an end to the increasingly hectic dynastic game that the later Seleukids had by now been playing for the whole century since the death of Antiochos IV. One remarkable feature of the period is that although the kingdom was constantly getting smaller, all participants in the dynastic struggles seem to have been able to finance their military activities and issue coins in their own names, doubtless primarily to pay their troops. Seleukid Syria was indeed rich in agricultural land, but trade seems to have been a major source of wealth, if we may judge by the presence at Delos during these years of men from a whole range of (mostly coastal) Syrian and Phoinikian cities, especially the traditional trading cities of Sidon, Tyre, and Berytos, but also inland cities such as Damascus, Hierapolis, and Antioch (Roussel, *DCA* 84f.). The importance of controlling the tax income of these and other similar places explains much of the tactics of the dynastic contenders.

To the end, the Seleukid monarchy retained many of the Macedonian characteristics that had shaped it from the beginning. In a sense, the intradynastic struggles that dominate the last years were an immediate result of the personal nature of the monarchy, which had always been governed by the king and his personal “friends,” even though in the course of time various formal status differences with appropriately differentiating titles had been introduced to distinguish the very closest of the royal administrators. This personal characteristic also explains the especial prominence of many of the later Seleukid queens, who in periods of dynastic uncertainty showed little hesitation in promoting the interests of their children and grandchildren, or even taking over themselves. In this sense Kleopatra Thea and Selene were true successors of the great Macedonian queens of the fourth and third centuries, such as Olympias, Eury-dike, Arsinoe, or Laodike, all of whom in periods of masculine uncertainty had tried to seize the reins of their states and to direct them in the direction they wanted to go. We shall see the same phenomenon in Ptolemaic Egypt, from which the later Seleukid queens came and where they received their early socialization. In the last resort, however, the dynastic system in the Seleukid kingdom collapsed as a result of the lack of discipline and the unbridled personal ambition shown by its chief male representatives, who in the much smaller kingdom of the later second and first centuries had little opportunity of curbing generational or sibling ambition by sharing power geographically, in the way earlier kings, beginning with Seleukos Nikator himself, had done. Where there was so little power to share, compromise was read as weakness, and perceived weakness stimulated challenge. There was no effective way of breaking this vicious dynastic circle except by abolishing it. In 64 Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, the victor over pirates and Mithridates, drew this logical conclusion. From now onwards Roman interests would determine what happened in Syria.

Central and Eastern Anatolia



270s	Pontic kings take Greek royal title
250s	Kappadokian kings take Greek royal title
188	Stratonike of Kappadokia marries Eumenes II of Pergamon
182	Pharnakes of Pontos captures Sinope in war against Eumenes II of Pergamon
163	Succession of Ariarathes V of Kappadokia
ca. 159	Death of Pharnakes of Pontos, accession of Mithridates V "Euergetes"
133ff.	Ariarathes V and Mithridates V help Rome against Aristonikos
ca. 120	Death of Mithridates V
ca. 112	Mithridates VII "Eupator" sole ruler in Pontos
95	Ariobarzanes nominated by Roman senate as king for Kappadokia
92	Sulla escorts Ariobarzanes to Kappadokia; death of Niko-medes III of Bithynia
91	Nikomedes IV in Rome; Ariobarzanes in Rome
88	Mithridates attacks Roman Asia – "First Mithridatic War"
85	Peace of Dardanos
82	"Second Mithridatic War"
74	Death of Nikomedes IV of Bithynia, leaves Rome as heir; outbreak of "Third Mithridatic War"
63	Death of Mithridates; Pontos and Bithynia reorganized as Roman province

I Anatolia Becomes Hellenistic

One of the characteristic features of the second and first centuries BC in the Hellenistic world is the development into independent states of territories which had previously been subordinate to, or even mere

provinces of, one or other of the major Macedonian monarchies. Their model for self-representation and organization was always what they already knew, so that the collapse of the power of the Seleukids and Ptolemies did not lead to a collapse of their administrative and cultural-political traditions, but in a sense to their extension. We have already seen this kind of development in connection with Pergamon in the third century and with the Jewish (Hasmonean) state in the second. Both were well-established, monarchically ruled states that had maintained a certain independence over many decades before one of their rulers claimed the royal title and with it status equality with the longer-established Macedonian kingdoms. Both, of course, lost their royal status as a result of Roman intervention. A similar development can be traced in central and eastern Anatolia, where the collapse of Seleukid power after Apameia led to the establishment of much stronger regional powers than had been possible while the Seleukid kings were able to realize their claims to dominance in the area. Particularly important in this respect was the geographic area of Kappadokia, through the southern part of which, sometimes known as "Greater Kappadokia" or simply "Kappadokia," nearly all land communications between Syria and the Aegean coast passed.

Information about this area before the time when Alexander the Great and the Macedonian successors struggled to attain control of the whole of Anatolia is scarce, since it had no regular contact with most of the Greek world, apart from with the long-established Greek trading colonies on the southern shore of the Black Sea; and only after the death of Lysimachos and the establishment of Seleukid control does information about the region begin to flow. Important for the integration of southern Kappadokia into the world of the Macedonian monarchies was the marriage of the son of the current ruler, Ariarathes III, to a daughter of Antiochos II in the 250s, an event that immediately raised the acknowledged status of the Kappadokian rulers, who now began to use the Greek royal title, *Basileus* (Diodoros 31.19.5). This mutually advantageous attachment to the mighty Seleukids continued until the defeat of Antiochos III by the Romans, when Ariarathes IV "Eusebes" initiated a political reorientation by giving his daughter Stratonike to the rising star of the time, Eumenes of Pergamon, who then intervened with the Roman authorities on his behalf.

Whereas Kappadokia up to this time had been a land dominated by castles and large estates, some of them owned by temples, where knowledge of Greek was restricted to what was necessary to get on with the Greek-speaking neighbors, the closer attachment to the Hellenizing Pergamenes initiated a much stronger Greek influence. Ariarathes V, who succeeded in 163, had visited Athens and on one

occasion even sponsored the Panathenaic Games as formal *agonothetes* (Robert, *Bull. Ép.* 1951, 79). At about this time the first evidence emerges for some Kappadokian cities being organized in the Greek style, with independent local administrations, some Greek social institutions, and even imported Greek laws. Greek-style artistic festivals were celebrated and Ariarathes, who kept up his old contacts with Athens, employed Athenian performers in them. Towards the end of his life he and his wife Nysa were therefore honored in Athens by the grateful Athenian Guild of Dionysian Artists (*IG II²* 1330 = Le Guen, *TE* 5). The main urban settlement, Mazaka, was renamed in Greek Eusebeia, as was Tyana; Hanisa, the age-old originally Assyrian trading city known as Kanesh, was well equipped with Greek institutions, under the supervision of a royal official, and a new Greek-style city with the dynastic name Ariaratheia was founded by Ariarathes IV. The territory ruled by the kings was subjected to Seleukid-style regional governors, called by the Greek name “*strategos*.” It is therefore hardly surprising that when the Romans accepted Attalos’ testament and required local allies to help them fight against Aristonikos, Ariarathes V was more than ready to comply, and that – though he himself died during the war – his loyalty was rewarded by his successors being granted the neighboring southern territory of Lykaonia, which had been Pergamene since the treaty of Apameia in 188 (Strabo 12.1–2; Justin 37.1.2; Michel 546).

The northern part of Kappadokia, Kappadokia by the Sea, normally abbreviated simply to “Pontos,” had a similar but more independent recent history when its current ruler, Mithridates V “Euergetes,” was summoned to help the Romans against Aristonikos. The kingdom of Pontos, like that of Greater Kappadokia, had gradually emerged from the chaotic conditions created by the wars of Alexander’s successors, Mithridates I profiting from the deaths of Lysimachos and Seleukos I to take the Greek royal title *Basileus* after the battle of Koroupedion (281). He also cooperated in the 270s with his western neighbor, Nikomedes of Bithynia, to settle Galatians in Phrygia. Gentle expansion, especially along the Black Sea coast, where Greek colonies, the most important of them being Sinope, had exploited trading possibilities with the peoples of the interior for centuries, characterized the next years. A marriage alliance with Seleukos II, Mithridates II marrying his sister Laodike, brought Pontos into the circle of widely recognized stable powers in Anatolia. Sinope, however, remained stubbornly independent, resisting every challenge until 182, when king Pharnakes managed to capture and retain it after his otherwise unsatisfactory war with Eumenes, despite Roman mediation.

After this unpleasing affair, Pharnakes turned his attention to areas

less interesting to Eumenes and Rome, founding a Greek-style name-city, Pharnakeia, on the coast and taking over control of the area known later as Lesser Armenia, which included the coastal city Trapezous. In fact Pharnakes, who ruled until about 159, seems to have realized the importance of not annoying Rome too much, doubtless observing what had happened even to Roman friends after Pydna, by developing eastern interests that could hardly cause any conflict – a choice which Pergamon, for instance, did not have – and he seems to have prospered by it. At some point a formal alliance was made with Rome, and when Pharnakes made a treaty with the city of Chersonnesos in the Crimea, perhaps in 180/79, he included a clause stating, “I shall assist in guarding democracy with all my power, as long as the Chersonnitai remain in their friendship with the Romans and do nothing contrary to them” (*IOSPE* I² 402 = Burstein 77); a dedication in Rome by Pharnakes’ brother and successor Mithridates IV Philopator describes the Roman People as his “friend and ally” (*OGIS* 375). It is therefore again not surprising that when the Romans sought allies against Aristonikos in 133, the current king of Pontos, Mithridates V, complied and was suitably rewarded with a land grant of large parts of ex-Pergamene northern Phrygia after Aristonikos’ defeat (Justin 37.1.1–2).

II The “First Mithridatic War”

The disappearance of the kingdom of Pergamon in 133 and the subsequent permanent presence in Asia Minor not only of Roman administrative officers but also of hordes of Italian businessmen of all kinds, bankers, slave traders, and tax gatherers (*publicani*) – individuals might, of course, be all three at the same time – changed the whole climate of relations between Rome and the neighbors of the new province of Asia. At about the same time, new rulers took over in Bithynia, Kappadokia, and – around 120 – in Pontos, all of whom were in varying degrees less than enthusiastic about the much closer official and unofficial Roman presence in the area that the mere existence of *Asia provincia* made inevitable. It was hardly surprising that the Roman businessmen, once settled in the province under the protection of Roman state authority, also began to take a more direct interest in the affairs of neighboring states, using the Roman name and Roman authority to forward private financial interests, and so gradually intensify the previous laid-back attitude that the senate had adopted towards their royal friends and allies in Asia Minor.

The event which proved critical for the whole future of Asia Minor

was the death of Mithridates V “Euergetes” in 120. He left his wife Laodike as guardian of his two sons, Mithridates and Chrestos, and for a while this dual monarchy seems to have functioned: two inscriptions from Delos honor the two boys as “king Mithridates Eupator and his brother Chrestos” (OGIS 368, 369 = Durrbach 114, 113). By 112, however, the honeymoon was over. Mithridates, now around twenty, murdered his mother and brother and began to rule alone, beginning an aggressive policy towards southern Kappadokia and the westerly territory of Paphlagonia which, situated between Bithynia and Pontos, had long been coveted by both states. The Roman presence was tolerated, despite the fact that the senate, doubtless under pressure from Roman financial interests, revoked its grant of Phrygia after Euergetes’ death, and so through this breach of faith provoked in Mithridates a lifelong suspicion of Roman motives and detestation of their presence. But the effects of this lay still in the future, and it need not inevitably have led to the catastrophe that occurred two decades later (Memnon [*FgrHist* 434] F22.2; Justin 37.1.6–4.9; 38.5.3; Appian, *Mithridateios* 12).

Figure 15 Mithridates VI. Marble head based on an official portrait, with the addition of the lion’s scalp headgear suggesting an association with Alexander the Great and with Herakles. Musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo RMN. © Hervé Lewandowski.



Mithridates' first independent activities involved asserting his personal control of Black Sea coastal areas as far east as Colchis (now western Georgia); but also two expeditions, both of them commanded by Diophantos of Sinope, made efforts to aid the Greek cities of the Crimea, particularly Chersonnesos, which were threatened by local Skythian tribes. The people of Chersonnesos passed and published a long decree, thanking Diophantos for his activities that were described in detail (while carefully attributing all his successes to king Mithridates), and culminating in the assertion that "he regained control of the area for king Mithridates Eupator" (*Syll.*³ 709 = *BD*² 56). Somewhat later, though the precise timescale is quite uncertain, Mithridates' aggressiveness turned against Greater Kappadokia, which he managed to destabilize through a series of diplomatic and violent interventions, and Paphlagonia, where he gained control of the eastern parts. In both areas he found a rival in Nikomedes III of Bithynia. When the senate learned of these troubling activities in the states directly neighboring their province, they tried to intervene,

insisting that both kings retire from any recent conquests; they also explicitly declared Kappadokia “free,” since Mithridates had murdered the last surviving member of the ruling dynasty, Ariarathes VII, who, had he lived, would doubtless have continued the by now traditional Kappadokian policy of friendship with Rome. The Roman decision did not, however, please the leading Kappadokian families, since monarchical rule was all they knew, and they feared chaos. They therefore called on the senate to change its mind and give them a king, suggesting the nobleman Ariobarzanes as an acceptable person to become king, and the senate duly accepted him as its favored candidate. The precise timing of these events, which in detail were complex and involved several competing candidates favored by the two external kings, is quite unclear, but Ariobarzanes’ senatorial nomination took place in 95. For the first time the senate took a proactive decision in a dynastic dispute, taking the initiative in appointing a new ruler where no natural successor existed, and as a result Roman prestige and authority became closely implicated in the fate of Ariobarzanes (Justin 38.2.3; Strabo 12.2.11).

At this point another player entered the field, Tigranes of Armenia, whom we have already met when a few years later he took over Seleukid Syria in the 80s. In the 90s Tigranes was still building up his kingdom in eastern Anatolia. At this time he married a daughter of Mithridates and occupied the territory on the upper Euphrates known as Sophene, which gave him a common border with Kappadokia. At this time he had no known contact with Rome but enjoyed a close relationship with the eastern Great Power, Parthia, where he had once served as a hostage. It was therefore easy for him to underestimate Roman persistence, of which he had no personal experience, and so he saw no problem in attacking Kappadokia and replacing Ariobarzanes with one of Mithridates’ sons, his own brother-in-law. Thereupon Ariobarzanes traveled to Rome where he received sympathetic support, and in 92 a Roman delegation led by Lucius Cornelius Sulla, governor of Roman Kilikia – the western parts of this southern coastal territory, bordering on ex-Pergamene Pamphylia, had been made a Roman province around 102 because of rampant piracy in the area – escorted him back; Sulla also met representatives of the Parthian king on this trip (Plutarch, *Sulla* 5). As soon as Sulla went away, however, Mithridates arranged the renewed ejection of Ariobarzanes from Kappadokia, so Ariobarzanes made his way back to Rome. At about the same time, in Bithynia Nikomedes III died and Mithridates seized the opportunity of solving his ongoing disputes with the Bithynians by putting his own candidate on the throne there. As a result of this interference, the young son of Nikomedes III, who had naturally expected to succeed his father, joined Ariobarzanes in Rome in 91

(Appian, *Mithridateios* 10).

This power-poker over the control of the minor Anatolian monarchies was an explicit challenge to the legitimacy of Roman interests beyond the borders of the Roman provinces. In the Kappadokian affair the Roman senate was in no way being treated as the government of an omnipresent superpower, whose wishes were commands, but merely as a distant, and therefore relatively powerless, interferer in the traditional power play of the eastern monarchies. Roman prestige alone was simply not sufficient at this time to control events on the ground in eastern Anatolia through diplomatic means. Mithridates nevertheless made every effort to achieve his own aims through diplomacy, also in connection with Rome, wherever this seemed possible.

Figure 16 Official coin portrait of Nikomedes III of Bithynia wearing the diadem; the reverse records his cult title, *epiphanes* ("Renowned"). Photo John Lee/The National Museum of Denmark.



Bithynia was much closer to direct Roman interests in Asia and Macedonia to be treated as cavalierly as Kappadokia. Roman private financial concerns had already become involved in the slave trade

there; when around 104 Nikomedes III was asked, as a Roman ally, to provide some troops for Rome's existence-threatening campaign against the Celtic invasion of northern Italy, he supported his refusal with the assertion that Roman *publicani*, operating as private companies based in the province of Asia, had already taken most of his fighting men as slaves (Diodoros 36.3.1). Mithridates' challenge to Rome in the Bithynian succession crisis therefore possessed quite a different quality compared to that in distant Kappadokia, because here it touched not only strategic public concerns but also highly influential private financial interests that expected to suffer serious damage by not having a Roman candidate ruling there. Nikomedes IV, smoldering in his Roman exile, knew well enough how to increase his support in Roman financial circles by making promises about future business opportunities, should he be restored, so that despite the devastating civil war that broke out in Italy in 90 with Rome's Italian allies (the "Social War"), the senate sent out a high-level delegation led by Manius Aquillius, a son of the man who had first organized the province of Asia. They were to be supported by such troops – not, in fact, very many – as the current governor of Asia, Lucius Cassius, could raise, and their mandate was to restore Nikomedes to Bithynia and, while they were in the area, to bring Ariobarzanes back to Kappadokia again.

This action soon provoked protest from Mithridates, since Nikomedes lost no time in attacking his territories, plundering as far east as Amastris. It was claimed that he did this because he needed ready cash with which to pay his debts to the Roman moneylenders who had financially supported his claim to the throne, and this might even be correct. If so, it was a major miscalculation on both sides, since it was the last straw for Mithridates, who not only saw his ambitions to control Bithynia thwarted, but even had to suffer attacks from it (Appian, *Mithridateios* 11–14). Preparations for war must in fact already have been well advanced at the time of Nikomedes' provocation, since in 88, while Italy was still in chaos after the Social War, Mithridates attacked Roman interests on a wide front, first in Kappadokia, then in Bithynia – Nikomedes and Ariobarzanes soon met up again in Rome – before going for the main objective, *provincia Asia*, with its rich Greek cities and the large immigrant Italian population that had come to exploit them. The Roman upper-class symbiosis between public career and the pursuit of private financial interests had in the last generation proved impossible to overcome, and most public officials who had served in the new province had proved unwilling to exercise adequate control over the private activities of Italian entrepreneurs. Only very few men had dared to show the institutional respect that Greek cities expected to receive from their

rulers – respect which they had largely received from the Pergamene kings in pre-provincial times, who indeed taxed the cities but also invested in their goodwill. Romans of this generation taxed but did not invest, the goodwill of the taxpayers was less important than making a fast denarius, and swarms of Italians were everywhere, enjoying the protection of Roman authority for their public and private financial interests – it was difficult to tell the difference, owing to the *publicani* system of tax gathering – and they seem on the whole to have regarded the province and neighboring territories merely as a source of uncontrolled and easily gained revenue. In the generation since the creation of the province these immigrant Italians had acquired such a devastatingly bad reputation for brutal exploitation that Mithridates reckoned with good chances of gaining support from the oppressed Greeks.

The details of the war in the Roman territories in Asia and the Balkans, where Mithridates sent his general Archelaos to central Greece, do not concern us in detail here, since the immediate result was merely to confirm Rome's hold on the lands it already controlled, despite the sufferings of the population, large sections of which at first indeed showed enthusiasm for the invader when he ordered the massacre of thousands of the Italian exploiters, as Mithridates had expected. Lucius Cornelius Sulla brought about a peace, negotiated at Dardanos in the Troad in 85, which – since he had already driven the Pontic troops under Archelaos out of Greece en route – foresaw as price for peace Mithridates' withdrawal from Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia, as well as the payment of a war indemnity. Otherwise, Mithridates could continue to rule Pontos. Sulla, in fact, needed peace at this time more than Mithridates did, since he expected to have to fight a civil war when he returned to Italy; the peace terms were therefore never ratified by the senate, but remained informal. Nevertheless, Nikomedes and Ariobarzanes were once again restored to their respective states and Mithridates retained his kingdom and lived to fight another day. Had Sulla not been pursuing an Italian agenda at the time, Mithridates would doubtless not have got away so relatively lightly but would have experienced a quite different level of Roman engagement in Asia Minor (Appian, *Mithridateios* 17–63). The fate of Perseus in Macedonia would have been the model to apply. As it was, however, because of the civil war in Italy it was twenty more years before Mithridates was deposed and Pontos became a Roman province.

III Anatolia Becomes Roman

There can be no doubting basic Roman intentions to stop the rot in Asia Minor. When Mithridates refused to evacuate Kappadokia and so provoked an ultimately unsuccessful attack by Sulla's lieutenant, Lucius Murena, in 82 – usually known as the “Second Mithridatic War” – status was involved, and despite his defeats Murena was allowed to celebrate a triumph. Despite the peace of Dardanos, Mithridates was still clearly regarded as a serious enemy. When Nikomedes IV died suddenly in 74 and left a will in which he bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman People, there was no hesitation in Rome about organizing the new territory as an additional province (Appian, *Mithridateios* 71). Also in 74 the senate undertook the first of a series of major efforts to combat the serious piracy menace in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, not least because Mithridates had links with pirate groups and had employed them during the war with Rome. But the decisive blow that delivered the whole of Anatolia into Roman power, and brought the world of independent Macedonian-style kingdoms there to a final end, was still to come.

As in 88, the immediate provocation began with Mithridates. He was unable to bear the thought of having a Roman province of Bithynia as his immediate neighbor and launched an attack on it by land and sea, which took the Roman authorities in the area completely by surprise, so beginning the “Third Mithridatic War.” It was, however, a disastrous mistake on his part, a fatal misinterpretation of Roman determination, a late parallel to the inconsidered challenge of Antiochos III, when he attacked Greece in 192, more than a century before, and in the end just as self-destructive. In the new Roman province Mithridates did, of course, find elements that encouraged him, people who would dearly have loved to avoid being ruled by Romans and exploited by Roman *publicani* and other Italian business interests. But they were of little help and could offer no serious resistance when both ex-consuls of 74 were sent to Asia Minor, Marcus Aurelius Cotta to Bithynia and Lucius Licinius Lucullus to Asia, with the explicit mandate to fight Mithridates (Appian, *Mithridateios* 69–71; Memnon [*FgrHist*] 434, F27; Cicero, *Pro Murena* 15.33).

Lucullus was one of Sulla's most effective lieutenants in the first war, and had no hesitation about the way to go about his current task. It was by now clear that Mithridates personally needed to be eradicated; the only possible solution to the longstanding problem of Pontic aggression was to be that of Macedonia after the Third Macedonian War, therefore no meaningful negotiations could take place. Pontos, however, occupied a huge mountainous area in northeastern Anatolia, and though the war proceeded systematically, starting in 73, progress was slow. Lucullus was supported by the

taxpayers of the Roman provinces, some of the coastal cities of which provided ships for his fleet, but also by the Galatians, who had been appallingly treated by Mithridates in the first war – their leaders, with few exceptions, had been brutally murdered. Deiotarus, one of the survivors, now eagerly supported Lucullus with Galatian troops and the Roman client king in Kappadokia, the again restored Ariobarzanes, provided vital logistical support and local knowledge. By the end of 72 Mithridates was expelled from Bithynia, his fleet being defeated near Lemnos and forced back into the Black Sea. During the winter 72/1 Lucullus besieged Amisos and in 71 confronted Mithridates near Kabeira on the river Lykos in central Pontos, before Mithridates decided to abandon resistance and seek refuge in Armenia with his son-in-law Tigranes. In 70 Lucullus overcame remaining nests of resistance, capturing the royal residences Sinope and Amaseia, and reported to the senate that they could send out the by now traditional ten-man commission (*legati*) to organize the new province. There was no doubt that the creation of another province was the planned solution to the Pontic problem (Appian, *Mithridateios* 72–83; Plutarch, *Lucullus* 7–20).

Lucullus' confidence proved to be premature. Mithridates was still on the loose, and Lucullus' legate, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who was sent to Tigranes to achieve the handover of Mithridates, was led on a wild-goose chase through Armenia searching for Tigranes before he finally caught up with him at Antioch. Pulcher's frustration exacerbated the natural arrogance of the Roman nobleman, and a brusque demand that Tigranes hand over Mithridates was met by an equally brusque refusal. The importance of capturing the charismatic king should not be underestimated: this was a time when strong personalities could work wonders, and there was no current personality in the area with greater charisma than Mithridates. Tigranes' refusal to hand over his father-in-law thus presented a challenge to Lucullus, who had no official mandate for taking the war into Armenia, except on the argument that the war against Mithridates could not be regarded as being over until Mithridates in person was in Roman custody – or dead. It was to prove a bitter and dangerous operation that produced indeed some successes on the ground, but still no Mithridates, who in 67 even managed to slip back into Pontos, raise a new army, and inflict a major defeat on the Roman garrison troops at Zela before Lucullus could extract his much larger force from the Armenian mountains. Mithridates must have seemed once more to be a force to reckon with.

Lucullus' premature report of his successes had stirred up interest at Rome among those senators eager to govern the Asian provinces which he still controlled, and successors were appointed for Kilikia

and Asia in 68, for Bithynia and Pontos in 67. The defeat of the garrison troops at Zela, however, put a quite new complexion on the problem, and none other than Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, who in 67 had been given an extraordinary command to finally deal with the pirate menace throughout the Mediterranean basin, was once more given extraordinary powers through the tribunician *lex Manilia* in 66 in order to complete the war against Mithridates. Lucullus, who had done all the groundwork, was recalled, and Pompeius reaped the reward, driving Mithridates out of his kingdom. This time he received no warm reception from Tigranes. Pushing on by land around the jagged eastern and northern coasts of the Black Sea, Mithridates eventually arrived in his northern dependencies based on the Kimmerian Bosporos and the Crimea, where his son Machares was governor. Machares, however, had earlier contacted Lucullus and offered submission to Roman wishes, and as a result was now driven to suicide when he was unexpectedly confronted with his desperate father. Mithridates made every effort to consolidate his hold on the Bosporan kingdom, but in 63 his increasingly brutal methods finally provoked a mutiny, and rather than be put on show in a Roman triumph he had himself killed. He was succeeded by his favorite son Pharnakes, who obtained Roman favor (Appian, *Mithridateios* 101–111).

In eastern Anatolia Pompeius still had Tigranes to deal with, since what Lucullus had begun needed to be completed, not least for the sake of Roman prestige in the region. Tigranes' experience with Lucullus, who had only failed to gain Tigranes' submission because of having to break off to deal with Mithridates' diversionary activity in Pontos, had taught him that he would stand little chance against a much larger Roman army. As Pompeius' force reached the neighborhood of the traditional Armenian capital city, Artaxata, Tigranes rode out in full royal regalia to meet him and laid down his diadem before Pompeius, who then restored it to him on condition that Tigranes give up all his own conquests and restrict himself to his traditional small mountain kingdom. This was the decisive moment that placed the whole of Anatolia and Syria, which since 84 had been part of Tigranes' expanded kingdom, at the disposition of the Roman People, and marked the end of any significant level of state independence in the area. From now on even those kings, like Tigranes in Armenia, Ariobarzanes in Kappadokia, or Pharnakes in the Bosporan kingdom, who were left in power, were merely tolerated by the Romans, and were therefore in a real sense Roman client kings. As independent Hellenistic states they had ceased to exist.

Egypt Becomes Roman

325 300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25

168	"Day of Eleusis"; Noumenion in Rome
163	Ptolemy VI Philometor returns to Alexandria; Ptolemy (VIII Euergetes II) goes to Kyrene and appeals to Rome about Cyprus
ca. 155	Ptolemy (VIII) attacks Cyprus; makes will in favor of Rome
145	Death of Ptolemy VI Philometor; accession of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and marriage to Kleopatra II
142	Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II marries Kleopatra III
131	Outbreak of civil war in Egypt
124	Reconciliation of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and Kleopatra III with Kleopatra II
118	Great " <i>philanthrope</i> " decree
116	Death of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II; accession of Ptolemy IX Soter II; death of Kleopatra II
107	Expulsion of Ptolemy IX Soter II; Ptolemy X Alexander king in Alexandria
101	Death of Kleopatra III
96	Death of Ptolemy Apion; Kyrene becomes Roman
89	Expulsion from Alexandria and death of Ptolemy X Alexander
88	Ptolemy IX Soter II returns to Alexandria and rules with his daughter Kleopatra Berenike
80	Death of Ptolemy IX Soter II; accession of Ptolemy XI Alexander II and then of Ptolemy XII Neos Dionysos ("Auletes")
59	"Auletes" recognized in Rome
58	Cyprus becomes Roman province; "Auletes" in Rome
51	Death of "Auletes"; accession of Kleopatra Philopator and Ptolemy XIII
49–47	Civil war in Egypt
48/7	Caesar in Alexandria
45/4	Kleopatra Philopator and Kaisarion in Rome; murder of Caesar
42	Battle of Philippi; start of Antonius' activities

The longest survivor of the three great post-Alexandrian Macedonian monarchies was Ptolemaic Egypt. The reasons for its long life are doubtless complex, but a mixture of physical distance from the center of Mediterranean affairs and the unique separate cultural identity of the land had always isolated Egypt as a special case. In the specific circumstances of the second and first centuries BC the critical factor, however, was certainly geopolitical: Egypt simply never presented a challenge to dominant Roman interests, but as soon as it did so under Kleopatra Philopator it too was beaten in a major battle, at Aktion in 31 BC, and subsequently dissolved as an independent political entity. Kleopatra Philopator was thus the last of the long series of Macedonian monarchs who had dominated the Greek world for three hundred years – the battle of Aktion was fought exactly three hundred years after the battle of Gaugamela in 331, where the Macedonian Alexander finally defeated the Persian king Darius and laid the foundations for Macedonian dominance throughout the Middle East. After 31 BC the last major bastion of the Hellenistic world became a Roman province.

This could all have happened much earlier, had the Roman senate been inclined to take over responsibility for Egypt. However, the internal structure of the Roman state and the political dynamics of the Roman Republic made the senate reluctant to take on the sort of responsibility abroad that would offer individual senators the opportunity of exploiting their experiences overseas for internal purposes at Rome. The opportunities offered by public service in a prosperous province always included the chance of personally becoming super-rich, to an extent that could tip the political balance within the governing group of traditional landowning Italian gentry that the Roman senate theoretically still was. This basic attitude explains the general reluctance, especially in the second century, to create new directly administered provinces overseas, except under conditions where this seemed to be the only solution, as in Macedonia in 148 or at Pergamon after 133. For Egypt this essential condition arrived late. Roman relations with Egypt functioned, therefore, through ambassadors, messengers, and visitors, official and unofficial, in both directions, through senatorial opinions and authority on the one side, through requests and appeals on the other, but not until the very last phase through military intervention. As long as Egypt presented no perceived threat to Roman interests elsewhere and did not try to influence events that involved such interests, the senate was

satisfied to let things run. The internal squabbles of the representatives of the inbred Ptolemaic dynasty and continuing low-level dissatisfaction with their rulers among the Egyptian population ensured that Rome would see no danger to its interests emerging from Alexandria.

I Ptolemy VI “Philometor”

The senate’s attitude towards eastern Mediterranean lands changed after Pydna on a broad front, as we have seen. The intervention of Popilius Laenas at Eleusis in 168 was, of course, primarily directed at preventing the resurgence of power of the Seleukid Antiochos IV. Its natural corollary, however, was that Egypt, including its exposed external possessions Kyrene and Cyprus, though remaining an independent separate state, was inevitably increasingly felt and seen to be a Roman protectorate, since it owed its special status to direct Roman intervention. This attitude is illustrated already by the visit of the senior courtier Noumenion to Rome immediately after the withdrawal of Antiochos. He came on behalf of the current young rulers, Ptolemy VI Philometor and Kleopatra II together with Ptolemy (VIII), to thank the Romans for their “benefactions” (Polybios 30.16.1). Livy, who had a fuller version of Polybios’ account available than has survived in the original, recounts Noumenion’s assertion that the sibling monarchs “owed more to the Roman senate and People than to their ancestors, more even than to the immortal gods,” since through them they had recovered their ancestral kingdom, which was almost lost. The senate replied that they were very pleased that their actions had ended positively for the Egyptian monarchs and that they would continue to operate in such a way that the Egyptian royals “would reckon the faith (*fides*) of the Roman People as being the most powerful support of their kingdom” (Livy 45.13.4–8). If the phraseology is authentic and not just anachronistic coloring by Livy himself, it amounted to an explicit summons to the Ptolemies to regard themselves as Roman clients.

The future behavior of the Ptolemies suggests that they understood the message, but this did not make them more willing to continue to share royal responsibility at home. The nominal joint rule of the Ptolemaic brothers, Philometor and his younger brother together with Kleopatra II, Philometor’s sister-wife, that had been patched up to present dynastic solidarity against Antiochos, had fallen apart by 164. A first attempt to drive the brothers apart was made by a senior courtier called Dionysios – also known by his Egyptian name

Petosarapis. He tried to work up the mob in Alexandria against Philometor, but was defeated at the last minute through a public show of dynastic solidarity, which held up sufficiently long for Philometor also to put down an indigenous uprising at Panopolis in the Thebaid (Diodoros 31.15a; 17b). But by mid-164 Philometor had left Egypt, driven out by his younger brother, and he turned up in Rome as a refugee petitioner, his expulsion allowing the senate to respect its own recent ruling not to receive a ruling king! He gained some senatorial support, and sometime before May 163 was escorted back to Alexandria by Roman *legati*. They brokered an agreement with the younger brother, who in the single year of his rule had made himself so unpopular in Alexandria that he was glad to accept Philometor's offer to rule Kyrene, so that he could escape the city with his skin intact.

This was the message that the senatorial legates responsible for Philometor's restoration told the senate when the younger brother himself appealed to Rome later in the same year, arguing that the division of the kingdom was unfair and that he should also have been given Cyprus (Polybios 31.10). This time, for whatever reason, the senate agreed with him and sent him off with Titus Manlius Torquatus and Gaius Cornelius Merula to take over Cyprus, as long as this could happen explicitly "without a war." Polybios, who was in Rome at the time, comments on this otherwise inexplicable decision to favor the younger Ptolemy: "Many decisions of the Romans are currently of this sort. Through them they exploit the mistakes of their clients and so effectively extend and build up their own area of influence, just as it suits their own interests; at the same time they gratify and give the impression of benefiting the guilty party" (31.10.7). This is Polybios' own contemporary assessment of the post-Pydna syndrome. The critical words in the current decision, however, were "without a war," and since Philometor simply refused to hand over Cyprus to his brother, although the Roman authority demanded it, the *legati* had no alternative but to return to Rome, their mission being impossible. The senate was clearly split over this issue – which, however, was not regarded as being very important, since no further action took place and Cyprus remained united with Philometor's Egypt. The younger brother even had a struggle to reoccupy Kyrene after his unsuccessful visit to Rome and adventure in Cyprus, meeting massive local opposition that required military action to quell it.

In 155 the younger Ptolemy set up an inscription in the sanctuary of Apollo in Kyrene city, announcing to all visitors that in view of a recent attempt not just on his kingdom but on his life, "should a human event [i.e., death] occur before I have successors to leave for the kingdom, I leave to the Romans, with whom from the beginning I

have honestly upheld friendship and alliance, the kingdom which belongs to me" (*SEG* 9, 7 = Austin² 289 = Burstein 104 = Sherk, *RGEDA* 31 = BD² 51). This remarkable text, a copy of which, Ptolemy says, was sent to Rome, illustrates how fragile the dynastic structure of the Ptolemaic division of responsibilities was, but it also shows the absolutely central role in Ptolemaic thinking played by Rome and Roman connections at this time. The idea that a kingdom was purely a personal possession, to be disposed of at the will of the current possessor, was also a new idea, but once admitted was certainly imitable. We do not know who Ptolemy meant by his mention of the assassination attempt; it is often assumed that his siblings in Alexandria were envisaged as perpetrators, but there was enough local opposition to his rule in the Kyrenean cities that would have been delighted to have him removed, though at the same time would certainly be reluctant to simply see him replaced by Roman administrators and so be discouraged by the publication of the testament. Shortly after this, he launched a military attack on Cyprus, only to be met with fierce opposition from Philometor's troops in the island, who shut him up in the small harbor town of Lapethos, where he was forced to surrender (Polybios 39.7.6; Diodoros 31.3). Philometor then agreed that Ptolemy should go back to Kyrene – thus, in effect, ruling out the modern idea that he had previously wanted to assassinate him – where he remained until Philometor's death in 145. We know nothing of any direct Roman intervention in this business, but Roman interests were certainly in the air. Cretan mercenary troops that had taken part in Philometor's successful campaign set up statues of their immediate commander, Aglaos of Kos, and of their paymaster, Ptolemy Philometor himself, on Delos, where the inscriptions have been preserved. Aglaos is praised for his services, past and present, to the king, especially during the Cyprus campaign, as well as to the mercenaries and their home state, the Cretan Federation (*koinon*) (Durrbach 92). Ptolemy is praised for his mildness, for his making "friendship and peace," and for "devoting himself to all aspects of public affairs in a generous way and in particular setting priorities in areas in which he can most gratify the Romans" (*OGIS* 116 = Holleaux, *Etudes* 3, 79). This latter text was clearly aimed at the ever-increasing Roman and Italian population of the island who profited from its recently created customs-free harbor zone and who might be expected to pass the message on to their friends in Rome.

If Roman interest was the dominant factor that permanently needed to be respected at the highest level of the Ptolemaic state, normal life did go on in Ptolemaic Egypt independently of any Roman intervention. Despite the struggles with his brother, Ptolemy Philometor, employing normal dynastic practice, appointed his son

with the royal appellative and ruler cult title “Eupator” (“Of Good Father”) to be governor of Cyprus in 152, though in the event the young man did not live long enough to succeed his father (*OGIS* 123–125). In Upper Egypt there are signs that central authority was finally reestablished. Philometor’s general Boethos, one of many Karians in Ptolemaic service, pressed on into Nubia as far as the second Nile cataract in the area known as “Triakon-taschoinos” and founded two new dynastic cities there, “Philometoris” and “Kleopatra”; the action brought him the title “City-Founder” (*ktistes*) (*OGIS* 111). Philometor’s greatest apparent success was, however, the temporary recovery of Koile Syria (though without Palestine, where the Hasmoneans were by now immovable). This was achieved through his massive, but flexible, intervention in Seleukid affairs, first supporting Alexander Balas as Seleukid king – in conformity with Pergamene policy and with Roman toleration – to whom he married his daughter, Kleopatra Thea, then quickly changing to favor Demetrios II, to whom he also transferred Thea, when he was offered Koile Syria as reward for helping Demetrios against Balas. The fact that this success did not last long was a result of his accidental death after the battle at the river Oinoparas near Antioch in 145 (Diodoros 32.9c).

II Ptolemy VIII “Euergetes” II

The death of Philometor ushers in a century-long period which it is difficult to avoid calling “the decline” of Ptolemaic Egypt, leading to the final takeover by Rome. Philometor had found an opportunity to pay attention to the internal and external problems of Egypt, despite his continual disputes with his younger brother. From 145 onwards, however, inner-dynastic struggles, sometimes accompanied by appalling acts of gratuitous violence, descending again and again to the brink of civil war, and even beyond, become the dominant features of Ptolemaic history. Characteristic of the time is also the ever-increasing prominence of the Ptolemaic queens – most of them now called Kleopatra, the name borne by the sister of Alexander the Great and brought into the Ptolemaic house in 193 by the Seleukid import, Kleopatra I, daughter of Antiochos III. This name now becomes almost an official dynastic name for females of the dynasty, like Ptolemy for the males. The kind of dynastic disintegration that we shall see taking place in Egypt we have already observed in the Seleukid kingdom, which at the personal level by now was increasingly interwoven with the Ptolemaic. The main difference between the Ptolemaic and Seleukid malaise was that Egypt, being

fairly isolated geographically, was not exposed to the same extent as the Seleukids were to “nibbling” at the edges of the kingdom by external powers (like the Parthians) or ineradicable internal dissatisfaction (like the Jews in Palestine) – despite ongoing localized low-level dissatisfaction among the native Egyptians – and therefore was able to bear the political and financial costs of the dynastic struggles for power for much longer. Moreover, the complex bureaucratic apparatus of the government continued to function reasonably well and, thanks to the vested interests of the middle and lower bureaucracy, was not directly damaged by the severe disputes affecting the court at Alexandria.

The troubles began immediately after the death of Philopator. His sister-widow Kleopatra II, with the support of high palace circles, seems to have planned to imitate her mother’s action when her father, Ptolemy V, died and continue to rule herself, though she had no son remaining for whom she could be regent. Before she could begin to rule effectively her younger brother, currently in Kyrene, saw his chance finally come to take over in Alexandria. With the support of the Alexandrian mob – an increasingly influential body at this time, the precise composition of which it is difficult to analyze in detail – as well as of a Roman senator, Lucius Minucius Thermus, who happened to be in Alexandria at the time, he organized an invitation for himself to return and take over the kingdom (Justin 38.8.2; Josephos, *contra Apionem* 2.49–51). He tried to make himself popular by immediately making concessions to the population in general through an amnesty decree (*philanthropa*) that especially favored the soldiers, as an inscription of the Cyprus garrison shows (*SEG* 12.548 = *C.Ord.Ptol.* 41–42). He therefore took the historicizing cult-name “Euergetes” (“Benefactor”), harking back to the great Ptolemy III a century ago (he is therefore for us Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II: on the modern numbering of Ptolemies see chapter 12, p. 258). A much less favorable name was, however, also current, “Physkon” (“The Belly”), derived from his monstrous obesity. In Alexandria a pogrom of Euergetes II’s opponents – actual or apparent – took place, especially among the richer and intellectual sections of the community that Philometor and Kleopatra II had particularly encouraged (Diodoros 33.6; 6a). A sarcastic Kyrenean writer, Menekles of Barka, wrote that Euergetes II was responsible for a surge of classical education throughout the Greek world, because he expelled so many intellectuals and artists from Alexandria who had supported his brother that they had to settle in other places in order to ply their trades, to the benefit of their new homes (*FgrHist* 270 F9 = Athenaios 4.83, 184BC). On the other hand competent senior administrators stayed in office to serve the new regime. Boethos continued to operate in Upper Egypt, gaining

promotion in the court hierarchy and founding another city, to which he gave the politically correct name “Euergetis” (*AJP* 43, 1997, 315–363). Herodes of Pergamon, who was associated with Boethos in Upper Egypt under Philometor, also continued to serve there under Euergetes II (*OGIS* 111, 130). They will not have been the only ones.

Faced with this range of support for her brother, Kleopatra II's position proved to be hopeless, and within a few months she compromised and accepted Euergetes II as her new husband. She became pregnant immediately and bore a son to Euergetes II, born at the time of his formal crowning as Pharaoh at Memphis and therefore known as “Memphites.” Shortly afterwards Euergetes II raped Kleopatra's teenage daughter, his own niece, but by 142 he had also married her, raising her to be joint queen along with her mother and so monopolizing all potential sources of dynastic influence. For us she is therefore known as Kleopatra III. Official royal protocol thereafter distinguished the two ruling Kleopatrain as “Kleopatra the Sister” (II) and “Kleopatra the Wife” (III) (though actually both were wives). These seedy events look like a recipe for dynastic disaster, and so it proved to be. It was not long before a supporter of Kleopatra II, a Greek general called Galaistes, who along with other highly placed persons had gone into exile when Euergetes II returned to Alexandria, started a movement to return, and he could be stopped only with great difficulty (*Diodoros* 33.20; 22). As a result of all this upheaval in Egypt, a high-powered senatorial delegation, led by the victor and destroyer of Carthage, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, on tour in Greek territories with the official objective of reconciling disputes, chose to visit Egypt, perhaps in 139, to see what was going on, and was received with the greatest honors by Euergetes II. The Romans seem to have been satisfied with their treatment, though they were scornful of the extravagant triviality of life at the Ptolemaic court (*Diodoros* 33.28b). Around the same time, an important decree was issued in the names of Euergetes II and his two Kleopatrain on the appeal of some priests who complained about the lack of respect shown by state authorities for their financial privileges. As always in Ptolemaic Egypt, the support of the priests was vital for the central government's control of the native Egyptian population – a relatively small village like Kerkeosiris in the Fayum possessed no fewer than thirteen privileged temples and shrines – as well as for the propagation of the official version of the ruler cult. The government of Euergetes II realized this as well as its predecessors had done, and despite the financial pressures caused by the recent upheavals decided in the interest of the priests (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 47 = BD² 166).

The toleration agreement between the three nominal rulers, doubtless approved, if not actually brokered, by the Roman mission,

lasted until the thirty-ninth year of Euergetes II – he counted his years from his first association with Philometor in 171/70 – when the tensions proved so great that actual civil war broke out between Kleopatra II on the one side and Euergetes II and Kleopatra III on the other. Why this precise time, spring 131, was crisis time is unknown, but riots in Alexandria, stirred up by Kleopatra II who retained much personal support in the city, became so fierce that Euergetes II and Kleopatra III abandoned Egypt, going to Cyprus where they began to raise an army. Kleopatra II was now able to realize the dream of ruling alone, which she had been forced to give up in 145, and began a new counting system for her own years of rule, starting from this date. She seems to have relied mainly on the support of the Alexandrian population and the garrison troops there. She presented herself publicly as the continuator of Philometor's tradition, calling herself by the same cult-name "Philometor," while at the same time claiming to be a new founder of the dynasty by using the cult-title "Soteira," the feminine form of Soter, Ptolemy I's cult-title. She may have intended to integrate the boy Memphites, her son by Euergetes II and now about twelve years old, into her system, but he was away in Kyrene at the time, and before she could bring him to Alexandria he was summoned to Cyprus by his father where he was soon murdered. His dismembered body was sent to Alexandria in a box addressed to his mother, which arrived just as she was about to celebrate publicly her royal birthday (Diodoros 34/35.14). This gruesome act did nothing to increase Euergetes II's popularity in Alexandria, but it decisively eliminated Kleopatra II's last surviving male child. In the meanwhile, Euergetes II had living children from Kleopatra III, and this now gave her a decisive advantage over her mother. A curious survival of the very short period of Memphites' association with Euergetes II and Kleopatra III before his death is an inscription from Delos, in which he made a dedication (or it was made for him) for "Queen Kleopatra Euergetis, the wife of my father and my own cousin" – she was, of course, also his uterine half-sister (*OGIS* 144).

Despite this horrifying act that thoroughly shocked Alexandria, Euergetes II retained supporters in the Egyptian countryside. An accidental papyrus find shows the commander of forces in the Thebaid in Upper Egypt in 130, a native Egyptian called Paos, remaining loyal to Euergetes II and treating Kleopatra II's supporters as rebels (*SP* 101 = *BD*,² 53). In general, the period was later referred to as "the Troubles" (*tarache*) or "the Separation" (*amixia*), so emphasizing the fact that the whole land was politically divided, though there is no good evidence that this was generally on ethnic lines, despite Euergetes II's favoring native Egyptian elements and the fact that the old Pharaonic capital, Memphis, remained loyal to him. Certainly

Upper Egypt decided relatively quickly to remain loyal to Euergetes II, except for some pockets of “rebels,” and the important Fayum area, where large numbers of Greeks had settled, continued to recognize Euergetes II and to date documents according to his years of rule; Kyrene also remained loyal to Euergetes II, as an inscription honoring Kleopatra III alone, as wife of Euergetes II, clearly shows (*SEG* 9, 61).

By 127 Alexandria, where the troubles began, seems to have been virtually isolated in continuing to resist Euergetes II. Kleopatra II had tried to involve the Seleukid Demetrios II on her side – once her son-in-law, as husband of her daughter Kleopatra Thea – after his release from Parthian captivity, but Euergetes II was able to stop an invasion attempt, after which Kleopatra II abandoned the city, taking such state funds as she could lay hands on in Alexandria with her, and joined Kleopatra Thea in Syria (128). That was the signal for Euergetes II to set up a new pretender to the Seleukid throne, Alexander Zabinas, who with Euergetes II’s support was sufficiently successful with his challenge to prevent any further Seleukid attempt to interfere in Egypt (Justin 39.1). Before August 126 Alexandria had fallen, and Euergetes II and Kleopatra III were again in control of their capital city. Little is known about the immediate consequences. One source speaks of the burning down of a gymnasium, together with all the young men exercising in it, and this is presented as a revenge act against the Greek parts of the population, which seems improbable (Valerius Maximus 9.2, ext. 5). Roman and Italian shippers and merchants, who were in the city when it was taken, set up a statue on Delos of the successful general Lochos, with an inscription thanking him for the benefits they received when the city fell to Euergetes II. Precisely what they consisted of is not stated (*OGIS* 135). Whether the sort of pogrom against opponents – largely Alexandrian Greeks – that had characterized Euergetes II’s takeover in 145 was now repeated, is simply not known; but if it happened, it did not prevent a further extraordinary development: before 124 Kleopatra II returned to Alexandria and was formally reconciled with her brother and daughter. Her primary motivation for this may well have been the hopeless situation in Syria, where she had been living in Ptolemais with Kleopatra Thea; Euergetes II and Kleopatra III will have been glad enough to integrate her remaining followers in the capital city by putting on a show of dynastic solidarity. Moreover, at some time before 118 – the earliest piece of evidence – a new dynastic god, listed between Philometor and the ruling Euergetai, was inserted into the official titulature of the priest of Alexander with the name “Neos Philopator,” the “New Philopator” (“New Father-Loving”). Under the circumstances the most probable identification of this otherwise unknown figure is with Ptolemaios Memphites, the most prominent

casualty of the civil war, and his posthumous rehabilitation fits well into the current desire of the Alexandrian royals to demonstrate dynastic integrity.

The country as a whole took some time to settle down after these years of civil war. Local conflicts broke out in several areas, but by 118 the government had gathered sufficient momentum to attend to the greatest problems oppressing the population, and issued the most comprehensive amnesty decree (*philan-thropa*) of which we know. Reading between the lines, the document gives us a unique view of the state of Egypt, as perceived by the government in Alexandria at the time. The basis of the agricultural economy was severely damaged, since many farmers had abandoned their land as a result of the civil war, and many villages were therefore depopulated. Taxpayers had accumulated large debts to the state, so that the financial administration could no longer cope; public officials acted arbitrarily and were corrupt, making illegal exactions and abandoning normal legal process. Some people had ignored the rights of the king, occupying royal land illegally, and the temples, as always, exploited every opportunity to extend their possessions and privileges. The optimistic aim of the measures taken in 118 to stop the abuses was to make a new start in all these important areas: tax arrears were simply written off, efforts were envisaged to check official corruption, farmers were given privileges in order to encourage production (and so to enlarge the tax base), but it proved impossible, or at least socially and politically undesirable, to check the privileges of the priests, who once more were able to extend their own privileged position in return for their continued support (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 53–55 = *SP* 210 = *Austin*² 290 = *Burstein* 107 = *BD*² 54).

III Woman Power

Future developments suggest that these measures had little long-term effect. Official arbitrariness and a culture of corruption in a major economy could not be stamped out merely at the stroke of a pen, and when Euergetes II died in 116, leaving Kleopatra III to decide which of their two sons should succeed him, the dynastic circus began all over again in the new generation, and the upper levels of the administration of the land sank again in the dynastic morass. Only the middle bureaucracy saved the land from disaster. Euergetes II chose to regard his kingdom as a personal possession when he appointed Kleopatra III in charge of its future (*Justin* 39.3.1), just as forty years earlier he had left the Romans Kyrene in his widely publicized will,

should he then die childless. His second will also foresaw that his illegitimate son Apion should receive Kyrene. Both wills were at their time unique; the first may well have prevented an untimely death and then did not need to be put into effect, so serving its purpose, but the second proved ineffective. Euergetes II's sister, Kleopatra II, was still alive and favored the classic principle of primogeniture, whereas her daughter, Kleopatra III, preferred her younger son (both boys, with confusing inevitability, bore the dynastic name Ptolemy). The elder son was currently in Cyprus, acting as governor of the island there when Euergetes II died, and it is conceivable that his mother's intention was to leave him there, now decorated with the royal title, while her younger son would rule in Egypt under her direction. If so, this would have meant the separation of the two remaining external territories of the dynasty, Kyrene under Apion and Cyprus under the elder son of Kleopatra III, from the central administration of the kingdom in Alexandria – troops had abandoned remaining Ptolemaic positions in the Aegean at the latest under Euergetes II, once the remaining threat from Macedonia was removed. The perspective of such a division merely for inner-dynastic reasons proved unattractive and was doubtless one of the reasons why Kleopatra II gained support in Alexandria with the people and the garrison troops to prevent her daughter's wishes being put into effect. The clash of opinions, however, meant no more than that the debilitating struggle between mother and daughter at the head of the state would continue, and at first Kleopatra II was successful. The elder Ptolemy was recalled from Cyprus and crowned in Egypt, taking the prestigious cult-title “Soter,” recalling that of the founder of the dynasty and, more recently, Kleopatra II's own “Soteira” during her period of sole rule from 131 onwards (for us, therefore, he is Ptolemy IX Soter II). His immediate support in Egypt, thanks to his grandmother's activities on his behalf, was so widespread that even when she died later in the year, his mother was unable to shake his hold on power. This meant that Cyprus and Kyrene continued to be ruled from Alexandria. As late as April 108 Apion had still not taken over in Kyrene, as a dated letter of Ptolemy IX Soter II and his current sister-wife, Kleopatra Selene, published there shows (*SEG* 9, 5).

The king's mother, Kleopatra III, nevertheless remained a powerful figure in Alexandria. A temple inscription at Edfu in Upper Egypt calls this Ptolemy “the one his mother crowned on the throne of his father,” demonstrating the prominence she claimed. At about the same time she insisted Ptolemy divorce the sister whom he already had as wife (traditionally called Kleopatra IV by historians) and whom he had left in Cyprus when he came to Egypt, and take a younger sister, Kleopatra Selene, in her place (Justin 39.3.2). The date is uncertain,

but the divorced Kleopatra IV shared the spirit of her mother and grandmother, and in 113 married herself to Antiochos Kyzikenos in Antioch, bringing with her from Cyprus a goodly part of the Ptolemaic garrison of the island (Justin 39.3.3). The date was conditioned by the fact that Ptolemy IX's younger brother had now been sent to Cyprus as governor with the administrative title *strategos* (certainly not as independent *basileus*, "king") (Pausanias 1.9.2). Formal documents also illustrate the prominence of the queen mother Kleopatra III, in which she is regularly named as queen before her ruling son, as in a series of letters replying to petitions of the priests of Chnum at Elephantine (Aswan), which they engraved on a stone, now in the British Museum (OGIS 168). This documented queen-motherly preeminence is unique, as is also the especial prominence that Kleopatra III established for herself in the religious life of the land.

Kleopatra III never gave up her distant political objective of installing her younger son as king in Alexandria. This may perhaps have happened temporarily in 110, but it was 107 before she finally achieved her aim. Soter II then sought refuge in Cyprus, replacing his brother there, who in the meanwhile took the royal title, dating his regnal years retrospectively from his first appointment to the island as *strategos* (RC 71 = Austin² 222 = BD² 55). The younger brother now, if not already earlier, tried to trump his brother Soter with the choice of cult-name, choosing to recall Alexander the Great, founder of Alexandria, whose cult was a central feature of Ptolemaic court life (for us he is, therefore, Ptolemy X Alexander). Precisely how this exchange of kings took place is unclear, but it is certain that Kleopatra III bore primary responsibility for the arrangements, since she remains dominant in royal protocol until her violent death at the hand of Alexander in 101 (Justin 39.4.5; Pausanias 1.9.3). By then Apion had also finally come into his own at Kyrene and now also bore the royal title, so that the kingdom was finally split into its three constitutive parts, each with its own king, and was never again reunited, except for specific Roman reasons during the Roman civil wars. A Roman law issued in 101 concerning the functions of Roman provincial governors in the east, where cooperation against piracy was one of its main aims – the law is traditionally, but not quite accurately, known at the "Piracy Law" – was brought to the attention of "the king ruling in the island of Cyprus and the king ruling in Alexandria and Egypt and the king ruling in Kyrene" (*Roman Statutes* 12 = Sherck, *RGEDA* 55 B8–9). Nothing could illustrate the status quo in the Ptolemaic kingdom with greater plasticity than this coolly pragmatic Roman statement.

Remarkably little is known about Roman attitudes towards events in Egypt during these years, although the law just quoted makes it clear that the senate was well enough informed. An accidental papyrus

find shows us a Roman senator, Lucius Memmius, being treated with the high honor due to a state visitor when he traveled from Alexandria to the Fayum in 112 to enjoy the tourist sites; but why he was in Alexandria in the first place we have no idea (*SP* 416 = *BD*² 69). We can also imagine that Italian traders, like those who had been in Alexandria in 126 when the city was retaken by Euergetes II, did not disappear under his successors, but the only evidence is an inscription from Delos recording the erection of a statue for an unknown Roman *legatus* – the usual restoration of the lost name as that of C. Marius is mere fantasy – who had helped a group of Italians who were active in Alexandria at about this time (*I.Delos* 1699). There was certainly no direct senatorial intervention to stop the gradual self-dismemberment of the Ptolemaic kingdom, and there seems to have been no real hesitation in Rome about what to do when Apion died in 96, imitating his father half a century ago in leaving his kingdom to the Roman People (Livy, *Periocha* 70; Justin 39.5.2). The royal estates were immediately exploited by the Romans, but Kyrene was not so strategically important that it required the immediate regular attention of a senatorial governor. It was therefore only twenty years later, in 75, during the years of crisis following the death of the dictator Sulla, that measures were taken to regulate the financial exploitation of Kyrene and to ameliorate the security situation there, which had seriously deteriorated in the years during which there was no effective central government for the territory.

In Egypt itself the last independent actions of the Ptolemaic dynasty were being prepared. The period of Ptolemy X Alexander's rule, which lasted until 89 when he was expelled by the Alexandrians, offers little information. The man himself, like his father Euergetes II, was grotesquely obese, needing supporters even to walk – though he was allegedly a good dancer, when drunk – and his most infamous act was to melt down the golden sarcophagus of Alexander the Great in order to pay his mercenaries (Strabo 17.1.8 [794]). More important and certainly more popular in Alexandria was his wife Kleopatra Berenike, daughter of his expelled brother Ptolemy IX Soter II, who survived him; after their expulsion she came back to Alexandria with her father in 88 to be his queen (but not his wife), when Soter II returned to begin a second period of rule. This lasted until 80. These were frightening years for a weak king. A new insurrection in the Thebaid could be suppressed, but the decisive events that would seal the fate of Egypt were taking place in distant Asia Minor and Greece, where Rome was fighting Mithridates. When Athens fell to Sulla in 86 Ptolemy Soter II, exerting the traditional benevolence of his dynasty towards Athens, was ready enough to help with the restoration of the damage, and statues of himself and Kleopatra Berenike raised by the

grateful Athenians were still standing more than two hundred years later (Pausanias 1.9.3). During the Mithridatic War, in winter 87/6, Lucius Licinius Lucullus visited Alexandria as Sulla's legate, seeking contributions for his fleet, so that Soter II, willing or not, was bound into the Roman side in the epochal struggle (Appian, *Mithridateios* 33; Plutarch, *Lucullus* 2–3).

This would not in itself have been problematic, had not the sole surviving legitimate male member of the dynasty, an early-born son of Ptolemy X Alexander, who was living on the island of Kos, been captured by Mithridates' troops when they took the island in 88. As a result of the peace of Dardanos in 85, this young man (for us Ptolemy XI Alexander II) fell into Sulla's hands, and so he came to Rome, where he was living when Soter II died in 80. Soter II's death proved to be a critical moment for Ptolemaic Egypt, the moment when the land undisputedly turned into a Roman client state, where nothing of importance could be done without Roman consultation or permission. Kleopatra Berenike continued to rule for a few months on her own in Alexandria, but it was a decision taken in Rome that shaped the future, for Sulla soon sent off the young Alexander II to take over as king. One of the conditions for Roman support was that he make a will in favor of Rome; since he was a young man, this will have seemed unproblematic. Alexander's minuscule period of rule, however, was a disaster from beginning to end. He did not like the idea of being married to the much older Kleopatra Berenike, and Kleopatra Berenike did not like the idea of sharing power with the son of her first husband by another woman, sent along as a Roman puppet. After less than three weeks tensions already reached a peak and Alexander murdered Kleopatra Berenike, who was so popular with the Alexandrians that when her death became known Alexander himself was immediately lynched by the mob when he left the palace. He was the last recognized legitimate descendant of the founder of the dynasty in the male line (Appian, *Civil War* 1.102; Cicero, *de lege agraria* 1.1.1; 2.16.41f.).

At this point court officials in Alexandria bethought themselves of two illegitimate sons of Soter II, and even organized their installation, one in Alexandria, one in Cyprus, but neither received recognition at Rome where, however, the senate did nothing further about the will of Alexander II, which had become relevant so much more quickly than Sulla had anticipated. The two new Ptolemies were therefore tolerated in their separate areas until such time as a decision on the future of the remaining Ptolemaic possessions needed to be taken. Little is known about the brother in Cyprus, but in Egypt the Alexandrian was officially recognized as king and in due course crowned Pharaoh in Memphis by the High Priest of Ptah (for us Ptolemy XII). His preferred

Greek cult-title, “Neos Dionysos” (“New Dionysos”), drew attention to his own artistic interests, represented especially by Dionysos, and his personal participation in performances brought him the derogatory nickname “Auletes,” “the Flute Player,” from the Alexandrians. However, he also adopted the historicizing title “Philopator” (“Father-Loving”), in order to emphasize the importance of his father as sole source of dynastic legitimacy, and, once he had married his sister, Kleopatra Tryphaina, he also became “Philadelphos” (“Sibling-Loving”), a title redolent of the great times of the dynasty two hundred years before.

For some ten years the pair ruled together, but late in 69 Kleopatra Tryphaina disappears from the royal protocol, though she had not died, and “Auletes” ruled alone. It was a dangerous time for Egypt, since by the mid-sixties some important men in Rome – among them the ambitious young Gaius Iulius Caesar and the super-rich Marcus Crassus – were already thinking about taking over Egypt, because Pompeius was in the process of reorganizing the whole of the rest of the Middle East, including Syria; the open Egyptian question thus became a ball in the play of the mighty senatorial factions in Rome, which “Auletes,” who naturally took up contact with Pompeius while he was in Syria, tried to influence by large financial inducements. When in 59 “Auletes” finally received from the consul Iulius Caesar recognition as “friend and ally of the Roman People,” it had allegedly cost him 6,000 talents, something like half a year’s royal income from the whole land (Suetonius, *Iulius* 54). Yet at the time it might well have seemed like money well spent, for his brother in Cyprus was less intuitive, or perhaps just more parsimonious, and in 58 his kingdom was finally annexed as a Roman province, the king committing suicide rather than suffer the ignominy of seeing his kingdom abolished. In Egypt itself the situation went from bad to worse: “Auletes” appeared personally in Rome in 58, appealing this time for Roman military aid against revolting Alexandrians who did not want him to rule them and had expelled him, again offering huge sums for support that this time he had to borrow in Rome from private bankers against the security of future state revenues. For Egypt this semi-private financial burden was a disastrous development that encouraged Roman private financiers to develop an active interest in the question of who was actually running Egypt.

While “Auletes” was away the Alexandrians rehabilitated his sister-ex-wife Tryphaina, who promptly associated her daughter by “Auletes,” Berenike, with her on the throne. Berenike took the historicizing cult-title “Epiphanes” (“Renowned”). When Tryphaina died in 57, one of the remaining Seleukids, Seleukos son of Kleopatra Selene and one of her Seleukid husbands, was invited to marry

Berenike and share the throne in Alexandria, but he proved so unsuitable that Berenike had him eliminated after only a few days. An alternative male was found in Archelaos, who had recently been appointed by Pompeius as priest and ruler of the temple-state Komana in Pontos. He was in Syria at the critical time and promptly claimed to be a son of Mithridates Eupator in order to show sufficient royalty to convince the Alexandrians of his suitability (Strabo 12.3.34 [558]; 17.1.11 [796]). The joint rule of Berenike Epiphanes and Archelaos did not last long. By 55 “Auletes” had mobilized his Roman friends and he was duly restored by Roman troops under the command of Aulus Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, who defeated the army raised by Berenike and Archelaos, who were then put to death by “Auletes.” The price of the Roman intervention was, however, very high: his chief Roman financier, Gaius Rabirius Postumus, received the post of *dioiketes*, the chief financial officer of the kingdom, which he used to plunder the land under the pretext of raising cash for Ptolemy to repay what Rabirius had lent him, and Roman troops brought in by Gabinius remained as garrison.

Although our source material for this period is extremely Rome-centered – and there can be no doubt that the relationship of “Auletes” with the leading Romans and their attitude towards Egypt were by far the most important factors for the kingdom – we do catch some glimpses of the internal policy which allowed “Auletes” to survive for nearly thirty years. There is evidence of some unrest in various areas of Egypt during his years of rule, which was met in the by now traditional way of making concessions to the dissatisfied, though only the Alexandrians were well enough organized to be able to make life so difficult for him that he had to flee the city in 58. As with so many of his predecessors, “Auletes” knew where the power lay in the country districts and so cultivated the priestly classes throughout Egypt with privileges, especially grants of asylum or tax concessions (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 67–71), and a widespread investment in religious buildings. The High Priest of Ptah in Memphis, who had crowned “Auletes” in 76, proudly recorded that he received an annual revenue from the temples of Upper and Lower Egypt, certainly a royal instruction (Stele BM 886). A case of extravagant international generosity is also recorded: the gift of thirty-four elephant tusks to the temple of Apollo at Didyma in 54/3 after his restoration to Egypt (*I.Didyma* 394, lines 13–18).

These glimpses of traditional royal beneficence to influential Egyptian and other non-Roman institutions illustrate that “Auletes,” despite his political reliance on Roman support in the second half of his reign, nevertheless knew how a Ptolemaic king was expected to act and, despite his desperate financial situation, was prepared to try to

fulfill expectations. Critical, however, was his dependence on Rome and on individual Romans, so that by the time he died in 51 the kingdom had become to all intents and purposes part of the Roman empire, although the senate had been unable to decide on its direct annexation as a province. It is therefore hardly surprising that when the Roman civil war between Caesar and Pompeius broke out in 49, Egypt, like the other client states, was perforce involved. The Roman world was at war with itself, and since by then the whole Mediterranean basin had become an integral part of the Roman world, whatever its precise legal status may have been, Egypt could not avoid participation.

IV Kleopatra “Philopator” and the End of Ptolemaic Egypt

Without the Roman civil wars, the history of the last Kleopatra (variously numbered VI or VII by modern writers, depending on who else of the numerous Kleopatrai they include in the body count) would doubtless have been as petty and provincial as that of her earlier power-hungry namesakes, Kleopatra II and Kleopatra III, worn out in the end by political infighting for power and influence in the only ambience they knew, that of the Alexandrian court. The integration of Egypt into the Roman imperial system, however, gave this Kleopatra and the land she ruled the opportunity to play a role, though hardly an independent one, on the world stage, and this she seized with an intelligent eagerness. When Ptolemy XII Neos Dionysos (“Auletes”) died, Kleopatra, the eldest of four surviving children, had already been raised to the status of joint ruler with her father, and his testament left her – now about eighteen years old – in power, though the elder of her two brothers, a boy of ten, was officially associated with her (for us Ptolemy XIII). Her close relationship with her father was expressed by her chosen cult-name, Philopator (“Father-Loving”). In view of Rome’s current interest in Egypt, “Auletes” included in his will a request that Rome see to the fulfillment of the terms of his testament and so respect the terms of his treaty. A copy of the will was also sent to Rome but did not become generally known there, since Pompeius, Ptolemy’s most influential Roman patron, in whose house he had resided in 58/7, kept the document for himself.

The double kingship of the young woman and the child almost inevitably led to palace intrigues and faction-building, just as similar constructions in the past had done, and the tensions at court between Kleopatra and the courtiers who directed her brother were further

increased by supply difficulties affecting Alexandria in autumn 50 (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 73 = *SP* 209). When the Roman civil war broke out in January 49 and Pompeius retired from Italy to the eastern provinces, where he had achieved his greatest successes and now hoped for greatest support, it was inevitable that Egypt would have to participate on Pompeius' side. There was no real choice involved when Pompeius' son Gnaeus came to Alexandria in spring 49 looking for concrete support. He received no fewer than fifty warships and 500 cavalymen, the latter taken from those troops which Gabinius had brought to Alexandria when he restored "Auletes" in 55, and who since then had remained behind as a garrison (Caesar called them disrespectfully "Gabiniani" [*Bellum Civile* 3.4.4]). In this crisis the two young rulers and their advisers presented a common front, but by summer 49 Kleopatra was in exile somewhere in Syria, and Pompeius' rump senate, meeting in Thessalonike in that autumn, formally recognized the boy Ptolemy XIII as sole legitimate king in Alexandria, thus excluding Kleopatra from all formal influence (Lucan, *Pharsalia* 5.58–64).

Figure 17 Kleopatra VII. Marble head made for insertion into a statue, reproducing an official portrait of the queen also known from her coinage. bpk/Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Photo: Johannes Laurentius.



Had Pompeius been victorious in the civil war, Kleopatra would therefore never have stood a chance of ever again ruling in Alexandria, but his disastrous defeat at the battle of Pharsalos in June 48 changed the whole scenario. Pompeius escaped and fled to Egypt, hoping to draw on the resources of the land to continue the struggle, but he found Kleopatra and Ptolemy XIII facing each other with armies near Pelousion when he arrived. By now Ptolemy's advisers realized they had been forced into supporting what seemed to be the losing side in the Roman civil war (though it was not yet over), and had no stomach for providing a base for a Pompeian recovery attempt. As Pompeius landed, he was brutally murdered, and when Caesar arrived at Alexandria in hot pursuit two days later he was shown Pompeius' severed head and his signet ring as appeasement symbols. He is said to have wept.

Roman events had so far prevented a clash of arms in the Egyptian civil war, and Caesar now occupied the palace in Alexandria. With characteristic Roman arrogance he ordered the two armies to be

dissolved and the two young monarchs, Ptolemy and Kleopatra, to appear before him (Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 3.107.2). It was Kleopatra's great chance, and she knew how to use it. The fortuitous timing of her exile had happily prevented her from seeming to support Pompeius, as her brother had done, and this alone will have predisposed Caesar to favor her; and whether or not she was carried into Caesar's presence wrapped in a bed-roll, as the romantic tradition represented by Plutarch has it (*Caesar* 49), by the next morning she had certainly won the jackpot. Caesar's sudden decision to implement the will of "Auletes" – joint rule by the two siblings – not only contradicted the recent decision of Pompeius' senate at Thessalonike in favor of Ptolemy XIII but also, more seriously, provoked riots in Alexandria, which were further fanned by Ptolemy's advisers, in particular his chief administrator, the eunuch Potheinos. Caesar underestimated Alexandrian hostility both to Kleopatra herself and to the occupation of the city by his Roman troops; and since Potheinos did not disband Ptolemy's army as Caesar had ordered, fighting soon broke out in the city itself between Caesar's Romans and the Ptolemaic troops, aided by active elements of the Alexandrian population. It was early 47 before Caesar, in the meanwhile supported by reinforcements from Syria, regained control of the situation. By then both Potheinos and Ptolemy XIII, together with other opponents of Kleopatra, were dead; Kleopatra's sister Arsinoe, who had chosen to support her brother rather than her sister, was captured, to be displayed in Caesar's Roman triumph. Formally the remaining younger brother (for us Ptolemy XIV), a boy of about twelve, was now associated with Kleopatra as joint ruler to appease the Alexandrians, who did not like being ruled by a woman alone: he joined her in bearing the cult-title "Philopator." When Caesar departed from Alexandria in spring 47 to continue the civil war, he left three Roman legions there to ensure that his regulations would be respected ([Caesar], *Bellum Alexandrinum* 33.3–4) and queen Kleopatra seven months pregnant. An incidental but culturally far-reaching result of the war in the city was the destruction by fire of a large part of the unique collection of books in the Mouseion library.

Roman dominance thus made its physical mark on Alexandrian life, even though Caesar avoided making Egypt a formal province. Egypt was nevertheless an integral part of the Roman imperial system, and Kleopatra's child, to which she gave Caesar's name – officially "Kaisar" in Greek, but more popularly known as Kaisarion, "Little Caesar" – symbolized the very personal nature of the ruling queen's association with Rome, the most intimate possible form of integration into the Roman power block. The fact that Caesar restored the administration (and the income) of Cyprus to Kleopatra did not alter

this fundamental relationship one iota. Cyprus was Caesar's to give, or to take away again; its income, if he needed it, Kleopatra would not, could not, deny him. When Caesar was murdered on March 15, 44, Kleopatra and her child were living in Rome, far away from her Egyptian responsibilities, but they departed as soon as possible thereafter for Alexandria, where she eliminated her brother and associated her child with her as co-ruler, who is now known in Egypt as "Ptolemy who is also Kaisar, Philopator ('Father-Loving') and Philometor ('Mother-Loving')." An additional legion was also sent to Egypt.

In the years that followed, Kleopatra found herself once more without a political choice for her country, inevitably on the side of the Caesarians, and then when Antonius and Octavian divided up the Roman world between them in 42 after the battle of Philippi and Antonius became responsible for the eastern parts, the passionate and intelligent Kleopatra understood how to win the new Roman master of the east, as she had Caesar. Egypt itself remained important for Antonius as a secure base and an unfailing source of revenue, which he needed for his operations in eastern Anatolia and elsewhere; and Kleopatra provided whatever was necessary to satisfy Antonius' public requirements. Their personal affection also produced three children over the next years. This relationship was much romanticized in the telling, most splendidly perhaps by Shakespeare in *Antony and Cleopatra*. Love and epochal defeat in war together make a fine and tragic tale. The fact is, however, that Kleopatra, as queen and nominal ruler of Egypt, had no serious independent status. She had been drawn into the maelstrom of Roman civil war politics, where she could play no leading part. When disagreements between Antonius and Octavian became so intense that they began preparations for civil war, Kleopatra once more had no choice as to which side she and her land should support, and so conveniently provided Octavian with the self-serving propaganda that depicted her as the figurehead of those opposing him, in order to avoid his having to admit publicly that he was indeed fighting yet another civil war. Rome's wars sucked the economic lifeblood of her land for its own distant Roman purposes. The queen might indeed tame the powerful general with the joys of her physical presence, but when Antonius lost the final battle of the civil war against Octavian at Aktion in 31, Kleopatra and Ptolemaic Egypt with her were also lost. In August 30 Octavian visited Alexandria in person and formally ended the rule of the Ptolemies. Kleopatra herself committed suicide, some said through the bite of the symbolic Uraeus snake, but her children (except for Kaisarion, who was murdered) were brought to Rome to be shown in Octavian's triumph and to grow up in the caring Roman household of the

conqueror's sister. Ptolemaic rule in Egypt was at an end, the last of the great Macedonian monarchies a thing of the past.

Epilogue

The sea change brought about in the Greek world as a result of the expansionist activities of the Macedonian monarchs Philip II and Alexander III in the fourth century justifies the modern classification of the following centuries as a new epoch. It is not just the opening of a new, wider world for Greek influence and the Greek way of life that characterizes the period, but also the transfer of the sociopolitical leadership from major city-states such as Athens, Sparta, or Thebes to the Macedonian monarchies with their starkly authoritarian structure and the central importance for their efficient functioning of the personal activity of the kings themselves. Men became important and influential in the monarchic system primarily because of their personal connection with the king. This situation led on the one hand to the domination of individual monarchies by more or less stable ruling cliques, who for one reason or another enjoyed the favor of the king and were known as the king's friends, and on the other to an unprecedented opening of opportunity for ambitious new men, since the new monarchies were also reliant on attracting competent personnel as royal friends and administrators, and employed no rigid self-protecting citizenship definition, such as had made most Greek cities of the classical period closed shops for outside political talent. The new monarchies therefore followed the open-house practice employed by Philip and Alexander, recruiting political, military, and administrative talent wherever they could find it, and so offering career opportunities to the ambitious – especially Greeks, of course, but in Egypt native Egyptians, and in the Seleukid empire Iranians and Babylonians, could also enjoy the new opportunities.

The personal nature of the monarchic loyalty structure ensured that the dynastic tradition of Macedonia was extended and continued under the new conditions. This meant that the ruling king always preferred to see a son as his successor, since this was the closest possible relationship that could be envisaged, the nearest possible guarantee for a secure present and a prosperous future. In the earliest phase of the creation of the new monarchies a son was regularly

closely associated with his father during his lifetime, often sharing the royal title – as Antigonos and Demetrios Poliorketes, Seleukos and Antiochos I, or Ptolemy I and II – in preparation for the succession, and this seems to have functioned satisfactorily. Only in Macedonia itself, where the old tradition that allowed senior members of the crown council influence on the succession was still alive, did it prove more difficult to establish a new dynasty, once the Argeads had been eliminated, though the accidental circumstances associated with Kassander's early death and the extreme youth of his sons at the time were unforeseeable causes of the serious disruption that occurred there.

It did not prove easy to establish a new ruling dynasty anywhere, but once established the Macedonian kings did everything to put on a show of dynastic solidarity, marrying within the peer group, in Egypt from Ptolemy II onwards even within the nearer family, in order to monopolize dynastic loyalties and hinder inner-familial competition. The dynastic structure, however, despite all efforts to optimize it, offered no absolute guarantee of success. It was not always possible to avoid sibling rivalry, particularly acute when a king had sons from more than one queen, as happened in the tragedy of the House of Lysimachos or in the confused history of the latter Ptolemies and Seleukids. One particular characteristic of the period is the leading role played by many Macedonian royal women, beginning with Olympias and Eurydike in the immediate succession crisis after 323, Thessalonike in Macedonia or Arsinoe II in Thrace and Egypt a generation later, Laodike at Antioch under Antiochos II, or the great series of Ptolemaic and Seleukid Kleopatras in the second and first centuries. This particular prominence was nicely symbolized by the fact that the last Macedonian ruler to fall to Rome was a woman ruling alone, Kleopatra Philopator, the last of the Ptolemies to rule in Egypt.

Given the strongly personalized nature of the Macedonian monarchies it is not surprising that the rulers regarded themselves as having a right to rule, to holding onto power for the family, and regarding the kingdoms increasingly as personal, or at least dynastic possessions. In the last resort, when no suitable royal successor was available, as began to happen in the second century, a ruling king might even make a testament granting his kingdom to a third party, as with Ptolemy VIII in Kyrene in 155, Attalos III in Pergamon in 133, or Nikomedes IV of Bithynia in 74, as if it were his own personal estate. After the first phase following the death of Alexander the Great in which the loyalty of the soldiers was the decisive element concerning success or failure, and all the warlords made efforts to win them over by consulting with them and informing them of their plans and

prospects, we hear little of mass meetings in the monarchies, not even in Macedonia itself, where the old tradition that the king be available for all his subjects was still alive under Philip V. Occasional outbursts of public solidarity or mob activity, as happened increasingly in Alexandria from the mid-second century onwards, to the point of expelling or even lynching a king, were no adequate alternative to regular ordered consultation of the population, which simply did not take place. Government thus became an increasingly centralized operation, with the kingdoms being divided up into regional administrative provinces that reflected the local tradition of the areas concerned, but each with its own governor directly appointed by the central administration, as under the Persians. As a result of this centralized form of administration under the Greek-speaking rulers, the Greek language also spread throughout the areas ruled by the new monarchies, being the favored language of administration and culture. But while it overlaid the existing native languages at the highest level of the states, it did not necessarily replace them for everyday purposes where the state was not involved, except in some areas particularly exposed to Greek influence, such as Karia and Lydia in Asia Minor, where the indigenous languages indeed disappeared in the Hellenistic period.

In order to rule the new kingdoms, differing methods were employed, related to the prehistory of the regions concerned. In Old Greece in Europe the tendency, going back to Antipater, to rule with an open show of military power was persistent: characteristic was the description by Philip V of his three major forts, Demetrias, Chalkis, and the Akrokorinth, as the “Fetters of Greece.” It is therefore hardly surprising that opposition to Macedonian rule was widespread in European Greece, and since individual cities had not the strength to resist in the long term – not even major cities such as Athens and Sparta – two important federal states quickly developed, the Aitolian and the Achaian Leagues, which grew in strength particularly through effective opposition to Macedonian rule, as alternative and, under the prevailing circumstances, more effective forms of political organization than the individual cities on their own.

In Asia, where the population of the Greek cities had for centuries experienced Persian rule and where the Macedonians could with some plausibility initially present themselves as liberators, it was easier to establish new structures. In principle, the population accepted the need to pay the Macedonians for their own protection – they were used to paying taxes, “tribute,” to the Persians – and here it proved easier for the Macedonians to give the impression that their presence, even when accompanied by garrisons, was in principle beneficial. The policy of the kings in these areas was to produce a climate of patronal

sympathy, so that the cities which provided tax income, soldiers, and administrators would continue to see advantage in supporting “their” ruling king. Many new Greek-style cities were also founded, usually bearing a dynastic name, such as Thessalonike, Antiocheia, or Ptolemais. All enjoyed a formally democratically structured constitution with a citizen assembly, a selected or elected council of state, and elected short-term – usually one year – magistrates. The establishment of this type of democracy in Asia had been one of Alexander’s key means of winning popularity in Greek Asia because the Persians had favored more authoritarian forms of government, and his successors did not dare to go back on this. Ironically, it was therefore the Macedonian monarch who guaranteed the almost universal introduction of democratic constitutions in the Greek cities of Asia – a constitutional model adapted from Athens, which however, in European Greece continued to give the Macedonian governments there serious trouble.

For the cities themselves their arrangement with “their” monarchy gradually led to a greater personalizing of their own sociopolitical structures, despite their formal democratic constitutions. The most important outside contacts of the independent cities were now inevitably with the kings, not with their more or less equal neighboring cities, and the power difference made it essential that the men who represented their city in diplomatic relations with the kings were suitably prominent persons. The best representatives were, of course, citizens who actually served on the staff of one of the kings and so had sufficient direct influence at court to achieve benefits for their home towns (as, for instance, Demodamas of Miletos under Seleukos I); but failing that, citizens who possessed special abilities or were simply rich and experienced enough to show self-confidence in the personal presence of the ruler became especially favored. As a result, such people, becoming an elite group, gradually acquired an importance and authority far beyond their formal position as one among many equal fellow-citizens. The community as a whole needed such men and also needed to retain and foster their goodwill. As a result, the democracies began to issue decrees formally thanking men who had undertaken special functions for the city, often listing their beneficent activities in detail and inscribing the text on stone, perhaps on the base of a statue, if the man were sufficiently prominent to have deserved one, which the community set up to memorialize his benefactions. This “culture of gratitude” became extremely widespread in the Hellenistic period; it was in effect the oil that kept the local political machine running, and many hundreds of such inscriptions have survived to provide evidence of it. The kings, of course, also participated in this phenomenon, as all-powerful men

receiving from the cities cultic honors of various kinds which expressed communal gratitude for benefactions received and the hope for more in the future. Many of the kings, depending on time and circumstances, made large investments in the goodwill of the cities, so stimulating further gratitude, helping in emergencies, cultivating international religious centers, making grants in money or material for buildings or other infrastructural requirements – in a word, fulfilling the expectations that the population directed towards their (almost) superhuman ruler.

In the first instance this type of euergetic activity had a concrete political function, to reconcile the subject communities to their subordinate status within the territory of the kingdoms by showing respect for the way of life of the cities and even participating in it at the highest level. Not all rulers showed the necessary delicacy of touch that such relationships required – the sheer power difference could not, in the last resort, be disguised, and some were not much inclined to even try to do so – but by and large efforts were made on all sides to reach a satisfactory symbiosis. The cities which physically benefited most from the monarchic system were inevitably those chosen as residence cities – especially Alexandria, Antiocheia, Pergamon, and Pella – where the royal families and the centralized governments resided and where a suitably extravagant representational ambience was aimed at. This proud environment served to reconcile residents to their lack of real local political activity and to impress visitors with the ability of the king to dominate all areas of cultural life that had traditionally been the preserve of the city-states – in advanced architecture, town planning, the provision of public facilities such as water supply, street paving, educational institutions, libraries, and dramatic festivals – so that new cultural leaders emerged under royal protection and favor. Particularly active in this respect were the Ptolemies in Alexandria, where the Mouseion not only offered the best library facilities the Greek world had ever known but also provided well-endowed posts for professional academics who worked there and used the books for their research. Pergamon in the second century also built up a famous library. The principle of the kings in this respect was to do good, but above all to be seen to be doing good.

The type of monarchy created by the Macedonian successors of Alexander also offered a model for constructing smaller regional kingdoms at the edge of the Macedonian world, especially in Asia Minor, where several regional dynasties with claims to recognition as royalty managed to establish themselves, with or without the toleration of the Seleukids. The most prominent were those in Bithynia and at Pergamon, then farther east in Kappadokia, Pontos, and Armenia. In Syria in the second century the Hasmoneans also

established a kingdom in Judaea, and each of these units took as model the personalized dynastic monarchic system of the Macedonians; when they followed the urbanizing trend of the time and founded new cities, these were in principle Greek-style cities with formally democratic constitutions, but they also usually gave them a Greek dynastic name, such as Nikomedeia, Eumeneia, Ariaratheia, etc., just as the Macedonian grandes had done for their new foundations.

A further aspect of the creation of larger political structures through the Hellenistic monarchies was the widespread growth and extension of cultural activities in cities and at temples. In particular this took the form of creating new local or regional competitive artistic and athletic festivals on the model of the Olympic or other pan-Hellenic games. This growth was certainly favored by the fact that major military activity and the expenses which went along with it were, with rare exceptions, now monopolized by the monarchies and the federal Leagues, and in many areas an improvement in the economic situation seems to have occurred, doubtless stimulated also by the opening of new territories to Greek enterprise and trade, as well as by direct royal economic activity. Some of these prominent new festivals, like the Alexandrian *Ptolemaieia* or the *Eumeneia* at Pergamon, were direct royal foundations, others like the *Soteria* at Delphi – a decision of the Amphiktyonic and Aitolian Leagues to celebrate the saving of Delphi from the Galatian attack in 279 – for a specific historical reason, still others like the Milesian *Didymeia* or the festival of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia on the Maiander were developments and extensions of existing local or regional festivals. As a result of this massive expansion of festival activity, the whole festival business became professionalized and the artistic performers began to organize themselves into an international guild – a kind of artists' agency or trade union, placed under the protection of the artists' god Dionysos and so called the "Guild (*koinon*) of Dionysian Artists." The first lodge was founded in Athens at the end of the fourth century, and in the course of time four other lodges, based at the isthmus of Korinth, in Ionia (from about 220 at Teos), in Egypt, and in Magna Graecia and Sicily, followed. The guild of artists created a large vested interest in the perpetuation and further extension of the festival business, which helped guarantee its survival long after the political structures that had created it had disappeared and made it one of the characteristic socioreligious phenomena of the Greek east under the Roman empire.

The critical factor that brought fundamental change to the Hellenistic world was the growth of Rome and Roman intervention. The first serious intervention was provoked by the rash decision of

Philip V of Macedonia to approach Hannibal in 215, and it was not long before the Roman senate – by its nature not really capable of friendship with monarchs, particularly when they claimed equal rights – became convinced that the major Hellenistic monarchies needed to be weakened. The effect of this policy was that the networks of personal relationships that had provided an adequate structure for the relationships between the cities of the Greek world and the ruling dynasty were broken, and it proved increasingly difficult to find adequate replacements in Rome, given the inchoate nature of Roman decision-making processes. Individual Romans, a Titus Quinctius Flaminius or even a Lucius Cornelius Sulla, were not immediately as influential as individual kings had been – though they might well have given the impression of being so – so that the conventional cultic honors of gratitude due to a king could only with difficulty be attributed to a Roman senator, a member of an organ consisting of 300 members. Instead, after some initial uncertainty, an artificial goddess, the personified “Roma,” was created as an alternative objective for demonstrations of loyalty, without at first anybody really knowing how effective this rather nebulous construction would be. The culture of gratitude for received benefactions was so basic to the grown structure of the Hellenistic world that it needed to be continued – the Greek cities could envisage no real alternative – but the amorphous sociopolitical structure of the recipient and uncertainty about the effectiveness of such not inexpensive actions led in the end to a certain overkill – better too much thanks than too little. An important question was, however, thanks for what? The kings had in general tried to offer security, at a price, but had also made some demonstrative investments: Rome merely offered a liminal security, but certainly no investment. Indeed, in the first century or so of close Roman contact, quite the opposite. Romans of all stations quickly developed an alarming interest in collecting Greek art, and cities were only rarely in a position to refuse a Roman request for a gift. It gradually became clear that the Roman senate as a whole and Roman senators as individuals were not inclined even to pretend to be an equal partner of the “liberated” Greek states, but all expected obedience within a basically patronal relationship. The creation of directly administered Roman provinces with Roman responsibility for taxation and security was the logical conclusion of this development. The Greek world thus gradually became so integral a part of the Roman imperial system that three critical battles of the Roman civil wars took place in European Greece: Caesar defeated Pompeius at Pharsalos in Thessaly in summer 48; in summer 42 Antonius and Octavian defeated the republican murderers of Caesar, Brutus and Cassius, at Philippi in Macedonia; and in summer 31 the collected

western European forces of Octavian defeated the last reserves of the Hellenistic world, raised by Antonius and Kleopatra Philopator, at Aktion in Akarnania. The Hellenistic world was at an end; it remained to be seen how much could be restored under the Roman imperial system.

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In accordance with the aims of the series, this bibliography is restricted to a small selection of books in the English language, except for fundamental works for which no English equivalent exists. It includes some titles that are also noted in the list of abbreviations. Its aim is to select books from which further detailed studies can be ascertained, if needed. I have therefore not included articles in academic journals or contributions to collections of essays, most of which for this period are in any case in languages other than English, on the assumption that if more detailed information is required, titles can be found in the literature listed. There are fairly exhaustive recent bibliographies of the international research on the Hellenistic period in Blackwell's *Companion to the Hellenistic World* and the *Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*.

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Royal Dynasties

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Macedonia

323	[Death of Alexander III “The Great”]
323–317	Philip III [Arrhidaios]
323–310	Alexander IV
ca. 315–297	Kassander [royal title only after 305]
297	Philip IV
297–294	Antipatros and Alexander V
294–288	Demetrios [“Poliorketes” {“Besieger”}]
288–281	Lysimachos
281–279	Ptolemaios [“Keraunos” {“Thunderbolt”}]
279	Antipatros [“Etesias” {“Summer Wind”}]
ca. 277–239	Antigonos [“Gonatas”]
239–229	Demetrios II
229–222	Antigonos III [“Dodon” {“Giver”}]
222–179	Philip V
179–168	Perseus

Seleukids

312–281	Seleukos [“Nikator” {“Victor”}] [royal title after 305]
281–261	Antiochos (“Soter” {“Savior”})
261–246	Antiochos II (“Theos” {“God”})
246–226/5	Seleukos II (“Kallinikos” {“Triumphant”})
226/5–223	Seleukos III (“Soter” {“Savior”})
223–187	Antiochos III (“Megas” {“Great”})
187–175	Seleukos IV (“Philopator” {“Father-Loving”})
175–164	Antiochos IV (“Epiphanes” {“Renowned”})
164–162	Antiochos V (“Eupator” {“Of Good Father”})
162–150	Demetrios (“Soter” {“Savior”})
150–145	Alexander [“Balas”]
145–140	Demetrios II (“Nikator” {“Victor”})

145–ca. 142	Antiochos VI (“Epiphanes” {“Renowned”})
138–129	Antiochos VII [“Sidetes” {“Of Side”}]
129–126/5	Demetrios II (“Nikator”) [second period of rule]
126/5–123	Kleopatra (“Thea” {“Goddess”})
126	Seleukos V
126/5–96	Antiochos VIII [“Grypos” {“Hook-Nose”}]
114/13–95	Antiochos IX [“Kyzikenos” {“Of Kyzikos”}]
95	Seleukos VI
	Antiochos X (“Eusebes Philopator” {“Pious, Father-Loving”})
95–88 (Damascus)	Demetrios III (“Philopator Soter” {“Father-Loving, Savior”})
95 (Kilikia)	Antiochos XI (“Epiphanes Philadelphos” {“Renowned, Sibling-Loving”})
95–84 (Kilikia)	Philip
87 (Damascus)	Antiochos XII (“Dionysos” {“Dionysos”})
84/3	Philip II

Ptolemies

323–283	Ptolemy (“Soter” {“Savior”}) [royal title from 305]
283–246	Ptolemy II (“Philadelphos” {“Sibling-Lover”})
246–221	Ptolemy III (“Euergetes” {“Benefactor”})
221–204	Ptolemy IV (“Philopator” {“Father-Loving”})
204–180	Ptolemy V (“Epiphanes” {“Renowned”})
180–145	Ptolemy VI (“Philometor” {“Mother-Loving”}) [170–164 with Ptolemy VIII and Kleopatra II; 163–145 with Kleopatra II]
145–116	Ptolemy VIII (“Euergetes II” {“Benefactor”}) [“Physkon” {“The Belly”}]
116–107	Kleopatra III and Ptolemy IX (“Soter II” {“Savior”}) [“Lathy-ros” {“Chickpea”}]
107–101	Kleopatra III and Ptolemy X (“Alexander”)
101–88	Ptolemy X (“Alexander”) and Kleopatra Berenike
88–81	Ptolemy IX (“Soter II”) [second period of rule]
80	Kleopatra Berenike and Ptolemy XI (“Alexander II”)
80–51	Ptolemy XII (“Neos Dionysos, Philopator Philadelphos” {“New Dionysos, Father-Loving, Sibling-Loving”}) [“Auletes” {“Flute Player”}]
51–30	Kleopatra (“Philopator” {“Father-Loving”})
51–47	Ptolemy XIII
47–44	Ptolemy XIV (“Philopator” {“Father-Loving”})
44–30	Ptolemy XV (“Kaisar, Philopator Philometor” {“Caesar, Father-Loving, Mother-Loving”})

Pergamon

283–263	Philetairos [no royal title]
263–241	Eumenes [no royal title]
241–197	Attalos (“Soter” {“Savior”})
197–159/8	Eumenes II (“Soter” {“Savior”})
159/8–139/8	Attalos II (“Philadelphos” {“Sibling-Loving”})

139/8–133

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from ca. 297–280

280–255

255–235

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281–ca. 266

ca. 266

ca. 250–after 220

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42–ca. 36

36–AD 17

[Ariarathes III makes Kappadokia independent and takes royal title]

Ariarathes IV (“Eusebes” {“Pious”})

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Iasos, held by Ptolemaic mercenaries; friend of Rhodes; freed from Philip V's garrison; taken by Antiochos III; approached by Eumenes II

Ilion; receives land of Aristodikides of Assos; Peace of Phoinike; regarded as Troy; citizens represent Lykians at Apameia
Illyria, supplies mercenaries; threatens Macedonia; *see also* Agron; Skerdilaidas; Teuta
Ioannes Hyrkanos
Iollas, brother of Kassander
Ionia
Ionian League, honors Antiochos I; honors Eumenes II
Ionopolis
Ipsos, battle of
Isis
Island League; *see also Nesiotai isopoliteia*, Aitolia
Isthmian Games; Flamininus' declaration
Itanos, Ptolemaic garrison town
Iulius Caesar, Gaius; meets Kleopatra
Jerome
Jerusalem; letter of Antiochos III; Antiochos IV at; Antiochos VII at
Jonathan, brother of Judas Maccabaeus
Jordan, river
Joseph, son of Tobias
Josephos, historian
Judaea
Judas Maccabaeus; death
Jupiter Capitolinus
Justin, historian
Kabeira
Kaikos, river
Kalauria
Kallatis
Kallias of Sphettos
Kallikrates of Leontion, changes Achaian policy toward Rome, enemy of Polybios; friend of Rome; dies on embassy
Kallikrates of Samos
Kallion
Kallippos, Athenian politician
Kallixeinos of Rhodes, writer
Kalydon
Kalykadnos, river
Kalynda

Kambyses, Persian king

kanephoros

Kanesh

Kanopos Decree

Kappadokia, given to Eumenes of Kardia; demanded by Kassander; Ariarathes III takes royal title; *philoï*; comes closer to Pergamon; development after Apameia; declared free by senate; *see also* Ariarathes; Ariobarzanes

Kardakon Kome

Kardia

Karia; Doso's expedition; Ptolemaic influence; Rhodian influence; Rhodian administration

Karnak

Karneades, academic philosopher

Kassander, son of Antipater, king in Macedonia; appeals to Antigonos; in Peiraieus; captures and kills Olympias; marries Thessalonike; attacks Karia; peace of; position after peace; eliminates Alexander's son Herakles; loses Athens; adopts *basileus* title; war in central Greece; position after Ipsos; premature death

Kassandreia, foundation; Demetrios and Phila at; Arsinoe II at; recognizes *asylia* of Kos; citizen participates in Delphic *Soteria*

katoikoi

Kaunos; honors Sostratos of Knidos at Delos; becomes Rhodian; freed

Kephisodoros

Kerkeosiris

Kerkyra; mediates dispute

Kilikia, Krateros at; cities attacked by Ptolemy; Pleistarchos receives part; held by Ptolemy III; source of timber; base for attacking Antioch; western part Roman province; eastern part occupied by Tigranes of Armenia

Kineas, founder of Ai Khanoum

Kineas, Egyptian official

Kios; renamed "Prousias"

Kirrha

Klearchos of Soloi, philosopher

Kleitos, Macedonian officer

Kleomenes of Naukratis

Kleomenes III, king at Sparta; challenges Achaian League; reforms in Sparta; war with Doso's Security Pact; flees to Alexandria; death

Kleonymos of Sparta

Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great at Sardeis; death

Kleopatra, wife of Philip II

Kleopatra I, daughter of Antiochos III wife of Ptolemy V

Kleopatra II, daughter of Ptolemy V; marries brother Ptolemy VI; marries brother Ptolemy VIII; launches civil war; flees to Kleopatra Thea; returns to Alexandria; struggle with Kleopatra III

Kleopatra III, daughter of Ptolemy VI; marries uncle Ptolemy VIII; struggle for power with mother Kleopatra II Kleopatra Thea, daughter of Ptolemy VI marries Balas and Demetrios II; marries Antiochos Sidetes; resides at Ptolemais and issues coins; receives Kleopatra II

Kleopatra IV, daughter of Ptolemy VIII marries Antiochos Kyzikenos

Kleopatra Selene, daughter of Ptolemy VIII, marries Antiochos Grypos and Kyzikenos; marries Antiochos X

Kleopatra Tryphaina, daughter of Ptolemy VIII Kleopatra Berenike, daughter of Ptolemy IX

Kleopatra VII Philopator, daughter of Ptolemy Auletes; meets Caesar; role in Roman civil war and death

Kleopatra, city foundation in Nubia

Knidos

Knosos

Koile Syria; taken by Antiochos III; disputed under Ptolemy VI; remains Seleukid; ongoing dispute with Ptolemies

Kolophon

Komana

Komanos, Ptolemaic official

komogrammateus

Korinth, held by Kratesipolis; taken by Kassander; garrisoned by Demetrios Poliorketes; garrisoned by Antigonos Gonatas; base of Krateros; Achaian hostility to garrison captured by Aratos of Sikyon and incorporated in Achaian League; captured by Kleomenes III; regained by Doson and garrisoned; dispute with Epidauros; Roman garrison withdrawn; destroyed in "Achaian War"; citizen wins at Delphic *Soteria*

Korinthian League

Koroneia

Koroupedion

Korrhagos, Pergamene official

Kos; cult of Nikomedes; letter of Ziaelas; birthplace of Ptolemy II; *asylia* campaign; good relations with Ptolemy IV; recognizes penteteric *Didymeia*; recognizes Pergamene *Nikephoria*

Kosmas Indikopleustes, writer

Krannon, battle of
Krateros, officer of Alexander the Great
Krateros, half-brother of Antigonos
Gonatas
Kratesipolis, wife of Alexandros, son of Polyperchon
Kraton of Chalkedon
Kritolaos, Peripatetic philosopher
Kritolaos, Achaian *strategos*
Ktesikles, Seleukid official
Kutha
Kyinda
Kykliadas, Achaian *strategos*
Kyme
Kynaitha
Kynnane, mother of Adeia
Kynoskephalai, battle of
Kypsela
Kyrene, annexed by Ptolemy I; Ophellais; Magas; honors Sostzratos of Knidos at Delos; administration; *koinon* founded; opposition to Ptolemy VIII; Ptolemy VIII's will; remains loyal to Ptolemy VIII in civil war; willed to Rome by Apion
Kyros, Persian king
Kytenion
Kythera
Kyzikos; supported by Philetairos; home of Apollonis; mediates in Egypt; home of Antiochos IX "Kyzikenos"
Lachares, Athenian tyrant
Lade
Laevinus, Marcus Valerius
Lamia, "Lamian War"; provides judges for Athens and Boiotia
Lampsakos appeals to Rome
Laodike, mother of Seleukos I
Laodike, daughter of Achaïos I, first wife of Antiochos II, divorce; resides at Ephesos; "Laodikean War"; land holdings in Babylonia; land holdings in Hellespontine Phrygia
Laodike, daughter of Antiochos II, marries Mithridates II of Pontos
Laodike, wife of Seleukos II
Laodike, daughter of Mithridates II of Pontos, wife of Antiochos III; letter to Sardis; contact with Teos; ruler cult

Laodike, daughter of Antiochos III, wife of his son Antiochos
Laodike, daughter of Seleukos IV, wife of Perseus
Laodike, wife of Mithridates V of Pontos
Laodikeia, Syria
Laodikeia on the Lykos
Laodikeia in Iran, Nehavend
Laodikeia, festival at Sardeis
Laodikeon, month-name at Smyrna
Laomedon of Mytilene
Lapethos
Larichos of Mytilene Larissa, Demetrios murders Alexandros; Philip V's letters
Lato
League of Islanders see *Nesiotai*
Lebedos, Antigonos" planned *synoikismos* with Teos; Lysimachos' plans
legati
Lenaïos, Ptolemaic official
Leonidas, Spartan king
Leonnatos, Macedonian officer
Leontios, Macedonian officer
Leosthenes, Athenian general
Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius
lex Manilia
Licinius Crassus, Marcus
Licinius Crassus, Publius
Licinius Lucullus, Lucius, visits Alexandria; war in Pontos and Armenia
Lilaia
Lissos
Livy, historian
Lochos, Ptolemaic general, honored at Delos
Lokris, sends troops to Thermopylai; ravaged by Aratos of Sikyon
Loudias, river
Lucullus *see* Licinius
Luxor
Lydia
Lydiadas of Megalopolis
Lykia, demanded by Kassander; Ptolemy I operates there; Ptolemy II

extends influence; language disappears; Lykian League; dispute with Rhodes; honors Ptolemaic official

Lykopolis

Lykortas, father of Polybios

Lysandra, daughter of Ptolemy I and Eurydike, wife of Agathokles

Lysias, Seleukid official

Lysimacheia, foundation; Ptolemy “Keraunos” proclaimed king at; Celts defeated by Antigonos Gonatas; treaty with Antiochos II; Aitolian garrison expelled by Philip V; taken and rebuilt by Antiochos III; evacuated by Antiochos III; burned down by Diegylis

Lysimacheia, Aitolia

Lysimachos, in coalition against Antigonos Monophthalmos; consolidates hold on Thrace; peace of; adopts *basileus* title; helps Rhodes; battle of Ipsos; results of battle; gives grain to Athens; recognizes Demetrios in Macedonia; regime in Asia Minor; divides Macedonia with Pyrrhos; expels Pyrrhos; family tragedy; death at Koroupedion

Lysimachos, son of Ptolemaios, honored at Ptolemais

Lysimachos, brother of Ptolemy III

Lysimachos, brother of Jewish High Priest Menelaos

Lyttos

Macedonia, urbanization; nature of personal monarchy; monarchy abolished and land divided; a Macedonian wins at Ptolemaic *Basileia*; *see also* Antigonos; “Fetters of Greece”; Perseus; Philip

Machanidas, Spartan ruler

Machares, son of Mithridates VI

Magadates, Armenian officer

Magas I, son of Berenike, rules Kyrene; takes royal title; treaty with Oreioi

Magas, younger son of Ptolemy III and Berenike

Magnesia on the Maiander, *asylia* campaign; free city after Apameia; receives Myous; war with Miletos

Magnesia under Sipylos; battle of

Magnesia, Thessaly, becomes Macedonian again

Maiander, river

maiestas

Malla

Manlius Vulso, Gnaeus; decision for Samos

Mantineia-Antigoneia

Marathos

Marcus Philippus, Quintus
Marius, Gaius
Maroneia, Ptolemaic possession; taken by Philip V; possession disputed
marriage, dynastic
Massilia
Matthathias
Mausollos
Mazaka
Media
Megaleas, Macedonian officer
Megalopolis, besieged by Polyperchon; tyranny of Aristodamos; joins Achaian League; anti-Spartan orientation; sacked by Kleomenes III; prefers Macedonia to Rome; dispute with Sparta; home of Polybios
Megara, taken by Ptolemy I ; taken by Demetrios; Deidameia at; sends troops to Thermopylai; joins Achaian League; acts as arbitrator
Megasthenes, writer
Megiste
Meleagros, brother of Ptolemy “Keraunos”
Melitaia
Memmius, Lucius
Memphis, Alexander the Great buried; Ptolemy V crowned; priests accept Antiochos IV; Ptolemy VIII crowned; remains loyal to Ptolemy VIII in civil war 298; “Auletes” crowned
Menalkidas of Sparta, Achaian *strategos*
Menekles of Barka, writer
Menelaos, brother of Ptolemy I
Menelaos, Jewish High Priest
Menippos, Seleukid official, in Rome; in Aitolia
Mesopotamia
Messenia, helps Sparta against Pyrrhos; friendly with Aitolia; dispute with Sparta settled; attacked by Illyrians; internal dissensions; death of Demetrios of Pharos; Peace of Phoinike; joins Achaian League; dissension with League; secedes
Metellus *see* Caecilius
Methana-Arsinoe, Ptolemaic outpost
Mikion, Athenian politician
Miletos, freed by Antigonos; Demetrios at; Eurydike at; taken by Ptolemy II; troubled by Galatians; occupied by Timarchos; favored by Seleukos II; *sympoliteia* with Seleukeia-Tralleis; agreement with

Mylasa; campaign for *Didymeia*; *sympoliteia* with Pidasas; relations with Herakleia by Latmos; cult for Eumenes II; disputes with Magnesia and Priene; receives finance from Attalos II

Minnion, Seleukid official

Mithridates I of Pontos

Mithridates II of Pontos

Mithridates IV Philopator of Pontos

Mithridates V Euergetes of Pontos

Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontos, accession; interferes in Kappadokia and Bithynia; war with Rome Peace of Dardanos; second and third wars with Rome; death

Mnesimachos, Seleukid officer

Molon, Seleukid officer

Monounios, Illyrian leader

Mounychia

Mouseion

Murena, Lucius

Mylasa, agreement with Miletos; Zeuxis; free city after Apameia; dispute with Euromos; mediates between Magnesia and Priene

Myonnesos

Myous

Myrina

Myrleia

Mysia

Mytilene

Nabataeans

Nabis, Spartan ruler, Peace of Phoinike; joins Rome; occupies Argos; defeated by allies; revolt and death

Nagidos

Naukratis, foundation; self-administering city; citizen wins at Ptolemaic *Basileia*

Naupaktos

Nearchos, officer of Alexander the Great

negotiatores

Nehavend

Nemean Games

Nesiarch

Nesiotai; honor Sostratos of Knidos; recognize *Ptolemaia*; dissolution

Nikaia, daughter of Antipater

Nikaia, widow of Alexandros of Korinth
Nikaia, place near Thermopylai
Nikanor, brother of Kassander
Nikanor, Macedonian officer
Nikanor, governor of Media
Nikanor, Seleukid official
Nikanor, officer of Philip V
Nikarchos, Seleukid governor
Nikephoria, Pergamene festival
Nikephorion
Nikokles of Paphos
Nikokles of Sikyon
Nikomedeia
Nikomedes I, invites Celts to Asia; uses royal title; cult on Kos
Nikomedes II, son of Prousius II
Nikomedes III, son of Nikomedes II
Nikomedes IV, son of Nikomedes III
nomarch
Noumenion, Ptolemaic official
Nubia
Nysa, wife of Ararathes V
Octavian
oikonomos, in Egypt; in Cyprus; in Karia
Oinanthē of Samos
Oiniadai
Oinoparas
Olbia
Olous
Olympia, treaty between Aitolia and Akarnania; statue of Glaukon;
statue of Nikomedes I; treaty between Akarnania and Anaktorion
Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great; struggle with Antipater;
invited to support Polyperchon; reign of terror; death
Olympias, wife of Alexandros of Epeiros
Olympic Games
Olympichos, dynast in Karia
Olympos, mountain
Olynthos
Onias, Jewish High Priest candidate
Ophellas, governor of Kyrene

Opous
Orchomenos
Oreioi
Orikos
Orontes, river
Orophernes, Kappadokian
Oropos
Ortagion, Galatian leader
Otanes, Seleukid officer
Oxos, river
Oxythemis of Larissa
Paionians
Palaimagnesia
Palestine
Pamphilos of Apollonia Salbakes
Pamphylia
Panaitolika, Aitolian festival
Panathenaia, festival, at Athens; at Pergamon
Paneia, Delian festival
Panion
Panionion
Panopolis
Paphlagonia
Paphos
Papirius Carbo, Gnaeus
Parnassos
Parthenon
Parthia
Parthians; in Babylonia meet Sulla
Parthini
Patrai
Patrokles, Seleukid governor
Patroklos, Ptolemaic commander
Pausanias, writer
Paxi
Pedasa *see* Pidasia
Peiraeus, held by Antipater; held by Antigonos Gonatas; freed from garrison
Peithon, Macedonian officer

Pella, Macedonia

Pella, Syria

Pelousion

Peraia of Rhodes

Perdikkas, Macedonian grandee, appointed regent at Babylon; decision on Samos; marries Nikaia; war with Ptolemy and coalition; assassinated

Perdikkas, Macedonian officer, visits Cretan cities

Pereia

Pergamon; *philoï*; troops at Magnesia; treatment in Peace of Apameia; family solidarity of royal family; expansion of city; Great Altar; after Pydna; attacked by Prousius; building program continued under Attalos II; city left free in will of Attalos III; library

Perinthos

Perrhaibia

Perseis

Persepolis

Perseus, last king of Macedonia; accession; married Laodike, daughter of Seleukos IV; war with Rome

Persian empire, character of

Persis

Pessinous

Petra

Peukestas, Macedonian governor

Phaidros of Sphettos

Pharnakeia

Pharnakes I of Pontos

Pharnakes II

Pharos, Illyrian city

pharos of Alexandria

Pharsalos, battle of

Pherai

Phila, daughter of Antipater, marries Krateros; marries Demetrios; mother of Stratonike; death at Kassandreia

Philadelphia, Fayum

Philadelphia, Lydia

Philai

philanthropa

Philetaireia, festival, at Kyme; at Kyzikos

Philetairos of Pergamon; employs mercenaries; helps Kyme; international influence

Philetairos, brother of Eumenes II

Philip III Arrhidaios, Macedonian king, accession; restoration decree; murdered

Philip, son of Kassander

Philip V, Macedonian king, too young to succeed Demetrios II; accession; marries sister to Prousius I; war with Aitolia; letters to Larissa; approaches Hannibal; operates in Illyria; *prostates* in Crete; actions after Peace of Phoinik; operates in Aegean; attacks Pergamon; meets Lepidus at Abydos 202; 'Second Macedonian War'; results of war; supports Rome against Antiochos III; agreement with Baebius; dispute with Thessalians; dispute over Ainos and Maroneia; new orientation after; Polybios' view of; death and assessment

Philip, son of Antiochos IX 277 Philip, son of Philip, grandson of Antiochos IX

Philippides of Kephale

Philippoï; battle of

Philippoï-Euromos

Philippopolis

Philippos, general of Antiochos III

philoï

Philokles of Sidon

Philokles, Macedonian commander of Chalkis

Philometoris

Philopoimen, Achaian leader; campaign in Lakonia; unites Sparta with Achaian League; leads League in 180s; death at Messene

Phoinike; Peace of

Phokaia

Phokians fight Celts; regain seats on Amphiktyonic Council; member of Doson's Security Pact

Phokion, Athenian statesman

Phrygia, part given to Mithridates V after war with Aristonikos

Phrygia Epiktetos

Phthia, daughter of Alexandros of Epeiros

Phylarchos, historian

Pidasa, written "Pedasa" in Polybios; freed from Macedonian garrison; *sympoliteia* with Miletos

Pieria, Syria

Pindos, mountains

Pisidia

Pitane

Plataiai

Pleistarcheia-Herakleia by Latmos

Pleistarchos, brother of Kassander

Pleuratos, Illyrian leader

Plutarch, writer

Polemaios, nephew of Antigonos Monophthalmos

Polybios, Achaian stateman and historian; exiled; contact with Demetrios I of Syria; idea of *symploke*; on Achaïos; on “Peace of Naupaktos”; on Philip V; on “Robber Treaty”; on Aitolia; on Kallikrates of Leontion; recognizes importance of Pydna

Polykrates of Argos

Polyperchon, Macedonian grandee, succeeds Antipater; restoration decree; operates in southern Greece; appoints Eumenes of Kardia to Asian command; contacted by Antigonos; promotes Herakles, son of Alexander the Great

Pompeius Magnus, Gnaeus, war against Mithridates VI; founds province of Syria; organizes Roman East; murdered in Egypt

Pompeius, Gnaeus, son of Pompeius Magnus

Pompeius Trogus, historian

Pomponius Atticus, Marcus

Pontos

Popilius Laenas, Gaius

Porphyrios of Tyre, writer

Potheinos, Ptolemaic functionary

Potidaia

Prepelaos, general of Kassander

Priene; dispute with Samos; trouble with Galatians; negotiations with Larichos of Mytilene; honors Sotas; dispute with Miletos; supports Magnesia

Protogenes of Olbia

Prousius-Kios

Prousius I of Bithynia, marries sister of Philip V; attacks Pergamon; peace of Phoinike; cooperates with Philip V; helps Rome against Antiochos III; survives after Apameia; war with Pergamon; gives asylum to Hannibal; helped by Philip V

Prousius II of Bithynia, marries daughter of Philip V; favors mediation in “Third Macedonian War”; visits Rome; attacks Pergamon

Ptah

Phthiotic Thebes

Ptolemaia, festival, at Alexandria; at Athens

Ptolemaios, son of Lysimachos

Ptolemaios, son of Pyrrhos

Ptolemaios, son of Thraseas, holds estates at Skythopolis; becomes Seleukid religious administrator in Koile Syria; letter of Antiochos III

Ptolemais, daughter of Eurydike

Ptolemais, city in Upper Egypt; Dionysian Artists there

Ptolemais, city in Kyrenaika

Ptolemais-Ake, Palestine; residence of Kleopatra Thea; residence of Kleopatra Selene

Ptolemais, Athenian *phyle*

Ptolemy I Soter, appointed to Egypt at Babylon; annexes Kyrene; captures Alexander's body; occupies Koile Syria; peace of; at Kos; operates in the Peloponnese; loses Cyprus; takes *basileus* title; becomes Pharaoh; helps Rhodes; takes Cyprus from Demetrios; land settlement program and administration; builds up Alexandria; multifarious progeny; cult as "Soter"; death

Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy I, "Keraunos," resides with mother Eurydike near Miletos; seeks refuge with Seleukos I; murders Seleukos; rules and dies in Macedonia

Ptolemy II Philadelphos, accession; marries sister Arsinoe II; anti-Antigonid policy; supports Aratos of Sikyon; Syrian interests; "First Syrian War"; peace with Antiochos II; administration and internal consolidation; tax concessions; founds *Ptolemaia*; cult

Ptolemy "the son," son of Ptolemy II

Ptolemy III Euergetes, "Laodikean War"; recognizes *asylia* of Kos; funds Aratos of Sikyon; funds Kleomenes III of Sparta; erects statue of Glaukon at Olympia; family monument at Thermon; starts Horus temple at Edfu; cult with Berenike; calendar reform

Ptolemy IV Philopator, accession; character; at battle of Raphia; indigenous rebellions; modified Aegean policy; mediates in "Social War"; mediates in "First Macedonian War"; recognizes *asylia* of Magnesia; death

Ptolemy V Epiphanes, troubles at accession; loses Koile Syria; loses coastal Asia Minor; indigenous rebellions; some Aegean bases retained; crowned Pharaoh at Memphis; marries Kleopatra I; *philanthropa* decree; premature death

Ptolemy VI Philometor; struggles for throne; attack of Antiochos IV; possesses Cyprus; supports Alexander Balas, then Demetrios II; recovers Koile Syria; death

Ptolemy Eupator, son of Ptolemy VI, governs Cyprus

Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II ("Physkon"); rules in Kyrene; makes will in favor of Rome; attacks Cyprus; takes over in Egypt; pogrom of intellectuals; marries Kleopatra II and Kleopatra III; supports Alexander Zabinas; great *philanthropa* decree; death

Ptolemy "Memphites," son of Ptolemy VIII

Ptolemy Neos Philopator, perhaps identical with "Memphites"

Ptolemy IX Soter II; helps Athens and receives statue

Ptolemy X Alexander II

Ptolemy XII Neos Dionysos ("Auletes")

Ptolemy XIII, elder brother of Kleopatra VII; recognized by Pompeians as sole ruler; civil war with Kleopatra VII

Ptolemy XIV, younger brother of Kleopatra VII

Ptolemy XV Kaisar ("Kaisarion"), son of Caesar and Kleopatra
publicani

Pydna, siege of; battle of

Pylos

Pyrrhos, king in Epeiros, helps Alexandros, son of Kassander; joins coalition against Demetrios; divides Macedonia with Lysimachos; expelled from Macedonia; marries Antigone; agreement with "Keraunos"; goes to Italy; attacks Macedonia; attacks Sparta; dies at Argos

Pythais

Pythian Games

Rabirius Postumus, Gaius

Raphia, battle of

Raphia Decree

Revenue Laws

Rhakotis

Rhamnous

Rhaukos

Rhodes, *synoikismos*; besieged by Demetrios Poliorketes; good relations with Ptolemies; earthquake; mediates in "Social War"; ediates in "First Macedonian War"; Cretan interests; dockyard fire hostility to Philip V; appeals to Rome; helps Athens; supports Rome in "Second Macedonian War"; affected by expansion of Antiochos III suggested by Antiochos as arbitrator fleet supports Rome; envoys at Rome after Magnesia; receives Asia Minor south of Maiander; appeals to Rome about Sinope; administration of Karia; dispute with Lykia; ruling for Priene; mediates at Miletos; transports Perseus' bride; attitude to "Third Macedonian War"; irritates Romans

Rhosos

Romaia, festival at Delos

Rome, effects of Hannibalic War; attitude to Philip V; Peace of Phoinike; appeals of Attalos and Rhodes; intentions in “Second Macedonian War”; allies visit senate; treaty with Aitolia; treaty with Antiochos III; concern about Lykia; “Third Macedonian War” attitude to Greeks after Pydna; attitude to Rhodes; favors Athenian Dionysian Artists; treaty with Jews; war with Mithridates VI; aims in Mithridatic War

Rosetta Stone

Roxane, mother of Alexander IV, pregnant at Babylon; accompanies Polyperchon; captured by Kassander; murdered

Salamis, Athens

Salamis, Cyprus

Samareia

Samaria

Samos, occupied by Athens; freed; dispute with Priene; under Lysimachos; occupied by Ptolemy Philadelphos; occupied by Timarchos; honors Boulagoras; taken by Philip V; Rhodian influence at; Samian wins at Ptolemaic *Basileia*

Samothrake

Sarapis, in Alexandria; on Delos

Sardeis, Perdikkas at; Kleopatra at; taken by Demetrios; Seleukid city after Koroupedion; residence of Antiochos I; held by Antiochos “Hierax”; residence of Achaïos II; captured and plundered by Antiochos III ; residence of Zeuxis; correspondence with Antiochos and Laodike; endangered by Galatians; temple of Artemis; festival *Athenaia Eumeneia*; visit of Sulpicius Galus

Scipio *see* Cornelius

Seleukeia on the Tigris, foundation; residence of Antiochos I

Seleukeia in Pieria, Syria, foundation; taken by Ptolemy III; recovered by Antiochos III; declared “sacred and inviolable” by Antiochos VIII

Seleukeia on the Eulaios

Seleukeia-Tralleis, agreement with Miletos

Seleukid era

Seleukis

Seleukos I Nikator, at Babylon; appointed to Babylonia; leaves for Egypt; operates with Ptolemaic fleet in the Aegean; battle of Gaza; returns to Babylon; peace of; war against Antigonos; operations in Iran; at Ipsos; results of battle; founds cities; favors Didyma; nature of empire; wins at Koroupedion; death

Seleukos II Kallinikos, son of Antiochos II; “Laodikean War”; “War of the Brothers”; relations with Smyrna; recognizes Koan *asylia*

Seleukos III, son of Seleukos II

Seleukos IV, son of Antiochos III; daughter Laodike marries Perseus; pays subsidies to Jerusalem

Seleukos, son of Demetrios II and Kleopatra Thea

Seleukos, son of Kleopatra Selene

Sellasia, battle of

Sempronius Gracchus, Tiberius

senatus consultum

Septuagint

Sestos

Seuthes, Thracian leader

Seuthopolis

Side

Sidon, held by Demetrios; occupied by Ptolemy; King Philokles operates in Aegean; Sidonian boxer wins at Delos; honors for Diotimos

Sikyon, held by Kratesipolis; freed by Aratos; citizen wins at *Soteria*; mediates between Athens and Oropos

Simon, Hasmonean leader

Sinope

Sisenna

Siwah

Skepsis

Skerdilaidas, Illyrian leader; joins Rome

Skopas of Trichonion

Skotoussa

Skythopolis

Smyrna, major city; treaty with Aitolia; honors Antiochos I; loyal to Seleukos II and receives privileges; negotiations with mercenaries; appeals to Rome against Antiochos III; wins favor; first to institute cult of *Thea Rhome*; envoys at Rome after Magnesia

Soloi, Kilikia

somatophylakes

Sophagasenos

Sophene

Sophron, Seleukid governor of Ephesos

Sopiter, perhaps officer of Lysimachos

Sosibios, son of Dioskorides, advises Ptolemy IV; at Raphia; modifies Ptolemaic Aegean policy; negotiates with Antiochos III; death

Sosthenes, officer of Lysimachos

Sosthenes, Macedonian officer

Sostratos of Knidos, admiral of Ptolemy I

Sotas of Priene

Soteria on Delos; at Delphi

Sounion

Sparta, Kleomenes III's reform; social problems; manpower loss at Sellasia; post-Sellasia difficulties; joins Rome; joins Achaian League; exile problems; dispute with Megalopolis; secedes from League; *see also* Areus; Kleomenes III; Nabis

Spartokos

stasis

Stele of the Satrap

stephanephoros, Miletos

Stoboi

Strabo, geographer

strategos; in Achaia; in Aitolia; in Egypt; in Kappadokia; of Lysimachos; in Macedonia; at Pergamon; at Rhodes

Stratokles, Athenian politician

Stratonike, daughter of Demetrios Poliorketes; marries Antiochos I; dedications at Delos; cult at Smyrna

Stratonike, daughter of Antiochos I, marries Demetrios, son of Antigonos Gonatas

Stratonike, daughter of Antiochos II, marries Ariarathes III of Kappadokia

Stratonikeia, festival on Delos

Stratonikeia, Karian city

Stratonikeon, month-name at Smyrna

Sulla *see* Cornelius

Sulpicius Galba, Publius

Sulpicius Galus, Gaius

Susa; renamed "Seleukeia on the Eulaios"; death of Antiochos III

Susiana

sympoliteia, Miletos-Pidasas

synoikismos, Teos-Lebedos; Smyrna-Magnesia; Chalketor; Meliteia-Pereia

Syracuse

Syrian Wars

tarache

Tarentum, Pyrrhos at; citizen wins at Ptolemaic *Basileia*

Taucheira
Taurion, Macedonian officer
Tauros, mountains
Teleas, officer of Antiochos III
Telephos
Telmessos
Tempe, pass
Tenedos
Tenos
Teos, planned *synoikismos* with Lebedos; honors Antiochos I; taken from Attalos by Antiochos III; *asylia* campaign; Rome grants *asylia*; dispute with Dionysian Artists; priest for Eumenes II
Termessos
Teuta, Illyrian leader
Thasos
Thea Rhome
Thebaid
Thebes, Egyptian
Thebes, Boiotia
Thelphusa
Theodotos, Aitolian mercenary commander
Theoi Euergetai
Theoi Philadelphoi
Theokritos, poet
theoroi
Thera
Thermon; monument of Ptolemy III; attacked by Philip V
Thermopylai, battle against Celts; battle against Antiochos III
Thespiai
Thessalonike, daughter of Philip V, marries Kassander; murdered
Thessalonike, Macedonian city, foundation; Romans visit; Pompeian senate sits at
Thessaly, seats on Amphiktyonic Council; briefly abandons Macedonia; member of Doson's Security Pact; freed by Romans; dispute with Philip V
Thoas, Aitolian politician
Thrace, governed by Lysimachos; Antiochos II occupies parts; Antiochos "Hierax" flees to; Ptolemaic interests; problems for

Macedonia; claimed by Antiochos III; claims attention of Philip V;
Thracian wins at Ptolemaic *Basileia*
Thrasedas, Ptolemaic officer
Thyateira
Tigranes of Armenia submits to Pompeius
Timaïos, historian
Timarchos, Aitolian
Timarchos of Miletos
Titeia, festival at Argos
Tobiads
Trapezous
Trasimene, battle of
triakontaschoinos
Triparadeisos
Tripolis
Trogoditis
Troizen
Tryphaina, daughter of Ptolemy VIII
Tyana
Tylis
Tymphaia
Tyre, besieged by Antigonos; controlled by Demetrios; occupied by
Ptolemy I; taken by Antiochos III; death of Demetrios II; dedication at
Delos; traders on Delos
Tyriaion
Uruk
Valerius, Marcus
Villius, Publius
Vulso *see* Manlius
Xanthos
Xenophanes, Athenian
Xenophon, writer
Xerxes, Persian king
Xerxes, ruler of Armenia
Xyniai
Zabinas *see* Alexander Zabinas
Zama, battle of
Zela
Zenon of Kaunos

Zenon of Rhodes, historian

Zeus Genethlios

Zeuxis, Anatolian viceroy of Antiochos III; agreement with Philip V;
attacks Pergamon; commands at Magnesia

Ziaelas, king in Bithynia

Zipoites, king in Bithynia

Zipoites, son of Zipoites